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PRE: _ 
The purpose of this thesis is to throw into relief 
the principal ideas about Christology and Anthropology in 
the thought of St. Maximus the Confessor. This has been 
undertaken from the point of view of spirituality, which 
may be described as theology lived. I have chosen the 
Expositio Orationis Dominicae as the basis of this study 
because it is one of the most synthetic of Maximus' 
writings and I believe that an examination of its impli- 
cations is a way into his theology as a whole. When I 
undertook this work, there was no English translation of 
the Expositio Orationis Dominicae, so that I translated 
it as an exercise in the understanding of the thought of 
Maximus and with the intention of having a Maximian text 
in English to hold my own reflections together. Since 
then an English translation has appeared. I have 
decided to persist in my intention of including a 
translation of the Expositio Orationis Dominicae as an 
alternative to the already published one and because 
many of my observations stem from the nuances in my 
version. Two studies of the Expositio Orationis 
Dominicas have already appeared, one by G. Walther in 
1914, the other by I. H. Dalmais in 1953. The former is 
so redolent of the spirit of the Enlightenment that it 
has little value as a theological statement; the latter 
is a splendid essay of permanent interest. I have 
asserted my independence by commenting on the Expositlo 
Orationis Dominicae from a different point of view, with 
more attention to terminology and structure and in a 
more extended way. I have been able to avail myself of 
scholarship devoted to the study of Maximus since 1953, 
not least that of Dalmais himself, in my effort to grasp 
the significance r of this important work. Since I 
believe, with Collingwood, that the intellect has to be 
most critical in the positive appropriation of truth, I 
have tried to enter the thought of Maximus in a 
comprehensive way and refrained from negative criticism 
of those with whom I disagree, apart from the occasional 
passing comment where interpretation requires it. 
V. 
In Chapter 1, I have presented the evidence for the 
life of Maximus as a way of answering the question: 'who 
is Maximus'? We find that the personal character of his 
thought reflects his Christian identity so that his 
spirituality was indeed theology lived. Chapter 2 is an 
investigation of the way in which he did theology and 
provides as well a short account of his works and their 
contents. Again it becomes obvious that his theology 
was the fruit of his way of life, both because of the way 
he understood it as a science and because of the subjects 
that engaged his attention. In Chapter 3, I examine the 
Expositio Orationis Dominicae in order to grasp some- 
thing of its linguistic and structural qualities. This 
affords an opportunity of observing Maximus in profile, 
so to speak, and complements Chapter 2 because of the 
unconscious way in which he reveals his spiritual 
approach to the task of doing theology. Chapter 4 is 
the principal part of the thesis. It examines the five 
areas of theological interest that emerge in the 
Expositio: theology and sonship by grace; equality of 
honour with the angels; participation in divine life; 
restoration of nature to itself; purification from the 
law of sin and the abolition of the tyranny of the Evil 
One. The Prologue and Introductions to the Expositio 
provide an opportunity of prefacing the main commentary 
with Maximian insights into agape and the place of 
mediation in the divine plan. Chapters 5 and 6 treat of 
the Christological and Anthropological dimensions 
respectively. The Expositio is constructed on the basis 
of the notions of kenosis and theosis, which on scrutiny 
are seen to be parallel to theology and life. Therefore 
spirituality will be theology lived in such a way that 
kenosis will issue in theosis through agape exercised in 
virtue and prayer. 
I should say that part of this thesis has already 
been published as 'The Commentary on the Pater Noster: 
An Example of the Structural Methodology of Maximus the 
Confessor' in HEINZER, F. & SCHONBORN, C. (eds. ), 
Maximus Confessor (Paradosis 27, Editions Universitaires, 
vi. 
Fribourg, Suisse, 1982), pp. 147-155. All the transla- 
tions in the text of the thesis are mine, apart from a 
few taken from the work of Polycarp Sherwood, which I 
distinguish in the notes by the addition of '(S)' to 
the relevant citations. 
It is now my pleasant duty to express my gratitude 
to those who made it possible for me to undertake and 
finish this work. Firstly, I wish to thank the Faculty 
of Divinity in the University of Durham for having 
accepted me as a post-graduate student. I am especially 
indebted to my Supervisor, The Very Reverend Father 
George D. Dragas, not only for having provided me with 
the conventional direction required by his office, but 
above all for the confidence I was able to place in his 
judgment as a theologian and in his inspiring knowledge 
of the Tradition. I would also like to thank Mr. Peter 
Macardle, Dr. Jan Rhodes, Dr. Peter Rhodes, Dr. Fred 
Tibbals of the University of Durham and Dr. Noreen Hunt 
of New College, Durham, for having put their skills at 
my disposal. 
Next, I gladly acknowledge the favour done me by 
the President and Staff of Ushaw College in admitting me 
as a member of their Senior Common Room. I would like 
to thank them for their unfailing courtesy and the 
encouragement I drew from their goodwill. I must 
mention in particular Mr. John Saward and thank him for 
the pleasure and profit which I derived from innumerable 
theological discussions. I wish to record too my 
indebtedness to Miss Teresa Muthall, Secretary at the 
College, for her generosity and patience in typing the 
script. 
Finally, I wish to thank my Brethren of the 
Carmelite Order, who ungrudgingly gave me the leisure 
to 
complete this work during a time when they might have 
reasonably expected other services from me. I owe a 
lot 
to Father Jerome Lantry, Father Michael Buckley and 
vii 
Father Finnian Monahan, Provincials, in that respect. 
Last but not least, I would like to express my 
thankfulness to Father Norbert Cummins, who gave me 
the first intimation of what a love of wisdom might be 
and who has kept me reminded of it for thirty three 
years. 
Nicholas Madden, O. C. D. 
Feast of St. Thomas the Apostle, 1982. 
CHAPTER 11 
MAXIMUS THE CONFESSOR - HIS LIFE. * 
When Maximus the Confessor was being interrogated 
during his trial at Constantinople in 654, he said that 
he was seventy five years of age. 
' This enables us to fix 
with certainty the date of his birth in 579 or 580. From 
a letter written in 632 we know that he had arrived in 
Africa and apparently had settled at C4rthage. 2 Between 
the date of his birth and that of his sojourn in Africa we 
have to be content in regard to chronology and residence 
with hypothesis and probability, apart from knowing that 
Anastasius the monk became his disciple in 617.3 Until 
recently the main source for a biography of Maximus was 
the Vita ac Certamen4 of a eulogistic hagiographer, 
thought to have been composed about the time of the Sixth 
Ecumenical Council at Constantinople in 680-681, together 
with the Acta that comprised the Relatio motionis5 from 
the trial of 654, a letter of Maximus, 
6 letters of 
Anastasius, 7 the dispute of Bizya in 6568 and the 
Hypomnesticon of Theodore Spoudaeus. 9 Lackner would seem 
to have shown conclusively that the Vita is of much later 
origin, probably from the tenth century, and that, apart 
from information gleaned from the Acta, conciliar acts 
and contemporary correspondence, what was thought to have 
been historical fact is now seen to have been nothing more 
than pious rhetoric based on a stylized life of Theodore 
the Studite. 10 This critical analysis demands a Revision 
of the work of Sherwood" on the chronology of Maximus' 
* See Appendix I for a chronological table of the 
Life of St. Maxim A-o 
2 
life and writings to the extent that it was based on the 
Vita and used its sequence for framework. This is 
especially true of Maximus' earlier life, up to his 
arrival in Africa. With Brock's publication in 1973 of 
'The narrative concerning the wicked Maximus of Palestine, 
who blasphemed against his creator and his tongue was cut 
out under the title of 'An Early Syriac Life of Maximus 
the Confessor', 12 we have possibly a new source, this 
time from an unsympathetic author, which if it is genuine, 
throws new light on Maximus' life, especially on that 
earlier period concerning which the Greek Vita has been 
shown to be unreliable. This Syriac Life of monothelite 
provenance, ascribed to George of Resh'aina, is to be 
found in a manuscript of the seventh or eighth century'3 
and its matter of fact tone as well as its surviving the 
test of comparison with other sources apart from minor 
and explicable inconsistencies, strengthens its claim to 
be contemporary with the events it describes and inclines 
scholarsto accept its author's credentials. 
14 If the 
author was an eyewitness, then it would be possible to 
accept the substance of the account of the early life 
while making room for a sceptical attitude to what seem to 
be mythical accretions. Until the Syriac Life is entirely 
discredited, an unlikely eventuality, it will have to be 
taken into account in Maximian biography, albeit with 
circumspection. 
15 
Whereas the Greek Vita would have us believe that 
Maximus was born into an aristocratic family at Constan- 
tinople and having completed a course of study, that he 
entered the imperial service and quickly rose to the 
3 
position of first secretary to the Emperor Heraclius and 
eventually became a monk in the monastery of Chrysopolis, 
16 
the Syriac Life, on the other hand, would have him the 
bastard son of a Samaritan father and a Persian slave-girl, 
born and reared in Palestine, taken into the Palaia Lavra, 
the monastery of St. Chariton near Tekoa where he was given 
the name Maximus in place of Moschion and educated by 
Pantoleon the abbot. 
17 The only thing of which we can be 
entirely certain with regard to this period of his life is 
that, as we have seen, he was born in 579 or 580. These 
versions of his early life may provide nothing more fruit- 
ful than a study in contrasting styles of wishful thinking, 
the one by an admirer, the other by an hostile critic. 
That Maximus was well educated goes without saying; his 
writings display a remarkably wide knowledge as well as 
depth and brilliance. But it is the kind of learning that 
would not necessarily have required the sort of teaching 
given at the imperial or patriarchal schools in Constantin- 
ople, where it was thought Maximus received his intellectual 
formation, on the assumption that the Vita was trustworthy 
18 
The so-called 'neo-platonic' cast of his mind did not 
necessarily require a first-hand acquaintance with Plato or 
the Neö-Platonists; nor did his familiarity with Aristotle 
demand a reading of the works of the philosopher himself; 
the same holds good for a study of Proclus and Iamblicus, 
their commentators and the staple diet of the philosophical 
students at the schools of Constantinople. 
19 His knowledge 
of patristic literature would have been sufficient to give 
him command of a language that was partly drawn from Greek 
philosophical sources, while in common with the Fathers his 
4 
usage was not limited to merely philosophical semantics. 
His familiarity with the Pseudo-Denys and Leontius of 
Byzantium would, for instance, account for his awareness of 
the philosophical dimensions of theological reflection, but 
would not necessarily imply that his 'love of the supernal 
world', evidenced by his interest in Denys, was fired by 
neoplatonism20 nor that he had made a close study of the 
categories of Aristotle in order to grasp the teaching of 
Leontius. 21 It would seem that Maximus was educated in a 
monastery and that patristic and biblical sources would be 
sufficient to account for his culture. 
The Vita says that he was a monk at the monastery of 
Chrysopolis (Scutari), the Asiatic suburb of Constantinople; 
on the basis of his correspondence with John of Cyzicus 
biographers have suggested that he spent some time in the 
monastery of St. George there; 
22 the Syriac Life assigns 
him to the Palaia Lavra at the age of ten, where he 
eventually became a novice. 
23 Since Origenism was rampant 
in the monastic world of the Middle East, Maximus might 
have encountered it in any of these three possible settings 
for his life as a monk. Although we know little or nothing 
about the tradition of theology and spirituality in any of 
these monasteries, during the life-time of Maximus, it is 
true that he recalls for John of Cyzicus the time when he 
worked on problems raised by the works of Gregory Nanzian- 
zen as part of their examination of the tenets of Origenism; 
he speaks of 'passages that caused you difficulty and to 
which I devoted a labour of love when I was with the 
others'. 
24 This evokes a picture of Maximus living with 
his fellow monks and theologians in the bishop's community 
"5 
at Cyzicus (Erdek). In one of his letters he expresses the 
desire to be able to return from his exile to the monastery 
of St. George. 
25 Garrigues suggests an alternative identity 
for John of Cyzicus which would invalidate the theory of 
Maximus' stay at Cyzicus. A John Of Cyzicus was abbot of 
the monastery of St. Abraham on the Mount of Olives26 and 
may have become a bishop in the patriarchate of Jerusalem. 
He would have known the monk of the Palaia Iavra, then at 
the monastery of St. George in Jerusalem. He strengthens 
his suggestion by pointing out the concern of the John of 
the Epistles for the re-organization of monks dispersed, 
possibly by the Persian capture of Jerusalem in 614, which 
would seem to imply more than one community '27 a factor 
that would be true of Jerusalem and not Cyzicus. Besides, 
we know otherwise that there was a twin monastery of nuns 
under the title of St. George of Jerusalem28 and the 
correspondence of Maximus furnishes evidence of his rela- 
tionship with Eudocia, 
29 the head of a community that may 
possibly have been that of St. George of Jerusalem. 
Although this makes for interesting speculation, the 
evidence is so fragmentary that it scarcely can be hammered 
into a coherent historical pattern and leaves the evidence 
for the site of the monastery of St. George, tenuous though 
it may be, pointing to Cyzicus on the Propontis. Eusebius, 
bishop of Cyzicus had protected Leontius of Byzantium (500- 
543) during the Origenist crisis, 
30 
which would indicate a 
sympathy with the Origenistic Chalcedonians and the likely 
continuation of that sympathy until the time of Maximus' 
arrival there. Here too he would almost certainly have 
found the works of Leontius. Chosroes, the Persian ruler, 
6 
having begun his successful conquest in 609, took Antioch 
in 611, Damascus in 613 and strengthened his grip on the 
eastern provinces with the fall of Jerusalem in 614. Since 
we have reason to think from the evidence of the Syriac 
Life that Maximus was a monk at the Palaia Lavra, and that 
Pantoleon the abbot was a protagonist of Origenism, 
31 it is 
not beyond the bounds of probability that Maximus may have 
fled from the Palaia Lavra in 614 with the fall of Jerusalem 
and arrived in Cyzicus asking for asylum in a monastery that 
would have been well disposed to a monk from the Palaia 
Lavra with its Origenistic reputation. The complexity would 
border on the intolerable if, on the assumption that 
Garrigues' theory about John of Cyzicus, abbot of St. 
Abraham, were valid, Maximus had fled from the monastery of 
St. George in Jerusalem, under the pastoral care of John of 
Cyzicus and arrived in the monastery of Cyzicus on the 
Propontis, again dedicated to St. George. 
According to the Syriac Life if it can be trusted, it 
seems that Maximus knew Sophronius (550-639) in early life 
while he was a monk at the Palaia Lavra. 32 The author tells 
us that 'Sophronios used to praise Maximus as someone 
endowed with a lofty understanding'33 and, as we shall see 
later, he suggests that Maximus swayed the theological 
opinions of Sophronius, 
34 
something clean contrary to the 
conclusions of historians writing before the publication of 
the Syriac Life. Perhaps this allusion to Sophronius' 
admiration for Maximus is meant to prepare the way for a 
subsequent and, to the author, lamentable dependence of 
Sophronius on Maximus, the implication being that the 
poisonous seed had been sown as early as the period before 
7 
the departure of Sophronius in a spirit of FevvrcCm from 
Palestine in 603. It is impossible to date exactly the 
time of Maximus' influence on Sophronius, but the possibil- 
ity of such a young man having impressed the seasoned monk 
and theologian of the neighbouring monastery of St. 
Theodosius35 in such an influential way is a fascinating 
one. 
Besides the possibility that we are touching bed-rock 
with the claim of the Vita that Maximus was a monk at 
Chrysopolis, there is independent evidence that he was on 
terms of easy familiarity with court officials like John 
the Chamberlain, 36 Peter the Illustrious37 and George, 
38 
apart from knowing that Anastasius his disciple had been 
'secretary to the Emperor Constans' grandmother', the wife 
of Heraclius. 
39 This would seem to indicate that he had 
known John the Chamberlain personally before their corres- 
pondence took place and that his access to Imperial 
Governors like Peter and George was based on his reputation 
at court so that he must have been in or near Constaninople 
before his trial in 654. There is, of course, the off- 
chance that the author of the Vita concluded that Chrysopolis 
was the monastery of Maximus' conventuality because of this 
evidence rather than from a more explicit and exact source. 
But it is hard to account for the convergence of the 
evidence just mentioned unless Maximus had resided, if not 
in the court, at least somewhere nearby. Again there is the 
outside possibility that it was at Cyzicus that Anastasius 
came to know Maximus and it is sufficiently near Constan- 
tinople to have been the cynosure of courtly attention for 
not entirely imponderable reasons because, apart from the 
possibility of Anastasius the ex-civil servant residing 
8 
there, the growing reputation of Maximus as a theologian, 
in an age when theology was a political consideration of 
the first magnitude, would have been enough to forge links 
between the court and the monastery at Cyzicus. At the 
time of his trial Constans attested to his association with 
the court when he said that Maximus 'had been close to his 
forbears and dear to them$, 
40 
which would indicate that he 
must have lived somewhere accessible to the imperial family, 
and Chrysopolis is more probable in this respect than 
Cyzicus. The monastery there, dedicated to the Mother of 
God, had been built by a brother-in-law of Emperor Maurice 
in 59441 and would have been a likely place for the 
development of the kind of relationship that Constans 
implies. 
On the assumption that }Taximus had never been in the 
imperial service himself, it is possible that he had been 
introduced to the court by Anastasius after the latter had 
become his disciple in 617. Pyrrhus, with whom Maximus was 
to have subsequently his famous dispute, was a monk at 
Chrysopolis before becoming patriarch of Constantinople. 
In fact, he had been hegoumen of the monastery and yet in 
the course of the dispute he submitted that he had not known 
Maximus previously. 
42 This would indicate that Maximus had 
either never been a monk there or that he had left before 
the arrival of Pyrrhus. If we are to settle for the latter 
possibility, then Pyrrhus must have climbed the hierarchical 
ladder in the monastery with, even for him, remarkable speed. 
At all events, whether Maximus had been in Cyzicus or 
Chrysopolis when he had become the familiar of John the 
Chamberlain, we know that in 628 he is no longer near his 
9 
friend. 43 Devreese would seem to have proved definitively 
that Maximus was referring in his Epistola VIII to the 
forced baptism of Jews and Samaritans in Africa at Pente- 
cost 632, which had been ordered by Heraclius, and so that 
he was in Africa at that time. 
44 It has been suggested 
with some cogent argumentation that the occasion of his 
leaving his monastery was the Persian invasion which 
culminated in the siege of Constantinople in 626.45 
Sherwood would have Maximus leave Chrysopolis for Cyzicus 
in 624 or 62546 and in this way he hopes to reconcile the 
Vita's saying that Maximus was at Chrysopolis and his con- 
eluding from the letters to John of Cyzicus that he was 
also at Cyzicus. Devreese thinks that Maximus went into 
exile from Chrysopolis47 while it suits Sherwood to say 
that he left from Cyzicus. 
48 This must have been about the 
year 626. Unless further evidence comes to light it is 
doubtful if a history of the early years of Maximus can be 
anything more than a tentative and tortuous account, based 
on meagre and conflicting material. 
II 
The data from a secure account of the years between 
his having left his monastery and his writings from Carthage 
in 632 is equally tenuous, and the attempts at reconstructing 
his life at this time equally hypothetical. He says himself 
that he was in Crete where he engaged in controversy with a 
group of Severian bishops49 and it is not unlikely 
that he 
would have put in at Crete on his journey from 
Asia Minor to 
Africa. It is worth noting, in passing, that he would have 
merited the controversial attention of the Cretan bishops 
10 
because of his reputation as a theologian, not merely of 
the Origenistic debates that had claimed his industry 
while with Bishop John and his fellow monks, but also 
presumably as a peritus in Christology. He would soon 
write his celebrated Quaestiones ad Thalassium, concerned 
primarily with a Christian cosmology and anthropology, 
but if his debate in Crete took place at this time, then 
he would have already studied the great Christological 
questions of the day sufficiently well to be a doughty 
defender of Chalcedonian positions. Was it at this time 
too that he made the acquaintance of the Bishop of 
Cydonia? 50 The possibility of his having visited Cyprus 
is put forward by biographers on the basis of his corres- 
pondence with Marinus5l and the assumption that such a 
relationship points to Maximus' having known him 
personally. This period would again provide the 
opportunity for such an encounter. Similarly, if he had 
known Bishop Arcadius personally, it is possible that it 
was during a stay in Cyprus at this time that he made his 
acquaintance. 
52 As we shall see, the Syriac Life speaks 
of a synod in Cyprus, 
53 but that would seem to have been 
later than 632, and besides Maximus is said to have 
declined the invitation to attend, 
54 
so that the hypo- 
thesis of a visit in the interval between his flight from 
his monastery and his being at Carthage in 632, flimsy 
though it be, still stands. 
When eventually Maximus reached Africa he joined 
Sophronius and a group of exile monks who had settled in 
a monastery entitled 'Eucratades'55 derived from the 
surname of Sophronius and also that of his friend John 
11 
Moscus, 'Eucratas'. Maximus says that Sophronius 'stayed 
with me and many foreign monks in the land of the 
Africans'. 56 Elsewhere he speaks of him as 'my blessed 
master, father, teacher, lord abbot Sophronius'. 
57 
It seems then that Sophronius was hegoumen of the 
monastery and that Maximus became his disciple there. We 
have seen already, on the basis of the evidence of the 
Syriac Life, that Maximus may have known Sophronius in 
Palestine and even have exercised some influence on his 
theological reflections. The roles would now seem to have 
been reversed. The mutual influence of men of this 
stature on each other is hardly matter for trivial specu- 
lation. While we are certain that the Syriac Life 
insists that Maximus stiffened the resolution of 
Sophronius in his opposition to the monoenergists on the 
occasion of his participation in the synod in Cyprus, 
58 
biographers are generally inclined to think Maximus was 
influenced considerably by Sophronius in the sphere of 
Christology, especially with regard to the threats to 
orthodoxy that the politico-religious manoeuvring created 
at that time, well versed as he was bound to be with 
church affairs in Africa and so in a position to brief 
Maximus on current deviations in doctrine. 
59 With regard 
to the tradition of spirituality to which Sophronius gave 
his allegiance, we are well informed, especially about 
his attachment to sinaitic monachism as exemplified 
particularly in the teaching of St. John Climacus. 
60 
The influence of this on the thought of Maximus would have 
incalculable importance for the future development of 
Byzantine theology anti spirituality. 
61 
We know that 
12 
Sophronius was at Alexandria in 633 where he upheld 
orthodoxy. 
62 We do not know for certain if Maximus 
accompanied him on that occasion. Maximus describes 
Sophronius pleading with Cyrus, the patriarch of 
Alexandria, about the terms of reconciliation with the 
monophysites, 
63 but this is not necessarily an eye- 
witness account. The putative '0rigenist crisis' in the 
thought of Maximus was considered to have occurred about 
this time, when he was described as having had a period 
of intensive study of the works of Origen at Alexandria, 
the upshot of which was said to have been a profound 
personal theological self-questioning. 
64 Sherwood has 
shown definitively that Maximus was in fact construct- 
ively critical about Origen and that there was no 'crisis' 
of the kind supposed by Von Balthasar. 
65 The only other 
piece of information that may be linked with this period 
of the life of Maximus is his reference to Conon as his 
superior66 and it has been concluded that he succeeded 
Sophroniuo at the monastery of the 'Eucratadee'. If this 
is so, then Maximus must have continued as a member of the 
community there, and even if he had accompanied 
Sophronius67 to Alexandria in 633, he would have returned 
to resume his monastic life there. However, the attempt 
to establish a probable sequence is further bedevilled by 
the evidence of the Syriac life, which postpones Maximus' 
stay in Africa until after the death of Sophronius. 
68 
Brock suggests the possibility of two sojourns in Africa. 
In that case Maximus would have returned to Syria- 
Palestine some time before 633 and 641 where he is said to 
have begun 'to sow his teaching among certain individuals 
in the regions of Syria'. 
69 
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To appreciate the Pact of Union and its consequences it 
is necessary to keep in mind the predicament of Emperor 
Heraclius in 633.70 When he became emperor in 610 
Byzantium was invested on the north by Avars and Slave, to 
the south and east by the Persians. With the fall of 
Jerusalem in 614 the collapse of the old order seemed 
imminent, but due to the administrative and military 
reforms initiated by Heraclius and the character of a 
crusade taken on by the war after the capture of the 
relics of the Holy Cross and in spite of the nadir touched 
by imperial fortunes in 626 with the siege of Constantin- 
ople by Avars, Slavs and Persians combined, Heraclius 
succeeded in driving back the Persians and containing the 
Avars and Slavs. He finally defeated the Persians in a 
decisive battle and had brought the relics of the Holy 
Cross back to Jerusalem by 630. The efforts of Heraclius 
to consolidate his empire were rendered more difficult by 
the disaffection of his Monophysite subjects q who for 
centuries in Armenia, Syria and Egypt had resisted the 
verdict of Chalcedon. Now that he had gained at least a 
temporary respite in his struggle for mastery, the 
emperor decided to renew his efforts to bring about a 
unity of faith among his subjects. In this design he 
found a ready ally in Sergius, Patriarch of Constantinople. 
It was not the first time that the emperor had relied on 
the patriarch. Since his appointment in 610 Sergius had 
been the willing collaborator of Heraclius, bringing to 
his task intelligence, courage and diplomatic skill; he 
was a considerable theologian. 
71 It was due to his 
constancy that Heraclius had not fled from Constantinople 
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and it was his faith in Christianity that was able to 
transform the military operations of the emperor into a 
holy war after the fall of Jerusalem. He also put the 
patriarchal treasury at the disposal of his political 
master. 
In his Dispute with Pyrrhus 
,q 
Maximus has given us a 
thumb-nail sketch of the origin of the monoenergism that 
subsequently gave place to monothelitism. 
72 On the basis 
of this evidence we know that before 619 Sergius had been 
in correspondence with Theodore of Pharan, then George 
Areas of Alexandria, in an effort to hammer out a formula 
that would be acceptable to the Monophysites, but consis- 
tent with orthodoxy. Serving Heraclius' desire to win 
over Paul the Akephalos of Cyprus to the cause of politico- 
religious unity Sergius entered into theological negotia- 
tions with Paul and the kernel of the debate was the 
'unique energy' of Christ. He succeeded in winning to his 
views the ambitious Cyrus, Bishop of Phasis, who in spite 
of having discerned that Heraclius' decree against Paul the 
Akephalos was not consistent with the Tome of Leo, became 
the accomplice of Sergius, and for his pains was installed 
as patriarch of Alexandria in 631, obviously to further 
the imperial cause of religious unity in the interests of 
political stability. The Pact of Union of 633 was the 
outcome of this strategy, when Cyrus and his sponsors 
hoped the Severian Monophysites would accept a neo- 
chalcedonian theology which they contrived to pivot on 
their own contribution of Monoenergiem. 
73 Sophronius, as 
we have seen, arrived in Alexandria just in time to 
contest the formula of union, especially the seventh 
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chapter which speaks of: 'the same one Christ and Son, 
operating in divine and human things with one theandric 
operation, according to St. Dionysius'. 74 Although 
Sophroniua is represented to Pope Honorius as a trouble- 
maker, 
75 he succeeded in preventing the publication of the 
Pact of Union by going to Constantinople himself and 
making representations to Sergius, who as a result of this 
issued his famous Psephos, ordering Cyrus to allow no one, 
from then on, to speak of one or two operations with 
regard to Christ our God'. 
76 It can be noted now that in 
the course of his investigations, prior to the formulation 
of the Pact of Cyrus, Sergius had not confined his interest 
to the 'operation' of Christ, but also, according to 
Maximus, he had asked for advice on the 'one will' of 
Christ.?? While imposing an eirenical silence on the 
disputants with regard to the 'one operation', he dis- 
creetly introduces the subject of the 'one will, by 
rejecting the implication of two wills in two operations, 
so that Monoenergism is now twinned by Monothelitism and 
would eventually be superseded by it. Sergius sent the 
text of his Psephos to pope Honorius and Pyrrhus, probably 
at the behest of Sergius, sent a copy to Maximus, presum- 
ably to win the approbation of an influential theologian. 
The celebrated reply of Honorius contained the fatal 
phrases : 'Whence we confess one will of Our Lord Jesus 
Christ, because evidently our nature was assumed by the 
divinity, there was not ein in it .... there was not in 
the Saviour another law nor a different or contrary will, 
since he was born above the law of human nature'"78 This 
was a windfall for Sergius, confirming his theology of 
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Christ's will and strengthening his political designs. 
Against the probabilities, Sophronius was made patriarch 
of Jerusalem in 634 because of 'the great constraint and 
violence on the part of clerics beloved of God, pious 
monks, faithful layfolk and all the citizens of the most 
holy city of Christ our Lord'. 
79 On the occasion of his 
installation he issued his famous Synodicon, 80 a state- 
ment on the Christological positions of the time with 
special reference to Monoengrgism, in the context of an 
exposition on the doctrine of the Trinity and Creation, 
as well as an elenchus of heresies. Although Sophronius 
deferred to the will of Sergius in not mentioning the 
number of wills in Christ, the Synodicon was the first 
orthodox riposte to the heretical teaching of Sergius and 
his followers . 
It is not so easy to interpret the initial reaction 
of Maximus to the Psephos. In his reply to Pyrrhus81 who 
had sent it to him he praises both Pyrrhus and Sergius 
enthusiastically. He was obviously relieved that the 
doctrinal crisis precipitated by Cyrus' Pact of Union had 
been seemingly averted; the quality of his enthusiasm 
for both Pyrrhus and Sergius is hardly compatible with 
serious doubts about the orthodoxy of the Psephos. It is 
impossible to say whether or not he was maintaining a 
prudent silence about its monothelite implications or 
whether his theological awareness at that time was 
sufficiently acute to discern embryonic heresy. Sherwood 
argues from a passage in his letter to Pyrrhus: 'He 
works humanly what is divine ... and divinely what is 
human', that Maximus, while avoiding overt controversy, 82 
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was reminding Pyrrhus of the basis of true teaching in the 
matter in hand. 
83 Later on Maximus was to insist that 
although he was mistaken with regard to personalities, he 
had not been ambiguous in doctrine. 
84 Lethel has subjected 
the texts of this debate to minute analysis and he is of 
the opinion that at this juncture Maximus was still 
reflecting theologically in the style of the neochalce- 
donians and was not yet sensitive to the refinements 
required to spell out the function of the sacred Humanity 
of Christ in the economy of the Redemption. 
85 Sherwood 
finds corroboration for his own views in the later 
Ambi ua, 
86 
written about this time; Lethel reads the 
mb in a sense that is consistent with his interpre- 
tation: that 'the natural operation of the flesh' 
referred to by Maximus at this juncture was no more than 
the 'natural movement of the flesh' of Sergius. Maximus 
asks Pyrrhus for clarification on the distinction between 
! vepysLa and IvtpYTjµa . 
87 He is alert to the need for 
elaboration and we have ample evidence of the development 
of his thought until the issue is clarified beyond doubt. 
88 
At first he seems to have been content to rely on the 
Synodicon of Sophronius, but gradually he forges his own 
theology of the wills of Christ, until the problem set by 
Sergius is finally solved by 641. 
Much of the anti-Monoenergistic and anti-Monothelite 
writing is to be found in letters written by Maximus to 
his friends who asked for clarification of the questions 
that were causing such theological ferment at the time. 
His exchanges with Thomas, 
89 
a monk at Chrysopolis, are 
particularly instructive, because they illustrate his 
18 
initial caution giving way to explicit formulation and so 
finding himself at variance not merely with the doctrine 
of Sergius, but also with his patriarchal authority, which 
he had used to forbid mentioning the number of operations 
in the activity of Christ. Maximus could no longer keep 
silence and proclaims that to be justified it is necessary, 
not merely to give an interior assent to faith but that 'we 
are saved by confessing rightly by word of mouth everywhere 
and before all men'. 
90 
The name of Maximus would one day 
be identified with that confession in a singular way. With 
the publication of the imperial Ecthesis in 638, the lines 
of opposition between the orthodox and the unorthodox were 
drawn without ambiguity, because the Ecthesis is overtly 
and unambiguously monothelite'. Before we come to that, it 
is necessary to turn again to the Syriac Life which intro- 
duces an episode in the history of the church at the time, 
for which we have no other evidence, and which involves 
Maximus. 
The author of the Syriac Life tells us that : 'Now 
Sophronios, in that he held a grudge against Arkadios, 
readily accepted all that the rascal had to say, and 
Maximus (then) told Sophronios: "Send and gather for me 
those who are in doubt about this, and I will unite them 
with a defence" 1.91 This introduces a description of the 
summoning of a synod at Cyprus by Arcadius, whom, we have 
already seen, Maximus may have known personally. The Syriac 
Life tells us that although Honorius did not attend, he 
sent a deacon, that Sergius was represented by an arch- 
deacon, that Cyrus travelled from Alexandria and that 
Sophronius with nine of his suffragans, including George 
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the author of the Life attended. Although Maximus did not 
go to the synod in Cyprus he is portrayed in the Syriac 
Life as a major influence in the performance of Bophronius 
and his tome, composed for the occasion, was the centre of 
debate and eventually the basis of a letter sent to the 
emperor which elicited from Heraclius an 'Edict 1.92 We 
have an independent source to assure us that Sophronius 
had in fact some altercation with Arcadius, Archbishop of 
Cyprus, on the occasion of his having rebuked the Arch- 
bishop for tolerating the christological interpolation of 
Peter the Fuller in the Trisagion. 93 This may have 
complicated an already delicate situation in which the 
Archbishop found himself, asked as he was by Heraclius to 
deliver the emperor's decree of condemnation to Paul the 
Akephalos when Paul failed to comply with the imperial 
designs. 94 This took place about 626. By the time the 
synod was being convened in Cyprus, Sophronius was probably 
patriarch of Jerusalem, but being unacceptable to Sergius 
and Cyrus, he may have asked Arcadius to act as mediating 
convener. Arcadius, from what we know of him, was a person 
grata with Sergius and the establishment and in spite of his 
ambivalence with regard to the Trisagion interpolation, 
Maximus was of the opinion that he was a convinced chal- 
cedonian. 
95 
The Syriac Life summarises the theological position of 
Maximus accurately: 'And he wrote four books, acknowledg- 
ing in them two wills and two energies and two minds, 
acknowledging everything to do with Christ to be double, 
apart from the matter of the persons only'. 
96 Although this 
description may be enhanced by hindsight on the part of the 
author, and display a theology later than the date of the 
20 
presumed synod of Cyprus, it could approximate to the 
Maximus who encouraged Sophronius to resume his assault on 
the interpolation of Trisagion, bound, as he must have 
seen it, to Monoenergism in the logic of Severian 
Christology. 97 This portrays Maximus as exercising consi- 
derable ascendancy over Sophronius at this juncture, some- 
thing that seems improbable in the light of what we know 
from other sources, which shows us Maximus relying on the 
Synodicon and referring his correspondents to Sophronius 
for guidance. 
98 A priori there is no inconsistency in the 
possibility of reconciling the two views seen against the 
complex dynamics of human relationships, especially of men 
of this quality in a situation that demanded from them 
total self-forgetfulness in the interests of the truth. 
We have to keep in mind, however, that the author of the 
Syriac Life had a genuine reverence for Sophronius which 
may have inclined him to play down his part in the affair 
and to highlight that of the 'rascal' Maximus. He does 
not tell us the title of the 'four books' written by 
Maximus, but he is adamant that it was Maximus' 'tome' 
that was central to the debate in Cyprus and we may 
possibly see in that an effort to father the authorship 
of the embarrassing Synodicon on Maximus. The 'Edict' 
mentioned in the Syriac Life is probably the Ecthesis of 
638,99 so that if the Syriac Life is reliable, the synod 
at Cyprus will have taken place before that date. 
The publication of the Ecthesis in 638 did not mark 
a doctrinal development. It was for all practical 
purposes a repetition of the Psephos, but it represented 
a new stage in the evolution of Monothelitism as a heresy 
because of the twofold authority with which it was 
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invested; it bore explicitly the signature of the emperor 
Heraclius and the Psephos' reliance on theological 
principle of contradiction gave way to the implicit 
authority of Honorius, containing as it did his formula- 
tion of the 'one will' of Christ, interpreted in a 
Monothelite sense. 
100 Maximus, in his tome to Marinus, 101 
written before the Ecthesis had reached him, had already 
interpreted the letter of Horonius to Sergius in an 
orthodox sense and stood out unambiguously for dyotheli- 
tism in circumstances that were potentially public. So 
that we can conclude with Sherwood that: 'In the east 
therefore, and consequently for Maximus, the issue was well 
joined before the Ecthesis. Between Rome and Constantin- 
ople, however, it was the Ecthesis that brought the 
question to a head'. 
102 Honorius died in 638, as did 
Sergius shortly after the promulgation of the Ecthesis. 
Sophronius died in either 638 or 639.103 This left 
Maximus as the champion of orthodoxy. Severinus became 
pope, Pyrrhus succeeded to the patriarchate of Constantin- 
ople and Sophronius was replaced by a monothelite. The 
apocrisaries sent by Severinus for imperial approval for 
election skilfully won the approval without committing 
themselves on the question of the Ecthesis. They 
returned to Rome with the Ecthesis in 640. It is matter 
for debate whether or not Severinus condemned it before 
his death a short time later: 
104 for his successor, John 
IV9 condemned it authoritatively in 641. Later that year 
Heraclius died, but not before he had recanted, become 
reconciled to' Tome and put the blame for the Ect_e is on 
Pyrrhus. 105 Phyrrhus, who had convened a synod to ratify 
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the Ecthesis on his accession to the patriarchate, was 
deposed and fled in disgrace to Africa. After an unstable 
interval which witnessed the fall of the empress-regent 
Martina and her son, Constantine III9 Constane II came to 
power, and whatever hope had been engendered of Pyrrhus, 
was destroyed, because the new emperor espoused the 
heretical cause with the vigour that characterized him. 
Theodore I became pope in 642 and upheld the orthodox 
position taken by his predecessor John IV. 
Presumably with reference to the occasion of the 
publication of the Ectheois, the Syriac Life says: 'Now 
Maximus confined himself in a small cell out of fear of 
the emperor and the patriarchs who had anathematized his 
teaching'. But the Life goes on to relate that with the 
increase of Arab dominance in the Middle East and the 
curtailment of the imperial power, Maximus 'manifested 
his fraudulence once again openly' in propagating his own 
teaching in Syria. He is then said to have set out with 
Anastasius for Africa because it was 'in rebellion against 
the emperor at this time'. The goal of their journey is 
said to have been a monastery at Hippo Diarrhytus where 
there were eighty seven 'Nestorian' monks. 'Thus they 
led astray the whole of Africa', even 'deceiving the 
eparch there, whose name was George'. 
106 The normal 
assumption, until the publication of the Syriac Life, was 
that Maximus remained in Africa from his arrival there in 
circa 630 until his departure for Rome after his 'Dispute 
with Pyrrhus'. The Syriac Life has him in Syria after 
the appearance of the Ecthesis, first lying low and then 
boldly proclaiming his theological views. If the Syriac 
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Life is reliable, then we can assume, as we have seen 
already, that Maximus returned to Syria-Palestine sometime 
after 633 and that he remained there until after 638. 
George, the eparch of Carthage, was recalled in 642, so 
that Maximus' departure for Africa must have been before 
that. We know that both he and Sophronius were on terms 
of friendship with George whose political career foundered 
on the displeasure of Martina because of his antimonophy- 
site attitude and activity. 
107 It is probably to this 
that the Syriac Life refers in imputing 'rebellion' in 
Africa as the motive for Maximus' going there. He is 
further portrayed as having been an evil influence with 
regard to George. 
If Maximus arrived in Africa in 641 at the latest, 
then the hypothesis is that he stayed at the monastery of 
'Hippo Diarrhytus' until his dispute with Pyrrhus in 645. 
We know of Maximus' first reactions to the Ecthesis from 
a mutilated letter of his to Thalassius in which he 
approves of the way in which Severinus' apocrisaries 
handled the emperor, and so enabled the pope to evade 
committing himself on the Ecthesis, while winning approval 
for his election. 
108 The set of short anti-Monothelite 
treatises from these years that have come down to us show 
the single-minded effort of Maximus to clarify and develop 
his own theology and at the same time stem the development 
of heresy. 
109 He sent Anastasius to Rome to gain first- 
hand information on the Letter of Honorius to Sergius that 
had played into the latter's hands and was gratified to 
learn that the pope had been concerned with the moral 
relationship of the two natural wills. 
11° Sherwood shows 
24 
some surprise that one of the letters that has to do with 
the recall is so concerned with Severian Monophysitism and 
overlooks the current Monothelitism. 
111 While it is to 
the point to take into account the circumstances which 
evoked this letter as accounting for this seeming 
anomaly, 
112 it must be remembered too that in the mind of 
Maximus one heresy spawns another and that Monothelitism 
is bound to Severian Monophsitiam by an inevitable logic, 
and not merely to that, but to every false doctrine that 
destroys the reality of the assumed human nature of Christ, 
so that for Maximus this perversity is the title to member- 
ship of 'the chorus of frenzied drunkards' that includes: 
'Simon, Valentinus , Mani, Arius q Apollinarius, Eutyches, 
. Maximus sees this Dioscorus, Timothy and Severus' 
113 
danger epitomised in the 'one composite nature' of Severus. 
To his opponents Maximus was an '0rigenist' and a 
'Nestorian' as we can gather from the tendentious Syriac 
Life. This improbable association of epithets is derived 
from the opposition of Maximus and those of like mind to 
theopaschism. It overlooks entirely the grandeur of the 
Christology of Maximus with its growing appreciation of 
the function of the Hypostasis of the Word in the union of 
the natures. 
114 We are not surprised to find no mention 
of the Dispute with Pyrrhus in the Syriac Life, where 
Maximus's teaching found such clarity of expression and in 
circumstances that could not have been more public. 
Since the deposition of Pyrrhus had been popular but 
not canonical his presence in Africa was the source of 
problems to Peter the Illustrious, among them by what 
title he should be called. Peter consulted Maximus who 
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replied that it was inappropriate to call him 'holiness' or 
'venerable' as he was not in communion with the Roman 8ee115 
Pope Theodore had already insisted that Pyrrhus should be 
canonically deposed, sent to Rome to account for himself 
116 
and denied the title 'most holy'. Pyrrhus is by now 
credited with having composed the Ecthesis. He admitted to 
Maximus that he had contributed to its authorship117 and we 
can take it that this had facilitated his promotion from 
being hegoumen at Chrysopolis to being patriarch of 
Constantinople. The protagonist of Monothelitism and his 
opponent Maximus finally found themselves face to face in 
Carthage, whither Pyrrhus had fled before the Arab 
incursions into Africa. The Dispute118 took place in the 
presence of the governor Gregory, successor to George, and 
high officials of church and state. After the debate 
Pyrrhus determined to be reconciled to Rome and Gregory 
became reconciled to Maximus and his views. His subsequent 
revolt against Constans was attributed to the influence of 
Maximus. 119 Pyrrhus went to Rome to renounce Monothelitism 
in the presence of Theodore and he was given a reception in 
keeping with his patriarchal status. When he again defected 
to Monothelitism a short time later, probably influenced by 
the Typus of Constans, Theodore anathematised him in 
terrifying style, even going so far as to sign the document 
with ink mixed with the sacred species taken from the 
communion chalice. 
120 Maximus also went to Rome about this 
time. One of his letters implies that he had been in 
Sicily where he had to defend his teaching, possible 
against the charge of professing three wills in Christ and 
the Syriac Life says explicitly that : 'they then removed 
from there (Africa) and came to Sicily ... And when they 
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had made the rounds of all the islands of the sea, they 
went up to Rome itself'. 
121 'They' refers to the monks 
who accompanied Maximus and are seen by the author of the 
Syriac Life as his agents in the dissemination of 
heterodox teaching. In 646, presumably after Maximus had 
departed, three councils were convened in Africa to deal 
with the Monothelite question122 and the condemnations of 
the heresy which issued from these gatherings are a 
testimony to the prophetic character of the theological 
leadership of Maximus, in spite of the fact that, far 
from being a bishop, he was a mere monk. 
III 
Maximus would remain at least six years in Rome. It 
is not necessary to examine in this context the theologi- 
cal significance of the attitude of Maximus to the Roman 
See, but the historical perspectives require some 
appreciation of his view of Rome, so that his going there 
may be intelligible. In fact, it is obvious that the rest 
of his life and confession would not be entirely explicable 
without taking into account his understanding of the 
function of the Roman See in the life of the Church. It 
would be irresponsibly naive to claim that his decision to 
go there was merely motivated by political considerations. 
Maximus had nothing to gain from partisanship in a secular 
confrontation between Rome and Constantinople, completely 
devoid as he was of worldly ambition. Orthodoxy was the 
primary interest and passion of the life of Maximus and it 
is in relation to that that we must try to grasp his atti- 
tude to the Roman See. To him 'the church of the Romans' 
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was the senior church and it presided always until then 
over the others; 
123 to anathematise those who declared 
that Pyrrhus was culpable was to anathematise 'the See of 
Rome, that is the catholic Church'; 
124 Pyrrhus would make 
no impression on Maximus and his likes 'if he does not make 
satisfaction and implore the blessed Pope of the most holy 
Church of Rome, that is the apostolic see, which from God 
the Word Incarnate himself as well as from all the holy 
Synods-, according to the canons and sacred definitions, 
has received and possesses the power in all things and far 
everything over all the holy churches of God which are in 
the whole inhabited world as well as the power to bind and 
to loose'. 125 
Maximus then identifies in some sense the catholic 
Church with the see of Rome and the primacy of the Roman 
pontiff is for him tied up with supreme authority in 
matters of orthodoxy. 'In fact all the confines of the 
inhabited world, those everywhere in the world who confess 
the lord with a right and sincere faith look fixedly, as 
if to the son of eternal light, to the most holy church of 
the Romans, towards its confession and its faith, receiving 
from her the flashing splendour of the holy dogmas of the 
Fathers, as the six holy Synods, divine in inspiration and 
eloquence, have explained them genuinely and reverently, 
proclaiming most clearly the symbol of faith'. 
126 He goes 
on to refer to Matthew 16,18-19 to point up his claim 
that the Roman See is 'the unique base and foundation' of 
all the Christian churches. 
127 For him it is, in some 
sense, the guarantee of the tradition of the Fathers and 
the teaching of the Councils. Incidentally, he accepts 
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the Lateran Synod of 649 as ecumenical; this is implied in 
his 'six'. Apaxt from knowing that he set out for Rome in 
this frame of mind, we are in the dark for more precise and 
practical motivation. He may have travelled at the request 
of Pope Theodore, or of Pyrrhus on the way to his venera- 
tion of 'the tombs of the apostles, or rather of the 
princes of the apostles themselves, then to see face to face 
the most holy pope, and to give him a memorandum of my 
errors'. 
128 The Syriac Life envisages Maximus going there 
as a member of a migrating community, 'fear of the Arabs 
having disturbed them'. 129 Or he may have set out 
spontaneously in order to put his gifts at the service of 
the Church in a moment of crisis. We know that before 
this he had already been concerned with the eschatological 
aspects of the collapse of the established order before the 
onset of the Arab incursions and saw the possibility of 
having to shed his blood for the faith. 130 Whether he 
divined it or not, his decision to go to Rome was in fact 
a turning point in his life and involved him in a situation 
that was to lead ultimately to the sealing of his confess- 
ion of the faith with a martyr's death. 
While in Rome, Maximus probably resided at the 
monastery of St. Sabbas on the Aventine. 
131 Here he 
engaged in a period of intense research and reflection on 
the Christological problems of the day. This is reflected 
in his treatises and correspondence of this time. Especially 
significant is the florilegium that he provided for Stephen 
of Dora, containing texts from the Fathers to support the 
anti-Ecthesis position. 
132 In 647 the emperor Constans, 
seeing that the effort to establish Monothelitism was check- 
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mated and that the Ecthesis had not achieved the aims for 
which it was promulgated, tried to push the situation back 
to a pre-controversial phase by the promulgation of his 
Typos, which forbade the affirmatipm of one or two wills, 
one or two operations. 
133 With the severe sanctions with 
which it was fortified, Constans hoped to consolidate the 
politico-religious unity of an empire hard pressed by Arab 
invasions. Insensitive to the fundamental issues implied 
in what must have seemed to him theological niceties, he 
failed to evaluate what the Church by then had realised: 
that she was involved in the upholding of the orthodox 
faith and that there could be no withdrawal from the 
public confession of that faith. Martin I became pope in 
649 and in the October of that year he convoked the 
Lateran Synod. We are not certain if Maximus took an 
active part in the deliberations of the synod, but his 
theological influence is obvious in its formulations, 
especially in canons 10 and 11 which reflect his teaching 
and terminology accurately when dealing with the questions 
of will and operation in Christ. 
134 The theologian has 
become a Father in whose teaching the Church recognizes 
her own faith. We find inverted testimony to the theo- 
logical ascendancy of Maximus at the Lateran Synod in the 
account of the disaffected author of the Syriac Life: 
'they then went up to Rome itself, and by means of their 
deceitfulness even Martinos the patriarch there was 
ensnared, and he fully accepted his doctrine, with the 
result that he gathered a synod of 190 bishops to confirm 
the doctrine of Maximus'. 
135 
30 
IV 
The condemnation of the Typos by the Lateran Synod 
was interpreted as a political challenge by Constans, a 
man not to brook opposition. So we find him sending the 
exarch of Ravenna, Olympius, to Rome to apprehend Martin 
and bring him to trial at Constantinople. The revolt of 
Olympius delayed the execution of the imperial order, so 
that Martin did not arrive in Constantinople until 653, 
having been arrested and conducted there by the new 
exarch. Martin, whose election as pope had never been 
confirmed by the emperor was considered to be a usurper 
and he was charged with treason and heresy. He was 
found guilty, condemned and deported to the Crimea, where 
he died. in 655 completely forsaken and alone. 
136 Part of 
his final suffering was the knowledge that the church at 
Rome had found a new bishop, Eugene I, who was consecrated 
in 654. It was generally thought that Maximus had been 
arrested together with Martin and brought to Constantinople 
with him to be tried once Martin's case had been suitably 
brought to a close. On the basis of the Syriac Life, the 
new hypothesis is that he went to Constantinople in 652, 
probably with the brothers Theodore and Theodosius of 
Gangres, charged with taking the decrees of the Lateran 
Synod and that he had availed of the emperor's absence to 
propagate the Lateran doctrine. 'And when Maximus saw 
that Rome had accepted the foul mire of his blasphemies, 
he also went down to Constantinople .... The Emperor 
Konatans was in Azorbaijan, and at that point Maximus 
entered Constantinople, hoping to corrupt it too with his 
deception, just as everywhere else'. 
137 We know from the 
Syriac Life, complemented by its derivative Syriac 
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Chronicles, that Maximus stayed at Placidia, the sometime 
residence of visiting Roman apocrisaries, that he was tried 
and condemned by a synod on the return of Constans from war, 
that he was sentenced to be confined in a convent as 
ridicule, but that he won the nuns to his orthodoxy and a 
refusal of the sacramental ministrations of monothelite 
clergy. The trial of Martin, the burning of the nuns and 
the imprisonment of Maximus marked the climax of the 
emperor's determination to have the Typos accepted. 
138 
As the life of Maximus moves into its final phase with 
the beginning of his first trial at Constantinople in June 
654, its basic meaning as Christian existence becomes 
splendidly apparent. 
139 Through the unfolding of the 
process of political intrigue and passion it becomes 
obvious that his real life was the faith he had in the Son 
of God. Everything else about him, not least his theo- 
logical work, is an emanation from that central fact, so 
that it is worth our while to review, even briefly, the 
denouement of his witness with its unswerving purpose and 
flawless consistency. Maximus was tried for treason before 
the Senate and, during its second session, before the new 
patriarch of Constantinople, Peter, and the patriarch of 
Antioch, Macedoniud. The resilient Pyrrhus, who had 
regained the patriarchal throne on the death of the re- 
morseful Paul, himself had died in June 654. The apocrisaries 
sent by the newly elected pope Eugene I had arrived in 
Constantinople to secure the imperial approval for his 
election. Their presence strengthened the case for the 
prosecution and made the dilemma of Maximus more acute by 
compounding the politico-religious aims of Constantinople 
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with the ecclesiastical expediency of Rome. Maximus was 
accused of opposing imperial policy; the evidence was that 
he had been responsible for the fall of Egypt, Tripoli and 
Africa to the Saracens. 140 Furthermore, he had affronted 
the emperor himself, implicitly anathematising him by his 
rejection of the Typos. 
141 He had caused division in the 
church and prevented the reconciliation of Rome and 
Constantinople. 142 
While Maximus countered these charges with a 
vigorous self-defence, the primary thing to emerge from 
the evidence of the Relatio motionis is the play of 
Maximus' conscience in function of his fundamental faith. 
Granted the rightness of that faith, he cannot be accused 
of subjectivism in conscience; because his faith is 
relational his conscience is intentional and informed. We 
are in the presence of a witness. To his prosecutors the 
Typos was the key to the indispensable unity sought by the 
emperor and his acquiescent clergy; to Maximus it signi- 
fied a denial of faith and betrayal of the Church: lie was 
innocent of political intrigue; there could be no union 
on the basis of heresy. When it was pointed out to him 
that his refusal to be in communion with the Byzantine 
church was eloquent of his disapproval and a cause of 
division, he replied: 'Nothing is more violent than the 
reproach of conscience and nothing gives more assurance 
than its approbation'. 
143 To reject the charge that he 
had condemned the emperor and his followers, he replied 
that, like the three youths in the fiery furnace, his 
primary concern was his fidelity to God, not the conduct 
of others; he reminded them that Daniel had been pre- 
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occupied with his own fidelity and preferred to die than 
to deny God and endure a bad conscience. He concluded: 'I 
prefer to die rather than experience a tormented conscience 
because of having betrayed my faith in God, no matter 
how. 144 He is then reminded that the Roman legates are 
about to share communion with the patriarch and so 
implicitly acknowledge the Typos. Maximus reminds them in 
turn that the legates have not brought an authorisation of 
the consecration of Peter the new patriarch, that the 
action of the legates must not be taken as prejudicial to 
the will of the Holy See: 'I am in no way persuaded that 
the Romans wish to be united to the Byzantines if they do 
not recognise that our God and Lord has by nature the will 
and energy necessary for our salvation according to each 
of his natures, of which and in which he is, and which he 
is,. 145 That is the crucial point. Nor is Maximus worsted 
when the prosecution asks him what he will do if the Romans 
join sides with the Byzantines: 'The Holy Spirit, by the 
mouth of the Apostle pronounces anathema even on the 
angels, if they should sanction anything contrary to the 
kerygma'. 
146 Earlier in his trial, when accused of 
causing division in the Church he replied: 'If he who 
quotes the texts of Holy Scripture and the Fathers causes 
division in the Church, what will he be shown to do to the 
Church who suppresses the dogmas of the holy ones, without 
which this thing itself could not be a Church? '147 
The Church is identified with its teaching in the 
mind of Maximus. When he is pressed on the anathematisa- 
tion of the Typos with its implied condemnation of the 
emperor, Maximus prays God to forgive those who pushed 
Conetans to compose it and those who approved it, that is 
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'the representatives of the Church' and the 'political 
leaders' and declares roundly that it is they who are 
responsible for besmirching him 'who is innocent and clear 
of all heresy'. 
148 A little further on he denies that he 
has shown contempt for the emperor, but admits that he 
anathematised 'a document foreign to the true faith which 
the Church professes'. 
149 Maximus was found guilty of 
treason and deported to Bizya in Thrace where he was 
imprisoned late in 654. 
With their customary diplomatic skill, the Roman 
apocrisaries had won approval for the consecration of 
Eugene I without having approved the Typos, at least 
formally. They had agreed to take the synodal letter of 
Peter the new patriarch to Rome for acceptance by the 
pope in exchange for the imperial approval of his 
consecration. This letter contained a further theologi- 
cal formula meant to justify the Typos and the whole 
monothelite episode: there were in Christ two natural 
wills and one hypostatic will. 
150 When, in the course of 
his trial, Maximus got wind of this latest patriarchal 
expedient he forewarned the clergy and people of Rome 
through a letter written by Anastasius to the monks of 
Cagliari, 
151 
so that Eugene It reassured by a revolt of 
clergy and people against Peter's Synodicon, did not 
accept it, had himself consecrated without imperial 
approval and was henceforth considered a usurper at 
Constantinople. 
In 656 Constans and Peter tried again to win Maximus 
to their cause. It was a critical time for Byzantium, at 
once rebuffed by the pope and under severe pressure from 
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the Arabs. If they could get Maximus to compromise, and 
enjoy the support of his ascendancy as a theologian, 
perhaps the long desired unity would quickly come about. 
Their representatives went to Bizya with the intention of 
conciliating Maximus but without admitting the validity 
of the Lateran Synod and its doctrine of the wills and 
operations of Christ. The ensuing dispute is a variation 
on the familiar theme: a confrontation of single-minded 
profession of faith and resourceful political compromisel52 
For Maximus the Lateran Synod was an ecumenical council 
and Rome was in some way the guarantee of the orthodoxy 
of its decrees, so that there could be no union until 
those decrees were accepted and the position of Rome 
acknowledged. When it was argued that the synod had no 
authority because it was not approved by the emperor, 
Maximus retorted that it was orthodox faith not emperors 
that ratified synods. He formulates the principle of his 
view in this way: 'The pious rule of the Church recognizes 
as holy and approved those synods which orthodoxy of 
teaching has distinguished to be so'. 
153 Orthodoxy is 
the supreme canon. When Maximus seems to have convinced 
the bishop Theodosius of the rightness of the Lateran 
doctrine, so that he professes himself willing to accept 
it publicly, Maximus insists that the emperor and the 
patriarch of Constantinople must be reconciled at the price 
of submission to the 'pope of Rome' on the basis of 'your 
right confession of faith'. 
154 On departing the consul 
Theodosius wonders if the emperor will consent to send an 
intercessory rescript to Rome. Maximus can see no problem 
if the emperor is willing to humiliate himself as God did 
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for our salvation. Then in a remarkable sentence which sums 
up Maximian spiritual teaching and points a striking contrast 
between Maximus and his adversaries he said: 'If God who, by 
nature saved us, did not save us before willingly humbling 
himself, how will man, who by nature is saved, be saved or 
save others if he does not humble himself? '155 
After a brief interval Maximus is brought to better 
quarters at Rhegium to where the ambassadors returned to 
attempt to undermine his intransigence, first by getting 
him to promise in general to do whatever the emperor would 
ask, which elicited from him a typical riposte: he was 
willing to do whatever the emperor asked provided it was of 
a merely temporal character! He is given a sense of his 
importance by being assured that if he enters into commun- 
ion with Byzantium all the West and those 'of bad spirit' 
in the East will return to unity. The emperor himself will 
accord him the highest honours; 'we will proclaim you our 
Father'. 156 But the condition of such tokens of esteem is 
that he should accept the Typos. After a shärt exchange 
with the pathetic Bishop Theodosius, Maximus affirms that: 
'Truly, all the power of heaven would not persuade me to 
act thus'. 
157 Then flattery yielded to dramatic vindictive-- 
ness as Maximus was buffeted and insulted and found his 
clothes saturated with courtly spittle. Having failed to 
force his consent to open agreement with the monothelite 
position, they then tried to silence him in accordance with 
the prescriptions of the Typos. Maximus reminded them that'. 
'God has not confined the whole of salvation to the heart 
while he says : "He who confesses me 
before men, I will 
confess him before my Father who is in heaven". And the 
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divine Apostle teaches saying: "Faith in the heart leads to 
justice, confession by the lips to salvation" '. He argues 
that to attempt to silence him is to endanger his salvation. 
He is nothing if not consistent. They return to his 
signature of the Lateran anathema, but this again demon- 
strates than a man, whose philosophy is the folly of the 
Cross, cannot but be at cross purposes with those whose 
vision is hampered by the exigences of a temporal politic. 
Since Maximus cannot evade the invitation to share the 
kenosis of his Lord the protagonists of myopic prudence 
have to fall back on a final flourish that cannot rise 
above a brutal threat: 'Know well, sir monk, that if we 
find a little respite in the political confusion, by the 
holy Trinity, we shall know how to join you to the pope, 
who at this moment is puffed up, together with those who 
are talking over there (in Rome) and with the rest of 
your disciples; and we will smelt you all as in a 
crucible, each one in the place that befits him, as Martin 
was smelted'. 
159 From this we can measure the effective- 
ness of the letter Maximus had written to the monks in 
Cagliari. He was sentenced to be deprived of the little 
he possessed and sent to far-off Perberis to be discarded 
in prison there. 
Eugene I died in 657 and he was succeeded by Pope 
Vitalian who took the initiative by a gesture of recon- 
ciliation with Byzantium, sending legates to the emperor 
in return for which he secured imperial approval for his 
election. Vitalian, as a sign of communion, sent his 
synodal letter to the patriarch Peter, in which he did not 
raise the question of the Typos. The patriarch, assuming 
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that he had at last contrived the longed for doctrinal 
agreement which would underpin political unity and the 
stability of the empire, went to the prison to interview 
Maximus, who had been again brought to Constantinople. 
We have an account of this occasion from Maximus himself160 
The patriarch asks him to what church he belongs and names 
the five patriarchates which he says are now united. 
Before Maximus asks what the basis of his confession is 
to be he gives his remarkable definition of the church: 
'The God of all declared the Catholic Church to be the 
orthodox and saving confession of faith in Him, in calling 
Peter blessed for the words in which he rightly confessed 
Him'. 161 The patriarch then proposes the doctrine of two 
natural wills and one hypostatic will which he had 
formulated in his synodal letter, but now disguised as a 
plurality and unity of energies. Maximus cannot accept 
that; 'You who have the power, do what you like'. 
162 
The patriarch then threatens Maximus with papal anathe- 
matisation. 
We have little or no inkling of inner conflict in 
Maximus. He is a martyr because he clings heroically to 
what is right, as he understands it, without violating 
charity with regard to others. At that moment, even if 
he were spared misgivings about his fundamental stand, he 
must have tasted the bitter irony of a situation where he 
is threatened with excommunication by the pope who, for 
him, ensures that his own confession is in keeping with 
that of Peter. In fact Vitalian never condemned Maximus 
nor his companions, but neither did he, in his anxiety to 
placate the emperor, ever speak out in their defence. 
163 
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Heroic faith is compatible with such abandonment; out of 
his dark night of the soul Maximus can say: 'May what was 
decreed by God before every age find its perfection in me, 
giving to him the glory known before every age'. 
164 
Compared to the treasurg hidden in a field, the fall cf an 
empire and the human frailty of the institutional church 
are insignificant to men like Maximus. Finally in 662, 
Maximus was tried again with his companions Anastasius, 
his secretary, and Anastasius, a Roman apocricary. They 
were found guilty and condemned to be flogged, to have 
their tongues torn out and their right hands cut off. 
They were then displayed in their ignominy in all the 
quarters of Constantinople and sent into distant exile 
and imprisonment in Lazica. There Maximus died on the 
13th of August 662. In retrospect the Church has 
acknowledged that the right to which Maximus clung so 
heroically was in fact orthodoxy. For that reason he is 
a martyr . 
CHAPTER II 
MAXIMUS THE THEOLOGIAN; HIS METHOD AND HIS WORKS 
In our first chapter we have seen enough of the life 
of St. Maximus to realise that he did not avoid the partic- 
ularity of concrete choice and affirmation as expressions 
of his faith, even when this witness cost him his life. It 
is this quality of a theology lived that gives such 
splendour to his spirituality. In examing his method as a 
theologian and reviewing his corpus of teaching, we can 
do so in the confidence that he enjoyed in an outstanding 
way the advantage of that indispensable preliminary to 
theological research: profound and even heroic faith. 
The context of patristic theology is the response of 
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man in faith to God's self-bestowal in the Word made flesh, 
where man encounters the mysterious coincidence of the 
aid tke cj d d., 
uncreatedA of the infinite and the finite in the person of 
the Word. The theologian attempts to fathom that mystery 
by submitting to the Spirit in the letter of scripture and 
for the Fathers that letter was not to be violently torn 
from its ecclesial setting, but it was to be questioned 
reverently as it was spoken by the living Church expressed 
in councils and in patristic tradition. God's self- 
communication to man was understood by them as continuing 
to take place in the Spirit-filled Church and not merely 
through the spoken and written word, but in the compler 
tart' modes of sacrament and service. The Church was r 
as the Bride. in relation to her divine Bridegroom, r 
that the exercise of faith was understood as an aff' 
tion within the wholeness of that sacred mutuality 
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merely as an isolated function of sanctified intellect. 
Faith was certainly an intellectual assent, but beyond that 
it was required to be a consent of the will that carried 
with it the promise of total conversion, something that 
would involve man in all the dimensions of his being. He 
was a 'new creation' in the Pauline sense' and so the 
exercise of faith was the affirmation of new being, of 
Christian existence. Because the meaning of the Christian 
life is to be found in the existential and intentional 
reference of man to God, the profession of faith implies 
worship and obedience, the awe-inspired acknowledgement of 
the presence of God and the will to make him the ground of 
human existence in such a way that man's activity becomes 
the unfolding of a participation in divine nature. For 
the Fathers the practice of theology took place within the 
consciousness made possible in that kind of commitment. 
It was at once the property of faith to seek understanding 
and to remember that its term was not the formulae but the 
reality expressed in them, so that although theology could 
not shirk the stringent procedures of critical reflection 
it was in turn bound to the impulse towards reality immanent 
to the act of faith and the larger context of that life 
which we may describe as Christian existence. This was the 
root of theology and the secret of its orthodox consistency. 
For them there could be no question of theology without this 
preliminary of a living faith and its concomitant awareness 
of divine reality. To have attempted any other kind of 
exploration of the data of revelation would have been for 
them merely profane discipline, doomed to failure. Von 
Balthasar has said of the Fathers that 'their own lives 
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reproduced the fullness of the Church's teaching, and 
their teaching the fullness of the Church's life'. 
2 
Before we look more closely at Maximus as theologian 
it may be helpful to consider briefly in a more general 
way some further aspects of patristic theology. In that 
theology the presupposition is the Word apprehended in 
faith and in virtue of that principle the whole of 
hellenic rationalism can be assumed and put to the service 
of articulating the implications of revelation. In the 
Fathers we find all the resources of human intelligence 
called on to investigate the meaning of the words which 
are ultimately the language of the Word, the sequence of 
human thought into which He has poured a content that is 
coterminous with himself and in this process theology 
accepts not only the demands of rigorous method, but also 
the necessary submission to the hegemony of the Word 
himself. Besides it is a discipline where dialectic is 
always prepared to yield to silence because the words 
issue from the Word and vice versa the finite expression 
is constantly opening on to the infinite; because that 
infinite is personal, reflection takes place in a climate 
of prayer. To insist that theology requires more than 
the play of reasoning intellect is not to belittle that 
process; it is to. admit that there is more to man's 
encounter with God than the manipulation of concepts, but 
it is at the same time to recall that because of revelation 
the cataphatic is the way to the apophatic, that we go 
through the flesh to the Word, that the letter is the way 
to the Spirit. As Meyendorff puts it: 'Because the 
concept of theologia in Byzantium, as with the Cappadocian 
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Fathers, was inseparable from theoria ("contemplation"), 
theology could not be - as it is in the West -a rational 
deduction from "revealed" premisses, i. e., from Scripture 
or from the statements of an ecclesiastical magisterium; 
rather it was a vision experienced by the saints, whose 
authenticity was, of course, to be checked against the 
witness of Scripture and Tradition. Not that rational 
deductive process was completely eliminated from theologi- 
cal thought; but it represented for the Byzantines the 
lowest and least reliable level of theology'. 
3 
For Lossky, in the eastern tradition 'the inner 
experience of the Christian develops within the circle 
delineated by the teaching of the Church'. 
4 It is that 
circle which ensures access to what cannot be encircled 
and guarantees that the experience is truly relational 
and not subjective illusion. In this view of theology 
the rational process is in function of a more fundamental 
awareness of divine reality and it is this awareness that 
releases the reasoning intellect from being condemned to a 
futile revolution within the bounds of its own possibilit- 
ies when confronted with mystery and enables it to serve a 
higher process and in turn find itself transformed. 
Theology then becomes the exploration of an expanding 
consciousness of divine reality that is perceived in some 
way more directly than would be possible to reason left to 
itself. The theologian must not merely learn divine things 
but also suffer them5 so that theology is the product of a 
higher dialectic where the gulf between the clarity of its 
conceptions and the brilliance of the mystery, which 
strikes the mind as darkness, is felt ever more keenly. 
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In order to enter this formidable region the Fathers 
required that profound reformation of sense and spirit that 
Scripture calls 'renewal of mind'. 
6 For them, unless 
a ap theia within the context of naked faith has set the 
mirror of the soul in order, there can be no question of 
theologia, simply because unruly emotion distorts the truth 
and inhibits that passivity to the divine that is made 
possible by a developed charity and is the basis of an 
energetic exercise of reasoning intellect. The language 
of their theology was a complex of spirit-chosen words. 
Its function was not so much an attempt to translate 
divine reality into the language of a secular culture, as 
the plastic use of language, especially philosophical 
language, under the control of a creative vision beyond 
the possibility of any merely secular resource, so that it 
was transformed and rendered capable of conveying divine 
truth. It is the Holy Spirit who is the guarantor of the 
verbal traditiron of truth in the theology of the Fathers 
and the Spirit for them was not thought of as in any way 
set over against the Church. The Church was, as it were, 
the locus where the intervention of the Spirit was guaran- 
teed to take place for the sanctification of man and his 
guidance into all truth. Because of this approach to 
theology there was no clearcut distinction between 
theology and spirituality in the mind of the Fathers. 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the 
function of anthropology and christology in the spiritua- 
lity of Maximus the Confessor, so that it is well at this 
stage to say that 'spirituality' is understood in the 
contemporary sense of 'the personal assimilation of the 
7 
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aalvif is mission of Christ' 'present in the Church and 
transmitted through its preaching and sacraments' While 
it is the province of theology to listen to the revelation 
of God in words, to reflect on their implications and to 
systematise - at least inchoatively - its findings while 
maintaining its alertness to the mystery hidden in the 
words, it is the special province of spirituality to be 
concerned with 'the core of Christian existence' and 'with 
the wisdom of God in a mystery'9 and with the realization 
in practice of revelation in a concrete living experience 
of faith, hope and love. While spirituality can be said 
to be the subjective aspect of dogmatics in general, here 
we shall concentrate on Maximus' view of man and his 
redemption finding that his anthropology and soteriology 
are synthesized in his christology. Spirituality will be 
concerned not only with the enhanced appreciation of 
revealed truth made possible by yvwai, s, but also with 
%päEcC, not merely as an indispensable preliminary for 
yvwoLs, but also as the expression of that \/vucIS in the 
concrete as the translation of the possibility of truth 
into the actuality of Christian living. Thus the adoration 
and obedience that flow from the fundamental engagement of 
faith inform this theology and manifest the counterpoint- 
ing of hellenic idealism with the realism of the gospels 
where truth goes beyond ideas and requires existential 
realization. Spirituality is governed by the conviction 
that man must do the truth in. charity. 
10 In this way man 
11 
enters the llvc 3a and becomes nvev. urr xdr,. 
12 The Spirit 
ensures that he yields to the dynamism of his nature and 
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becomes the fullness of his destined truth. Von Balthasar 
might have been describing the Christian existence of 
Maximus when he wrote that 'the Word in this world has the 
power to turn speculation into actual living, the exercise 
of authority into holiness of life g theology into Christi- 
an practice, reflection into irrefutable witness to the 
point of martyrdom. 
13 
The Methodology of Maximus the Confessor 
In the Fathers the word OcoAoyCa has two meanings : 
14 
it can designate an extended reflection in faith on the 
mystery of the Blessed Trinity in contrast to a comparable 
meditation on the redemptive incarnation oZxovoµCa 
Maximus very rarely uses the term in this sense. He 
generally intends by the word its second meaning: the 
final phase of the way of perfection as it was schematized 
by Evagrius of Pontus: practical philosophy, natural 
contemplation and theology. 
15 'Theology' here is meant to 
convey an aspect of 'divinization', the culmination of the 
process of man's being transformed in his relation to God, 
something that will be perfected posthumously, but of which 
there is granted a foretaste in experimental knowledge of 
God and divine things in this earthly condition. 
16 Maximus 
would not have used an expression like 'passive contempla- 
tion', but for him 'theology' was something in that order. 
'Practical philosophy' and 'natural contemplation' were a 
preparation for that, the one a vigorous asceticism, the 
other an approximation to what we would now describe as 
'theology'. 'Natural Contemplation' referred to a compre- 
hensive reflective exercise by a thoroughly christened mind 
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over the whole field of human experience, mediated by the 
phenomena of nature as well as by the words of Scripture 
17 
For Maximus the attempt to appropriate intellectually the 
realm of nature cannot prescind from the Incarnation; 
18 the 
philosopher must enjoy a purification 'in the Spirit'19 if 
his mind is to function genuinely. 'Natural contemplation' 
for Maximus then corresponds to what we mean by philosophy, 
except that he presupposes a rectification of man's reason 
by a Christian asceticism or 'practical philosophy'. 
20 
As we have just seen, it would also include a systema- 
tized reflection on revelation and so be equivalent to our 
'theology'. The contemporary notion of theology as systema- 
tized reflection on revelation is a broader idea than 
Maximus' 'theology' as reflection on the Trinity, while for 
the most part, especially in the West, his 'theology' in 
the sense of contemplative knowledge, is something outside 
normal usage nowadays. In a recent study of his metho- 
dology, Vittorio Croce has subjected the theology of Maximus 
to careful scrutiny. 
21 He excludes 'theology' in the sense 
of mystical knowledge from his review of the theological 
method of the Confessor and confines himself to 'natural 
contemplation'. It must be said by way of introduction that 
just as wonder as a% Oor. was the beginning of wisdom for 
a Greek philosopher, so a monk of Maximus' spirituality 
would never be deprived of a comparable wonder in the field 
of theology. Heidegger has pointed out that wonder as 
7, äOoc. is always the beginning of wisdom, in the sense that 
it is the fundamental astonishment that energizes philosophi- 
cal reflection, the basic noetic relationship to reality that 
22 
supports the grind of philosophical discourse. In the 
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same way contemplative prayer was the primal relationship of 
spiritual theologians like Maximus with divine reality and 
even if Croce cannot incorporate it into a scientific schema 
of his method, it can undoubtedly be presumed to be there as 
the form of Maximus' personal openness to the Christian 
mystery in faith, a mystery that is expressed verbally in a 
living tradition. It is this openness to the Spirit that 
enables him to have insight into the written record of what 
Jesus said and did as the core of the Christian tradition. 
It is the 'knowledge of God' spoken of in Scripture and 
it is received at the depth of consciousness and responsive- 
ness in man described in the bible as the 'heart'. 
We have explicit statements from Maximus himself on his 
method and it can be said straightaway that this method 
applies both to his spiritual writing and to his polemical- 
dogmatic treatises and that he used the same method all 
through his career as a theologian and spiritual master. In 
his 6th Epistle, an early piece, he says that he intends 'to 
demonstrate with natural arguments, without biblical or 
patristic evidence, that the soul is an incorporeal 
creature. 
ý3 Here we have the three elements of theological 
method as understood by Maximus q the one he intends to use 
in his reply to Bishop John and the other two which he will 
not employ in this case. Towards the end of his life he 
holds, in his argument against 'hypostatic energy', that 
'new expressions should not be coined which lack scriptural, 
patristic or natural force, but have a value that is 
extraneous and the invention of perverse men'. 
24 Between 
these two significant instances there are two other explicit 
references to this threefold proof. In the Ambi ua, in a 
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refutation of origenism, he uses a proof that he' qualifies 
as cpvc3 LxwC xaC YpacpLxws xaC xWcp Lxwý &iooe8E vrµjvov . 
25 
The same triad appears in his Dispute with Pyrrhus in 645 
A. D. 26 Another proof was adduced by him, that from the 
Councils. 27 We shall see later on how he relates the 
Fathers to the Councils. 
Even though the method of his spiritual writing is less 
rigorously scientific it is basically the same kind of 
appropriation and expression of the data of revelation as 
that found in his strictly polemical and expository work. 
Conversely all the theological endeavour of Maximus, the 
effort to find certainty in theology, is situated in his 
view of the spiritual life as a whole, schematized as we 
have seen in the triad of Evagrius: 
28 'practical philosophy', 
the mastery of the passions, which disposes man for a 
perception of the A6'ot of things, unclouded by the dis- 
tortions of passion, that is for 'natural contemplation'; 
the third phase, to be realized eschatologically, is that 
of 'theology', participation and vision of God, anticipated 
in some way here in 'pure prayer'. 
29 'Natural contemplation' 
is ordered to 'theology'30 as Maximus sees, so that research 
and demonstration are ordered to contemplation. In fact, 
for Maximus, discourse and contemplation are incompatible, 
at least when it is a question of the perfection of contem- 
plation as will be granted to man after death: 'In fact, 
the wise men say that it is not possible that the experience 
of God and reasoning about him should coexist, or that a 
conceptual activity about him should coincide with the 
perception of him. 
31 It has already been suggested that the 
perception of him possible in this life would seem to have 
an enriching influence on reflection about him. 
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(i) Scripture 
It is not difficult to understand why a man like 
Maximus, whose intellectual life was caught up in the 
dynamic of a search for God, should find in Scripture the 
basis of his noetic. For him it is the divine word, 
'words divinely inspired'32 'the word spoken by God', 
33 
'the voice of God who speaks by means of the prophets. 
34 
It is the word of God because it is inspired by the Holy 
Spirit; 35 it is the word of Christ36 and in the Gnostic 
Centuries he sees the scriptures as an incarnation of the 
Logos, so that in this work the Logos as a human being 
and the Logos as expressed in words are identical: 'there 
are not two Logoi'. 
37 
For Maximus three things offer themselves to man's 
consideration: himself, creation and Scripture; 
38 in the 
three he finds two levels of reality, or if you wish an 
outside and an inside. To grasp the meaning of reality it 
is necessary to move from level to level, to penetrate the 
outside in order to lay hold of the inside. In self- 
understanding man must move from sense-knowledge to 
intellect, in the understanding of creation he must discern 
the intelligible in the phenomenal, the logos in the mani- 
festation and in scripture he must transcend the letter in 
order to find the spirit. Knowledge then is not the 
discarding of what we may call the 'outside' but a use of 
it that enables the knower to find the intelligible and 
finally God himself. The quest of the meaning of scripture 
must respect the objective character of all created reality 
as we encounter it; exegesis cannot free itself from a 
human epistemology, so that we cannot receive the light of 
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the Logos except through his spoken words, the formation of 
the Spirit except through its formulation in scripture. 
Knowing is a matter of accepting the forms of expression 
woven into the human condition, and of not being 
restricted to those forms, but of appropriating their 
deeper content. Maximus did not neglect the letter of 
Scripture and he could use a literal interpretation of the 
text with splendid effect, 
39 but the principle of his 
interpretation was an acceptance of Christ in faith and so 
he relentlessly sought to understand scripture by an 
analysis of its language in the light of the previous 
acceptance of Christ in faith. 
40 Everything for him was 
linked to the mystery of Christ, everything in scripture 
the revelation of some aspect of that mystery. 
41 There 
was no question of apprehending Christ and scripture in 
the light of that apprehension without the intervention of 
the Holy Spirit, so that his counsel is: 'Seek with the 
Spirit that which is of the Spirit', 
42 
a fundamental 
principle of exegesis for him. He is aware of the Spirit 
within who 'searches and scrutinizes the knowledge of 
beings in us'43 so that exegesis for him has to be 
'spiritual' in its subject who knows, the object known and 
the path of that knowledge. 
44 Just as the Logos is at the 
origin of the scriptural word so He is the source of the 
light in which it is understood: the logoi of the words 
of scripture find their source in the logos from which they 
derive their meaning. 
45 Croce suggests a useful formula to 
summarize the principle of maximian exegesis: 'Seek accord- 
46 ing to the spirit the logos of the narration'. Here for 
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Maximus 'spirit, ' is the way of research, the 'logos' is 
the object of research. This approach is rooted in the 
conviction that all scripture is divinely inspired and is 
given to us for salvation. 
47 In short, it is an analytical 
application, to every passage of Scripture, of the global 
significance of the revelation that the Spirit has already 
led us to accept in faith. It may be pertinent to suggest 
again that 'theology' as Maximus understands the 
term, contemplative knowledge, can be understood to have a 
Cc3 
function here, within faith,, but, giving it a maturer 
quality in the form of experience. This kind of interpre- 
tation of scripture launches us into a totally spiritual 
world. It takes for granted the habitual exercise of faith 
in the exegete and so is in striking contrast to the 
exegesis that is done in the light of secular historical 
principles only. It is of course the exegetic style of the 
alexandrian school, with Origen as its greatest exponent and 
the exegesis of Maximus has all the characteristics of that 
great exegetical tradition: consciousness of the transcend- 
ence of the word of God, its spiritual relevance, the combi- 
nation of universal significance and the word of God, its 
spiritual relevance, the combination of universal signifi- 
cance and personal applicability, the contrast of literal 
and spiritual interpretation as that between the possibility 
open to Jew as against Christian and so the invitation to 
the Christian to surpass the literal by seeking the 
spiritual meaning. 
48 
The sacred writers bear witness to events rather than 
present us with a system. The events point beyond themselves 
to the realm that is accessible to faith and so it is quite 
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legitimate to interpret the events in the light of the 
further reality. In fact, a reading of scripture that 
would exclude this reference to the whole mystery of Christ, 
would be less than a christian interpretation. There would 
seem to be the possibility of a further distinction within 
the faith-approach to the meaning of the bible. It is a 
distinction made by Origen when he says that there is 
, 
f£ith-and - xvpCwr. %Lors3cLv , 
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which are successive 
phases of the same faith, the former is a faith that is 
experienced as being over against its object in some way, 
an external observation of the mystery, the latter is a 
development of yvwoLC,, a new realization of the intimacy 
of the mystery of Christ's being with us and in us. 
Exercising faith in the former way, an exegete could work 
up a very worthwhile biblical theology, a satisfactory 
statement of the Christian mystery as it is expressed in 
the bible. But with the latter kind of developed faith 
the writing should take on a new dimension; it would 
become spiritual in the sense that the mystery would be 
apprehended in a superior way because of the action of the 
Holy Spirit in the believer, making his faith to be 
enlightened faith. Croce does not seem to visualise the 
possibility of this distinction in this context. It would 
mean the influx of 'theology' into the composition of a 
work that took the form of a 'natural contemplation' to 
use the language of Evagrius. This kind of exegesis is 
consistent with all that Maximus has to say about the 
possibility of knowledge in a purified mind. In a remark- 
able passage in his Mystagogia he says: 'If the invisible 
things are contemplated through the visible things, in a 
much greater measure the visible things are understood 
54 
through the invisible things by those who give themselves 
to contemplation. 
50 This makes it evident that for 
maximus to have sight of the logos of creatures is to take 
hold of them at the source of their intelligibility and 
ultimately in and through the Logos who is the locus of 
the logoi. It is to be noted that this is the prerogative 
of those who give themselves to contemplation. Very 
obviously this can be referred to 'natural contemplation'. 
But if the knowledge is so radical and so comprehensive it 
looks as if it has something gratuitous about it, that it 
is in some way a gift of God, that some dimension of 
'natural contemplation' in this context is not merely 
acquired by personal effort even in faith. 
The language of Scripture corresponds to the 'visible 
things', it is the normal manifestation of the Logos to 
the man of faith, a record of the Incarnation. 
51 In fact 
it is Maximus' contemplative appreciation of the formula 
of Chalcedon that gives him insight not merely into 
scripture, but into all creation. 
52 He in some way has 
knowledge of the conclusions in their principles and so 
he can, before Aquinas, 'dispose the phantasms'53 with 
anticipatory discrimination. We can see his method in 
these two passages: 'The mystery of the taking flesh of 
the Logos has the force of all the enigmas and types of 
Scripture and the knowledge of creatures visible and 
intelligible. And whoever has understood the mystery of 
the cross and burial, has understood the logoi of the 
above mentioned things. Whoever has been initiated into 
the unspeakable power of the resurrection, has understood 
the purpose for which God initially gave sustenance to all 
55 
things'. 54 'When the Logos of God becomes clear and 
luminous in us and his face shines like the sun, then also 
his garments appear to shine, that is the words of holy 
Scripture, of the Gospels appear evident and manifest, 
having nothing hidden. But Moses and Elias also come with 
him, that is the most spiritual logoi of the Law and the 
prophets'. 
55 For Maximus the mystery of Christ is the 
unique object of the spiritual sense of scripture; it is 
not so much a case of understanding something of Christ 
through the scriptures as of understanding the scriptures 
through Him and beyond them the whole of the created 
realm. 
56 It also puts into perspective how Maximus under- 
stands the literal sense of scripture, an understanding 
that could accommodate the most exacting critical stand- 
ards, but which would not be bound by them. There is 
something of the interplay of cataphaticism and apophati- 
cism in his exegesis. 
57 Maximus always uses scripture 
with a theological purpose but this means that it must be 
used critically; he intends 
gence'58 the scriptural text. 
'to examine with intelli- 
For him the Bible has 
absolute authority: 'in itself it gives a sure foundation 
to discourse'. 59 He will when required have recourse to 
the literal sense, as for instance in Quaestiones et 
Dubia 71,60 but at the other end of the spectrum he 
maintains that 'the logos of all beings are contained bj 
the word of God, while it is not contained by any being'. 
61 
For Maximus the language of scripture rests on an inverted 
and created apex, but opens out to infinity. 
(ii) Fathers and Councils 
56 
While it is obvious that for Maximus Scripture is the 
expression of the mind of God and so an irreplaceable 
means of entering into that mystery, he does not use the 
Scriptures out of relationship to the Church. The fissi- 
parous principle of sola scriptura is entirely foreign to 
him. The Scripture is always in his case the final court 
of appeal when it comes to ascertaining some facet of 
revelation, 
62 but he would never have thought it possible 
to take up the Bible, open its pages and discover tout 
court its divine meaning. For him it is the Fathers of 
the Church who 'draw from the divinely inspired words the 
wisdom of the divine mysteries'. 
63 The authority of the 
Fathers comes from the fact of their docility to the Holy 
Spirit: 'really it was not for them to speak, but the 
grace of the Holy Spirit which enveloped them completely 
64 
They too are 6s6, xvcvaTo,, 
65 
and so 'approved by God', 
66 
'inspired by God', 
67 'made wise by God', 
68 'divinely 
eloquent'. 
69 
The genitive case in the expression 'Fathers of the 
Church' can be either objective or subjective. In the 
former sense it is an application to the bishops of the 
church of the pauline begetting in the Lord through the 
gospel; in the latter sense it means that they belong to 
the Church, are approved by the Church. This twofold 
semantic possibility can give rise to what may look like 
vicious circles in argumentation. If they beget the 
Church by their teaching, how can the Church claim the 
right to approve or disapprove of them? As we shall see 
the formal principle of orthodoxy is the faith of the 
Church, of which the Fathers are the brilliant exponents, 70 
57 
but of which the Church under the Holy Spirit io the 
ultimate judge71 and she exe rciaee this function in times 
of doctrinal crisis in Councils so that the term 'Father' 
is not reserved in the usage of Maximus to the great 
patristic figures of the past72 but is also applied to the 
bishops of his day 'to whom is entrusted the guidance of 
the holy and catholic Church of God'. 
73 When he uses the 
term of those in the past he does not apply it to all the 
bishops but only to those of whom the Church has approved - 
01 Eyxp v o. flatie peC , 
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a group of outstanding teachers 
commonly accepted in his time. It is the writings of these 
Fathers that express the true faith of the Church for 
Maximus. They express the Church's understanding of the 
revelation contained in Holy Writ, so that occasionally we 
find them used paratactically with scripture in Maximus, 
but more frequently as a secure way back to its interpre- 
tation, reliable links with the apostolic age, genuine 
expositors of the apostolic intentions: 'animated indeed 
by the one and identical Spirit, they passed on to the 
people the right profession of faith'. 
75 
In his final trial Maximus challenges his adversaries 
by inviting them to search for 'the meaning of the express- 
ions of the Fathers and' he concludes, 'we shall know the 
truth'. 76 All through his polemical career he was at 
pains to emphasize that he was not introducing novelties, 
but always seeking to find the meaning of the patristic 
texts: 'we therefore do not introduce new modes of speech 
( W6FeLC ), as our adversaries say, but we profess the 
expressions of the fathers, nor do we manipulate the terms 
for personal reasons - that would be indeed rash and the 
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work and invention of an heretical and lunatic mind, - but 
we dutifully use them as they were understood and expressed 
by the same saints'. 
77 Fidelity to tradition was fidelity 
to concepts and meaning, not to terminology divorced from 
that. 78 Not that terminology was unimportant to Maximus. 
His principle of reciprocal immanence was valid here too: 
the meaning was immanent in the words, so that it is 
necessary to use the words to find the meaning, but to 
divorce the words from the meaning was to make them meaning- 
less. 79 
The Christian's knowledge of God is inseparable for 
Maximus from the Church. He thinks of the Church primarily 
in relation to the faith which ensures the discovery of God 
and participation in his life. 
so Faith for him means the 
virtue, of faith and the content of faith. It is the 
acceptance by each one of the doctrine proposed by the 
Church as a faithful expression of revelation: 'I learned 
this faith and was instructed in it by the holy and blessed 
fathers who were among us before and those who remain now, 
to whom was entrusted the guidance of the holy catholic 
church of God and who guide it rightly to the port of the 
divine will'. 
81 He describes the function of the Fathers 
accurately when he says that 'animated by the one and 
identical Spirit they passed on to the people the right 
profession of faith. I have found also all those who hold 
the reins of the Church, by the grace of the Spirit, in 
agreement with them, those who have preserved the right 
logos of the pious faith and have in no way changed its 
meaning'. The Church teaches what she believes; 
82 
Maximus speaks of 'ecclesiastical faith'83 and 'ecclesi- 
astical teaching'. 84 Faith here does not necessarily mean 
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primarily the attitude of accepting revelation; it can 
mean the content of the formulae. Nor is it possible to 
find in Maximus an explicit statement about 'consulting 
the laity'85 even though he was aware of their heroic 
performance during the Arian heresy, when the accredited 
teachers were confused and in disarray. But it is the 
whole church that professes the faith; in fact he 
identifies the church with the 'right and salvific 
profession of faith in Christ'. 
86 'The Church is indeed 
pure and uncontaminated, faultless and genuine, complete 
and capable of the true light'. 
87 For him, the notes of 
the Church can be seen in relation to the faith of the 
Church: her sanctity is the 'piety' of her faith; her 
catholicity can be understood as communion in the same 
faith that is itself complete; her faith is apostolic 
because of the unbroken continuity between her actual 
profession of faith and that taught by the Apostles; the 
faith is the principle of her unity. 
88 What may look like 
vicious circles in argument to the formalist become 
intelligible when the faith of the Church is appreciated 
from the inside: it is the faith that founds and 
constitutes the church; it is for the Church to regulate 
the dogmas of the true faith. 
89 The Church is alive with 
the Spirit that scans the depths of God and his economy 
for man; it is the Spirit who ensures that the Church 
will preserve the mind of Christ; it might be even said 
that the Church knows her own mind which is the mind of 
Christ and so she is in a position to say what is and 
what is not a genuine expression of that mind, who is and 
who is not a true father of the Church. The Fathers for 
60 
Maximus, to be credible and reliable, must be approved by 
the Church. This approval is expressed for the Confessor 
in the form of ecumenical councils: 'the whole of christi- 
anity: that is indeed in reality the most holy council of 
the orthodox fathers'. 
90 The 'ecclesiastical faith' 
received by the Church is preserved and passed on in 
'ecclesiastical teaching'. 91 The whole Church is in some 
way actualized in the Council as the teaching Church, a 
church that is already a believing one. 
92 
Maximus tells us much about his theological method 
when he says of the monothelites: 'not having any usage of 
any council or father or scripture as testimony in favour 
of their affirmations, they manipulate the dogmas of piety, 
which they, who from the beginning were eye-witnesses and 
ministers of the Word (Lk. 1,2), have passed on to us and 
afterwards their disciples and successors, the masters of 
the truth inspired by God, that is to say in the five 
ecumenical councils of the most holy and divinely inspired 
fathers' . 
93 The revelation expressed in Scripture is funda- 
mental: it comes from eye-witnesses; it accepts the kind 
of testimony claimed by John the evangelist in his first 
epistle as well as by Luke cited by Maximus. It is passed 
down as 'dogmas of piety'; the revelation is formulated in 
authoritative teaching that ensures its identity with the 
primitive revelation. It has been 'passed on to us' not 
merely by the eye-witnesses but by their disciples and 
successors, so that continuity is maintained with the 
original witnesses of the revelation. The successors are 
described as 'the masters of the truth' which for Maximus 
is equivalent to 'father of the Church'. He visualises the 
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fathers 'in the five holy ecumenical councils'. The 
council on its own, because of its embodying continuity 
with the past would have been sufficient for Maximus to 
ensure the truth of its pronouncements as is evident from 
his declaration that 'even if there were none (i. e. 
patristic texts to confirm the Chalcedonian formula), 
when really there is an abundance of them, what would 
prevent so many saints - rather the whole of christianity: 
this indeed is in reality the most holy council of the 
orthodox fathers - from pronouncing authoritatively this 
expression and sanctioning it against the contraction of 
Eutyches'? 94 So that he seems to use the term 'father' 
in two senses in the previous quotation: it refers to 
the fathers actually in council and to a father as the 
source of testimony. While the Scripture is at the basis 
of the faith, it is for councils to sanction the right 
understanding of the same faith relying on the faithful 
transmission of the fathers in the sense of the approved 
bishops who left written evidence of their belief. 'If 
the Fathers give testimony to the right faith, the Councils 
define it with authority'. 
95 
With regard to Scripture, Fathers and Councils 'it is 
(Christ)who has spoken through them'; 
96 they in turn are 
the way to Christ and through him to God. The formulation 
of the gospel message in Creeds was for Maximus as for the 
whole Church of his time an essential synthesis of the 
faith, to be professed explicitly by those who claimed to 
follow Christ and be members of the Church. He devotes 
much attention to it in his Mystagogia. 
97 For him it was 
the ultimate criterion of orthodoxy and just as it was a 
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synthesis of belief, so it could be unfolded to show its 
implications. In fact every statement that purported to be 
an expression of Christian faith must be in some way related 
to these basic Symbols, a qualification that Maximus cannot 
find, for instance, in his examination of the origenistic 
theory of the preexistence of souls. 
98 The possibility of 
synthesization and development of the data of revelation is 
evidence that the human appropriation of the word of God is 
not something mechanical, but something living, an assimila- 
tion of the truth given in faith in a genuinely human way, 
capable of conceptualization, definition, division and 
judgement. Because of this, besides the external criterion 
of truth that the Confessor finds in the faith of the Church 
taught with authority in councils that define the testimony 
of the fathers and scripture, he looks for an inner criteri- 
on, by which man can know that his grasp of the revealed 
faith is coherent and integral and he finds it in logic. 
99 
For him every father, whether poring over the scriptures 
and expressing his meditations in writing or sitting with 
his fellow-bishops in council had to exercise his mind and 
exercise it rightly. Between the 'practical philosophy' 
of the exercise of virtue and an unthematic encounter with 
God there was for Maximus the stage of 'natural contempla- 
tion' with its unremitting application of reason to revela- 
tion in the light of faith, a faith that was patient of 
contemplative modification, but which was always laborious 
as a search for a definition of what the Church actually 
believed. Interpretation is the proper trade of the 
fathers as theologians. 
100 
Although there is no need to elaborate the place of 
63 
the liturgy as an element in the theological methodology of 
Maximus it would be an inexcusable omission not to mention 
it. When we think of him as a theologian contemplating 
evidence for God in scripture and in nature we must recall 
that his actual experience of life was also to a large 
extent informed by his participation in the liturgy. He 
did not use the liturgy in the spirit of contemporary 
theologians as a locus theologicus nor is his Mystagogia101 
a technical commentary on the liturgy of his time. It is 
above all a work of asceticism and mysticism in which he 
opens up for us vistas of breathtaking grandeur as he 
interprets the Church and the Liturgical rites so that 
those who take part in the liturgical action may be 
disposed to encounter in and through the mystery of the 
eucharist, the mystery of Christ. 
102 Because of this 
rapport with the myotery through action we find in the 
liturgy powerful evidence for the spiritual character of 
all the theological undertaking of Maximus. The liturgy 
was the situation in which the mystery was assimilated in 
a way that transcends a mere conceptualization in an 
intellectual way. It was the acting out of faith in 
terms of sacrament and through sacrament there was a 
living relationship with Christ who is the mystery in a 
fuller sense. The liturgy came within the purview of 
'natural contemplation' but as a symbol, in the maximian 
sense of a mode of the presence of the mystery rather than 
as a quarry for theological language and thought. 
103 
Mystagogy was for Maximus a kind of initiation into the 
mysteries, an interpretation not unlike the catechetieal 
64 
interpretations of other Fathers, Cyril of Jerusalem for 
instance, who prepared their neophytes, not merely to 
understand the mysteries, but to be existentially disposed 
to enter into them by fitting states of mind and feeling. 
104 
It was an exercise in proper orientation. 
Having reviewed Maximus' use of scripture and 
tradition in the sense of the councils and fathers and 
having recalled the concrete milieu of his christian 
experience in the liturgy we must now address ourselves to 
the question of how he searched for God by an appreciation 
of what it was to be a knowing subject confronted not 
merely with revelation in the strict sense, but with 
nature as a declaration of the Logos. 
(iii) Logos 
Perhaps the theological epistemology of Maximus could 
be described as logical realism. For Him the ultimate 
real in the order of knowledge is the Logos and conscious- 
ness is the real come to self-awareness, so that conscious- 
ness finds in itself the real in terms of knowledge, it is 
the real in the order of knowledge, become aware of reality 
and so of the laws of reality, so that gnoseological laws 
are the laws of being at the level of knowledge and aware- 
ness. Since this real is, for Maximus, the logos, being 
logical is having a consciousness that obeys the reality of 
the Logos participated, that submits to the laws of logic 
in the sense of being, as a capacity of knowing, conformed 
subjectively to the reality of the Logos and so able to lay 
hold of the Logos through the logoi of created things, of 
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being able to appropriate the truth that is derived from 
the Logos and leads to the Logos. The process of knowing 
theologically approximates to the knowledge the Logos has 
of reality in himself and as Himself q being a share in his 
knowledge as faith and in the power to know with the laws 
of knowing woven into it so that a right use of that power 
will ensure the unfolding of what is implicit in the 
statements of scripture and also in the manifestation of 
the Logos that Maximus finds in nature. 
As we have noted already Maximus does not think of 
philosophy as a possibility for the Christian apart from 
the 'practical philosophy' of the purification wrought in 
man by his tackling inordinate passions which distort 
human vision, giving him a caricature of the real, by 
restricting his knowledge to sense and the merely created. 
The purification then is not conceived as a merely moral 
rectification but as the physical rectification of the 
power to know, rendering it truly logical. This, for him, 
is the pre-requisite of 'natural contemplation' or 
'contemplation in spirit'. 
105 The object of that contem- 
plation is Scripture and nature, so that we have a 
'natural contemplation' of Scripture and a 'natural con- 
templation' of nature of 'the beings of nature'. 
106 
Maximus deals with this possibility and this distinction 
in many places, especially in the Ambigua. Commenting on 
the Transfiguration, for instance, he writes that 'the 
most blessed splendour of the shining face, which was too 
much for the power to see, is a symbol of his divinity 
which is above intellect, sensation, substance and know- 
ledge. .... the white garments are the symbol of the words 
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of sacred Scripture, in so far as they became for them (the 
apostles) limpid and clear and evident ... and of the 
creation itself in so far as it was liberated from the 
perverse opinion of those who allow themselves to be 
deceived by its appearances and are bound by sensation 
alone ... In the words of Scripture he is veiled as Logos, 
in creation as creator, maker and artificer. Therefore I 
affirm that whoever wishes to make for God in an unblame- 
worthy way has absolute need of both, whether of the 
scriptural knowledge in spirit or of natural contemplation 
of being according to spirit'. 
107 The interest of Maximus 
in the knowledge of nature was caught up in the dynamic of 
his whole life with its powerful bias to God and union 
with Him, so that we never find him revelling in a merely 
humanistic way in knowledge for its own sake. This does 
not mean that he was in any way negligent of the power to 
know, accepting its strength and limitations with wisdom. 
While he normally used the argument from nature together 
with that from scripture and the fathers and councils, 
there were two areas where he occasionally used it on its 
own: natural theology and anthropology. We can hear 
anticipatory notes from the Canticle of the Sun in this 
quotation: 'all the creatures that make up the totality 
of the cosmos praise and glorify God with inarticulate 
expressions, and their praise becomes ours, "by means of 
having received the power to praise", says Gregory, the 
great eponym of theology'. 
108 
The recognition of God 
from creatures depends on the Christian apatheia, but that 
undertaken and the consequent power of vision achieved, 
they 'learned that there is a provident being of things, 
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whom they recognized as God and the creator of all things109 
Maximus contrasts the views of the Christian thinker on 
creation with those of origenism, which he attributes to 
pagan Greek thought. For him the dependence of the world 
on God was total, the contrast between the creature and 
God absolute, so that the providence of God was universal 
and absolute too: 'Providence is the will of God, by which 
all beings receive fitting guidance'. 
110 He finds the 
origenistic teaching on the 'unity of logical beings' had 
its origin in 'the thought of the Greeks'. 
lll It would be 
entirely mistaken to suggest that Maximus hellenized the 
gospel. He accepts the opinions of the philosophers when 
they coincide with his own, but he contradicts them, 
modifies them, reinterprets them according to the exigencies 
of his independent thought, which is thoroughly Christian 
in inspiration and evolution. There is no need to substan- 
tiate that claim here beyond referring to passages like 
these in the Opuscula Theologica et Polemica, where he 
contrasts Christian usage with that of the pagan philoso- 
phers in the interpretation of terms like nature, individual 
and hypostasis. 
112 
The other area where he sees the validity of the 
natural argument as particularly relevant is that of anthro- 
pology. His thought about man and his nature is expressed 
at times without citations from the Scripture or the 
Fathers, as for instance in his Letter to Bishop John, 
where the argument is from Reason only, as he proves that 
the soul is incorporeal. 
113 In another letter he undertakes 
to show how the soul continues to hold its intellectual 
capacity after death. 
114 His thought in this style is 
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very self-critical and he affirms more than once that it 
is a matter of 'research', 
115 
or 'conjecture'; 
116 the 
quality of the certainty is in contrast to the dogmatic 
assurance of argument from scripture and tradition which 
can can give a 'tranquil knowledge of God and his creaturoo ' 
The argument from nature can give genuine knowledge, but 
it must be accompanied by a sense of its frailty which 
becomes its strength, a quality that Maximus finds 
lacking in the pagans who 'believed that all that could 
not be affirmed by their own reasonings did not in fact 
exist either'. 
118 
Although Maximus was the greatest thinker of his age 
and has left ample evidence of the depth and breadth of 
his mind, although he provided a system of thought that 
was a thoroughly Christian counterpart to ancient 
philosophy, particularly because of its comprehensive- 
ness, he nowhere confronts ancient philosophy as such, 
nor does he give us an explicit account of how he saw the 
relation between philosophy and his own synthesis. As 
Sherwood has shown with authority, he was capable of 
giving an orthodox bias to a system as profound and 
comprehensive as that of Origen, but he does it modestly, 
quietly, almost, one would think, without adverting to 
his momentous adjustments. 
119 
We have seen that Maximus considers the Logos not 
merely as the ultimate reality but also as in some way 
shared by man subjectively, so that his thought is 
logical when it is consistent with the Logos, not merely 
as an appropriation of objective reality, but as the proper 
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functioning of the knowing subject. What is illogical 
cannot coexist with what is logical for Maximus, no more 
than light can cause darkness, incredulity find a place in 
faith or the devil connive with Christ. 
120 
The metaphysi- 
cal impossibility of the coincidence of the incompatible 
becomes in the order of knowledge the principle of contra- 
diction in the thought of Maximus, the irreplaceable 
foundation of sane thought and for him that sanity is 
required in every sphere of enquiry and reflection, human 
and divine: 'It is not possible to consider contradictory 
realities at the same time and under the same aspect's 
121 
There are numerous examples in the theology of the 
Confessor where he points out the presence or absence of 
this principle: in his rejection of the origenistic 
thesis about the fall of the angels and men from the 
primitive henad of rational beings, 
122 demonstrating the 
absurdity of knowing God as He knows himself, 
123 in his 
refutation of the monothelite errors, where he reduces 
their -errors to the heretical opinions of their prede- 
cessors already condemned and then shows the illogical 
character of the previous opinions. 
124 On the other hand, 
he frequently examines the logical coherence of the 
Christian teaching as for instance with an argument that 
foreshadows the contemporary proof from the connection of 
dogmas, he confutes the origenistic opinion on the pre- 
existence of souls by showing that not alone is it meta- 
physically absurd, but irreconcilable with the 'most 
mysterious of the divine mysteries, the mystery of Christ' 
125 
Likewise he can use effectively arguments based on the 
soteriological principle which held such away with the 
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Fathers as he does, for example, when he quotes Gregory of 
Nazianzus: 'what was not assumed, was that not healed; 
that in turn which is united to God is also saved'126 and 
concludes that something of human nature would have evaded 
salvation if there were not two wills and activities in 
Christ. 127 We have further compelling evidence of his 
esteem for vigorous logic in his finding that principles 
of 'theology' are valid in 'economy'. 
128 Besides 'every 
proposition pertaining to the right profession of faith 
can show its bond with the fundamental truths expressed in 
the Creed'. 129 But logical coherence is not something 
static, it is seen too in growth, not in the sense of 
addition to the deposit of faith, but in a deepening and 
widening of the understanding of faith. Because it was 
the meaning immanent in the words that the theologian 
sought, it was reasonable to expect development in doctrine 
as a mode of profounder understanding, of a more explicit 
grasp of the meaning of the words of revelation. 
Maximus did not shirk this task in his christological 
debates and he found a precedent for it in both the practice 
of councils and the method of his great theological prede- 
cessors: 'if indeed it is possible to accuse the council 
of Chalcedon of a different definition of the faith because 
of the addition of expressions to the definition of the 
Council of Nicaea, the same accusation must logically 
follow for the same reason against Cyril and the one 
hundred and fifty. If on the other hand it is not possible 
to bring this accusation against the latter, I cannot 
understand how it can be brought against the f ormer'. 
130 
The irreproachable Gregory of Nanzianzus is brought in to 
justify his procedure: he would be open to the same 
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accusation from his adversaries of having distorted 
doctrine 'because he developed that which at the council of 
Nicaea was said in an incomplete way about the Holy Spirit' 
because (as he said) "such a question had not been asked 
then"131 and he recognized the Spirit with the Father and 
the Son and wrote to Cledonius to think and teach that'. 
132 
The way of development was not for Maximus, no more than 
for any of the Fathers, a mere philological exercise. For 
them the indwelling of the Spirit in the Church was a 
guarantee that the Church was in possession of her total 
doctrine just as a person knows his own mind. 
133 The 
development of doctrine is the development in awareness of 
the total content of the words of revelation. The mystery 
has been expressed in history, but it is not possible to 
lay hold of the mystery by merely scrutinizing the history; 
it must be contemplated in the light of the Church's faith 
in the mystery itself. The growing awareness is not the 
exclusive privilege of theologians; it is the whole Church 
that makes progress in the realization of the implications 
of the deposit of faith, because it is the whole Church that 
is informed by the Holy Spirit. Within that mutuality the 
Fathers were for Maximus the brilliant logicians. 
The theologian is soon confronted with the problem of 
combining negation and affirmation in his discourse on God 
and all things in relation to Him. He has to steer a 
steady course between an arrogance that would presume to 
speak accurately and satisfactorily about God in himself 
and the opposite temptation to give up the attempt and say 
nothing at all because of the magnitude of the task and 
the impenetrability of the divine. Since Moses had caught 
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sight of the back of God and had been blinded by the light 
of his presence, men had oscillated between apophaticism 
and cataphaticism. We find it in Philo, the Cappadocians 
and Dionysius the pseudo-Areopagite for instance, 
134 
before we come up against it in Maximus. It is well to 
mention this here as it concerned Maximus as a theologian 
and we find that he balances the possibilities very nicely 
by his confidence in speaking about the 'energy' of God 
while accepting the inaccessibility of the divine essence135 
Nor does he become vertiginous in reconciling affirmation 
and negation because he holds on to his principle of contra- 
diction and allows a succession in the phases of knowing, 
extrapolating with assurance, qualifying with respect for 
mystery, constantly mindful that God transcends both 
negation and affirmation. 
136 Because our language is the 
expression of our conceptual appropriation of created 
reality, the scriptures too have to accept the limitations 
of creaturely expression in the face of the divine 
ineffability. This holds even for the Word made flesh: 
'In fact being truly made substantial with our substance, 
the supersubstantial Logos joined with the affirmation of 
nature and that which is natural their negation through 
supereminence and became man, joining the rpdxoc of super- 
natural being with the Xdioc of the being of nature . 
3'' 
'Substantial' here implies coming within the ambit of 
created being and so of creaturely intelligence. 
Before bringing this section to a close it will be 
helpful to mention the Fathers that Maximus quotes in his 
christological works to give an idea of extent of his 
knowledge of the Fathers. There is no need to elaborate 
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his use of the Fathers here in the sense of how he handled 
the testimony of individuals. It can be said in general 
that it was reverent but free. The present list is by way 
of making concrete the many references already given to 
'the Fathers' : Cyril of Alexandria, Gregory of Nanzianzua, 
Basil, Gregory of Nyasa, Dionysius the pseudo-Areopagite 
('Bishop of Athens'! ), John of Constantinople, Chrysostom, 
Athanasius of Alexandria, Leo the Great, Anastasius of 
Antioch, Clement of Alexandria, Theophilus of Alexandria, 
Ambrose of Milan, Cyril of Jerusalem, Severianus of Gabala, 
Eulogius of Alexandria, Irenaeus of Lyons, Alexander of 
Alexandria, Eustachius of Antioch, Diadocus of Photice, 
Nemesius of Emesa, Justin the philosopher. He quotes 
these in his treatment of the two wills and energies of 
Christ. His spirituality shows acquaintance, with Origen, 
Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory of Nanzianzus, Dionysius the 
pseudo-Areopagite and Evagriua, John Climacus and John 
MosckuS. Leontius of Byzantium, Leontius of Jerusalem and 
John of Scythopolis influenced him especially in forging 
an accurate language to make the proper distinctions in 
his personalism. 
Enough has been said to justify Maximus' title to 
being a theologian and to show how he conceived the metier 
of doing theology. Because of our special interest in the 
spiritual aspect of his theological work it may be useful 
to add that his theology as a whole was spiritual because 
of its orientation to mysticism, placed as we have seen 
between 'practical and philosophy' and 'theology'. It was 
spiritual too in the sense that his method rested on faith 
in the 'mystery', a word that always means for him the 
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saving event of Christ, and that basic stance gave a 
spiritual character to all his thought: it was a perse- 
vering exploration of the implications of his relationship 
to Christ in faith and probably, as we have suggested, in 
a faith that was enhanced by contemplative experience. 
This is evident in his use of scripture for instance, 
where he is habitually concerned with the 'spiritual 
sense'. It must be remembered too that for him theology, 
while it was splendidly speculative, was never merely 
academic. It was always done with a sense of the urgency 
of the love of God and so even his most abstract reflections 
have some orientation to finality. The pressure of finality 
becomes more evident in his strictly spiritual works, where 
not alone is the method spiritual but the content too in 
the sense that it is concerned with the praxis of metarioia 
and contemplation. Works like the Liber Asceticus, 
138 
Capitum de Caritate Quattuor Centuriae, 139 Capitum 
Theologicorum et Oeconomicorum Duae Centuriae, 
140 
apart 
from some masterful Epistolae, 
141 
give ample evidence of 
this Christian commitment. We shall examine more closely 
below the claim of the Expositio Orationis Dominicael42 
to be called a work of Christian spirituality. 
The Works of St. Maximus the Confessor 
Having seen something of the method of St. Maximus as 
a theologian, it will be instructive to survey briefly his 
extant writings which give evidence of the depth and 
breadth of his thought as well as of a highly developed 
faith and spiritual awareness. Although the categories, 
into which his writings are usually divided, are somewhat 
artificial and not at all water-tight, they will suffice 
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as a basis for the kind of discussion envisaged hero. It 
is customary to classify, them as exegetical writings, 
commentaries on the Fathers, liturgical works, dogmatic- 
polemical treatises and ascetic-mystical writings. His 
letters, apart from giving occasional flashes of insight 
into his personality, might be said to cover in their 
interest all the other classes just mentioned. Some are 
purely occasional pieces. 
(i) Exegetical Writings 
The most important of these writings is Quaestiones 
ad Thalassium in locos Scripturae diff iciles, 
143 being 
sixty five questions and answers on difficult passages in 
Scripture addressed to his friend Thalassius, a Libyan 
priest-monk whose acquaintance he would have made after 
his arrival in Africa. Sherwood dates it between 630 and 
633/634.144 In the literary genre of patriotic exegesis 
of Scripture, Maximus develops many suspects of a 
spiritual anthropology in keeping with the tradition of 
monasticism to which Thalassius would have belonged, 
while taking care to correct its origenistic deviations 
in matters cosmological and anthropological. It is 
obviously meant to be used as monastic spiritual reading. 
Writing in the genre Quaestiones et Responsiones, about 
which our knowledge is far from complete, Maximus under- 
takes to meet his friend's request for a commentary 
xv cI ti71v dvayw - xiv Ocwpt; av . 
145 He realises that 
Thalassius has attained to the summit of spiritual 
knowledge and so he accommodates his observations to the 
needs of one who has transcended the letter for the 
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spirit and concentrates on anagogical interpretation of 
the texts: 'We shall pass over then the history, already 
corporally fulfilled in the time of Moses, and shall 
consider that history's spiritual power with the mind's 
eye, a power ever becoming and, in the process, flour- 
ishing all the more'. 
146 
Maximus allows that there may 
be several valid higher interpretations of a text because 
of the convergence of partial realizations in a central 
mystery of which there will be diverse representations. 
Sherwood would seem to have demonstrated that for Maximus 
this mystery is 'the mystery of Christ and of our unity 
in Him'. 147 As Maximus read Scripture, the Lord of 
glory was present to him in a faith enhanced by 
6eoXo'Ca and so his commentaries constantly refer to 
this illuminating presence and do not pretend to be 
exegesis in the Antiochene tradition, much less in a 
contemporary sense. Maximus is in the Alexandrine 
tradition of exegesis that derives from Origen, which 
brings together the interpretation of the Old Testamont 
in its fulfilment in Christ, with the Hellenic categories 
of the material and the vorjTbv . For Maximus with 
St. Paul, 'the end of the law is Christ!. 
148 The aim and 
object of his interpretation is an ävaYwyA that will 
issue in the manifeotation of the Spirit proportionate 
to each one's faith. 
149 
The Quaestiones et Dubia150 and the Ad Theopemptum 
scholasticum151 are works of exegesis in the same class 
as the Quaestiones ad Thalassium. They are both early 
works, seemingly more or less contemporaneous with the 
ad Thalassium. The former is a series of seventy nine 
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questions and answers. The questions cover a wider range 
than those in the ad Thalassium, but often the answers 
are no more than a sentence or two. Ad Theopemptum is 
described as ' ui quaesierat de judice iniquitatis; 
deque illo, "Si quas percusserit to in dexteram maxillam"; 
itemque illo, "Nöli me tangere: nondum enim ascendi ad 
Patrem" ', three questions that give Maximus an opportu- 
nity of giving a gnostic interpretation of scripture and 
touching on points of what we would call Christian 
spirituality. With his Expositio in Psalmum LIX (Deus, 
repulisti nos )152 and Orationis Dominicae brevie 
expositio153 we come to the two commentaries on scrip- 
tural prayer composed by Maximus, one from the Old 
Testament, the other from the New. Again the weight of 
opinion places them among the earlier works of Maximus, 
Sherwood dating the former at 626 and the commentary on 
the Our Father: 628-630,154 in Psalm LIX, the psalmist 
celebrates the deeds of David, recorded in 2 Kings, 8 
and 1 Paralipomenon, 18; the exegesis of Maximus is 
little concerned with the letter, but strives after the 
allegorical sense centred on Christ's victory and the 
vocation of the nations, with penetrating observations on 
aspects of spiritual anthropology. Here too we find 
Maximus, in the patristic tradition, using numbers as 
tools for insight and principles of formal organisation. 
Proper names are also here considered to be keys to 
deciphering the mysteries hidden in the words of Scripture. 
In spite of its relative brevity the Orationis Dominicae 
brevis expositio is a work of considerable importance in 
the MaxiVian corpus. 
155 In itself it is a commentary on 
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the Lord's Prayer full of theological insight, but perhaps 
it will be seen to have an even greater importance because 
of its powerfully articulated synthetic character. It is 
a commonplace of scholarship to remark on the lack of a 
thorough synthesis of Maximus' thought. He himself never 
provided it, either because he did not think that it was 
necessary to his immediate purposes or because he did not 
have the opportunity of welding all the essential elements 
of his theology into a whole, or even because it eluded 
him due to its vast and complex character. But there can 
be no doubt about his having had the principles of such a 
synthesis; we have evidence for that in this commentary. 
From the point of view of exegesis it is in line with 
the other exegetical works in that its main interest is in 
an attempt to convey his own insights into the divine 
mystery and the economy, those Xdyo,. that appear in 
ocwpCa cpvaLxrj , here brought to bear on the dominical 
prayer itself. Nor must we exclude the possibility that 
this OewpCa was modified by 6eokoyCm in such a way 
that his intuitions became too rich and too profound for 
straightforward comment, but rather often give the 
impression that he is struggling to express simultane- 
ously many facets of a mystery. It is intended to be an 
affective initiation into the mysteries that it presents 
so that 'we may appropriate these blessings of which only 
God the Father, by the natural intermediary of his Son, 
is, in the Holy Spirit, the veritable dispenser', in the 
words of Maximus himself. 
156 This claim is strengthened 
by the knowledge that the 'Our Father' finds a place in 
the liturgy and that 'mystagogy' was designed to facilitate 
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fruitful participation in the liturgical life of the early 
church as we see in the catheceses of Cyril of Jerusalem 
and Theodore of Mopsuestia. 
157 The Orationis Dominicas 
brevis expositio is related to the other works in this 
class and to grasp its full implications it would be 
necessary to refer constantly to them, as to both content 
and method. It can be said here that it is equally 
related to his great patristic commentaries and to the 
Mystagogia. Although Maximus had not undertaken his 
specialized Christological explorations when he composed 
this work, it provides sufficient foundation for assimi- 
lating whatever was to come, and in fact adumbrates it 
in an unambiguous way. 
(ii) Liturgy 
With the Mystagogia158 we come to one of the most 
significant and influential of the writings of Maximus. 
It is generally considered to have been composed during 
the earlier phase of his literary output; Sherwood 
places it between 628 and 630; 
159 Daimais thinks that it 
probably comes between 632 and 634.160 It has obvious 
affinities with all the works of that period and 
especially with Ambigua II. It reflects the monastic 
anthropology which by that time had come to maturity in 
its essentials and which forms the groundwork of his 
teaching as it is to be found more or less clearly 
articulated in the Quaestiones ad Thalassium, the 
Amber I and II, the Capita Caritatis, the Capita 
Theologica et Oeconomica as well as in the Liber 
Asceticus. It has much in common too with the Orationis. 
Dominicae brevis expositio, not only with regard to its 
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anthropological content, but also because of its firm 
structure. The introductory seven chapters see the 
church edifice as an image of God, the universe, man and 
scripture. It is an image of the great mysteries 
accomplished within the church itself and of the anthro- 
pological and cosmic syntheses achieved through the 
mystery. 'The mystery' is Christ through whose hypostatic 
union the original intention of the ' oneing' of the 
Creator and the creature is brought about, primarily 
through the deification of man which, for Maximus, is a 
participation in the mode of existence proper to the 
Word in his relation with his Father and by which the 
ultimate unity of all things is made possible while 
conserving their distinguishing particularities. 
Chapters 8 to 23 are concerned with the spiritual inter- 
pretation of the rites in their temporal sequence. It 
is noteworthy that Maximus does not undertake to comment 
on the more sacred parts of the eucharistic synaxis, but 
leaves them wrapped in the silence which fosters Yu(Zß! C 
as if it were the realm of the priest beyond the incono- 
stasis. He has addressed himself to the uncovering of 
'the mystery' which is the focal point of the whole 
liturgical celebration by leading into it or by a 
161 
µvßtiaýY ýa 
It has been pointed out that the kernel of Maximus' 
teaching with regard to the liturgy is that beyond, but 
through the rites, everyone of the faithful is introduced 
into ultimate realities, the mystery, the coming of the 
kingdom in power which the Church introduced into the 
interior of time and of which it anticipates the full 
realisation in the measure in which the faithful allow 
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themselves to be taken hold of by the rp6%oC kKdp&cwC 
of the Christ to which the mysteries celebrated ought to 
conform them. 
162 The final chapter 24 rounds off the 
work with further observations, the anthropological one 
being most probably the work of Maximus himself, the 
liturgical comments being more probably the contribution 
of anonymous scholiasts. 
The Mystagogia is a work of liturgical OewpCa . As 
such, it fits perfectly into the totality of Maximus' 
vision and describes a process that is an essential 
component in his spiritual anthropology. For him the 
mystery can be revealed in the ) 6'yoi, that contemplation 
releases from the natural universe; it is equally 
accessible in the words of Scripture; the presupposition 
of the liturgical treatise under consideration here is 
that it is to be found too in the rites of the eucharistic 
synaxis. 
163 The Mystagogia purports to introduce us into 
a knowledge of yvc1at. c of the mystery by a OewpCm 
directed to the liturgical symbols. OewpCa then is the 
process by which the initiation is effected in mystagogy. 
Corresponding to the threefold possibilities of Xdyot, 
scriptural words and liturgical rites there will be three 
kinds of mystagogy: cosmic, scriptural and liturgical, 
achieved by natural, scriptural and liturgical 6ewpCa 
164 
This higher knowledge of the mystery is to be attained by 
an intellectual penetration of the mystery under the inspi- 
ration of the Holy Spirit and it would fall short of 
Maximus' understanding of the knowledge involved to 
restrict it to a merely speculative exercise. The yvwat, C 
implies experience of the mystery, something that 
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modifies not only the noetic faculties, but through them 
the whole man under the shock of a personal encounter with 
the living mystery of Christ, so that yvwaLC is complemented 
by icpäF. LC and the total commitment of the man is unfolded 
in the activation of Yw'zcxij bvvaµcC as a response to God 
as Good and in conjunction with the perfection of his 
voi3C in living knowledge of God as the Truth. 
165 
An analysis of the text soon reveals a complex tissue 
of references to Maximus' great predecessors. While it is 
beyond the scope of this brief survey to attempt to dis- 
entangle the root system of Maximus' dependence on others, 
it is essential to point out that he explicitly declares 
that he is emulating to Pseudo-Dionysius166 and there are 
references to his work in the course of the Mystagogia, 
167 
but it is equally imperative to keep in mind that the work 
of Maximus is in striking contrast to that of Dionysius, 
not only in its method and object, but especially in the 
perspective of spiritual anthropology against which he 
sets his theory of liturgical anagogy. 
168 References to 
Evagrius also abound and probably through him to Origen, 
although it would be difficult to prove that Maximus had 
not read Origen himself when he came to write his 
Mystagogia. 
169 Bornert has brought attention to the fact 
that in the Mystagogia Maximus gave to monastic asceticism 
a liturgical broadening, and proposed the exterior cult of 
the liturgy as a valid basis for mystical ascent, thus 
synthesising the hesychasm of Evagrius and the sacrament- 
alism of Dionysius; at the same time he offset the danger 
of spiritualism in the former and formalism in the latter, 
by having integrated again gnostic understanding in litur- 
gical action, and above all, in this way, he rooted 
christian mysticism in the mystery of Christ. 
170 The 
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dependence of Maximus is quite obvious, but no less 
obvious is his originality in having turned the teaching 
of his predecessors to greater advantage because of his 
Christian holism. The employment of the 'old man'171 as 
the source of his information and indeed formation in the 
liturgy, may be nothing more than a literary device, but 
it may also be a tribute to a liturgical initiate to whom 
Maximus owed a genuine debt. Dalmais has suggested, 
tentatively, that this may be a reference to Sophronius. 
172 
It is interesting to speculate that the reference to love 
of the neighbour, found at the end of Mystagogia may be an 
echo of the central theme of the Liber Asceticus and in 
turn may be derived from Sophronius and through him from 
abbot Palladius. 
173 
(iii) Commentaries on the Fathers 
Since the condemnation of 553 forbade even the name 
of Origen to be mentioned, we find that Maximus had to 
tackle the problems of Origenism by discussing controversial 
passages taken from the works of the great Fathers, 
especially from St. Gregory of Naziansus, and given an 
ambiguous interpretation by those in monastic circles who 
wished to hold on to the teaching of Origen, Didymus and 
Evagrius. 174 The main purpose of his De variis diffici- 
libus locis SS. Patrum Dionysii et Gregorii175 was to 
reverse the pernicious conclusions drawn from the Origen's 
theory of the Henad, which can be seen as a grandiose 
attempt to interpret Scripture in concepts of a Plotinian 
hellenism. 
176 In this system the eternal goodness of God 
was deemed to account for the eternal creation of the 
84 
'rationals', 177 so that the pre-existence of souls was 
integral to this teaching. 178 A combination of spiritual 
satiety179 and free choice180 was invoked to account for 
the fall and a second creation, 
181 in which bodies182 were 
provided for the progressive recovery of a purely spiritual 
state through knowledge of God gained in 'an experience of 
the contrary' and by habitual prayer and apatheia. 
183 
This process would be completed in the apokatastasisl84 
or reconstitution of the Henad, when the 'rationale' 
having shed their material bodies, 
185 
would, become like 
Christ, the one unfallen logikos not open to evil. 
186 
The bulk of the Ambigua consists of commentaries on 
opinions of Gregory, but Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite 
figures in the work too. In fact, there are two sets of 
ambigua: Ambigua 11 
187 
or the 'Earlier Ambigua', dating 
from 628-30 and Ambigua 1,188 written in 634 or shortly 
afterwards. Maximus himself placed the later Ambigua 
before those written in 628-30 and numbered them accord- 
ingly, Ambigua 1-5 of Ambigua I thus preceding Ambigua 
6-71 of the 'Earlier Ambigua', a convention that has been 
observed ever since. The characteristic themes of this 
work give us some idea of its scope: of the Trinity, 
Christological problems, the Logos-Christus relationship, 
anthropology, ' the Economy, prophecy, negative and affirm- 
ative theology, arguments against Origenism, arguments 
against other errors, straightforward exegesis and 
philological exercises. Sherwood, who has written the 
fullest commentary on Ambigua II so far, 
189 
points out 
that 'the Ambigua are an illustration of that diabasis 
from the temporal and the present to the everlasting, of 
85 
the entirely central place that Christ and the Incarnation 
play in the attaining of that goal: participation in 
(rather than vision of) the Blessed Trinity'. 
190 
Of the quotations chosen for comment in Ambigua I by 
'the holy man, Thomae', four are taken from the Orations 
of Gregory191 and one from the Epistola ad Gaium'92 of 
Dionysius. Maximus is invited to elaborate his understand- 
ing of statements like 'Therefore unity, having from all 
eternity arrived by motion at duality, found its rest in 
trinity'; 193 'For he whom you now treat with contempt was 
once above you. He who is now man was once uncompounded. 
What he was he continued to be; what he was not he took to 
himself'194 from Gregory or this from Dionysius: 'How, you 
say, is Jesus, who is superior to all, reduced to the same 
order of essence as the rest of men? Nor in this place is 
he considered as the cause of men, but as being, in fact, 
essentially a complete man'. 
195 Ambiguum V, 196 to which 
this citation is prologue, is the only complete chapter 
devoted to Dionysius. Here Maximus comments on the 4th 
Letter of Dionysius in which is found the celebrated 
expression xäi, vTjv -vLva TTjv Ocav6pLx1jv ! v5pyecav ', 
197 
that was modified tendentiously in the debates of the time. 
The presence of Dionysius is palpable in other ambigua and 
in the Quaestiones ad Thalassium, Capitum de Caritate 
Quattuor Centuriae, the Mystagogia as well as in the 
Quaestiones et Dubia, Opuscula Theologica et Polemica, the 
'Gnostic Chapters' and Epistola XIII. 
lack of unanimity on the significance of the Dionysian 
corpus makes it difficult to assess the influence of 
Dionysius on Maximus or of the way in which Maximus 
86 
modified this doctrine to make it more congruous with 
tradition. 198 Riou has suggested that Maximus counter- 
balanced an excessively personalist Origeniam with the 
cosmic ontology of Dionysius, so that we find in Maximus a 
teaching in which person or nature do not obscure each 
other, but remain in an irreducible tension. 
199 Whether 
we think of the Dionysian cascade as primarily ontological 
or primarily gnoseological, it is obvious that the teaching 
of Maximus has a much sounder Christological base. 
200 'And 
although Riou's division is rather too neat, it points to 
one of the most important features of Maximus' work, its 
character as a "'metaphysics of grace" -a serious essay on 
the structure of reality that yet succeeds in having at 
its heart the free loving activity of God in Christ, the 
self-yielding of God on the cross'. 
201 
Finally it can be said that the Scholia in opera S. 
Dionysii202 which have been ascribed to Maximus are almost 
certainly not his work. 
203 
(iv) Dogmatic-Polemical 
The works of Maximus in this category fall into two 
principal groups, both concerned with questions of 
Christology. The first set is directed to clarifying the 
dyophysite position and combating Severian Monophysitism; 
these works cover the time between the beginning of 
Maximus' writing career, probably about 625, and his 
Epistola XVIII written in the name of the prefect, George 
in 641.204 The second set has to do with the heresies 
that came to a head during the lifetime of Maximus himself: 
Monenergism and Monothelitism. 
205 We find the discussion 
of these problems becoming progressively more prominent in 
87 
his works from 634, onwards and they engaged his attention 
right up to the end of his life. 
206 
By the time that Maximus had become aware of the 
religious situation in his environment, Monophysitism had 
consolidated itself in three areas: among the Copts and 
Abyssinians, Syrian Jacobites and Armenians. 
207 The 
tendency to discount the humanity of Christ had been felt 
before the events that led to the Council of Chalcedon 
(451), especially in the teaching of Apollinarius. 
208 But 
209 
it was Eutyches, 'the aged and muddle-headed archimandrite', 
who was challenged by Leo in his Tome and who was condemned 
for his monophysitic views at Chalcedon. 
210 He was induced 
to concede that Christ was 'of two natures', but he 
insisted that 'after the union, I confess one nature'. 
211 
With Timothy Aelurus we find the beginning of a rigorous 
insistence on the terminology of Cyril as the canon in 
these matters, 
212 
so that Monophysitism, pretending to 
conserve a pure Alexandrian doctrine, became a movement and 
found powerful adherents among monks and prelates, including 
Peter the Fuller, Philoxenus of Mabboug and Severus. 
213 
These theologians, especially Severus, gave proof of a 
speculative ability far beyond that of the well-meaning 
but blundering Eutyches, multum imprudens et nimis 
imperitus. 214 The situation was aggravated by political 
interest and initiative at both the ecclesiastical and 
secular levels. It was the moderate and subtle teaching of 
Severus that attracted the attention of Maximus. 
215 
The 
debate between Severus and Julian of Halicarnassus 
illustrates how difficult it was to steer an orthodox 
course between the variations of heteredoxy at the time, 
88 
because interpreted benignly, the doctrine of Severus would 
DI A 
seem to be unimpeachable. `i" Even though his language, 
properly sieved, may be shown to be wholesome, 
217 
yet his 
inability to make any concessions to the conciliatory John 
the Grammarian218 may indicate some deficiency in ecclesial 
sense and, in fact, a terminology not sufficiently refined 
to provide an alternative to that of Leo and the Chalcedonian 
canons, which in retrospect, is accepted as faithful to the 
Tradition in both the East and the West. Maximus, who had 
an exact concept of Nestorianism, 
219 
saw in the teaching of 
Severus a monophysitic threat to orthodoxy and he reacted 
accordingly. 
220 
Among the works of Maximus that show his concern with 
precision in language and exact definition in debate with 
the Monophysites we find: De du abus Christi nat urie; 
221 De 
gualitate, proprietate et differentia ad Theodorum Presby- 
terum in Mazario; 
222 Capita de substantia seu essentia et 
natura de ue hypostasi et ersona; 
223 De communi et 
proprio, hoc est, de essentia et hypostasi ad Cosmam 
religiosissimum diaconum Alexandrinum. 
224 We find an 
explicit defence of the Definition of Chalcedon in Opusculum 
XXII. 
225 Epistolae XII226 and XIII227 provide evidence of 
his theological polemic directed against Severus. It is 
abundantly clear from the writings of Maximus that these 
debates were not conducted in the atmosphere of an ivory 
tower. The affair of George, Eparch of Africa, and the way 
in which it prompted 'a long exposition of the right faith 
in view of the Severian doctrine'228 shows that the doctrinal 
divergences were considered by Maximus to be something of far 
greater import than doctrinaire logomachy. 
22 9 They were 
matters of truth and life. 
89 
With the promulgation of the Pact of Union220 by Cyrus, 
Patriarch of Alexandria, in 633, new Chrietological problems 
demanded the attention of the upholders of orthodoxy. 
Sophronius immediately objected to the conciliatory 
Monenergism of the Pact. 
231 The astute Sergius of Conetan- 
tinople realized that the Pact would open fresh rifts in 
the Christian empire and at the end of 633 he brought out 
his Pee hos in which he forbade the mention of either one 
or two operations in Christ. 
232 By shifting the basis of 
a possible theological consensus to the realm of the will, 
he merely introduced a new heresy, Monothelitism, but so 
subtly that Honorius the Pope and Maximus, the greatest 
theologian of the day, did not find his formula alarming. 
The latter was willing to accept the Psephos in a dyothelite 
sense; 
233 the former having failed to distinguish between 
diversity and contrariety in the wills of Christ, laid 
himself open to subsequent condemnation, 
234 
even although 
Maximus had interpreted his views in an orthodox way. 
235 
The doughty Sophronius published his Synodicon236 in 634, 
in which he argued that Monenergiem is at odds with the 
Tradition of the Church. 
237 In 638, Sergius reaffirmed his 
position in his Ecthesis, 
238 
but he replaced a philosophical 
argument with an appeal to the authority of the hapless 
Honorius. 
239 Meanwhile Maximus was refining his under- 
standing of the problems involved in these debates. As 
early as 633 he was engaged in countering monenergistic 
arguments in Opusculum V240 and in Epistola XIX, 
241 
of 
approximately the same date, we find him championing the 
dyothelite position, while at the same time praising 
Sergius effusively for having countered the heteredoxy of 
242 243 the Pact of Union in his Pse hos. Epistola Xv, 
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which is still as early as 634, is primarily concerned with 
the refutation of Monophysitism, but it contains antimon- 
energistic material too. With his Opuaculum IV244 in 634 
we find the first approaches to a solution of the problem 
of monothelitism; this is developed in Opusculum XX. 
245 
Both of these works were composed about 640, after Maximus 
had heard of the Ecthesis. 
246 
With the appearance of Opusculum VI247 in 641, he 
provided a solution to Monothelitism which is also a 
landmark in the history of theology, since, for the first 
time, the place of the human will of Christ in the work of 
salvation is stated unequivocally. 
248 The most extensive 
treatment of the problem posed by the interplay of the 
divine and human wills in the Agony in the Garden is to be 
found in Opusculum XV, ad sanctissimum Doreencem epiocopum 
Stephanum. 
249 This is also dealt with in 0puscu. 1a 111,250 
VII251 and XVI. 
252 Maximus at one stroke, exposes the 
ambiguity of the interpretation of Sergius and puts forward 
a totally convincing piece of exegesis. His antimonothe- 
lite polemic is exemplified in Opuscula XX, 
253 XXIV254 and 
x. 255 This reached its zenith with his celebrated 
Disputatio cum rrho256 which took place at Carthage in 
645. Here we see Maximus not merely as a brilliant 
controversialist, but also as a theologian of formidable 
ability. In Opusculum XII257 he has left us a valuable 
record of the principal events of the monothelite 
controversy. Opuscula XIV, 
258 XV1259 and XVIII260 provide 
evidence of the meticulous care that Maximus devoted to 
honing theological concepts, the tools of orthodox thought 
and doctrine. Opuscula XV, 
261 XXII29 262 XXVI263 and XXVI164 
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show him as the patristic anthologist, culling texts from 
the great Fathers, both as a means of insight into the 
tradition and as a way of defending a doctrinal development 
that was organically continuous with that tradition. 
After the Dis ute with Pyrrhus, Maximus went to Rome 
and collaborated with the theologians whose work under 
Pope Theodore bore fruit in the Lateran Synod of 649, 
which condemned the T os of Constans. 
265 This zeal for 
truth was interpreted as an act of defiance so that 
Maximus, together with Theodore's successor, Martin I, 
incurred the imperial displeasure which led to their 
arrest, trial and martyrdom. In the Dis utp atio Bizyae266 
with bishop Theodosius in 656 we have testimony that 
Maximus was still the vigorous and lucid champion of 
orthodoxy. Although w have extended passages on other 
dogmatic questions like that of the Blessed Trinity, 
267 
we do not have any complete work devoted to non- 
Christological questions. The De Anima, 
268 long 
attributed to Maximus, is not considered to be authentic. 
(v) Ascetic - Spiritual 
As we have seen in the biographical chapter on 
Maximus, the question of his early formation is hypo- 
thetical as there are two distinct possibilities, the one 
stemming from the evidence of the Syriac Life, the other 
from the longer established Vita. If we are to accept the 
former, then Maximus was entrusted to the care of Abbot 
Pantaleon in the monastery of St. Chariton, known as the 
Palaia Lavra near Jerusalem when he was ten years of age 
and it was there that he received his monastic education; 
on the evidence of the Vita he received his formation in 
92 
the monastery of Chrysopolia, having distinguished himself 
in public service. We must admit that we do not know with 
any exactitude the programme of formation in either of these 
establishments as we lack the typica that would enable us to 
appreciate the style of life peculiar to these monasteries 
in which Maximus came to realize himself as a monk. The 
same holds for the monastery at Cyzicus, which as we have 
seen, may have been the place where he enjoyed theological 
exchanges with John of Cyzicus and his brethren. But 
although we do not possess definite evidence of the 
immediate monastic influences to which Maximus was sub- 
jected, we are not entirely devoid of information on the 
monastic life of his time and environment as we possess 
the more or less contemporary Pratum Spirituale269 of 
John Moschus and the equally contemporaneous manual of 
spiritual formation by John Climacus entitled Scala 
Paradisi. 270 The light which these notable works may 
throw on the nature of the monastic life of the time in 
so far as it has bearing on Maximus would be very faint 
indeed and perhaps even illusory if it were not for his 
relationship with Sophronius, 
271 the life-long companion 
of John Moschus, and one of the greatest exemplifiers of 
the monastic tradition associated with John Climacus. 
272 
The Syriac Life would have us believe that Sophronius, a 
monk of the monastery of St. Theodosius near St. 
Chariton's, admired Maximus in his youth and suggests 
that Sophronius may even have been influenced by 
Maximus. 273 The probability of Sophronius having been 
Maximus' abbot much later when they lived in the 
monastery of Eucratades in Africa is well established274 
and John Moschus, known as 'Eucratos' 
93 
probably lent his 
name as well as his presence to this community. There can 
be no question of affirming that the identical t icon was 
in use in St. Chariton's and in the Eucratadea, but it is 
entirely probable that Maximus would have sought a kind of 
monastic life in exile that corresponded to what he knew 
as a young monk, so that he breathed the air so to speak 
of Moschus and Sophronius, and so would have seen monastic 
life as they did. 
The alternative possibility of giving a local habita- 
tion and a name to the monastic milieu in which Maximus 
may have received his initial formation is the monastery 
of Phillipicus, the brother-in-law of Emperor Maurice, 
founded in 594, in the asiatic suburb if Constantinople, 
Chrysopolis, on Mount St. Elijah and dedicated to the 
Mother of God. 
275 
As we do not possess the typte icon of 
this monastery we have no exact information about the 
life in the monastery nor the system for the initiation 
of novices. The monastic movement had spread like wild- 
fire through all the East after the example of Antony and 
Pachomius. Although there is no evidence of monastic 
life in Constantinople before 382, once the first 
monastery of Dalmatius was founded there it made such 
startling progress that by 536 there were 73 monasteries 
for men, including foundations set aside for national or 
provincial communities within the city. 
276 These 
disappeared about 536, probably due to the pressure of 
Byzantine nationalism and the monastery of Chrysopolis 
may well have been a replacement for a dissolved 
community. 
94 
Again we know nothing definite about the regime in 
the monastery of Chrysopolis nor in that at Cyzicus, in 
one or both of which Maximus may have been a monk. But we 
do know that the Byzantine monasticism of hie time recog- 
nised the genius of St. Basil and the relevance of his 
monastic Rules. 
277 True the basilian renaissance of St. 
Theodore had not yet taken place, but the cenobitical 
ideal that obtained in the monasteries of Constantinople 
and its environs was stamped with the character of Basil 
long before the Studite monasticism of the ninth century 
emerged as unequivocally basilian. 
278 So that apart from 
explicit references to Basil, the possibility and even 
probability of his influence having gone to shaping the 
monastic outlook of Maximus is considerable, if Maximus 
became a novice in Chrysopolis. The moderation of Basil 
is the obvious quality that spirituality inherited from 
him. His ideal of cenobitism to the exclusion of 
anbhoritism had not yet impressed itself on Byzantine 
practice. Gregory of Nazianzus, explored the interior of 
the monastic ideal that had been outlined by Basil and we 
have no doubt that with him we can identify a definite 
influence on Maximus. We have seen already that Maximus 
had a first-hand knowledge of the works of Gregory of 
Nazianzus. We inevitably find gregorian themes woven 
into the spiritual treatises of Maximus: the dangers 
that attend spiritual progress, the need of purifications 
and the master theme of divinisation. Maximus encountered 
the spiritual teaching of Nanzianzus in the systematisa- 
tions of Evagrius as well, but we find in Maximus's 
handling of theosis a greater emphasis on the will. The 
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consummation of spiritual growth takes place in the silent 
envelopment of the Spirit in which the divinized man knows 
God intimately through the Word made flesh. 
279 
Basil's 
brother, Gregory of Nyasa, completed this erudite monastic 
spirituality by providing a system of thought that would 
make more explicit the implications of monastic life and 
endowed it with a highly developed mystical teaching. He 
too was known to Maximus. 
So we find the same monastic preoccupations in the 
writing of Gregory of Nyasa: the struggle with the 
passions, the elements of the virtuous life; i. e. faith, 
prayer, joy, angelic conduct, impassibility, charity and 
the imitation of Christ. The contrast between knowing 
God in himself and through his attributes of goodness, 
justice, providence and peace as well as the theme of 
darkness are central to his spirituality. The dependence 
of Dionysius on Nyasa is patent, even if modified and, 
apart from direct knowledge of his works, Maximus would 
have undergone the influence of Nyasa through his 
reading of Dionysius. 
280 Epektasi98And apokatastasis282 
find their level in an original way in the teaching of 
Maximus. We can say, therefore, that in him we find the 
confluence of two great monastic traditions, the one 
taking its rise in Egypt and eventually acquiring a 
theological dimension from the works of Origen, which 
reached the monastic milieux of Maximus' time primarily 
through the teaching of Evagrius, but which also finds 
testimony in the works of Moschus and Climacus, the 
other reaching him by way of the Pseudo-Dionysius and 
carrying with it the Cappadocian assimilation and 
development of Origen as a theory that rendered intelli- 
96 
gible to a high degree the monastic ideal, as well as 
providing it with an organisation that was more sophis- 
ticated in its intellectual justification than the 
empirical system of Pachomius. 
283 The influences on 
Maximus can be seen as typical of the monastic world of 
his time; while there were different forms of monastic 
life and different formulae for the regulation of 
spiritual endeavour, it would be a mistake to imagine 
that monastic forms with a bias towards the desert were 
insensitive to the refinements of the Cappadocians, or 
that monasteries with a cenobitical and liturgical 
emphasis were unaware if the great tradition of the 
Desert Fathers. This is a way of saying that if Maximus 
entered the Palaia Lavra in Palestine, it did not mean 
that he was cut off from the rich patrimony of the more 
cenobitical forms of monastic life, especially the 
Cappadocian heritage; nor can we equally exclude from 
the formation programme of a monastery near Constantin- 
ople the knowledge of the ideals and methods of a more 
primitive way of religious life. In any event, the 
extant writings of the Confessor show a thoroughgoing 
knowledge of the twofold monastic discipline, so that 
whether we think of him as having being initiated in the 
Palaia Lavra and then going either to Chrysopolis or 
Cyzicus or to both, or as having begun at Chrysopolis 
and then spent some time in Cyzicus, we need not be 
surprised at the evidence of a comprehensive awareness 
of the tradition in his works. His sojourn in Africa 
would have sharpened his insights and facilitated a 
further appropriation of his reflection on the relations 
of means to ends within the sphere of monastic practice. 
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In the Pratum Spirituale of John Moschus we have in a 
simple straightforward style a constellation of short 
biographies, instructive discourses and anecdotes with a 
moral purpose that portrays for us the types of monastic 
life in his own time and communicates to us a sense of 
the transfiguration of the world that was achieved around 
the monks, much as the Fioretti creates the world of 
Francis of Assisi. 
284 The pertinence of this important 
work to our interest in Maximus is rooted in the fact that 
Moschus was widely travelled, having gone to Egypt, the 
Thebaid, Sinai, the lavras of Palestine, the monasteries 
of Syria, Cilicia and then Alexandria and the Nile delta 
as well as Cyprus and Samos on his way to Rome, besides 
the fact of his having done so precisely about the time 
that Maximus was undergoing his monastic formation. The 
dates of Moschus are not definitively established but 
they are between 540 and 634 to put them at their maximum, 
between 550 and 619 at their minimum. The possibilities 
of monastic life varied from that of a well organized 
community living the cenobitic life to that of a hermit 
more or less withdrawn from both secular and ecclesiastical 
society. Although the legislation of Justinian had 
attempted to offset the more colourful eccentricities of 
the hermits by prescribing that the eremitical life 
should be lived in relation to an organized community, 
there were still hardy solitaries to be found in Moschus' 
day. In Palestine, which interests us because of its 
possible bearing on Maximus, he found the official 
compromise in the form of a lavras, which comprised a 
monastery where the monks received their initial 
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training together with hermit cells for the tit%cLoL . 
285 
At the same time in Egypt this combination of communal and 
individual styles of life found-a looser structure in semi- 
eremitical institutions where the disciples lived in 
scattered cells under the direction of an acknowledged 
master and came together for liturgy once a week. The 
Palaia Lavra was founded by St. Chariton in the mid 
fourth century, 
286 
and although we know nothing precise 
about its history in the late sixth and early seventh 
century, we can reasonably take it for granted that its 
life corresponded to that of other lavras where Moschus 
found the tighter style of communal-eremitical life. 
The common purpose of all the forms of monasticism 
encountered by Moschus in the Middle East of his day was 
the winning of navxCa by means of rigorous &oxrIact 
The idea of ýav Ca includes the mastery of the 
passions, freedom from worldly care, contemplation of 
divine things, union with Christ, conversation with God 
and the angels, 
287 
while the preparatory äoxnoi. c 
demanded detachment, fasting, vigils, continence, sleeping 
on the ground and the habitual grind of manual work. 
288 
A cursory glance at the Pratum Spirituale makes it 
obvious that we are in the tradition of monasticism 
described in the oldest monastic texts: the Vita 
Antonia of Athanasius, 
289 the Vita Prima of Pachomius290 
and the Apophthegmata Patrum. 
291 It describes a way of 
life that was capable of retaining its vigour in a 
primitive way, entirely evangelical in its inspiration 
and popular in its formulation, innocent of philosophical 
speculation and unaware of the problems and debates of 
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sophisticated culture. But it was a way of life that was 
capable of the most refined analysis and, in fact, became 
progressively the subject of a highly developed monastic 
anthropology as we see in the work of Maximus. This 
process had already begun in the Conferences of Cassian292 
and would attain provisional definition in the elaboration 
of Evagrius Ponticus, as well as in the Cappadocian 
synthesis and it would issue in the cosmic theology of 
The Pseudo-Dionysius. 
With the Scala Paradisi293 of John Climacus we come 
to a work of major importance in attempting to assess the 
quality of monastic life at the time of Maximus. Here we 
have what may be described as a comprehensive directory 
for the formation of the monk. Climacus is not insensitive 
to the possibilities of Christian maturation outside the 
cloister, but his teaching is aimed primarily, and almost 
exclusively, at those who aspire to break with the world 
and attain to union with God. Here we find the same ideal 
and the same means of approaching it as in the Pr_ 
Spirituale, but spelt out more systematically and more 
extensively. The virtues of faith, hope and charity are 
the indispensable foundation of the monastic life and it 
is in function of these participatioi in the Christian 
life that the aspirant can embark on the first steps of 
detaching himself from the world in so far as it is 
inimical to the imitation of Christ: di o'rc y 
ä7cpoa1cäee La and Eev vrc Ca 
294 
and undertake the life- 
long task of transforming natural love into the love of 
God. Like all the great monastic teachers of the early 
Church, Climacus discerns behind the crippling disorder 
of human passions the malign influence of the demons and 
100 
so his analysis of the passions, schematized on a tripar- 
tite division of human being familiar to his contemporaries: 
the evµtxbv the 9%LOvµTTnx6v and the Aoyt. x6v , is 
meant to facilitate 't v6oc 
295 in a warfare joined in 
man's heart between virtue and vice, the outcome of which 
is meant to be the defeat of the devil and the victory of 
Christ. The practical aim of the author ensures that he 
does not spare effort to provide his readers with an 
instrument of self-knowledge, so that his analyses of the 
disorders in man are thorough, accurate and searing. 
296 
While he is not unaware of the relative character of 
ascesis, he devotes ample space to expounding its 
elements, so that the novice may not presumptuously 
aspire to the contemplation that leads to union with God, 
before having realistically accepted the laws of purifi- 
cation that ensure the indispensable &TdOS, a ; it is 
tears that prepare for the sentiment of the heart, it is 
fear that is prelude to illumination. 
297 John visualises 
the exercise of the asceticism in a monastic milieu, 
either solitary or communal. For him preferably it would 
be a partially solitary life, a few disciples under the 
direction of a spiritual father whom they would consult 
periodically. 
298 The function of the spiritual father is 
bas ýc 
axie-. in his system. It ensures that the penitence, the 
remembrance of Christ, the whole quality of the kind of 
life envisaged and desired would be safeguarded by 
obedience. 
299 This emphasis on a moral and spiritual 
discipline rather than on an external practice which, 
of course, is not neglected, is characteristic of this 
marvellously balanced spiritual strategy which is meant 
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to transform the ascetic into the hesychast by means of a 
contemplative endowment centred on discernment300 that 
progresses from knowledge of self to illuminative knowledge 
and is the fruit of virtue that manifesto a growing 
assimilation to Christ. The interior heaven of the 
anticipated resurrection enjoyed by the monk, who is 
introduced to union with God, is most obvious in his 
capacity for continual prayer. 
301 While terms like 
ýovxCa, 7Cpocsu i, dyvcCa , 
&ydxn and vtoeeota bring 
out aspects of this blessed condition, we probably see 
the most distinctive aspect of the monk's experience in 
ýGUXCM : an incessant act of worship and a continual 
presence before God'302 says Climacus and he then advises 
his disciples: 'Unite the memory of Jesus with your 
breathing; then will you understand the usefulness of 
ýQUxLQ . 
303 This would become in the subsequent 
development of Byzantine spirituality an exhortation to 
technique as well as to qualitative maturity, but in 
Climacus it seems to emphasise the habitual condition of 
the developed hesychast: he lives in that way: his life 
becomes the prayer of povoXoyCa. 
In this system we have a compendium of asceticism 
that was meant to issue in an c %dec La that would be 
the reverse of a union with God expressed primarily in 
habitual contemplative prayer. It has a twofold signi- 
ficance for us in this context, the one general the other 
more specific: it sums up the monastic teaching that 
sprang up in the desert when monachism replaced martyrdom 
on a large scale as a limit expression of the gospels and, 
more specifically, it describes in systematic detail the 
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kind of life to which the works of Maximus constantly refer, 
especially the Liber Asceticus, the Centuria Caritatis and 
the opuscula that are embedded in larger works, like the 
ascetical introduction to the Quaestiones ad Thalassium, 
but which he nowhere describes in the systematic way We 
find in Climacus. In his lifetime Climacus was known as 
John the Scholastic because of his extensive erudition. 
304 
Although he believed that the best teaching transcended 
that to be found in bookishness, he betrays either 
explicitly or implicitly a comprehensive knowledge of 
all the monastic literature produced before his time, 
so that in him, besides testimony to personal experience, 
we find the distillation of a long tradition, stretching 
from the monastic collections and histories like the 
Apophthegmata Patrum and Historia Monachorum305 through 
the letters and conferences of Nilus, Barsanuphius 
Dorotheus and their peers to his own time. 
306 Like 
Moschus he too was a well-travelled man in the spirit of 
F. ev vrc Ca, as well as in his desire to comprehend and 
experience the monastic life. Besides he became abbot of 
the monastery of Mt. Sinai to which Moschus too was 
attached for a time as a monk. The history of this 
monastery which Justinian built to protect the solitaries 
of the desert from both the external assault of nomads 
and the inner compulsion of eccentricity ensured that it 
enshrined the heritage of the wilderness, especially the 
ideal of constant absorption in God by prayer as well as 
the memory of well-tried ascetical practices. The Scala 
Paradisi is the ascetical counterpart of the profounder 
intellectual discourses of Maximus. It throws into 
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relief the principal preoccupations of the monasticism of 
his time as well as giving us a probable outline of the 
praxis of the monastery in which he may have received his 
early training: the Palaia Lavra, the regimen of which 
although not necessarily identical with that of the 
monastery of St. Catherine at Sinai, would have combined 
the same elements of spiritual formation in analogous 
patterns. For Maximus the imitation of Christ, by parti- 
cipation in his death and resurrection, should lead to 
the restoration of the image of God in likeness by way of 
an äoxr)aLr. more or less interiorised, producing an 
&w&ee. a that released the monk into habitual prayer. 
This prayer, the expression of eccwaLc because of a 
developed dyd. TI was the preoccupation and the ideal of 
the man who would sound its depths experimentally and 
reflectively to leave us a record of aspects of his 
discoveries in works of striking depth and comprehensive- 
ness. Through a Climacus we catch a compelling glimpse 
of a Maximus participating in the daily round of a 
monastery of his time. Admittedly it is an oblique 
perspective in which we see him, but it would be un- 
reasonably fastidious to deny to the Scala. Paradisi 
considerable importance in an attempt to observe him in 
the living context where he produced his teaching. It 
is a further reminder that his doctrine is the expression 
of a highly developed way of life, the radiation of a 
Christian existence. Evagrius played a major role in 
the formulation of monastic spirituality. His writings 
were known to Maximus. They played a basic part in the 
forging of his theories of monastic anthropology and 
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provided him with language that had by then become normal 
in the monastic world. The influence of Evagrius on 
Climacus is apparent at once, both with regard to termin- 
ology and the provision of anthropological and ascetical 
models. 
307 This is symptomatic of the universality of his 
influence even after the condemnations of 553. 
At this point it is pertinent to recall an instance 
of the cross-fertilisation of the desert tradition with 
that of the more complex and intellectually refined 
tradition exemplified in Gregory of Nyasa. Jaeger has 
established the dependence of the Great Letter of the 
Pseudo-Macarius on the De Instituto Christiano of 
Gregory of Nyasa, 
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so that we are not dealing at any time 
subsequent to this process with two contrasting and 
mutually exclusive traditions, the one primitive and 
evangelical, the other reflex and philosophical. We have 
clear evidence of the influence of Diadochus of Photike 
on both Antiochus of St. Sabas309 and on John Climacus; 
l0 
Diadochus, in turn, was undoubtedly influenced by the 
Pseudo-IMacarius. 311 Sophronius and Moschus frequented the 
monasteries of both Antiochus and Climacus and would have 
been aware of the Pandectes of Antiochus written by 615 as 
well as the Scala of John, or at least its content, so 
that the knowledge of Diadochus and the presence of 
macarian influence that we find in Maximus can be traced 
to Sophronius with cogent probability. 
312 If we interpret 
the evidence for the influence of Diadochus, and so of the 
macarian tradition, as symptomatic of a spirituality 
obtaining more or less widely in the Middle-East as a 
whole, and if we can rely on the Syriac Life, then 
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perhaps we can attribute the macarian influence on Maximus, 
not only to his relationship with Sophronius, but to the 
ehadowier figure of Pantaleon, abbot of St. Chariton 'o, 
and conclude tentatively that, from his earliest formation, 
Maximus was being equipped to counterbalance the excessive 
spiritualism and intellectualism of Evagrius with themes 
derived from the macarian tradition, for instance that of 
affectivity, the synergy of the will, the heart, baptismal 
grace and charity. 
313 Maximus' correspondent, Thalassius, 
gives evidence of a strong evagrian bias in his Centuries314 
and it is in Maximus' Quaestiones ad Thalassium, an 
indisputably earlier work, while granting that it was 
probably composed after his having joined Sophronius in 
Africa, that we find these themes. Here too Nyasa has 
again come into his own, so that if the literary work of 
Pseudo-Macarius depends in some way on the spiritual 
teaching of Macarius the Egyptian, and it obviously does, 
315 
then with Maximus we find that the equilibrium of the 
desert Father, upset by the excessively intellectualist 
interpretations of his disciple Evagrius, recovers its 
original poise by the restoration of essential elements, 
on the affective and volitional side for instance, to 
offset the teaching on impassibility and pure prayer which 
had become distorted in the evagrian synthesis. This 
allows the spontaneous and homespun style of the desert 
fathers to enjoy once more the benefit of an adequate 
intellectual interpretation. 
The Syriac Life ascribes the Origenism of Maximus to 
the influence of Pantaleon. 
316 St. Chariton's monastery 
had been involved in the Origenist crisis of the second 
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half of the sixth century317 and Maximus had first-hand 
information about this doctrinal dispute which he would 
have been well-placed to obtain at the Palaia Lam. But 
this does not mean that he, or Pantaleon for that matter, 
could have been justly dubbed 'Origenist' in the pejora- 
tive sense, although it is precisely what we find the 
author of the Syriac Life doing. Garrigues has pointed 
out that the Neo-Chalcedonian victory of 553 struck both 
Origenists and Nestorians because they refused to believe 
that the Word had suffered in the flesh. 
318 On the other 
hand, John the Almoner, Sophronius, Maximus and Anastasius 
the Sinaite instinctively recoiled from the christological 
interpolation in the Trisagion, seeing in it evidence of 
the influence of Severus of Antioch and his formula of the 
'composite nature' of Christ. Sophronius and Maximus, and 
possibly Pantaleon, had assimilated v! the myths of the 
De Principiis, but also the dogmatic implications of the 
Neo-Chalcedonianism of the sixth century, especially the 
identification of the hypostasis of union as that of the 
Word, 'one of the Trinity'. But because they opposed the 
severian monophysitism, the author of the Syriac Life, 
representative of the semitic cast of thought that found 
Severus congenial, goes back to the condemnations of 
Justinian to find a term with discreditable connotations 
to discomfit his opponents. No one tackled the Origenisrn 
of Evagrius with the energy and competence of Maximus who 
salvaged the deeper insights of Origen himself, by incorpo- 
rating them in his own orthodox synthesis. 
The works of Maximus usually assigned to this 
category are Epistolae I, 
319 11,320 III9321 IV9322 Liber 
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Asceticus, 323 Capita de Caritate324 and Capita theologica 
et oeconomica. 
325 The most significant works in this 
class are the Liber Asceticus and the Capita de Caritate 
which are considered to be a studied revision of the 
Praktikos and Gnostikos pof Evagrius of Pontus. 
326 The 
Liber Asceticus is a dialogue between a novice and an old 
monk, although the form eventually develops into two long 
monologues by the monk. The splendid ascetical teaching 
is grounded in the plan of salvation proposed by Christ, 
so that here we have a theological synthesis rather than 
a series of more less disconnected admonitions. The 
'purpose of the Lord'327 is the restoration of the unity 
among men that has been disrupted by disobedience and 
enslavement to passion. Charity is the principle of that 
unity, not merely on the basis of the one human nature 
but with God in a unity 'without confusion'. 
328 Although 
the interest and usefulness of this work depend to a 
large extent on the magisterial handling of evagrian 
asceticism and through it of the heritage of prudence 
taken from the psychology of the Stoics together with the 
daring speculations of the Alexandrians, its principal 
value is that, while Maximus could disengage the lines of 
an orthodox spirituality from the excessively intellect- 
ualist teaching of Evagrius, he was able at the same time 
to restore to asceticism its foundation in the Passion 
and Death of Christ seen as the supreme expression of a 
love that ensures the rectification of self-love and 
adherenece to the original bias of man towards God in 
whom he'finds his meaning and his stability. 
329 This 
was possible for Maximus because of his appreciation of 
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the Chalcedonian definitions, clarified by Neo-Chacedonian 
developments and eventually taken to their ultimate 
conclusions by himself in the Monothelite debate. The 
Christology of Evagrius had no room for the Passion of 
Christ because of its exclusive intellectualism and its 
distinction between Christ and the Word. The way to 
participation in the Henad for Maximus was charity, not 
the gnostic speculation of Evagrius and the possibilities 
of both Henad and charity were to be found in the 
Incarnate Logos who suffered and died for us. The oxowd 
tioü KupCov is that we should assimilate what is realized 
in Him and so it is the fundamental theme of the contem- 
plation of Maximus in this splendid treatise. 
330 
The Capita de Caritate were intended at the time of 
their being sent to Elpidius to be a complement to the 
Liber Asceticus and in that context they can be seen as 
a redressing of the teaching of Evagrius in his Five 
Gnostic Centuries, the Gnostikos. 
331 They take the form 
of gnomic literature, a series of apophthegms divided 
into four books of a hundred, on ascetic practice and 
prayer calculated to lead the monk to deification. The 
form owes its invention to Evagrius; the century 
represents the One, God, and the number four refers to 
the Gospels. 332 The apophtn gmatic style has its roots 
in the Desert Fathers and a living tradition of monastic 
wisdom passed from generation to generation of monks in 
this way. In Evagrius we see the confluence of this 
traditional monastic asceticism with its concern for 
deification through renunciation or worldly satisfaction, 
war on the passions, the cultivation of virtue and the 
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development of forms of contemplation with Alexandrian 
speculation, especially the Logos mysticism of Origen 
which undoubtedly becomes in Evagriua, whatever may be 
said of Origen himself, a more Hellenic than Christian 
intellectualism. 333 In the Capita de Caritato Maximus 
salvages the orthodox in this tradition by replacing the 
gnostic ideal of spiritual perfection with the Gospel 
revelation on charity and its fundamental role in the 
Christian life. 334 Apart from deft adjustments to the 
evagrian text, that owe inspiration to the Cappadocians 
or to the Pseudo-Dionysius, it is this constitution of a 
charity that is founded on the Incarnate Word as the 
organising principle of the whole body of ascetic and 
spiritual teaching in the Capita de Caritate that makes 
it so much an original work of Maximus and not merely 
plagiarism. 
335 All through the Centuries there is an 
abiding awareness ol 'the love of God which is in Christ 
Jesus'. There is a marked development in awareness of 
the presence of Christ to the believer and more intimately 
in the believer. Conflating Ephesians 3.17 and Col. 2.3, 
our author writes: 'If, according to the words of the 
divine Apostle, Christ dwells in our hearts by faith and 
in Him "are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge", 
then in our hearts are to be found all the treasures of 
wisdom and knowledge. And they are revealed to the heart 
according to the measure of the purification of each man 
by the commandments'. 
336 This is central to his spiritu- 
ality and we note that it implies a presence of Christ in 
man; that thin is in some way bound up with faith; that 
faith requires a purification by the observance of the 
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commandments, and presumably most of all by the commandments 
of love, in order that it may be the means of revealing that 
presence to us; that this will initiate us into a fullness 
of wisdom and knowledge. Just before this Maximus has 
admitted that we are excluded from these divine gifts 
because, through laziness, we lack active love for Christ337 
The gifts are said to be gifts of the Holy Spirit. A little 
further on he speaks of mind 'which the Lord calls "heart" 
and says that it is unaware of Christ 'who lives in it by 
the grace of holy baptism' because of impurity. 
338 
'Cleanse your mind' he tells us 'and then you will be able 
to know the indwelling of Christ'. 
339 The revelation the 
Trinity, the Incarnation, the meaning of the universe and 
of the Christian life are attributed to 'the grace of 
Christ which lives in you and is the pledge of the Holy 
Spirit'. 340 Here we have the elements of a sublime 
anthropology which finds its centre and meaning in the 
intimate presence of Christ in men because of the action 
of the Holy Spirit. It is an obvious way of linking the 
christology and anthropology of Maximus and this is even 
more obvious when he sees it as the way of restoring the 
lost unity of mankind because they now possess a common 
life in Christ: 'He who says "I am the life" is properly 
life'. 341 This puts Christ as Life at the very heart of 
the spiritual life which is the reapp? op1iation of the 
life man lost by sin; it is a motio sui that is truly 
his own but is even more truly the life of Christ. It 
is a restoration of the image by the death of Christ who 
'led back to life him who had been made dead'. 
342 The 
Pauline associations are strong although not quoted 
ill 
directly: 'I live, now not I, Christ lives in me, . 
343 
A further realization of the implications of unity is to be 
found in paragraphs 29 and 30 of the Second Century where 
Maximus seems to be pointing to the Trinity which 'is 
divided indivisibly and combined but dividedlyº344 as an 
exemplar for the unity which Christ has achieved in 
mankind where there is now 'neither Jew nor Greek, there 
is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor 
female', but all in all is Christ345 (Gal 3.28). 
Maximus then, with duo deference to analogy, sees the 
work of Christ issuing in that union for which He prayed 
the night before he suffered. The new man, 'being above 
the tyranny of passions and seeing one human nature, he 
looks equally on all men and is equally disposed towards 
them all'. 
346 Christ has enabled man to wed gnome to 
nature and so to become in Christ one, the new Adam. 
347 
Sherwood dates both of these writings early, 'by 626' in 
fact. 348 
The Capita theologica et oeconomica are placed by 
Sherwood between 630 and 634.349 With Von Balthasar he 
notes their dependence on the Quaestiones ad Thalassium 
and the Ambigua II. There is heavy dependence on 
Evagrius and through him on Origen for the material of 
these sentences, but Maximus has taken care to preface 
them with a group of ten capita that ensure that the 
reader will be able to draw benefit from the insights of 
the older masters into Theology and Incarnation without 
being trapped into the heterodoxy of evagrian Origenism. 
350 
Von Balthasar has classified the contents of the Gnostic 
Centuries: the transcendence of God and temporality as 
112 
the essence of the creature; the Good and its perversion; 
symbolical classifications of the way of perfection; the 
mystical Sabbath as world transcendence; the symbolism of 
the redemptive Economy; mystical ascent and economic 
stages of transformation; deification; new metamorphosis : 
mystical resurrection and ascension; allegories from the 
Old Testament; metamorphoses of the Logos, Parousia and 
eschatological sabbath. 
351 These indications give some 
idea of the scope of this outstanding work of spirituality. 
In his Epistola XII Maximus wrote: 'I do not write these 
things because I wish ill to the heretics or rejoice in 
their misfortune, but because I rejoice and take pleasure 
in their conversion. What is more beautiful for the 
faithful than to sei 
During his trial he 
possibly the Origen 
Justinian 's Council 
Origen seen through 
the scattered sons of God united? º352 
was forced to condemn Origen explicitly, 
he knew through the condemnations of 
in 553, or even more probably the 
the speculative Evagrius' Centuries. 
But his customary policy is to reverence the thought of 
hie great predecessors and to attempt to incorporate their 
teaching into larger syntheses so that nothing of value 
may be lost. This admirable self-effacement is a 
dimension of the reverence which Maximus had for the 
Fathers, so that even when he was faced with deviations, 
he sought to reconcile tensions in higher syntheses rather 
than display his intellectual acumen in unilateral 
polemics. His approach was different when it was a matter 
of confronting the living representatives of what he 
recognized to be heresy. 
353 But here too his intentions 
were eirenical. Of the remaining writings belonging to 
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this class, the one that deserves most notice is the 
remarkable E isp tola II to John the Chamberlain. Epistola I 
is a long exhortation to George the Eparch on his embark- 
ing for Constantinople. Since his career was in jeopardy 
the letter is: meant to stiffen his courage. It was almost 
inevitable that Maximus should have had recourse to Stoic 
vocabulary in that kind of context, but basically the 
letter appeals to theoria on the basis of Scripture. 
Epistola III is a letter of gratitude to John the 
Chamberlain, but Maximus does not fail to introduce 
considerations that recommend the practice of the 
virtues. Epistola IV is on salutary grief and its 
benefits, a typically monastic exhortation. 
Of Epistola II Sherwood says: 'on love, perhaps the 
354 
earliest little treatise that comes from Maximus', and 
scholars, from Combefis on, have not failed to notice 
that here vere maximum agit Maximus. 
355 Maximus uses the 
term yvuiµ-q in this letter and although in other cases it 
may be hazardous to date a letter or opus of a Father 
from verbal usage, it must be admitted that here Sherwood 
is right, as yvw4ij was so central to Maximus' later 
thinking on the dyothelite question and would not have 
been then used by him in the way it is found in this 
opusculum. 
356 Referring to ä(äßq , Maximus says that 
'it is, to sum up in a definition, a universal inward 
disposition with respect to the First Good, together with 
an all-embracing care for the whole race in keeping with 
nature'. 
357 Behind this arid formula 16 the conviction 
that the human %6yoc cvicew is orientated to God. This 
means that man is God's c xcv , an existential capacity 
for relationship with God which implies that he is what 
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he becomes and that he becomes what he does. 
358 This 
requires that man in his freedom should innovate his 
nature expressed in reason and become like to God through 
this personalisation. This, in turn, would mean that he 
was united to God and had laid the foundation of union 
with his fellow men. The realized unity of human nature 
would reflect the goodness of God and manifest his 
simplicity and consistency. 
359 The Fall is seen as man's 
failure to rise to his vocation because of passionate 
self-love expressed in the pursuit of the pleasure of 
sense. The waywardness of yvcµTI fragmented nature 
because man, by his abuse of freedom, refused to identify 
himself with nature and, deceived by the Devil, turned 
away from his natural bias towards God. 
360 The upshot of 
this was a multitude of individualists, saddled with 
ignorance, egoism and tyranny, at loggerheads with each 
other in place of a community based on human nature. 
361 
It required the kenotic, Incarnation of the divine Word 
to heal man's 'sickness unto death' and to restore to 
nature its power of union with God and men through 
äYd, x, i * 
362 
The purpose of the Incarnation was to stabilize 
nature and to restore its unity, no longer shattered by 
the wilfulness of yv(Zµ-n . At the same time the way of 
äYä7c'n was established: divine, deifying and leading to 
God. 
363 To bring this about the Word Incarnate took hold 
of the consequences of sin and accepting for love of his 
Father injuries, suffering and death, he freely submitted 
nature to the will of the Father and through the paradoxical 
use of the meontic he restored nature to its original 
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unity. 
364 Because yvwµi and cvoLC, were again at one, 
the reconstitution of the body, of which men wore to be 
members and in which they would recover the sense of being 
related to each other, had been achieved in principle. 
365 
Maximus concludes that Christ removed the obstacles to the 
way of charity in order to persuade us to cleave to God 
and to one another; consequently the saints suffered and 
resisted sin even unto death in order to be united to God 
and to each other in the unity of nature. 
366 In his 
justly famous letter, Maximus describes deification by 
comparing it to a communication of idioms, in which man 
and God exchange that which they possess most intimately? 
67 
Man participates in the divine glory and goodness, but 
God, for his part, conducts himself like a man to a man, 
whom he treats as a friend. A 'union without confusion', 
to use the Chalcedonian expression, is wrought where the 
Creator and the creature are united in one charity which 
ignores every difference. Christian existence finds its 
exemplar in the hypostatic union and the mysterious synergy 
of the two natures in the one person. 
368 Even though we 
may find here Pauline doctrine elaborated in Platonic and 
Stoic concepts, 
369 there is no question of a reductionism 
that would signify the overwhelming of the author's 
contemplative intuition by secular modes of thought. On 
the contrary, we are presented with an anthropology that 
has been immeasurably enriched by a profound understanding 
of the mystery of Christ. 
Chapter III 
LANGUAGE, MEANING AND STRUCTURE IN THE EXPOSITIO 
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Having examined the theological method of St. Maximus 
in a general way, it will be seen from a closer scrutiny 
of one of. his works, the Expositio Orationis Dominicae, 
1 
that his claim to be a writer of outstanding spiritual 
attainment is well founded. This conclusion emerges, not 
merely from an assessment of the content of his writings, 
but it becomes apparent too from an analysis of his style. 
Here we can approach the author, more or less unaware of 
himself, so to speak, and observe how he expresses himself 
rather than what he says. This sketch of the saint in 
profile should confirm the impression gained from a face 
to face encounter, in which the coherence of his life and 
writings is so radiantly obvious. 
2 Even the celebrated 
critic seems to have overlooked such manifest evidence. 
Commenting on the Quaestiones ad Thalassium, Photius has 
this to say about the writing of St. Maximus: 
As regards his style, he is tortuous in his 
sentences; he delights in inversions; he is in his 
element with amplification and he does not take care 
to express himself accurately. The result is that 
his writing is shot through with a lack of clarity 
and difficulty in understanding. Subjecting his 
discourse to a crudely tumid style with regard to 
construction and cadence, he does not try to soothe 
the ear. His figurative use of language does not 
glow with grace and charm, but is undertaken simply 
and artlessly. He even cones close to blunting 
those who are keen on him, for the solutions that he 
contrives are far from the text and known hi3tory, 
and even farther from the difficulty itself. 
Photius goes on to recommend his 'contemplative ways of 
thought' and acknowledges his genuine piety. While 
admitting the pertinence of this criticism of the 
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Quaestiones, it should be noted too that another work of 
Maximus, more or less contemporaneous with this one 
selected among others for assessment by Photius, displays 
characteristics which show him to have been not merely a 
saintly master of 'anagogical and contemplative ways of 
thought', but a writer of power and distinction. A 
cursory examination of his Commentary on the Pater Noster 
from the point of view of language and structure may 
serve to counterbalance the impression given by the 
Patriarch of Constantinople. 
(i) Language 
Like all his great predecessors, Maximus can use the 
accepted language with the liberty of a master, so that 
we have to weigh each word with discretion if we are to 
approach the meaning he intends it to bear in its context. 
Further, like him we have to constantly keep in mind that 
language and the thought that it expresses are not 
absolute entities, but rather a means of grasping reality. 
With these provisos in mind we can now look at the termin- 
ology of the Pater Noster. 
4 While the list is not meant 
to be exhaustive, it should enable us to draw some 
conclusions, not merely about the nature of the language 
used by Maximus, but also about the kind of theology he 
practised. This selection from a computerized analysis 
of the text merely notes the occurrence of the terms, 
without giving details of inflexion and conjugation. The 
numbers in brackets refer to frequency: 
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äYät (8), &YaKäw (16), &yaed (17), atoOTIo. c (6), atTCa (6), 
d. i eeca (4), cXoiCa (1), ävOpwcoC (26), & a©1 (5), &%oxarävTa- 
ot. t EL) , 
äpc'r (13) 
, 
äpxA (4) ,a 
rovpy6 (6) 
, ßaaLXc Ca (20) , 
ßou%r (5), Ytveoi. c (12). Yvi5 q (24), YvwaLG (4), 6LaCpcaLG (2), 
6L4eeoLC (14), 66Em (4), övvapLC (24), ctxwv (2), clvaL (15) 
gxovocoC (5), gv6pyeca (6), 17CcO iCa (11), EÜXA (5), r. wi (25), 
ý8ovA (8), eävatioS (12), 6sta (7), e&Xgµa (7), eeATloLC (2), 
eeoxorCa (4), ¬cd (49), eedti-nC (4), eewpCa (3), e6woLC (5), 
evµ6C (7), xgvwaiC (S), xCvT1OLC (2, ), xdooc (6), XayoC (67), 
µvati1pLov (3), vdµoc (20), voür. (11), 666un (2), oCxovopCa (1), 
6µoo5Qt. oC (1), 6voµa (9), ovTa (7), xäen (15), na'rp (39), 
weLpaoµcc (40), nveüµa. (30), -xdeoS (9), %päEiC (2), xpomCpeoLC 
(4), wpdvoca (1), xpoo&uXA (26), ompe (12), oogCa (4), of oLC 
(1), oSµa (9), Sw' p (S), crC6oLC (7), TptdC (15), rp6woc (12), 
vX1 (12), b7cäpxciv (13), ü7EapF. LC (2), k6otiaoLC (4), cat. vdµeva 
(1), cpdßoC (8), ceopä (5), cpvatC (79), cvoLxdC (8), xcpLC (26), 
'uXi (17), "Qv (34). 
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It will be readily conceded that this list makes a 
considerable proportion of a text of 13,274 words, 
including the article, conjunctions and particles. A 
glance at Lampe5 and more pertinently at works like that 
of Thunberg6 will show that this terminology drawn from 
common usage, philosophy and Scripture was, by the time 
of Maximus on the way to technical precision, if it had 
not already attained it. Although each word would merit 
special attention and distinctions, we can affirm 
confidently that here we are in the presence of a 
scientific vocabulary. It is a language that, while 
patient of a cluster of cognate meanings and sufficiently 
plastic to assume connotations from its context, has 
become consistent in usage, fixed, defined. This process 
will have ensured besides that it will have, for the most 
part, forsaken its concrete origins and entered the realm 
of the abstract, the universal and the necessary. This 
invites us to ask ourselves whether or not we are in the 
presence of a scientific vocabulary. 
For the Greeks &Lo' 9-L1 deduces universal and 
necessary conclusions from universal and necessary 
principles and all the materials it uses are marked with 
the same universality and necessity. The aim of 
science, which is said to be Wcp C 'r6 öv , is truth. 
The way to this kind of appropriation of truth is through 
a rigorous method of proof(&16ös LeLC) which has for 
instruments syllogism and induction. The former deduces 
the universal from axioms and first principles which it 
takes for granted upon authority(wC. -xapapvva6vTwv ) "? 
The other proves the universal from knowledge derived 
from particulars through clear evidence of sense. 
8 
120 
Since the major premisses or universals are ultimately 
derived from induction, the scientific process is rooted 
in experience, but transcends it. Every science has its 
proper principles; beyond these are the common 
principles, 
9 the ultimates in every kind of reasoning 
process, the ground of rationality: the basic principles 
of logic: the law of contradiction etc., mathematical 
and metaphysical axioms. Is it possible to have a 
theology that will meet the requirements of this kind of 
knowledge? To invoke the example of Aquinas is not to do 
violence to historical sense, but merely to affirm the 
possibility of attaining the ideal of &La-cAj1j. r1 , 
simply beca se it has been realized in his method. He 
says summarily: sacra doctrina eat scientia. 
10 So in 
his treatment of theology we find the use of explanatory 
understanding of the formulae of the Creed and behind 
them of the content of divine revelation. The first 
principles of this science are the articles of faith and 
the rational process, by the use of induction and 
deduction, ensures the evolution of theological insight. 
It is a discursive, ratiocinative, collative process that 
satisfies the exigencies of reason and gives rise to a 
knowledge through proper causes that can claim the title 
of &XLo'tiijif . It is an exercise in explanatory under- 
standing and 'explanation is in terms of the ultimates 
reached in analysis. 
" St. Thomas abstracts from 
particular and accidental determinations so that his 
theology can justifiably profess to be a mediation of the 
truth of revelation in rational categories. 
12 This was 
the theological road that Aquinas travelled. It can be 
said straight off that it was not the way of Maximus. 
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When we examine the Pater No= er of Maximus in the 
light of the achievement of Aquinas we have to admit that, 
although ultimates have been reached in analysis, as the 
language shows, the form is not discursive. There is no 
evidence of an habitual proceeding from principles to 
scientific conclusions. There is a tendency to draw 
paranetic conclusions, which alerts us to thinking that 
here we have a different intention and so find ourselves 
in a different realm of discourse. His performance in 
the Dispute with Pyrrhus, 
13 for instance, assures us 
that it was well within the competence of Maximus to 
reach the ultimates demanded by CLoT1jµi , but in the 
Pater Noster we have to admit that even though we are 
presented with a scientific vocabulary, we do not find 
it used scientifically. We are not being presented with 
a scientific treatise. 
A closer look at some of the passages in the Pater 
Koster will reveal unmistakeable evidence of another kind 
of discourse. In his essay on the 'spiritual senses' in 
the teaching of Origen, Rahner lays it down as a canon 
that 'if an author clearly speaks of five spiritual 
faculties, we are justified in taking into account texts 
which refer to a single faculty. 
14 We find that Maximus 
meets that requirement. In the Ambigua he says: 
The sight, that is the eye, is the image of the mind; 
the hearing, that is the ear, is the image of reason 
and smell; that is the nose, is the image of the 
aggressive appetite; taste is the image of the 
pleasure appetite and touch is the image of life. 15 
Maximus understands man to be fitted with five spiritual 
powers corresponding to the five bodily senses so that he 
may effect unity in creation as a whole. We may now 
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proceed to examine some texts that speak of 'a single 
faculty' and then corroborate our claims by adducing 
further statements that seem to indicate a higher appre- 
hension of divine things than would be required for the 
abstract elaboration of revelation. 
(877C): He (the Word) imparts a share of divine 
life by making himself eatable in a way that he 
himself understands; so do they who have received 
from him such intellectual sense that, by the taste 
of this food, they know in accurate knowledge truly 
that 'the Lord is good' . 
The crucial terms are atQ8T1QL6, voepä, Yei3otC, slbýva 
xaT1, XLYuwot, v . 
16 The object of the knowledge referred 
to by Maximus is not merely a web of thoughts about God; 
it is some kind of affective knowledge; it even looks as 
if it is knowledge through love: a realization that 'the 
Lord is good'. It has the character of sense perception: 
it is an aia(), gmc. , but at a higher level, that of uo'DC ; 
it is voepd ; it takes place in that area where man can 
enco ter God himself in himself, 
'7 it has something of the 
experimental character of sense knowledge, its concreteness, 
its immediacy, its imperturbable sense of the real, (an 
Aristotelian touch). The Word makes himself 9bc58 Lµov 
and he can be tasted. This will obviously give rise to a 
more perfect embodiment of the Word in men. Those who eat 
are imbued with a divine quality that makes for divinisa.. 
tion: -xoL6'rii« %pdc eewaLv . This passage illustrates 
the creative tension between the use of a technical 
vocabulary and a more descriptive terminology, when common 
or iuiiversal language has to give way to something more 
concrete if the experience of Christian verities, known at 
one level through tradition and its purified language, is 
to be communicated acsomething personal and known intimately 
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by the writer. The implication is that the author enjoys 
this apprehension. 
(897A): Here again we have the notion of nourishment 
with its connotation of tasting and eating: 'we are 
nourished by virtue and wisdom'; the Word 'is embodied in 
a variety of ways in each of the saved' . IIpäC L4, ecwp ca 
and OcoXorCa obviously account for %oLxCAwc. The 
bread of life and full knowledge is for the vanquishing 
of sin and death. If Adam had agreed to live and know in 
this way, had been willing to accept the Word-bread, he 
would not have died. Man must aspire to experimental 
knowledge if he is to be wise and live. The Word gives 
himself in proportion to 'works', to the deserts of voU« 
man's basic capacity for the Word which can be deepened. 
(901A): He who seeks the incorruptible bread of 
wisdom through prayer .... knows that the one 
pleasure consists in the attainment of divine 
things, the giver of which is naturally God, the 
guardian of which is the choice of free will of 
the one who receives. The only pain is failing 
to attain these blessings . 
We are given here something of the 'passionate' dimension 
of the experience of divine things. Aristotle speaks of 
the 'feelings' or emotions or affections of our moral 
nature, on which follow pleasure and pain as their 
distinctive feature. 
18 In Maximus we can transpose this 
to aEoOro . vocpä and assume that it follows the 
internal senses of 97-LOvpCa and 8vµdc . We are in 
the realm of spiritual experience. The assumption that 
I%LOvµta and 8vµ6 are being exercised at a higher 
level than their material principles would warrant is 
corroborated by Maximus's teaching on the transformation 
of passion, instanced in the Pater Noster (896AB), where 
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voIDC is 'stretched like a cord' by 6vµdt and is set 
on fire with IXL©vi. Ca . Wo find similar implications 
further on (905C), where the Word is said to move 'our 
appetite insatiably to Himself', the bread of life, wisdom, 
knowledge and justice. 'Axopt o' wC reveals the play of 
will, man's capacity for the transcendent in an appetitive 
way and the quality of the drive suggests a strong experi- 
mental dimension in the account. 
(905D): And from there again he leads upon the supreme 
ascent of divine realities to the Father of lights, and 
makes us sharers of the divine nature by participation 
in the Spirit through grace; through this we are given 
the status of sons of God, all of us having within us 
the entire author-himself of this grace: the Son of 
the Father by nature, without over limitation and in a 
pure way. From Him, by Him, and in Him we have and 
shall have being, movement and life. 
The embodiment of the Word is achieved in a threefold way, 
as we have seen, and culminates in the life of 'pure prayer', 
which is synonymous with 6eoXoyCa , and which is implied 
here as vision or sight by reference to 'the Father of 
lights', and is the anticipation of perfect 6ewotC in 
the next life. The passage takes on an experimental 
character from the context of concern with conversion and 
especially the teaching on prayer. There is besides an 
urgency woven into the style that communicates a sense of 
pressing reality with regard to 'tiä ec a of Maximus, 
which radiates through a seemingly conventional terminology. 
Other texts corroborate these principal ones: Maximus 
is about to describe what God grants XäpvrL , the grace 
to recognise grace; in (876A) we are reminded that it is 
profitable to know and experience yvSvaa xaC itpä&aL 
and thus to write duly about the power of the Lord's prayer; 
in (8770) he exhorts his readers to 'acquire ? 6IO by 
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%PMELS in order to be united to God yvwotiaxaC 
which will be attained by withdrawal from created things; 
this suggests a union beyond every finite thing and 
concept; the emphasis on cC Xavoi, C (881B) takes us 
through the will beyond the conceptual order to the order 
of the real in its own existence. The avrrcvic 
&vtiCXW LC (888C) hints at a connaturality begotten of 
iaeWV Td Ocia. 
If we are to trust a master, this play of spiritual 
sense might have led us to expect to find Maximus among 
those who 'by means of figures, comparisons and simili- 
tudes allow something of what they feel to overflow and 
utter secrets and mysteries from the abundance of their 
spirits rather than explain these things in arguments'. 
19 
This genre would be marked by description rather than by 
explanation, 'feeling' rather than conceptual understand- 
ing. In this kind of writing, where there is an effort 
to communicate directly with some kind of concrete 
immediacy what is experienced, we find recourse to images, 
not merely deployed as phantasms in an intellectual 
process, nor even the 'exploitation of image to develop 
an idea already formed', 
20 but as symbols where their 
sensuousness is employed to convey a whole scale of 
experimental resonances, spiritual, intellectual, voli- 
tional and emotional. 
21 It is an effort to elaborate the 
phenomenological features of a lived theology by the 
conversion of perceptions into appeeptions with a view 
to describing an interiorly differentiated consciousness. 
Since, 'description is in terms of the given, while 
explanation is in terms of the ultimates reached in 
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analysis, 
22 the evidence of the spiritual senses at work in 
the theology of Maximus would have led us to expect a 
language marked by its concreteness and sharp particularity 
put to the service of scientific and interpretative 
description, but in the Pater Noster we hardly find the 
language of spiritual sense used in this way. The 
experience is affirmed rather than conveyed by symbol=n. If 
Photius was lamenting the poverty of Maximus's imagery from 
this point of view, then his criticism was well placed, but 
perhaps he was merely deploring an imagination that was 
incapable of producing anything more exciting than 'like a 
sheepskin' or 'fiery horses', (888D). 
While there is evidence of rational power and activity 
in the Pater Noster, at least in the form of enthymeme and 
example, it would be more true to say that his method is 
declarative and compositional after the manner of art: 
23 
The careful arrangement of ideas and images is reminiscent 
of mosaic; the collative process is not inspired by an 
analytic purpose, but rather by the desire to penetrate 
language, image and concept in order to apprehend the 
reality veiled there; in a complementary manner that 
reality once apprehended would lead us to a new apprecia- 
tion of concept, image and language. In a remarkable 
passage in the Mystagogia he says: 'if the invisible things 
are contemplated through the visible things, in a much 
greater measure the visible things are understood through 
the invisible things by those who give themselves to 
contemplation'. 
24 Applied to the words of Scripture and so 
presumably to the Pater Noster, we are told that 'when the 
Logos of God becomes clear and luminous in us, and his face 
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shines like the sun then also his garments appear to shine, 
that is the words of holy Scripture, of the Gospels, appear 
evident and manifest, having nothing hidden. But Moses and 
Elijah also come with him, that is the most spiritual 
%6ToL of the law and the Prophets'. 
25 For Maximus the 
mystery of Christ is the unique object of the spiritual 
sense of Scripture; it is not so much a case of under- 
standing something of Christ through the Scriptures as of 
understanding the Scriptures through Him, and beyond them 
the whole created realm. He tells us explicitly in the 
Pater Noster that his method is to be the examination and 
interpretation of each word by means of OecopCa a 
search for the )6yoL which will make the prayer intelli- 
gible. 
26 His expositions on the Word and the Holy Trinity 
assure us that oewp Cm will be quo Lxrj and ecoxo r LXA . 
Besides the indications of the role of spiritual sense, 
which we have noted, suggest that it would be informed also 
by OcoXoyCa in the experimental sense, something that 
would have to be mediated by another kind of activity, that 
of X6yoc . The language of spiritual sense is a sign 
that the Word of God had become 'clear and luminous' in 
Maximus, so that the rest of the language, which has 
acquired scientific status or nearly so, is to be read in 
the spirit of gazing at the shining garments of Thabor. 
In fact, the author asks the Lord to open his voUC so 
that he may grasp the mysteries and that he may have 
matching Xdyoc for clear knowledge of the uooüµsva 
(876A). Here we have a distinßtion between the order of 
apprehension and the order of mediation, the activity of 
'mind' and the activity of 'reason'. This is explicit if 
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we translate voovµsva as 'ideas'; it is implicit if we 
render it as 'intelligibleo'. The whole process requires 
a gratuitous enhancement of votSr. : 'oar. ZOW4Vot, C 
T6v voiiv . The result is an unveiling of reality, 
'Anagogical and contemplative ways of thought' seem to have 
found a medium of expression that is valid even if defective 
in the use of imagery. 
(ii) Structure 
'Byzantine civilization was essentially mathematical 
in its emphasis on the inevitability of due proportion, 
rhythm and order. This sense of the inevitable reflected 
the underlying serenity of the self-concentrated Byzantine 
culture, based on recognition of the dominance of Idea and 
This emphasis of the rule of cool and temperate mind.?? 
on the mathematical was bound up with the concept of man 
as mediating between xdoµoc voiyrd« and xöoµoc 
atoer'r6 , so that in his artistic activity the harmonies 
of the world of mind would find an echo in the world of 
sense. The sense components of art became articulate by 
becoming part of rhythm which was understood as a partici- 
pation in the harmonies of pure numbers. Geometry and 
arithmetic were embodied in architecture and music. An 
examination of the Pater Noster will show that it is 
informed by this mathematical spirit. The arithmetical 
character of the work appears, for instance, in the six- 
fold treatment of the 'mysteries', 
28 
while its geometric 
structure is evident in single elements like a grammatical 
sentence and more obviously in its over-all organization. 
This structural quality gives Maximus the claim to be an 
artist and the Pater Noster the title of work of art. 
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Photius does not seem to have adverted to this facet of the 
Confessor's literary achievement and so to have overlooked 
his having succeeded in informing diversity with a marvell- 
ous unity and given his use of language the splendour of 
form. 
It will be instructive then to examine the work as a 
whole from the point of view of structure and to supplement 
this with an analysis of a paragraph and a single sentence 
in the same way. The work falls easily into a prologue and 
six sections, the last of which can be treated as a conclu- 
sion, but which recapitulates much of the material of the 
five preceding parts, so that we have a six-fold treatment 
of the main themes. The petitions of the Pater Noster 
provide a sure basis for a systematic approach and in 
section 1 we have a provisional list of the seven 
'mysteries' that Maximus discerns in the dominical prayer 
(876BC); there is no elaboration here, but after the 
manner of an overture it sets the themes in relation to the 
petitions for the first time and we are invited to explore 
the implications of what has been merely put before us 
nominally. Then the author unfolds some of the meaning of 
the terms from a theological point of view (876C-881A). 
This is highlighted by the stylistic device of introducing 
his commentary on the mysteries with the Word as subject: 
'The Word made flesh teaches theology'; 'He has made men 
of equal dignity with the angels' and so on. This emphasis 
gives a theological bias to the whole work, so that 
structure is used significantly. This becomes even more 
plausible when we recall that the structure of his 
experience, which we presume to be the inspiration of his 
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writing, points to an initial encounter with the Word in a 
supra-rational way, so that the logical sequence of his 
creativity is here embodied in the manner in which the work 
is constructed. The role of the Word Incarnate is set in 
the context of the life of the Trinity and edwoi, c is 
already seen as developing because of x6vwatc in function 
of our relationships to the Father, the Son and the Holy 
Spirit. The initiative and the dominance of the Word made 
flesh is basic to Maximus's exposition and he leaves us in 
no doubt about his vision and intentions by this literary 
emphasis, which throws into relief the Christocentrism of 
his thought. Section 3 recapitulates the seven 'mysteries' 
and while it does not add to our understanding of the 
terms, it does round off the first presentation of the 
themes and sets them in the context of 'prayer' and 'vow' 
(881AB). 
In Section 4 we have the Main Commentary (884A-905B). 
The fundamental intuition of Maximus, in keeping with 
Byzantine theology in general, is God's self-communication 
to man in Christ, so that we find a consideration of God, 
the Blessed Trinity and man, and the union of God and man 
in deification. This was made possible by the incarnation 
and Redemption which culminated in x4vwaLC and issued 
in the sending of the Spirit and the formation of the 
Church. These themes are woven into this commentary more 
or less explicitly. For Maximus man is an open and dynamic 
being essentially in relation to God, created in his image 
and given the task of acquiring his likeness in a free 
personal way. The Chacedonian 'union without confusion' 
of the natures in Christ is the key to his insight into 
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the possibility of a perfect union between the divine and 
the human, because in Christ it was realized hypostatically 
and offered to all men as their destinty in Him. He unites 
the human and divine natures and by a deified humanity 
removes man from the law of sin and by his incarnate 
divinity raises him to the deification of grace. The 
confluence of the theological and ascetical streams in 
perfect synthesis is made possible by the firmness of the 
author's spiritual anthropology. That is reflected in the 
place given to it in this work, where these themes occupy 
the principal exposition like the centre-piece of a great 
triptych, flanked by christological and ascetical contem- 
plations. Structure is again seen to be significant. 
Section 5 is a further recapitulation (905BD); this 
time however the 'mysteries' are taken in reverse order, 
prefaced by: 'If we really desire to be delivered from 
the Evil One and not enter into temptation', which shows 
that the approach has shifted from the theological to the 
ascetical point of view. The treatment begins with man's 
tragic situation and progresses to the glorious destiny 
held out to him by the Cord Incarnate. The ascetical 
momentum of section 5 carries over into section 6 (905D- 
908D), a splendid arenetic passage that summarises the 
whole teaching of the Pater Noster, although its sequence 
does not correspond exactly to the previous order of the 
themes. These few remarks should assure us that in this 
treatise of St. Maximus, structure is not something 
adventitious, but intrinsic to the significance of the 
work as a whole. 
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Now for a look at a paragraph, where we shall find a 
comparable structural firmness! In his prologue (873A-C), 
he declares that 'I have mingled fear with yearning for 
him and have formed from the two, fear and yearning, one 
love consisting of reverence and benevolence, so that fear 
stripped of affection may not become hatred, nor affection 
unaccompanied by prudent fear become contempt, but love 
should appear as the inner law of affection and appropriate 
everything that pertains to nature: by benevolence it 
masters hatred and by reverence it dispels contempt'. He 
then gives illustrative examples from Scripture and 
continues: 'As I have said, on my part mingling fear with 
yearning, I have laid aown this law of love towards my 
Lord up to this day: restrained from writing through 
reverence lest contempt occur, I am moved to write by 
benevolence so that hatred may not be considered the final 
excuse for not writing'. An analysis of this text will 
reveal how carefully constructed it is. Here we have to 
limit ourselves to saying that, while the upshot of the 
mingling of x6Oor. and gpdpoc is &YäxrI. , the 
components of the amalgam have been transformed in the 
process. 06poC has taken on the connotation of 
reverence and awe, while 7ý6eoc is now in some way more 
deliberately other-centred. From an entological point of 
view it would seem that it is äyä i that has transformed 
cpdpoc and %6Ooc . MCooC and xa'tacpövno!. c 
are seen to be defective in combining w66oc and 96po. 
an imbalance that must be corrected by the play of &y cn , 
the v6µo6 ! vö 4dOc' oc aTopygC . T'ropy , which has 
been translated as 'affection' is, for the Fathers, the 
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essence of cpLXavOpwicCa . Here its natural energy is 
transformed by &y %, and cÜvat. a and uCOwk now 
reappear in dispelling p. Caoc and xa'CacppöviIaLr., 
that is by restoring the proper balance between pdpot 
and x6eoc . 
'AYdVn is said to 'appropriate everything 
that pertains to nature'. This is essential to the whole 
of Maximus's spiritual anthropology with its concern for 
unification; here it refers to the capacity of love to 
transmute fear and yearning into something finer, so that 
the outcome of their association is more than the effect of 
their mutual influence. Once touched by &(dr-n the 
alchemy is at work. Finally we note that Maximus does not 
qualify the vdµoc &(tTC as ! vbt, aOcToc, as he 
did with c opy . This is because nothing can be more 
inward than dyd7-1 itself. Grammatically vdµoC &Ydx% 
is in contrast to vdµoc o'topyýC as subjective genitive 
to objective genitive. TTOpYpj is the object of ayd%rI 
which modifies it; 'Ayd%11 is the source of etuol, a and 
a1bwr. which are modes of expressing äYdxTi in writing 
to his correspondent. The law that demands eüvoca and 
a(M6_ is &Yd7CTI or stems from dYdaui 029 This 
whole passage falls into well-wrought periods that are 
classical in their equilibrium. The secret of the mathe- 
matical symmetry is that the author has found a centre of 
gravity for his thought, the notion of äYdt-Q , and so 
he can arrange the other concepts with the precision of an 
artist in mosaic. More than that, the experience of 
äY&CIQ shines through the symmetry in a life-giving 
way, ensuring that the visible beauty that delights sense 
and mind is an image of that invisible beauty that flows 
into man from on high. 
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Finally, we can scrutinize one sentence to verify our 
claim that language is used with precision and freedom in a 
geometrically patterned way in this work: 
If we really desire to be delivered from the Evil One 
and not enter into temptation, let us (trust God and) 
forgive our debtors their debts; thus shall we not 
alone receive forgiveness for the sins we have 
committed, but we shall overcome the law of sin and we 
shall trample on the Evil one. 
Firstly, we should note that in the terminology of Maximus 
the expression 'law of sin' is synonymous with 'temptation'. 
Then we can see that in this finely formed inclusion he makes 
the whole ascetic life turn on forgiveness. The structure of 
the sentence shows the pivotal function of this truth, as 
becomes evident if we set it out in a discrete way: 
abc 
If we really desire to be and not enter let us (trust God 
into and) forgive 
delivered from the Evil temptation our debtors their 
One debts; 
al 
and we shall trample 
on the 
Evil One 
bl 
but we shall 
overcome 
the law of sin 
of 
thus shall we not 
alone 
receive forgive- 
ness for the sins 
we have committed 
The structure is seen to be integral to the meaning, not 
merely of this sentence, but of the ascetical dimension of 
the treatise as a whole. 
The Pater Noster then is obviously a work that exhibits 
a marked structure; at the same time we cannot escape the 
impression of a freedom of use that is truly remarkable. 
This-assures us that in this writing there is more than 
structure; beneath the carefully organized manner of 
expression we are sensible of depths of life, dare we say 
hypostatic depths, that reveal themselves in the singularly 
original way in which the author communicates his unique 
135 
grasp of the 'mysteries' by means of a traditional termin- 
ology, organized into patterns that, at first sight, seem 
to have the rigidity of something abstract and impersonal. 
Freedom is not opposed by determination, but by necessity. 
The Byzantine writer does not have to be bound by necessity 
because he accepts the structures of his culture, no more 
than a violinist who accepts the 'givenness' of his 
instrument. The self-determination behind the thought of 
Maximus is apparent in his striking individuality; it can 
be presumed to have been formative in the creations of his 
cultural ancestors and in its very use to still bear in 
itself the imprint of that free origin, something redis- 
covered and recreated in the act of writing by an author 
of his power and profundity. We might say that he releases 
the potential freedom of the determinations woven into the 
cultural traditions of which he finds himself the 
inheritor. 30 In the usage of a man of this calibre we 
cannot afford to neglect the situational aspect by an 
excessive insistence on the formational aspect, the element 
that tends to constitute itself as a system. The situation- 
al aspect makes room for the subject, thinking and free, a 
being which is defined, in the spirit of the Fathers, in 
terms of mutual relationships, the ontological foundation 
of communication. Persons are basically the possessors of 
the medium of communication, most radically of the nature, 
with its structural elements. But persons are irreducible 
to nature and are the source of the plastic and creative 
use of nature, together with all its components and deriva- 
tives. The person finds expression in the nature; the 
nature is innovated by the person. The suggestion here is 
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that this principle extends to the literary composition 
which we are examining. 
It may be hazardous to suggest that it is easy to 
discern a necessary connection between the moral and even 
mystical maturity of a writer and his aesthetic refinement. 
But given the facts known about Maximus, his views on 
human growth, the singular combination of freedom and 
discipline in the Pater Noster, surely we can claim that 
such a fusion of spirit and law, of inspiration and 
literary convention is likely to bear some trace of the 
remarkable originality of the writer, not merely in his 
spiritual attainment but also in his power to express it. 
In this work we have a brilliant combination of the 
freedom and originality of an experiencing person with 
the accepted conventions of a cultural milieu. This is 
evidence of a remarkable talent for selecting and com- 
bining in a unique way the terms of an established system 
of thought and means of communication. Here we have 
undoubted indications of the presence of a dimension of 
human being that is unpredictable and self-determined, 
the power and the glory of person. The subject matter 
certainly contributes to our impression of a freedom and 
self-possession indicative of one who has realized his 
personal pitch, but the originality in the use of language 
and structure indicate in perhaps an even more cogent way 
the presence of a fully developed man. Persons are 
constituted by relationship and are revealed in the proper 
activity of personhood, communication. Here we find an 
instance of communication that accepts the limits of 
language and structure imposed by an accepted and 
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appropriated culture, but which moulds it into something 
entirely distinctive. The reader of this work cannot be 
persuaded that the writer is the prisoner of his cultural 
structures; he is detached from them and uses them to 
convey a significantly unique vision and experience. The 
style and literary structure give the impression of that 
creative tension which emanates from a work that displays 
the personal acquisition of a common heritage. It would 
be fatuous to suggest that he can express himself without 
using the accepted means of communication, so that it 
cannot be claimed that the writer is fully autonomous. 
This is an exemplification of the situation of man: he 
shares in nature; he communicates with his fellows through 
nature; he accepts the structures which constitute and 
distinguish nature, but he does so in a way that cannot be 
reduced to those structures; he does so creatively, with 
originality, personally. The work of art is a project of 
one who is a compound of X6yoC and rpöioC , and it 
embodies projections of these two indispensable dimensions 
of human being. 
31 The Pater Noster exemplifies the inter- 
play of these two aspects of man. The examples of structure 
that we have given will serve to reassure us about the 
presence of the intelligibility of nature; it is impossible 
to illustrate the contribution of the person apart from 
drawing attention to the splendid unity of the work as a 
whole and by reminding ourselves with Plotinus that: 
we have to recognize that beauty is that which 
irradiates symmetry rather than symmetry itself, and 
it is that which truly calls for our love. Why else 
is there more of the glory of beauty upon the living 
and only some faint traces of it upon the dead, even 
though the face still retains its fulneos and 
symmetry? Y are the most living portraits the most 
beautiful? 3 
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We might add that in the case of the Pater Noster, since 
the work can be classified as mystagogia, 
33 it would be a 
considerable advantage in the reader to have a spiritual 
awareness that matches the author's. 
We can conclude then that because this work is so 
strongly marked by its author's individuality, while it 
accepts the theological and literary conventions of his 
time, there must be a source of such striking originality. 
We suggest that it is the uncharted depths of hypostasis, 
where man is not alone, which are sounded in eeo? KoTCa 
and echo in the experience of 'pure prayer'. The genera- 
tive use of language, especially from a structural point 
of view, enables the author to convey his experience. 
This is something extra, a grace proper to a Father of the 
Church. 
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CHAPTER IV 
Expositio Orationia Dominicae 
This is the main part of the thesis, in which we 
examine Maximus' Commentary on the 'Our Father $. The 
Prologue will provide us with an 
the theme of agape has a bearing 
although it is not dealt with in 
work. The Introductions introdui 
Counsel and how the plan of that 
opportunity of seeing how 
on this treatise even 
the central parts of the 
-e the theme of the Divine 
Counsel is reflected in 
the plan of the 'Our Father'. Here we can examine Maximus' 
view of the Incarnate Logos as the Mediator between God and 
man, of how the five divisions, which man was meant to 
overcome, are healed by Him and the way is opened to all 
men to assume their role of mediation in the Church. We 
shall then address ourselves to commenting on Maximus' 
treatment of the'Seven Mysteries'. I have, on the basis of 
his example, reduced the sevenfold divisions of Parts I and 
III to the fivefold division of Part II, so that we can 
have a synoptic view of how ha. sees these themes throughout 
the Pater Noster. In Chapter VI, (i), we shall recapitulate 
the principal concepts that emerge in Part II as a preface 
to a more organized statement on Maximus' teaching on the 
virtues, 'the three laws', prayer and contemplation. 
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Expositio Orationis Dominicae 
The Prologue (872D-873C) 
If Dalmais is correct in placing the composition of 
the Pater Noster in that period when Maximus is thought 
to have deepened his understanding of the significance of 
the couplet Xdyoc - rp6, XoC, 
1 then we would expect to 
find äYc7v1 thrown into relief in the structure and 
elaboration of that work. But an analysis of the text 
reveals that while the noun &y711 , occurs ten times, 
including its inflected forms, these instances are 
restricted to the Prologue, where it appears seven times, 
2 
to the Conclusion where it appears twice3, and to the 
final observations of Part III where it occurs once. 
4 It 
does not appear at all in the main body of the work. The 
verb ayax w, turns up twice in the Conclusion; 
5 it is 
used only twice in the main part of the Commentary (Part 
11)6 and there not in a way that is germane to the 
structural interests of Maximus. So striking is the 
absence of äYI7 ii from the structure of his thesis in 
the Pater Noster that one might be tempted to suggest 
that the main part of the treatise was written at an 
? 
earlier, more 'gnostic', phase in the Confessor's 
development and that he provided a balancing introduc- 
tion later on, when asked by his anonymous correspond- 
ent for his ideas on the 'Our Father'. Or the anomaly 
might be explained by saying that, while he realized 
the prime importance of äyd7,1 in Christian spiritu- 
ality and pays due respect to it in his introduction 
and epilogue, it had not yet entered dynamically into 
his still mainly evagrian way of understanding, 
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evidence of which would then be found in the 'logical' 
exegesis of the 'Our Father'. 
8 A third and equally 
probable hypothesis would be that the Pater Noster (A. D. 
628-30) is evidence that Maximus was substantially in 
possession of his understanding of the spiritual life 
from early in his writing career and that his use of 
the concept äyaticrl in this treatise is evidence for 
that. If his further analyses demonstrate a more refined 
and developed understanding of the couplet A6yoc - rp67coc 
it would be mistaken to give his discoveries the 
revolutionary character attributed to them by Riou9 and 
Garrigues10 and adopted by Dalmais. 
11 They would point 
to a logical evolution rather than to dramatic discon- 
tinuity. It will serve our purpose then to put this 
introductory paragraph under the microscope. 
Maximus opens his treatise with a personal address 
to his correspondent, whose identity is not known. He 
may have been a hegoumen, 
12 
under whose authority Maximus 
had lived. His correspondent's letter has enabled 
Maximus to realise his presence. Maximus then assures 
him that he is always present 'in spirit', a reference to 
their common life in the Spirit and the mutual sensitivity 
that comes with a developed life of prayer. Apart from 
being a gracious compliment, this first sentence conveys 
to us something of the paradisal possibilities of friend- 
ship between meng purified from passion and already 
accomplished in the ways of the Spirit. It is a glimpse 
of Maximus relating to his fellow monks, unconsciously 
revealing not merely a romantic ideal, but hard won 
attainment. This initial evidence of spiritual maturity 
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is complemented and elaborated by 
his own attitude in answering the 
friend is what he is, he too will 
consistent with äyuirii ,a theme 
briefly, but masterfully. He row 
say by adding: 
Maximus 
letter: 
act in a 
which he 
ads off wl 
description of 
because his 
way that is 
develops 
Zat he has to 
And I. as I have said, mixing fear with affection, 
have laid down this law of charity in regard to my 
Master, up to this day: restrained from writing 
through reverence lest contempt should occur, I am 
moved to write by goodwill so that an honourable 
refusal to write may not be considered to be hatred. 
13 
We shall now examine the thesis that Maximus inserts 
between his first affirmation about his attitude and this 
conclusion. Apart from its intrinsic value and the 
bearing it has on the treatise as a whole and indeed on 
the entire spiritual anthropology of Maximus, it gives 
insight into the dimensions of his language and the 
coherence of his vigorous thought. He says that in 
approaching the task of writing to his friend, he has 
mingled fear ( cp6G3os) with affection ( %66oc ) and 
formed from them one äYäuyl consisting of aZ öws xa( e üvoia. 
He is speaking with psychological awareness and intention by claiming 
to have sminglerd' and 
'formed'. The 'fear' he has mingled with 'affection' is 
designated by the word cdpo4 which in patristic usage 
can have the nuance of fear of God in contrast to fear 
of punishment. 
14 As Maximus, in fact, will contrast the 
higher fear with fear of punishment, we may be justified 
in taking it that he has chosen the word carefully. 
Similarly, although %6Ooc can have implications of 
strong natural desire and even sexual longing, again we 
find it used for spiritual desire and affection by the 
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Fathers. l5 We then find Maximus saying that he has 
'mingled' these two and from them 'formed' one &yd%-n. 
For the Fathers generally äyd7. j is love in relation to 
God or what Maximus calls a few lines farther on 'divine 
love', especially God's or Christ's love for man and 
reciprocally man's love for God and man's participation 
in the love proper to God which he manifests in a die- 
interested love for his fellows. 16 
We are then confronted with two new terms c. Ux r. 
and etivoLa and told that &Ydw7j consists of them. 
A1665r. can be fittingly translated as 'reverence' but 
we should not overlook the implication of 'awe' in this 
context; E. Üvoca can also mean 'affection' or 'love', 
but perhaps 'goodwill' or 'benevolence' is nearer to 
what is intended here. The mingling of . cößoý and 
%60oC which Maximus says lead to the forming of 
o, y&cii has obviously Modified both 96Poc and 
%Uos. The result of the mingling is dYäx'n and 
the components in the amalgam have undergone a conversion 
in the process. o6 oc has acquired reverence and 
%68os now transcends its intrinsic self-concern 
&Yäw. n has become the inner law of love (! v6Ldee tor. 
vöµoc o'copTfis ITOPY11 is almost entirely free of 
sexual implications even in profane usage, while in 
patristic Greek it approximates closely to äyd7cn, 
since it can mean God's love for man and vice versa, as 
well as being the essence of gLWavOpwwCa. Its 
inner law, äyd7v9 , is then said to 'appropriate 
everything that pertains to nature'. 
17 Maximus has said 
that cpdßos without t6eos becomes hatred and 
144 
%c Oos without cp. 6poý , qualified as adcppwu, 9 
degenerates into contempt. He rounds off this well- 
wrought sentence by assuring us that äyaxn , as the 
inner law of love, masters hatred by goodwill (stvoLa) 
and dispels contempt with reverence ( atbwr. )9 so that 
when he says that &Yäx1 consists of reverence and 
goodwill, he is presuming that the latter have been 
effected by äiäiii having appropriated and trans- 
formed cpaaoc and W68os , reverence and goodwill 
thus becoming properties or constituents of äY i tT 
in man. 
Maximus then proceeds to throw further light on 
the interplay of fear and love by reconciling two 
scriptural texts that appear at first to be mutually 
exclusive : 'The fear (ccdpoc) of the Lord is chaste 
and lasts from age to age' (Ps. 19,9) and 'Charity, 
(dyc") casts out fear' ((pdßoc) (1 John 4,18). 
This he does by distinguishing between two kinds of fear. 
This possibility is hinted at in the quotation from 
'David' where the fear is said to be 'chaste'; for 
Maximus this can be reconciled with &r7t11 while the 
other fear is cast out. He characterises the latter as 
fear (OEOc, ) of punishment. The use of 89o( is 
probably to emphasise the contrast, although in the 
Greek of the Fathers it can be used for that fear that 
is the ground of the fear of God. 
18 It has been 
distinguished from cpdßoC as being more lasting and 
it is possible that Maximus chooses it deliberately in 
this context, where he is distinguishing a fear that 
lasts from a fear that passes, associating beoC 
145 
with punishment and affirming that lasting fear of 
punishment cannot be associated with dydxq. In using 
cpdßo(; to designate the fear that is compatible with 
&y6ATj he obviously wishes it to retain in this context 
the epithet äyv6 attributed to it in the quotation 
from Psalm 3,9.. Fear of punishment is something servile, 
the property of a slave and cannot last in a relationship 
with a God who can now be addressed as 'Father', nor with 
the substance of man's relationship to Him which is 
äYdirl 
. On the other hand the fear which is said to be 
'chaste' is for Maximus a constituent of 'divine charity', 
tiýS ee Caw & itii ovoTaT txöv . 
19 
a fear that has 
taken on overtones of awe and it lasts as long as charity 
'from age to age'. It 'naturally characterises the law 
of true love (otiopyn'y. StiopYA has affinities with 
äYä%i and is put beyond the bounds of misinterpretation 
by dxneoifc . We have seen already that the inner law 
of crzopYA is agape so that cpd0o6 &YvOG 'naturally' 
characterises äyä. %Tj in man: it is basic and so 'lasts 
from age to age'. 'B reverence it preserves for ever for 
the saints entirely without corruption the norm and code 
of charity towards God and towards one another'. 'Before 
looking more closely at the principal elements of this 
claim for cp6po4;, &yvöc it can be noted that its 
activity produces effects that are at once 'incorruptible' 
and 'foil ever'. The relationship between the two goes 
without saying, but it indicates that Maximus has not let 
go for a moment of his total view of his subject as these 
qualifications refer back to 'from age to age'. 
20 
i6po6 &yvöc is the implicit subject of the sentence 
represented by 'it' and it is said to exercise its 
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influence 'by reverence'. Maximus is not necessarily 
making a distinction between 96p oc and aibw6 so that 
we can retain our claim that 96poc has been trans- 
formed by äy&%Tl . The connection 'by' in 'By Reverence.. 
.. ' throws into relief the aspect of fear that is predomi- 
nant in man's relationship in äyci, u with God and his 
fellows, that of reverence and more profoundly, of 
religious awe. We have seen that äYi r) is the 
vöµoc dv6LdOe'oc ocopyfjc. Here a new distinction is made 
in the interests cf emphasising the comprehensiveness of 
aYän -n and the necessity of atbcc as a component in it. 
Not alone can this fear be reconciled with dycixrl , but 
äYdr-T] without it would not retain its essence nor be 
exercised personally without corruption. The couple 
eeaµ6c - rp67oC (norm and mode) inevitably calls to 
mind the frequently recurring couple logos-tropos21 in 
the maximian system: the essential element of a being 
as distinct from its hypostatic mode. 8coji6 with the 
Fathers generally means law or natural law or revealed 
law. It is the norm for both doctrine and morals; it 
can also mean the A6yoc as a rule for human activity. 
22 
The associations A6yoc, X6ioc, Xoit, xdc are 
habitually found in Maximus' writing and a fundamental 
note of Xöyos is its normative character. 
23 It is 
likely that he chooses esaµdt in conjunction with 
tipd-nos as a synonym for X6 oS in this context because 
of the obvious association of ecoµdc with vdµoc. He 
has said that cty(N-T) is the vöµoc ! vOu OcToc oTopyiC. 
He conceives of äyd7. n as a principle of participated 
divine life that appropriates and transforms 'everything 
that pertains to nature'. 'Aid u is the gift par 
excellence of God that created nature cannot produce, 
but which has within itself the power to transpose what- 
ever it finds in nature unspoilt by the personal malice 
of man, prompted by the Evil One. 
24 'Aydac: i then takes 
hold of orropyi and so transmutes it that it at once 
informs it in the philosophical sense and becomes its 
inner principle or law, the life principle or soul of 
otiopYrj and so it expresses itself in terms of 
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oropYA or love and in this sense is its norm. It can 
be said at once that this interpretation of vöµoC is 
virtually a description of A&YoC as Maximus understands 
it, so that the:: substitution of eeoµ6C for %6yoC is 
not fortuitous but calculated. It means the same thing 
but because äYä0 has been spoken of as normative in 
terms of vöµot , Maximus refers to it as ecoµd( when 
he wants to speak of it in association with 'tpd, coc 
which indicates the use to which man puts SycI, ti ; it 
is its hypostatic mode, its personal expression in 
individual lives. 25 For Maximus it is rpdxor. b-cäpý. ewc 
that is the key to both personal salvation and personal 
perdition. 
26 The X6yor. or vdµo6 of cLyd' refers to 
something stable, its principle of intelligibility or 
raison d'etre, but it-, does-not exclude the dynamic 
character of ätänii ; it is something living and active 
so that vöµos is not to o''oPYi1. something extrinsic, a 
canon, but something intrinsic, a modal principle of 
activity. It is with ä(äk11 thought of in that way, that 
cpdßos &yvds, is associated and, we are told, cp1)ot. x3C. 
The introduction of vp&xor. is then not to cover the fact 
of activity, but rather that of personal activity, an 
activity that stems from the responsibility of a person 
endowed with a nature that is transformed by &Yä7ci . So 
that ( 63o6. made cYubS because of atbws cannot be 
disassociated from äyäxri in the concrete life of the 
Christian. 
It is 'towards God and one another' xpdr. 0e6v xaC 
CXX47LOUC 27 that reverence preserved cY&. il without 
corruption. In commenting on the contrast between the 
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two fears of which Maximus speaks we suggested that he 
opposed the fear of punishment to a fear that responded 
to God as 'Father'. Filial fear will show itself as a 
punctilious care to act in such a way that man does not 
offend his Father because of the love that binds them to 
each other. But here Maximus is probably throwing into 
relief another aspect of this fear; it is an affirmation 
that no matter how deep the love of man for God, even 
when it is consummated in deification, it must always be 
qualified by the truth that man remains a creature in 
the presence of his Creator. In the very intimacy of 
love he is confronted by God as mysterium tremendum; 
28 
there is an abyss between Creator and creature that 
cannot be bridged and man's acknowledgement of this 
unalterable fact is religious awe or fear. God, for 
Maximus, as for Denis the pseudo-Areopagite, is the 
Transcendent One. 29 As a mystical theologian Maximus 
must stress the necessity of fear even in the intimacy 
of love. It does justice to the truth. This love and 
this reverence enhance each other; the fear by acknow- 
ledging the permanence of man's creaturehood tempers the 
love so that it does not degenerate into presumption; 
the love prevents man from succumbing to the terror that 
the contrast between himself and God evokes. While 
Maximus is content to imply this in relation to God he 
does refer to it in relation to man, or more precisely, 
with reference to his correspondent. 'ATditr for 
Maximus, as for the whole Christian tradition, must be 
expressed not only towards God, but also towards man. 
30 
It is the same äYäx7l , being a share in something 
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proper to God, which is extended to man. It is love in 
expression, so that we cannot claim to love God, whom we 
do not see, unless we love men with whom we can have 
immediate contact. This love too must be tempered by a 
reverence that is in some way analogous to the fear of 
God that we have just considered. It will be an attitude 
to man as related to the majesty and holiness of God, a 
reverence for the mystery of his being and personhood 
which will modify äyäir in his regard in a way that is 
parallel to its modification of cYäu1 when directed to 
God. For Maximus there can be no question of a love 
that is not balanced by respect, not alone with regard 
to God but with regard to his fellow men made in His 
image. Maximus simply says that he is 'restrained' by 
reverence. 
Maximus concludes: 'As I have said, on my part 
mixing fear with affection, I have laid down this law of 
love towards my lord up to this day; restrained from 
writing through reverence lest contempt occur, I am moved 
to write by goodwill so that hatred may not be considered 
the final excuse for not writing'. 
31 Before examining 
this, we may ask ourselves if Maximus has neglected to 
perfect the symmetry of his thesis by not having dealt 
with t6eoc - ctvoca in the same way as he dealt with 
q6 oc - atbws IIdeoc -e iwot, a is already treated 
implicitly in the argument concerning cpößoc - &ydnri 
There is a conflict between some kinds of fear and 
CLYäCTI , not that the fear of punishment is something 
bad; it is in fact a phase in spiritual purification 
and growth. The point that Maximus wants to Hake is 
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that love casts out this kind of fear-eventually, that it 
is irreconcilable with the perfection of dYä, x-q . He 
would not deny that itöOoc could be irreconcilable with 
äYä7r. T] if it is passionate in the pejorative sense, but 
that would be something totally incompatible with dYcxi 
whereas ö oC T LwpCas is not. Then he implies that 
there is not the same kind of opposition to the 
perfection of Ti äyäxto be found in t66oC , which in 
itself is a kind of love, so that when informed by äyaxn , 
it is transfigured and one might say appropriated by 
äYä, XT1 " Therefore there is never a phase in the 
development of the spiritual life when ärdn1 would have 
to cast out 7ý6OoC since the higher love virtually 
contains the humbler sort already. Pothos has a potenti- 
ality for transformation into &ydxTI which cannot be 
said of ö9o4; ' Li pCac , so that there is no need to 
perform a comparable operation to square %60oc with 
ä. YäicrI in terms of etwo as . The sentence quoted at 
the beginning of this paragraph rounds off what Maxiaus 
wants to say. It is the practical conclusion to his 
brief but complex treatment of an aspect of asceticism. 
The fact that it is practical helps us to understand the 
sense in which he uses vdµoc ¶Ic äYä71 . He says that 
the law of love he has set himself is restraint through 
reverence and allowing himself to be moved by good will. 
Inevitably we recall the use of vdµoC which we have just 
examined. If its use here were identical, then aCoWS 
and ctiuoLm would represent the inner principle of 
&ydx-rj rather than be its constituents. It is worth 
- noting that Maximus carefully avoids qualifying the 
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'z6 oý here by the adjective gv6t. d6eroc. He is rather 
using language empirically and describing again hia 
intentions as he did when he spoke of 'mingling' and 
'forming' above. He has returned to the plane of 
experience and practical intention. 
32 
It should be now possible to penetrate in some way 
the psychology of Maximus. Dalmais is probably correct 
in supposing that the addressee is a monk, because of the 
absence of any allusion, in the course of the whole 
opuscle, to responsibilities civil or ecclesiastical. 
33 
Maximus considers him to be present in a godlike manner 
by his dPc'r and possibly by his candour or capacity 
for plain speaking. It is because of his virtue that he 
is OcoµCµrrror. . The ovTxa' dßaaL6 , which his 
correspondent has shown, has divine associations, used 
as it is with reference to the Incarnation and the 
operation of the Holy Spirit in man. 
34 For Maximus, the 
Logos is incarnate in the Christian through the presence 
of the virtues. 
35 Here &pe' can refer to the diapason 
of man's virtuous life, moral, theological and mystical; 
but it is above all in c yd r that &pctlj finds 
expression. Maximus says that he has been the object of 
his friend's ä(äac1 and so the introduction to the 
brief statement on the interplay of love and fear, which 
we have just examined, is introduced by 6L6 036 
Maximus accepts the burden of Christian friendship and 
love. Just as his friend's charity has been marked by 
selfless concern for his fellow, so will Maximus allow 
charity to sublimate his own gifts and enable him to 
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show the face of Christ to his friend. This is possible 
because of the indwelling of the Logos through the virtues 
which are energized by the Holy Spirit's action in pouring 
charity into the human heart. 
37 
In this opening passage of the Pater Noster we have 
evidence of the play of 8swpCa cpuo . xrj , and even of 
OcoXoTCa , in the thought processes of St. Maximus. 
Because there is depth to his vision of &y&, Ln , the 
tesseral exactness of his composition should not blind us 
to the freedom with which he uses concepts like xöOoC 
cpöpos and o-zopyA , allowing them to be refined by both 
the immediate context, the larger ambience of patristic 
usage and, above all, by his personal experience. 
Spirituality emerges, as doctrine lived. To get inside 
his thought, then, we have to search for its foci and 
keep in mind that he uses the accepted language with the 
liberty of a master, so that we have to weigh each word 
with discretion if we are to approach the meaning that he 
intends it to bear in its context. Further we have to 
remember that language and the thought that it expresses 
are not absolute entities to be appropriated for them- 
selves, but rather a means of grasping reality, a reality 
that, for Maximus, was primarily accessible to faith and 
Yv@O Lr., . 
38 
The analysis of this introductory passage of the 
Pater Noster must make it obvious that ä'äXf is a 
central and controlling idea in the theology of Maximus, 
and that, even when he is not explicit, it is operative 
all through the treatise. 
39 This claim is reinforced by 
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the occurrence of the noun, dya , 
40 twice and of the 
verb &ra'tcm , 
41 twice in the Conclusion, which lends to 
äY&q. the character of an inclusion. It provides a 
framework, within which the rest of what is said is to be 
placed and understood. In hie elaboration of the Pater 
Noster themes, 7. pa6tiic 
42 
seems to occur when we would 
have expected d. y it1 . We may suggest here that it can 
be understood as a subjective disposition in man to 
accept the inpouring of 'divine charity' and so that when 
it is mentioned, it is meant to evoke its correlative 
äyax: n . Again when ä&d ii seems to be required, we 
are provided with rv4'i 
43 
or %poaCpeotC . 
44 This 
should not surprise us because, in this system these 
faculties or activities are the organs or means through 
which äyäxn is exercised, so that when they are 
mentioned, provided their functioning is in keeping with 
X6yoc cpvoeu , we are meant 
to presume the presence of 
transforming dydn'n . This would seem to be further 
borne out by the couplet X &oc - Oeaµd: 9 which we have 
examined. As we shall see, the idea of divine and 
natural law45 in Maximus has a strongly personal character, 
and so again implies the intervention of &ydbul 
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Introduction, a. The Divine Counsel (873CD). 
From an analysis of the Introduction to the Pater 
Noster (873CD) some of the basic themes of the theology of 
St. Maximus emerge. While he looks back to the dawn of 
creation he makes it abundantly clear that his reflections 
on man will be set between the moments of x6vwoLC and 
e&waLc. It is what God the Father 'wills and grants 
by grace' that will concern him primarily. Xäpýc here 
alerts us to the will and gift of God in so far as it 
concerns man in particular. It is that 7tnv 'C 
of which Athanasius speaks, the grace of the image or the 
grace of the Trinity. 
46 Elsewhere, Maximus speaks of the 
will of the Son in this matter. The Father creates by his 
Logos and Spirit. 
47 We know that he considers the %6yoL 
of a differentiated creation, that express the purpose of 
the Creator, to be held together by the Logos, and more, 
that they are bound up with the economy of salvation and 
the Incarnation of the Logos, so that creation-redemption 
is ultimately derived from the Trinity. 48 But here he is 
concentrating on the mystery of human freedom, hypostasi- 
sation and sonship. That is the 'work' of the will of God 
on which he intends to meditate. That the will of God is 
what is intended is confirmed by the cognate passage of 
the Quaestiones ad Thalassium. 
49 There we find that it is 
a Aoi of the 06%714m of the Son that complements the 
establishment of creatures with the hypostatic union and 
the divinisation of man. The Father, the Son and the 
Holy Spirit will as one, since they are personally 
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identified with the wholeness of the divine nature, while 
the divine will bears the impress of the hypostatic 
characteristics of each of the Persons. So Maximus can, 
without ambiguity, speak of the pouWA of the Father or 
the pov? ij of the Son. Elsewhere, 
50 that poV%A is 
identified with 'the mystery of the Economy', which Maximus 
reminds us, is secret until it is revealed by the Son, who 
thus becomes 'the Angel of the great Counsel of God'. We 
find the Counsel of the Blessed Trinity embodied in the 
incarnate person and history of the Logos made flesh. 
51 The 
UIXTI a of the Trinity has been expressed with wisdom 
in a povXij that is embodied in Jesus Christ. The 
Myoc became man so that man might become god. 
52 
Divinisation enables the man who knows the %6yoC of the 
mystery to become, in turn, an 'angel of the great Counsel 
of God' rising by virtuous living and contemplation, rooted 
in personalisation `to Him who came down to him'. 
53 
Keuwoc, s and O wotC immediately evoke the whole span 
of Christology and anthropology in the teaching of Maximus. 
When salvation is appropriated by men, the great Counsel 
of God is revealed anew. The work of the divine Counsel is 
embodied in the 'work' of man. 
54 
Between pov-&5 and xevwoLS and 8ewoi, c 
Maximus places wpdvoLm and xpCot. . 
55 Providence 
and Judgment are exercised by God and ensure that the 
eternal purposes of His Counsel are effected in a strong 
yet gentle manner. In the Pater Nos ter text, Maximus 
confines the field of divine activity to 'our present and 
future life', in which He determines for each the 'mode 
of activity that becomes it'. The emphasis on activity 
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recalls the fundamental 'zpd oC kdpCswC reminding us 
of the interpenetration of being, becoming and doing in 
the teaching of Maximus, where man is what he becomes and 
becomes what he does. Ej etvat will give way to äeC 
etvaL 056 In a cognate text the 'ages' or 'g enerations' 
of Scripture are interpreted to mean salvation history up 
to and including the Incarnation and then the age of man'a 
appropriating the salvation held forth to him by God in 
Christ, until it is finally consummated in 6&waac . 
57 
Therefore Maximus wants us to remember that, from beginning 
to end, it is God who takes the initiative, wisely uphold- 
ing and moulding, by the Xdyot. of His Providence and 
Judgement, the destiny of everyman in Christ. 
It should be said in a preliminary way that Maximus 
chooses in this passage to contemplate the divine mysteries 
rather than to have recourse to his own ingenuity, which 
would merely subjugate him to XoYcoµoC ,a term 
that 
usually conveys the futility of intellectual endeavour 
divorced from prayer and even the downright perversity of 
that kind of thinking. To avoid ambiguity Maximus 
transposes the XoyLoµot of the scriptural quotations to 
the unequivocal AdroL. He does not want to impose his 
Xoyioµot on revelation by substituting the mythology of 
Origenism for true interpretation. He modestly prefaces 
what he has to say with ¶vxdv . This is the area of 
OcoXoTovµeva but they are to be , weighed against 
Scripture and Tradition in the balance of a comprehensive 
theology. He interprets the ßouXi of the Lord to mean 
the xgvwoLc of the Son for man's deification. That 
xgvwoL(;, is a synonym for the redemptive incarnation of 
the Logos is clear from parallel passages in the 
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Quaestiones ad Thalassium58 and the Cap item Theologicorum 
et Oeconomicorum Duae Centuriae. 
59 In the former we are 
told that He 'had in their regard the ineffable supremely 
good Counsel: that He should mingle Himself with the nature 
of men without change through the veritable hypostatic 
union, to unite to Himself the human nature without alter- 
ation, so that He became man in a way that He Himself 
knows'; the latter has: 'The great Counsel of the God and 
Father is the secret and unknown mystery of the Economy, 
which having fulfilled, the Only-Begotten Son through His 
Incarnation revealed, becoming the angel of the great 
eternal Counsel of the God and Father'. In the same passage 
of the Quaestiones ad Thalassium, he makes a clear distinc- 
tion between the decision of the divine will to create, 
which was 'before all the ages' and the actual origin of 
created things. The decision is in the transcendent order, 
something outside time and the order of creation. There is 
no question of an Origenistic fragmentation of the Henad. 
The b Läcrujµa between AdTo L and Aöyot will have to 
find another interpretation. In the same way, the bridging 
of that 6Ldo'ciµa will require a more comprehensive 
solution than the intellectualist theory of Evagrius. In 
the Pater Noster, God is said to 'wisely' regulate our life 
by the X6yoL of his Providence and Judgment. The 
cognate passage from the Quaestiones ad Thalassium also 
invokes the wisdom of God, associating it with the 
providential and judicious distinction of the ages, that 
preceding the Incarnation and that subsequent to it. It is 
aoQCa. 
60 that endows the pour of God with a 'logical' 
character, so to speak, so that Maximus does not think of 
the divine Will as arbitrary or tyrranical, but rather 
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full of order and intelligence. The theologian who contem- 
plates the evolution of the divine ßovX1 , expressed in 
the mystery of God's Providence and Judgment, will himself 
participate in that wisdom. The %6yoL will expel the XoYLQµoC. 
In De guingue modis contemplationis naturalis brevis 
expositio61 we have a fundamental text that throws light on 
what Maximus means by 7Ep6voi. a and xpCoLc . It implies 
a trenchant critique of the Origenist and Evagrian notions 
of Providence and Judgement. 
release by oew. pCa cva. xi 
xCuT1aLr., 6 mcpopä, xpELaic, 
The purpose of Maximus is to 
the A6(o. of ovoCa 
oLc . For and ee 
62 
the Evagrians, Judgment meant the chastisement which God 
designed for fallen spirits: to incorporate them in bodies 
proportionate to the degree of their guilt and fall; 
corresponding to this, Providence expressed the goodness of 
God, who planned that the fallen spirits would be brought 
back to the Henad by progressive purification. Maximus says 
that the contemplation of ovoCa reveals the existence of 
God; Kiwqo t, c gives insight into His Providence and 
Judgement is discerned in öt, ac opä 40 
63 
Maximus contrasts the mistaken notions of Providence 
and Judgement with orthodox concepts: 
I mean by Providence, not the convertive and, as it 
were, economic restoration of the objects of 
Providence from what need not be to what needs be, 
but that which binds the whole together and preserves 
the principles ( X6yoc) by which, in the beginning, 
the whole came to be, and by Judgment, not that which 
is educative and, as it were, punitive of sinners, 
but the saving and defining differentiation of beings 
according to which each of the created things, bound 
to the principles ( A6yoa) according to which they 
were created, has in its natural identity inviolable, 
unalterable validity, since the Creator from the 
beginning decided and made each one to exist ', 4th 
regard to being, substance, mode and quality. 
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The Evagrian notions of 7ýp6voca and xpCai, c confuse the 
ontological and moral orders, 
65 
and it is the purpose of 
this passage to ensure that this distinction is made un- 
equivocally. Here the author wants to define the onto- 
logical and cosmological sense of the terms before he will 
introduce moral considerations. It is the contemplation of 
movement that reveals %. pdvoi. a so that the description of 
%pdvoca 
66 binding the whole together must be understood 
in a dynamic way. The movement has its source in divine 
power which has for aim the unification of all things that 
came to be, in the beginning, in dependence on the divine 
%6yoL. To be a creature is to be in movement, but not 
in a random way. Rather it displays to the scrutiny of 
ecwpCa Coo Lx! the presence of a majestic sweep of 
divine influence gathering all creatures into a pre- 
determined unity. Maximus insists that the progress of 
creatures to this end leaves intact the principles according 
to which they were created, but it does not imply that 
spirits were integral to the Henad before the fall. In fact 
the X6Ioa are themselves the principles of the divinely 
projected unity, so that the realization of the divine 
intentions requires that they should be preserved. Since 
unity is the aim of the divine will, the %6rot imply move- 
ment towards end. The notion of cpvaLr. and Xayor. 
Occur. can be rooted in the divine intention and activity 
in this way. 
Maximus' definition of xpCcLC, 
67 is designed to make 
obvious that the process of unification, effected by 
1 p6vom 9 in no way trespasses on the unassailable 
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individuality of each created thing when caught intb'. the 
comprehensive thrust of tpövoLa . He sketches in four 
aspects of created being: etvat,, 'rC clvac ,c 
and d otov to emphasize that it is the created being 
in its entirety that is left intact. 
68 
Noµtp6T1j, c 
69 
suggests that each being retains its legitimate individu- 
ality, so that it implies a created self-possession that 
will mature into self-realization under the influence of 
God's Providence and Judgment. The bringing of creation to 
perfection does not mean that the splendour of individuals 
has to be sacrificed. KpCoLC prepares, by 'difference', 
created beings for the harmonious movement of %pövoca 
ensuring that individual purposes ( X6yoL ) are 
distributed wisely in relation to the natural power of each 
being, proportioned in keeping with the subject of each 
substance. 
70 Harmony will be the effect of the unifying 
relationship that respects every facet of created being. 
Having established the inviolability of created beings, 
Maximus then goes on to safeguard the moral dimensions of 
7, p6voaa 
a moral 
and xpCo. s ; he affirms that he does not deny 
7, p6voLa and xpCOL6 in so far as God deals 
with men endowed with volition. The same Providence and 
Judgement are brought to bear differently on the exercise of 
human freedom. 71 Once the ontological status of creatures 
is established, Maximus can throw open the possibility of 
union with God through freedom. He proceeds to describe 
xpäoLc and 690t, s, two moral categories. 
72 Since they 
are not mentioned in this context of the Pater Noster, it 
is important to remember that they are linked by Maximus 
with wpdvot. a and xpCGLC being an unfolding of the 
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moral implications of xpCotr. in particular. This in 
turn will be seen to be emphasis on Tpd, toc kapeewC 
73 
and so on the personal dimension of human being, so that we 
find God moulding his world to His purposes through the 
personal exercise of human freedom. Kpäoc6 or synthesis 
symbolises the way in which rvc'p. 1 informs the virtues 
and how, in turn, it is transformed by them. ©60 t, r. 
refers to man in action and so to man's being in act. It is 
eEOi. s that ensures that man's life is in keeping with a 
Yvd)PTI. that accepts the godward thrust of the %6yor. 
cpi5ocws If we understand prudence to be the actual 
ordering of human life in keeping with the divine idea of 
what that life should be (?? 6yo4; ) , then this ordinance 
might be translated accurately as 'prudence'. Since it is 
through ärc. 1,4 that man's freedom is transformed, 
rendered pliable to the action of the Holy Spirit and open 
to the invitation to a synergy that issues in 81m0t, C. q 
Providence and Judgement extended in Synthesis and Ordinance 
will be seen to culminate in äYäxai 
The purpose of Divine Providence is to unify by right 
faith and spiritual charity those whom vice has 
sundered in various ways. Indeed for this the Saviour 
suffered - to gather together in one the children of 
God that were dispersed. He then who does not sustain 
the irksome, bear with annoyances, endure the laborious, 
walks outside divine charity and the purpose of 
Providence. (74) 
Here the shadow of sin is acknowledged as a factor to be 
overcome by Providence, compounding, so to speak, the 
problem set the ipbvoia of God by his xpCoL` The 
original divine intention ( axo7.6 ) was, for Maximus, 
perichoretic deification. The Fall bedevilled this aim and 
is remedied in the salvation that is then necessarily 
included in the divine axocdr. . In this way Maximus 
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has safeguarded the unity that fascinated Origen and his 
less discriminating followers, but without allowing 
differentiating hypostasis to be swallowed up in a heteredox 
unity. This is besides an optimistic view, not alone of 
finiteness, but of its material substructure, especially 
the somatic dimension of man with all that it entails in his 
concrete life and experience. 
In Ambigua 32, Maximus combines wisdom with substance 
(God as always the same), knowledge with providence (God as 
the ground of the whole creation) and virtue with judgment 
(God as Saviour). 
75 Thunberg notes that the point of view 
changes from the cosmological to the soteriological in the 
third element of the triad, which leads him to conclude 
justly that: 'this shows, however, not a Maximus haunted 
by Origenist temptations, but a Maximus for whom the idea 
of a general purpose of creation, and of Christ as the 
centre of understanding, is of primary importance'. 
76 The 
mystery of the Incarnation is, for Maximus, the key to the 
possibilities of union, and it goes beyond the'merely 
moral sphere. In the Quaestiones ad Thalassium, wpövota 
and xpCot. c are said to be 'the eyes of the Logos 
77 
overseeing the universe, the 'wings'78 on which the Logos 
comes flying to created beings. Nor does the Incarnation 
fall outside the scope of %pdvoLa and xpCa 
since the hypostatic union is referred to npdvoLm 
79 
with its emphasis on movement as a structural element in 
created being, and assuring us that the Immoveable one 
'moves about' his creatures; it is the passion of Christ 
that is referred to xpioi. r. , 
80 
where we find His 
freedom exercised sublimely in x6vwocc 
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In Ambigua 10, Maximus is concerned to emphasize that 
'pdvota 'preserves the %6yoc by which, in the 
beginning the whole came to be', and that xPCOLC has to 
do with individual beings, 'bound to the logoi according to 
which they were created'. 
81 In the Pater Noster, it is the 
? 6yo. of the 'pdvo. a and xpCQWs of God that 
wisely direct men, allotting to present and future life 
'the mode of activity that becomes it'. The X6yoL are 
not to be identified with the essence of God, as Evagrius 
would suggest, nor are they to be restricted to identifica- 
tion with things in their created existence. 
82 They are 
undoubtedly identified with created being, but they have a 
transcendent reference, being divine principles of being. 
The expression X6ToC Ton CIvaL relates created beings 
to God's will as to what they should be; 
83 X&roc 'o3 
EZ STVCL relates 
them to Him as good and as such 
regulates human freedom. 
84 In the dyad a6yo6 - rp6%oi; 
the rp6toC is identified with personal individuality 
and thus it appropriates the dynamism of %6Yoc 0-ocwc.. 
and enables the individual to go beyond himself while 
preserving his logical identity. The use of %6io in 
relation to ski cCvaL reminds us that, f or'Maximus, 
personal realization is not cut adrift from its source in 
the Logos. While the dimension of rpöxoc in human 
existence ensures that person is irreducible to nature, 
the ground of X6yoc. in relation to that very 'VPa7toC 
suggests that man's uniqueness is itself derived from the 
Logos, that it is related to the logos. Man enjoys 
A6yoc &dpEe as a foundation for the exercise of 
personal existence, so that his individuality can never 
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become a principle of arbitrariness and revolt, if he is 
to retain his proper identity. It is his destiny to be a 
son in the Son. The emphasis given by Maximus to 
ExaotiaV and Exaotia 
85 is meant to draw our 
attention, not merely to generic or formal distinction in 
created beings, but to their personal individuality. It 
is not merely mankind that is differentiated, as Maximus 
would have it, but each man in his uniqueness. 
Maximus' concern with the pair x6vwoi6 - UwoL. 
is in the mainstream of theological tradition. St. 
Athanasius summed up the reflections of hie predecessors 
on the divine image in man and the gift of divine eonship 
by saying simply: 'The Logos became man in order that we 
should become gods' . 
86 Dalmais, in his splendid article, 
'Divinisation', in the Dictionnaire de Spiritualit 
, 
shows 
how Athanasi, us understood that deification was essentially 
linked to sonship and that it was bound up with Baptism 
and the role of the Holy Spirit; he sees the Cappadocians 
as maintaining this teaching, with Gregory of Nyssa adding 
the idea of the Eucharist as unification of the deified 
flesh of Christ with ours; he observes that it became 
increasingly obvious that deification and union with the 
Logos are inseparable, the latter being the cause of the 
former; he points out that Cyril of Alexandria considered 
that deification was wrought in principle in Christ and 
was communicated to the individual Christian by the action 
of the Holy Spirit. 
87 With the writings of Dionysius the 
Pseudo-Areopagite, 69wat, C finally became a technical 
term. Dionysius saw deification as the purpose of, 
creation. 
88 It is the work of grace. He keeps in line 
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with the tradition by declaring that Baptism and the 
Eucharist are the means of effecting deification, 
89 but he 
adds his distinctive touch by saying that it is through 
the hierarchies that man rises to divine virtue. 
90 That 
Maximus is in continuity with this tradition and especially 
with Dionyaius, is obvious from a sentence like this: 
He made us to be partakers of the divine nature, 
sharers in his eternity and we appear like Him 
according to the deification that comes from grace, 
on account of which there exists and abides the 
system of created things and the creation and 
bringing into being of things that did not exist. 
91 
In this passage Maximus considers E)IWCDLC to be the end 
of creation, so that we expect to find the rest of his 
understanding finalized by this teleology. Because of the 
emphasis on the personal that marks his teaching as a 
whole, it is obvious that here he wants to underscore 
'partakers' and 'sharers'. Deification requires the 
irreducibility of the person; it is the personal share in 
the divine nature by which man participates in divine life 
that enables him to move from image to likeness; it is 
this that effects the transition from eZ elvaL to 
92 use ctvaa , making us 'sharers' of his eternity. 
For Maximus deification is the work of grace, that over- 
and-above conferred on man by his Creator, which makes him 
to be the image of God and gives him the power to grow 
into His likeness. This demands the exercise of his 
freedom, informed by dyä7r-Tj, . This in turn depends on 
the action of the Holy Spirit pouring tyä7cTI into his heart 
and man's response in synergy. 
93 Like Cyril of Alexandria, 
Maximus considers this to have been wrought in principle in 
Christ. Deification does not mean that man can enjoy the 
94 
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kind of being proper to God, but he can become godlike by 
'the possessive imitation'95 of divine qualities: immut- 
able in soul, immortal in body, 
96 
endowed with divine 
simplicity97 and above all, possessing the divine gift of 
äydlxn 98 which ensures that his use of freedom is in 
keeping with the basic impulse of his %6Xoc 9acwc 
For Maximus, man was created for union with God so that it 
0 
is natural to him to go beyond his nature. This brings us 
back to the mystery of ýtbctiaaLC and the existential 
character of rp6ro; . It is in the actuality of parti- 
cipating and sharing that man becomes like to God. That is 
XäpLs . It is how we become gods. 
99 Maximus gives 
this teaching a personal turn by his emphasis on the 
tantum-quantum character of what takes place in deification 
:. through avtiCöoatC and 1µ7CEpaXwp-nßLr. 
They say that God and man are models for each other, 
that God humanizes Himself for man through philan- 
thropy to the extent that man, enabled by charity, 
divinizes himself for God; that man is rapt up by 
God in mind to the unknowable in so far as man has 
manifested through virtues the God who is by nature 
invisible. 100 
When we speak of deification as the effect of grace, 
we do not attribute to Maximus a theory of grace that is, 
in any way, divorced from the concrete character of the 
Incarnation. Deification is possible because it has been 
realized par excellence in the Word made flesh and because 
He communicates it to men by the action of the Spirit and 
through the Church. 
It is in the Incarnation that Maximus finds the 
fullest possible realization of the union of God and man, 
with the humanization of the divine and the divinization 
of the human necessarily involving each other. At the 
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basis of his thinking is the definition of Chalcedon : Eva 
xaC ti6v o rti v Xptotöu', Y16v, Mpt, ov, Mowoysvn, !v bvo 
cpüosaLv äouyXv rws, ätipe? Twc, äö i. at, p&TwC , 
dXwp Co twC 
YpLr. dpevav . 
101 There can be no question, for Maximus, 
of blurring the edges of the natures. He balances the 
9x övo cpvocot, w 
102 
stressed by the Neo- 
Chalcedonians with their iv bvo cocct, v 
103 in 
order to remind us that the union does not violate the 
distinction of the natures. He adds that the natures are 
identical with the person to exclude the possibility of a 
tertium quid. Christ is God and He is man. "0C ovx . AXo 
'rL 7capa ¶6 1ý iZ, u , 
Ev ols ¶e xaC ä7cep ¬o' yvwpt, - 
, 6µcvoC 104 excludes the TpCtiov ä COTE', Xeoµa 
105 
and touches the ontological foundation of his teaching on 
dyothelitism by the refined co-ordination of the concepts 
of nature and hypostasis. The Logos extends His personal 
existence to a concrete humanity, in such a way that there 
are not merely two ? c5yoc gvoewc in Christ, but a new 
mode of existing of the Person of the Logos as well. 
106 
This conjunction ensures that, while the unity of the 
person of the Logos is maintained, the enhypostasization of 
the humanity safeguards its integrity and guarantees its 
personal human activity. By adroitly striking a balance 
between potential Nestorianism gnd potential Monophysitism, 
Maximus lays the foundation of a Christology that preserves 
the wholeness of the natures and the oneness of the person, 
and once this is established, can give full play to both 
natures, so that divinity does not have to be hampered by 
humanity, nor can humanity be thought to be deprived of 
what human personhood would give it. The teaching on 
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bcöotiaoLr. ovv6etior. allows us to predicate of 
Christ, without a whiff of heterodoxy, two sets of 
particularized characteristics provided that we insist, 
with Maximus, on one Subject. 
107 
This must be complemented by the affirmation of the 
polarity and reciprocity of the two natures within the 
hypostatic unity. Christ is 'a man above men'. 
108 He is 
no longer *L%64; ävepw7cor. 
109 
nor 'un'6 
8e6 , 
110 This is brought out most clearly in the use 
of the concept 77epLX6PHoLC 9 
111 
particularly with 
regard to Christ's activity. But this kind of activity is 
made possible by the cvýcpu. a of the natures, which 
enables the theologian to apply divine attributes to Christ 
as man and human attributes to Christ as God. The activity 
of Christ is characterized by -c15 %p6C tXX1XaC ovµt vtq 
xaC 'tepLXwpijaet, '112 where ovµcpvCa evokes 
the mutual adhesion of the natures in the mystery of the 
person and 7ESPLX. wprjot4;, refers to the interplay of 
their mutual activity as a co-penetration, again a fruit 
and consequence of the fundamental union of natures in the 
hypostasis. In fact, for Maximus, the unity requires the 
difference and the difference requires the unity, in the 
mystery of Christ: pupt, ydp -c6Tc ac. cpc T evwaar, 
itpaygd, mv 9arCv , EwC 
äv i tiov av 0(: V. E'at. cpvot. xlj 
8LacpopQ . Once Incarnation is effected, 
113 
deification follows of necessity. He will appropriate a 
text of Cyril's much used by the Monothelites and interpret 
it in keeping with the stringent distinctions of Chalcedon: 
µCa 're XIC avYYevIC ÖL' dAgoty Ivep(CLa "114 He 
insists that it is not a mixed energy that is in question, 
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but a %epLX(zQ11OI. C, of human and divine energies, so 
that the man acts divinely because of the Logos and the 
Logos, become man, acts humanly. 
115 Cyril had taught a 
avµcpv'Ca and 9vwoLr. of energies, not the hybrid 
fabrication of the heretics. The key to Cyril is 
ovoTaaLs 9116 the most intimate union of the energies, 
because of the unity of the person, not their confusion. 
The daýmvtiwc of Chalcedon constantly finds play in 
the Christology and Soteriology of Maximus. When Maximus 
speaks of the X6yoc xarä c-SoI. v , he is emphasising 
the distinction of the natures. 
117 They are inviolable 
in the union brought about in the hypostasis. We see the 
consequences of ovµgv. ýa 
of the rp6, xoL btäpýcwc 
in the 7cepLXWp-noLr. 
. The natures are not merely 
seen as dynamic because they are gvoiC ; it is above 
all the hypostasized mutual dynamism of the natures that 
gives rise to the tantum-Quantum 
118 in Christ, between God 
and man, which is at once an 
of man and historically what 
can justifiably observe that 
is represented as the result 
then often expressed with an 
the condescension of God in 
exemplar for the deification 
makes it possible. Sherwood 
'again and again deification 
of the Incarnation. It is 
antistrophic arrangement: to 
His Man-becoming responds the 
imitation of man in God-becoming, by the grace and power 
of the God-man'. 
119 
The original aim of the Great Counsel of God is 
realized in the Incarnation. 'In fact, before the ages 
a union of limit and without-limit, of measure and without- 
measure, of extremity and without-extremity, of Creator and 
creation, of stability and movement, was conceived'. 
12 0 
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Man's failure in his vocation as mediator opened the way to 
the coming of Christ who would heal the divisions and 
achieve the unity willed in the ßovXý of God. In fact, 
this unity 'has taken place in Christ shown forth in the 
final ages' 
121 
. Christ is mediator because as man He freely 
consents to the filial attitudes that constitutes the 
hypostatic character of the Logos. 
122 The Logos is Son; 
it is his relationship to his Father that constitutes him 
as Son and is expressed in his 'rp6wo4 
v7-äpCcu4 
His mode of existence is filial and it is by this very mode 
that his humanity exists in the Incarnation, so that as man 
he is fAo Cte 'Son from the first moment of his human exist- 
ence in the womb of His Mother. 
123 Maximus is insisting 
that he was not born of the will of the flesh nor of the 
will of man, but of God. His entry into our condition, 
that of YC'VEOLC is marked by YEti"oLC 9 
124 This 
implies the presence of the Person of the Logos from the 
beginning of his human history. His y vviot, c befits 
the Adyos cpßocwc and A6Yoc 'ri ycv'LQewC of man, 
destined to be son of God. Man's y vvronC had lapsed 
to the animal level, the product of instinct and philautic 
YyWµxj . In the Incarnation, it is the ¶P67toc 'ßf1« 
YEvvlioc u. S that is new; the X6yoc q 
3oew. c retains 
its identity. 125 Christ is fully human; but the mode of 
existence that charoterizes this human being is in keeping 
with human dignity and the destiny that God holds out to 
man. Even as man, He is ad Patrem and so He can heal the 
ancient divisions in creation and between creation and God. 
It is already achieved in His Person because of the 
17 1 
hypostatic union of the two natures, so that the cosmic 
vocation of man is fulfilled in Christ. In Him the right 
relationship between person and nature is expressed in 
fitting activity. The precariousness of nature is 
stabilized by innovation and made 'incorruptible'. It is 
an enhypostasized human nature that is at the source of 
the human willing and acting of the Incarnate Logos. It 
is y vv-q aLC carried over into xCvTptc as sý 
eival. and issuing finally in äeß cXvat . Nor does 
Maximus leave these concepts suspended in abstraction. 
He joins them to the mysteries of Christ's Birth, Baptism, 
Passion, Death, Resurrection and Ascension. 
126 The union 
of Creator and creature realized ontologically in the 
Hypostatic Union is taken into existence and life so that 
the five divisions are healed in history and metahistory. 
The willing and activity of Christ as man express the being 
of the Hypostatic Union. Because of the free consent of 
his human will to the hypostatic character of the Word he 
can unite male and female, Paradise and the inhabited 
world, heaven and earth, intelligible and sensible things 
and finally created and uncreated nature. 
127 This is 
rooted in His 'zp3i oc käpýcwc . The union of Creator 
and creature, which is the oxo7ccc of the divine 
ßovXij , has its ground in the ontology of the Hypostatic 
Union which is the basis of the union of wills in Christ 
and between Christ and his Father. 'A -dxn is what 
informs the human will of Christ and ensures that it is at 
one with His divine Will and so with the Will of His Father. 
'Aydatrl translates the enhypostasisation of the humanity 
into a life that is totally at one with the Will of the 
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Father. 128 It is in this way that the 'Henad' is coneti- 
tuted, that the 6tdotiiµa between the AäyoL and the 
A6yoc is bridged, that the five divisions are overcome, 
that the restlessness of created nature comes to rest in 
God. This is not restricted to the Person and life of 
Christ but is extended to all those who are filially 
adopted in Him. 
By His birth the Incarnate Logos inaugurated a new 
mode of birth by which man can participate in the His 
filial mode of existence. 
129 66coLC. is the consu- 
mmation of this process. It begins with Baptism, 
130 in 
which he is born of the Holy Spirit and launched into a 
new life of & uxTj . 
131 This presumes koTV oLC 
132 
the intervention of the Holy Spirit133 and ovvep(cCa 
134 
It requires the renunciation of cpi. XcLV Ca , 
135 the 
acceptance of äYäxil and the conversion of the passions 
into virtue. It is the combination of ouvc PYc Ca and 
äYä, t. q 
136 that will bring about the personalisation of 
man's being and life, enabling him to go out of his old 
self to live for God in a way analogous to the ecstatic 
human life of the Incarnate Logos. It is analogous 
because Christ's being as man is ecstatic; being enhypos- 
tasized substantially, it belongs not to itself but to the 
eternal Logos. On the other hand the analogy is valid 
since the life which everyman can live in Christ is 
because of the agape derived from Christ and poured into 
human hearts by the Holy Spirit. 
137 It is this that 
enables man to live as a son of God and so to enter into 
his inheritance as a person by sharing in the Son's 
Tpö. xoc käpEecc . The new baptismal birth 
culminates in 6AwoiI; . 
138 The states of Christ from 
173 
YgvvrpW: to äväoraoLc are to be reproduced in the 
Christian. Just as the Incarnation evolved as redemption 
through willing and activity, so the new-born Christian 
must walk the same road. The Church is the milieu where 
the life of agape is lived until it issues in the 
139 
perfection of 6ewot. C 0 
The maximian triad otiSaCm , 6vv4i1, C and 
IvFPYaLa 140 assure us that Maximus held for stability 
in the created order, even if it were relative and 
dependent. Creatures exercised the act of existence, they 
were capable of existing in themselves, they were agents. 
This triad also makes evident the dynamic character of 
creatures in this system: they are empowered and realize 
themselves in activity. As Von Balthasar reminds us, 
otSaCa is the supreme aristotelian category comprising the 
quid est and the quod est of things. 
141 Maximus, in 
dependence on Leontius of Byzantium, thinks of ovo Cm in 
a twofold way: as the supreme logical category embracing 
genus, species and individuals; it is also an ontological 
category, the xa6'SXov 
being of the universe. 
142 
and so is equal to the total 
Von Balthasar rightly points out 
that ovoCa and cvaLr. are virtually equivalent, 
particularly when it is a case of ovoCa xa6' 
143 
Exaotiov . While 
the dimension of xcLO' Exaotiov and 
xa6' avr6v are not identical, it is well to note that 
in the concrete existent they coincide so that the relation- 
ship of the individual to the divine xpCoK , which wee 
mentioned above, is valid even when it entails hypostatic 
individuality, allowing for the different exercise of 
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%p6voLm and xpCoLr. in regard to free beings, as 
Maximus himself noted. 
144 No oüoia can exist, in fact, 
without the prerogative of xaa ' av'r6v 
too has a general reference and particular essence is 
attached to a genus so that we have eiöor. ätioµov 0145 
The distinctive thing about o&(a , cpvo LC and eIboC 
is that they denote the essential dimension of being. They 
require another dimension to account for their existential 
actuality: xa6' &avtibw 0146 
OvoCa, Süvaµi. c and lv6pycl. a are three irreplace- 
able aspects of created being. They add up to the notion 
of gvci, s OvoaC is essentially dynamic, but it is 
also imperishably consistent in its basic principle. 
147 
Undoubtedly, cp5Qtr. is in the realm of the objective 
and since it has a transcendent reference because of its 
%6yor. 9148 it is ultimately grounded in the objective 
energy of the Logos. It is the point of intersection of 
two activities, that of the Logos and that of the %6yoc 
cpvaewc . The possessors of cpvoLC must respect 
its 
parameters. To disregard cpvoa5 is to plunge into 
unreality. It is the vector of individual activity. It 
also bears the character of the concrete universal of 
Gregory of Nyssa: its concreteness, in fact, is due to its 
being innovated by the possessors of nature so that Maximus 
can say that 'the saints, through many sufferings, free the 
nature that is them from the condemnation of death on 
account of sin' 0149 
So basic to 9 3GLC is the idea of xCvrp Ls that 
Maximus can define the inmost secret of each thing's 
essential consistency through its activity: 'the definition 
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of each nature is the principle of its essential activity'150 
All creatures are, can act and do act, that is, they are 
made up of ova Ca , bvvaµLC and 
evepyc i, a . Their 
energy is the unfolding of their essential existence 
through the power to act. Maximus draws attention to the 
reciprocal compenetration of the three aspects of creatures: 
the essence of a thing is constituted 'in truth and 
uniquely by its power of actuation, which one can call its 
natural activity. It is by that that it is essentially 
A, char, ýterized, 
because it is a specifying movement'. 
151 
Movement reveals the A6' oc cpvaewC, of what moves; the 
movement cannot emancipate itself from the same %6yoý 
(PüOe c if it is to be authentic movement. Conversely 
it is essential to the q 3o LC to move, so that Maximus 
can identify ava'ta'r vxA övvaµ LC with (pvaLXA 
IvepYeia . Von Balthasar says finely that 'nature is 
nothing else but organized movement'152 and he reminds us 
of how fundamental that principle would be to Maximus in 
his defence of orthodox Christology. 
That Maximus thinks of the triad oüoCa , bvvaµaC , 
gvepyeca from the point of view of finality is clear 
from his other triad y veat, 6 , xCU. T)Ot, c and oTd, aLc 
In this way Maximus can preserve the divine transcendence, 
deny the pre-existence of souls and find an ontological 
basis for the pre-eminence of the free movement of men in 
a Christian universe. His dynamic concept of the creature 
is set in the ultimate framework of &pXrj, . tco '' Bc 
and ' Xo4; . The whole of creation is referred to God in 
* Vide Appendix IV for an excursus on this triad. 
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this way: 
God is the Beginning, Middle and the End of beings 
in so far as He is active and not passive, like all 
the other things named by us. For He is beginning 
as Creator, He is middle as Provider and He is end 
as the Circumference, for from Him and through Him 
and to Him are all things. 153 
The bond between the triads becomes evident in Ambigue 15: 
So, God is the beginning and the end of every genesis 
and movement of things that exist, since from Him 
they have genesis and movement and they make for Him 
as respose. 154 
The asceticism of Maximus is an elaboration of the 
concept et cIvaa . This notion expresses the virtuous 
free movement of man, by which he evolves from being in 
the image of God to being in His likeness. Prom this point 
of view the terminus a quo is cluaL and the terminus ad 
guem is äcC elvaL . The triad elves, , eü elvaL 
and dsC elvaL are the ascetical counterpart of the 
ontological oücta , 8ýµavLc , 
ev9pycLCL and the teleo- 
0 logical triad - vecac, xCvro. c and ordc,. 
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Between the termini Elva. and äei clv aL Maximus 
visualizes the whole of man's temporal career. We can see 
this constellation of basic maximian ideas beautifully 
depicted in the following passage from the Capitum de 
Caritate Quattuor Centuriae: 
In bringing into being natures endowed with reason and 
understanding, God, out of His supreme goodness, 
communicated to them four of the divine attributes by 
which He supports, guards, and preserves beings, 
namely: being and ever-being, goodness and wisdom. 
Of these, the first two He grants to the essence; the 
other two, goodness and wisdom, He grants for fitness 
of will and judgment, in order that the creatures mo 
become by sharing, what He is by essence. Therefore 
he is said to be made to God's image and likeness; to 
the image of His being by being, of His ever-being by 
ever-being (though it has a beginning, yet it is with- 
out end); to the likeness of His goodness by goodness, 
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of His wisdom by wisdom. The one is by nature, the 
other by grace. Every rational creature is made to 
the image of God, but only the good and the wise 
are to His likeness. 156 
Through the notion of c? cIvaL Maximus can insert his 
ideas about human intelligence, will and the play of grace 
in human life. Thus he can insist on the mystery of 
innovation at the heart of the stability of cpi5oi6 
It is here that vpa7or., intersects with %6yor. and that 
a firmly structured universe finds its fulfilment in the 
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self-abandonment of aydocn 0 Dvocr. is transformed 
into the mystery of the intersubjectivity of God and man. 
Behind the- ýapparently and language of the theologian we 
catch a glimpse of the Great Counsel of God the Father in 
all its height and breath and depth: 
Contemplation reveals that the complete X6yoc of 
the whole genesis of rational beings comprises the 
principle of being, that of well-being and that of 
ever-being. The first, that of being, is given to 
beings by essence, the second, that of well-being, 
is given by free choice in that they are self-moved; 
the third, that of ever-being, is given to them by 
grace. It is seen that the first has to do with 
power, the second with activity and the third with 
repose l58 
Introduction b. The plan of the Divine Counsel reflected 
in the plan of the'Our Father' (873D-876C) 
This section invites reflection on two aspects of the 
teaching of St. Maximus : his understanding of the 'Our 
Father' as containing the axoubc of the Divine Counsel, 
articulated in seven principal mysteries and how a man 
might enter into those mysteries by identifying himself with 
the dominical prayer through ipäýa. 9 
159 
which can 
extend from the work of virtuous living to an experimental 
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knowledge of the inflow of divine grace. Here we shall 
isolate the theme of mediation and postpone a considera- 
tion of Maximus' teaching on prayer to the chapter on 
aspects of his anthropology. We are told that the 'Our 
Father' 'teaches us to lay claim to the benefits of which 
the God and Father alone, through the natural mediation of 
his Son in the Holy Spirit, is truly the giver'. The 
benefits are the 'mysteries', so that the use of the prayer 
is meant to be a way of appropriating the mysteries, which 
he understands to be subsumed under the seven which he 
lists here: 'theology, sonship in grace, equality in 
honour with the angels, a share in eternal life, the 
restoration of nature to dispassionate inclination to 
itself, the destruction of the law of sin and the abolition 
of the tyranny of the Evil One, who mastered us by deceit'. 
Since we shall see something of the import of the mysteries 
in the next section, it will be useful here to examine the 
basic character of his teaching on 'the Lord Jesus', who is 
"'the mediator between God and men"'. This is an inclusive 
doctrine and a more developed consideration of it by 
reference to other passages in the maximian corpus should 
provide us with useful associations, if not a solid frame- 
work, for our analysis of the main themes of the Pater 
Noster. 160 
The Mediator. aim of the Divine Counsel 
Commenting on a conflation of pauline texts - 
Maximus says in Ambigua 7: 
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For the mystery hidden fron ages and generations is 
now manifested however, through the true and perfect 
inhomination of the Son of God, who hypostatically 
united our nature to Himself inseparably and uncon- 
fusedly. He also united us to Himself as if we were 
first fruits through that intellectually and rationally 
animated holy flesh of His, which is from us and ours, 
and He deigned that we should be one and the same with 
Himself through His humanity. As we were predestined 
to be in Him before the ages as members of His body, 
in spirit He fitted and joined us to Himself like soul 
to body and led us into the measure of the spiritual 
age of the fullness that is according to Him. He 
showed too that we were made for that and that the 
excellent purpose of God in our regard before all the 
ages is not to be understood according to any innova- 
tion with regard to its proper principle (logos), but 
that it comes to fulfilment, indeed, through anjýyer 
newer mode (tropos) which is brought into play. 
In this passage it is obvious that Maximus holds that 
the creation of man was with a view to incorporation in 
Christ. That is the mystery hidden from ages and genera- 
tions. The X6yos of the divine purpose is constant, 
but the manner of its fulfilment is different. Here again 
we find that the divine oxo7c6S becomes clearer when 
referred to the contrasting operations of the Providence 
and Judgment of God. We have seen already that the 
Incarnation is referred by Maximus to the Providence and 
the Passion of Christ is linked to Judgment. In the 
following excerpt from the Quaestiones ad Thalassium, it 
is clear that the Judgment of God initiates a new mode of 
implementing His original purpose because of the abuse of 
human freedom. Deification is still available to man 
through the Incarnation of the eternal logos, but now it 
comes to him through a suffering Messiah. Commenting on 
the prophetic olive-trees he says: 
The mystery of the Incarnation of God according to 
Providence is on the right, because it operates the 
deification, which is above nature, by grace and 
which was fore-ordained before the ages for those 
who are saved. No principle at all of nature that 
i8o 
belongs to beings could attain to that. On the left 
clearly is the mystery, in keeping with Judgment, of 
the life-giving Passion of the God who willed to 
suffer in the flesh. This operates the total abolition 
of all the characteristics and movements, which had 
entered into nature in a way contrary to nature 
because of the transgression. On the other hand, it 
brings about the restitution, which lacks nothing of 
all the characteristics and movements, which existed 
beforehand in keeping with nature and according to 
which counterfeit %6yor. of beings will be ýg2 
found. 
In this revealing passage we find that Maximus understands 
the Incarnation to be without presupposition. It does not 
take place in any way in dependence on the prevarication 
of Adam, but is willed absolutely by God. The relation- 
ship of Incarnation to deification is also unequivocal: 
the Incarnation effects deification. The function of the 
sufferings of the God-man is to restore to man the 
deification willed for him in the Incarnation. It is a 
work of ämoxaTäoTaotr. and reconstitutes in 
humanity the characteristics and vitality proper to 
deification. The Judgment of God ensures that the original 
axou5 of His Providence is achieved. This gives us a 
glimpse of the true dimensions of the redemptive Incarna- 
tion in the thought of Maximus. It is that in terms of 
which the whole of the created universe can be understood: 
The mystery of the embodiment of the Logos has the 
meaning of all the riddles and types of Scripture and 
the knowledge of the phenomenal and intelligible 
creatures. He then who understands the mystery of 
the Cross and burial has understood the principles of 
what was said before; he who has been initiated into 
the ineffable meaning of the Resurrection has known 
the purpose for which God constituted all things 
beforehand 11b3 
The ultimate purpose of God in creating has been revealed 
in the risen Lord. It is there that man not merely grasps 
the significance of the natural and written laws, but 
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where he discovers embodied in flesh the law of grace, 
that guarantees the presence of the love of God in the 
Person of His Son. It is that Love that will deify 
every willing man. The eternal pouXA radiates 
through the providential and judicious activity of God 
and lets man see into 'the innermost depth of the 
Fatherly goodness'. 
164 In the light of this distinction 
the xf5vwot, C - UWaLc. dyad of the Pater Noster can 
be understood as the foundation of the theology of 
Maximus. Keuwoic will assume its connotations of 
suffering and death because of the Fall. Divinisation 
has become salvation. 
Assuming that the thought of Maximus was consistent 
and coherent on the subject of the oxow6c of the 
divine povXj , we can arrange seemingly incompatible 
texts by referring those, which seem to isolate 
salvation as the cause of the Incarnation, to the Judg- 
ment of God and interpret them within the wider context 
of Providence and the absolute character of 'His wonder- 
ful advent to us'. 
165 Thus we find statements like: 'the 
Incarnation took place for the salvation of the nature', 
166 
or 'God becomes man in order to save man who is being 
lost', 167 or even more unambiguously, 'the only cause of 
His birth in the flesh was our salvation'. In the 
168 
following passage, the Redemption appears as an alterna- 
tive way of ensuring that men would attain to union with 
God rather than that the Incarnation was the unqualified 
end of creation: 
It was proper that, when God had made us like to 
Himself by having through participation the exact 
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signs of His goodness, (He who had as purpose before 
all the ages that we should be in Him and to lead us 
to this most happy end, giving us the way through the 
good izse of natural powers, but with man voluntarily 
rejectin this way by the bad use of the powers), 
another 
(way) 
more marvellous and more in keeping with 
God should be substituted, to the extent that that 
which is above nature is superior to that which is 
according to nature, in order that man might not 
become a stranger far from God. And this, as all 
believe, is the mystery of the mystical sojourn of 
God with men. 169 
We can reconcile this with the deeper intuition of Maximus 
by saying that he refrains from speculating on hypotheses 
for which there is no foundation in Scripture and Tradition, 
on whether the Incarnation would have taken place without 
the presupposition of the Fall and confines himself to 
describing how, in fact, God now saves man. We have a 
dramatic description of man's inability to divinize himself. 
The implications of his failure are not spelt out, so that 
we are not told in what way the good use of his powers 
would have implied the presence of the Logos. It will be 
sufficient here to draw attention to the passage in the 
Pater Noster where we are told that 'the transgression of 
the divine commandment did not allow the first man to 
become a sharer of this'. 
170 'This' refers to the 'bread' 
which the Logos is. Divinisation depended on the Logos 
from the beginning. 
In the Quaestiones ad Thalassium we have a passage 
that clearly and unambiguously declares the Incarnation, 
which achieves the union without confusion of the 
uncreated and the created, to be the aim of the creation 
and the core cf great Counsel of God: 
The text of Scripture calls Christ 'the mystery of 
Christ' and the great Apostle attests it clearly 
when he says: "The mystery that has been hidden 
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from generations, has now been manifested" (Col 1,26), 
saying namely that the mystery of Christ is identical 
with Christ. Evidently, this is the ineffable and 
incomprehensible Hypostatic Union of divinity and 
humanity, leading the humanity to identity with the 
divinity in every way, by reason of the hypostasis and 
making the one composite hypostasis from the two, in 
such a way however as to bring about no diminution at 
all of their essential differences, from the point of 
view of nature, so that their hypbstasis, as I have 
said, becomes one and the natural difference remains 
unharmed, in accordance with which, even after the 
union, their natural number is preserved undiminished, 
even when united. For where, by the union, no modifi- 
cation at all of change or alteration ensued for the 
things united, the ? droc of each of the united 
entities remained uncorrupted. Those things, whose 
X6yor. of essence remained uncorrupted, even after 
the union, their natures had remained in every way 
intact, so that neither renounced what was its own 
at all through the union. For it became the Creator 
of all things, become by nature in keeping with the 
economy what He was not, to conserve unaltered both 
Himself as He was by nature and what He had become, in 
keeping with the economy. For change, in regard to 
which movement takes place in beings that are moved, 
is naturally not observed in God, in whom no movement 
at all is discerned. This is the great hidden mystery. 
This is the blessed end, on account of which all things 
were constituted. This is the divine purpose, conceived 
before the origin of beings. Defining this, we say that 
it is the preconceived end, on account of which all 
things are, but which itself is not on account of any- 
thing. 171 
In this closely woven passage we can see that, for Maximus, 
there is nothing created, in function, of which the 
Incarnation can be said to have taken place; on the 
contrary it is the mystery, 'ineffable and incomprehensible', 
of the Hypostatic Union which accounts for everything else 
in the created order. Maximus emphasizes that we cannot 
account for the union, merely in terms of Xöyoc . The 
ýöYoý of nature is, for him, inviolable: 
Indeed, no creature at all, existing according to 
its logos among the things that are, was ever what 
it is not now, nor is it, nor will it be, nor, 
indeed, is it now, nor will it be in the future, what 
it was not before. For those things, whose X6yo6 
possessed in the presence of God perfection together 
with existence, their production and realization 
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according to their own XöyoL are, in order to be, 
entirely unreceptive of every addition to and subt c- 
tion from the very thing which they happen to be. l 
Therefore the unprecedented event of the man-becoming of 
God must have taken place in another order, that of rp67. oQ 
It is in this order, too, that human participation in that 
mystery will take place: 
For every innovation, to speak in general, naturally 
takes place with regard to the mode (tipd, xoc ) of the 
innovated thing, but not in regard to the A6yoc of 
the nature. Therefore, on the one hand, the X6yoc 
of the innovated thing destroys the nature, which does 
not preserve unaltered the X6yoC according to which 
it is; on the other hand, the innovated mode of the 
entirely preserved Adyoc of the nature manifests the 
power of the prodigy, in showing clearly lt e nature active and passive beyond its own limit,. 
We shall return to this theme, having seen it functioning 
in the principal parts of the Pater Noster. 
In the following excerpts from the Quaestiones ad 
Thalassium, we find the Incarnate Logos assumes a position 
in regard to 'the ages' comparable to what we have seen 
attributed to God in an absolute way: 
Since Our Lord Jesus Christ 
and end of the ages, those 
will be, suitably there has 
end of the ages, which will 
according to grace, because 
the w orthy. 174 
is the beginning, middle 
that have been, are and 
come to us by faith the 
be in act by vision 
of the deification of 
Again the beginning can be identified with the law of 
nature, the middle with the written law and the end with 
the law of grace. The divinisation of man is subordinate 
to and dependent on the mystery of Jesus Christ, in whom 
the mystery of divinisation has been realized as in its 
foundation. His filial mode of existence, to which man is 
destined to be configured through divinisation, is reflected 
in the 7epLX4. Hßcc of the divine and human energies 
in His composite hypostasis. The deification of Adam, the 
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paradigm for the deification of all those descended from 
him, was meant to be a union of the created with the 
Uncreated through agape, which man would have achieved, 
the whole man having penetrated ( 7, epLxwpAoac. ) 
the whole God wholly and having become everything 
that God ie, without the identity of substance and 
having taken into himself the whole God Himself and 
having obtained God Himself as the highest reward 
of his ascent to Him. 75 
But this perichoretic divinisation is entirely beyond the 
native power of man: 'nothing created can by nature 
effect divinisation, because nothing can grasp God by 
itself'. 176 The combination of this radical inability 
with the way, in fact, it has been made possible, seems 
to have led Maximus to conclude that 'the whole man is 
deified by the inhomination of God, being made god by 
grace'. 
l?? Since this is so, divinisation simply pre- 
supposes Incarnation; in the present economy this is 
translated as xeuwot, c with a view to 6gwoLC 
Therefore when Maximus speaks of the Hypostatic Union, he 
always means it to imply the divinisation of the humanity 
of Christ and through Him the divinisation of those who 
accept salvation. Because of the necessarily opaque 
character of the divine mystery to human reflection, 
Maximus must be content to have recourse to the argument 
from fittingness: 
It was necessary, indeed, that He who was the creator 
of the substance of beings by nature should become the 
author, by grace, of the deification of the beings 
brought into being, so that He who is the giver of 
being should be seen t be the bNower of eternal 
well-being (äec e? i e vaa ). 
Our dependence on the Word Incarnate for divinisation is 
expressed antistrophically in this passage which sums up 
the thought of the Confessor on the subject: 
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For as He descended because of us and without change 
became man like us, apart from sin, having undone the 
laws of nature in a way that transcended nature, so 
we too in consequence shall ascend because of Him and 
become gods in keeping with Him, by the mystery of 
grace, changed in no way at all as regards our nature. 179 
The parallelism of descent-ascent and the insistence on 
the lack of change in the natures, the Logos retaining 
his divine nature and man his human nature, is obvious. 
So too is the fact that He became man that we may become 
gods. This has been done in a way that transcends nature: 
tip6io complements MyoC and enables it to go outside 
itself in personal ecstasy. The 'undoing' with regard to 
the laws of nature refers to the violence done to nature 
by man through sin, not to any solution of his X6Toc 
cpva. wQ , which, for Maximus, as we have seen, is 
inviolable. In fact the phrase comes from Gregory Nazianzen 
and is the basis of the discussion in Ambigua 31: 'The 
laws of nature are dissolved; the world above must be 
. fulfilled. Christ orders it; let us not resist' 
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Having dealt with the dissolution of the laws of nature as 
it is after the Fall, Maximus then proceeds to a more 
fundamental modification of the same laws. Human nature 
is taken into the personal existence of the Logos and 
thus becomes capable of a new way of life, entirely 
beyond the possibilities of nature left to itself and its 
own laws. 
Thus God dissolves the laws of nature, using nature 
above nature in the things that belong to nature. 181 
He will complement this in Ambigua 36, by saying of the 
sacred humanity : 
Thus from olle point of view, it remains in the 
, KäYor. of being according to which it was created, 
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having properly its being undiminished in any way; 
from the other point of view having taken on the 
divine subsistence by the XÖToC of 'how-being', 
it neither knows nor tolerates absolutely any 
impulse of movement towards anything else. 2 
Elsewhere he makes explicit the bearing that this mystery 
has on divinisation: 
Having assumed for us the %6ioc of the genesis and 
the 'pöioc of the birth, God has renewed the nature 
or, to speak more truly, He has i. nnay-ated_ it and led 
it back to the ancient beauty of incorruptibility by 
the holy flesh endowed with a rational soul, which He 
took from us, d He has granted it munificently 
divinisation. l83 
The Logos has assumed human nature in such a way that He 
respects ?6 'os 96cew5 . He has already made His own 
the way in which that nature was being used by man, the 
tropos of a slave not by becoming guilty of sin, but by 
taking on the consequences of sin and in that way, living 
as a Son, the tropos of His birth. He has restored to 
man his likeness to God so that men can again use nature 
as eons. It is His innovation 
_of 
nature that makes 
innovation possible for all men. This is to regain likeness 
to God, to be divinized. Maximus dwells on the paradoxical 
manner in which this innovation has been wrought in the 
human existence of the eternal Logos. He has reversed the 
domination of evil over human passibility in auch a way 
that it is through passion and death, consequences of sin, 
that He frees 'the whole nature of men'. By maintaining 
His filial mode of existence in the extremest abandonment 
by his Father, he has reconciled mankind with God: 
By His power, He has freed the whole nature of man 
from the evil that was mixed into it through its 
passibility by His holy flesh taken from us, as if 
by some first fruits. He did it by subordinating 
the domination of evil over nature to the natural 
passibility, a domination which lorded it over its 
I mean over the passibility of nature. 184 
188 
The 'natural passibility' was made to express the tropos 
of the logos, 'obedient unto death'. Kv aLc issues 
in eewcLc . 
185 The mediatorial role of the Incarnate 
Logos is most obvious in the fact of the Incarnation 
itself. It is this which, for Maximus, makes the other 
unifications possible: 
For a union of limited and unlimited, of measured 
and immense, of bounded and unbounded, of Creator 
and creature, of rest and movement, was preconceived 
before the ages. This took place in Christ appearing 
in the latter times, giving by means of itself ful- 
filment to the prescience of God. (''rl'qQ, &2iß, 
The Five Divisions and Synthetic Mediation 
A rapid survey of Aznbigua41 will reveal the context 
in which Maximus understood the mediatorship of Christ. 
Here he presents it in contrast to the failure of man to 
meet this vocation. The question of the ultimate 
axo7c6 of the divine Counsel is not foreclosed by 
this essay and the claim that the mediatorship of man is 
to be understood in the context of Christ can be upheld 
if we read it against the background of the distinction 
between Providence and Judgment which we outlined above 
a/nd remember that chronology is secondary to divine 
intention in the thought of Maximus. 
He appeals to the saints, who are followers and 
ministers of the Logos, and thus rooted in Tradition he 
reminds us that they 
say that the substance of created things is divided 
by five divisions, of which the first is that which 
divides the created nature - that which acquires 
existence through generation - from the uncreated 
nature... the second is that by which the entire 
nature below God, which receives existence by 
creation, is divided into intelligibles and sensibles. 
The third is that by which the sensible nature is 
189. 
divided into heaven and earth. The fourth is that by 
which the earth is divided into paradise and the 
inhabited world and the fifth is that by which man, 
benevolently introduced among beings by creation, like 
some comprehensive workshop in respect of all things 
and naturally mediating through himself in regard to 
all things and fr all the extremes, is divided into 
male and female. 186 
The thing to note in this cosmic vision is the mediatorial 
role assigned to man. The way in which he was to fulfil 
his vocation as the kingpin of creation emerges with 
sufficient clarity in what Maximus goes on to say. His 
constitution as microcosm fitted him to bring unity to 
the whole span of creation, since he concentrated in 
himself, a combination of elements that were found in the 
macrocosm: 'body, sense, soul and spirit'. 
187 It was 
through him that the rp6noc of God's plan to unite 
Himself with his creatures was to be accomplished. 
Because of this, man was introduced last to beings, 
like a natural link to the extremes of the whole 
because of his mediating parts; uniting in himself 
those things which are naturally very distant from 
each other so that, because of the union which 
leads all things to God as cause, beginning from 
the division in himself first of all and progressing 
in sequence and order through the parts to God, he 
would find the end of his ascent on high, whi h 
takes place through all things, in the union. f38 
The Creator desires that creatures, separated from each 
other by their natures, should attain unity, converging 
towards each other in the single nature of man and thus 
'God Himself would in this way become all in all'. 
189 
This 'is the great mystery of the divine Counsel'. 
190 
It now becomes clear that the unity, which man is called 
to mediate, while it presupposes his affinity with the 
'extremes' of the universe, depends for its accomplish- 
ment on how God intended him to live. The dimension of 
tipönos is thrown into relief. The ultimate principle 
190 
of the unity will be in the hypostatic order. 
The sexual distinction of male and female was not 
necessarily dependent on God's original intention for the 
generation of the human race, so that the basic division 
to be healed by man is the division that he finds in 
himself. He was to have shaken off divisive sexuality 
by impassibility, that 'most dispassionate condition'191 
so that man would not be male and female; it was his 
holy way of life that was to have ensured the unity 
between the inhabited earth'and paradise so that there 
would be one earth, 'pulled together' and not allowing a 
withdrawal of its parts; 
192 the unity of earth with 
heaven would come about when man acquired an angelic 
kind of life 'through virtue'; 
193 it was 'likeness in 
knowledge to the angels' that was to have compassed the 
union of sensibles and intelligibles, because now the 
two orders would not be divided by ignorance in contrast 
to knowledge, since man would enjoy 'gnostic understanding 
of the koyoL ' and find himself prepared for 'a plentiful 
effusion of true wisdom' ; 
194 finally man would bring 
about the union of creation with God 'through charity'; 
'pouring himself wholly into the whole God and becoming 
whatever God is, apart from identity of essence, he 
receives the whole God Himself in place of himself'. 
195 
In the Pater Noster 'male and female' are identified 
with anger and concupiscence 
196 
so that Maximus is here 
visualising the realization of the first union through 
the exercise of the vita practica in so far as it is 
brought to bear on man's passibility and would allow the 
191 
basic %6yoc, of humanity to assert itself. 
197 
It is the 
practice of the virtues that would ensure the maintenance 
of true consistency with the divine intention for man at 
this level. The paradise of the second mediation 
obviously has an earthly character and here again it is 
7-pä Lc that would effect the unity, now not merely 
restricted to the establishment of harmony in man's 
passionate life, but extended to the relationships with 
other men. 
198 This would be a foretaste of post- 
resurrection life in the present economy, but which was 
intended in an unqualified way by God's Providence. * The 
third and fourth mediations were to have been realized 
through the exercise of 6cwpCa cpvoLxt . In the 
third unification, men would know the sensible creation 
as the angels know it, that is through its A6yoL , 
and thus as it is in relation to the Logos. 
199 In this 
way man would not be 'inhibited from ascent into the 
heavens' 200 because he would be no longer subservient to 
the world, but would in some sort have entered the realm 
of the angels because, as Maximus insists in the Pater 
Noster, he would obey as the angels obey the divine will 
and in the consequent peace, be in a position to know as 
they know. 201 The range of that knowledge would be 
extended in the fourth mediation to the order of the 
intelligibles in themselves. 201 The most characteristic 
aspect of this was to have been an insight into the 
mystery of creaturehood and the divine principle by which 
all things subsist, called as they are from non-being to 
to being by God's creative word. This attainment of the 
, 
ultimate cause of the created order would precipitate 'a 
192 
203 
plentiful effusion of true wisdom', in the context of 
which is mentioned the final possibility of an immediate 
knowledge of God, äbtäruwaTov xaC ä Lep u vcv'cov 0 
204 
The final phase of unification is left to aa e205 and 
would coincide with the attainment of OcoXoYCa 
Knowledge here would be in function of charity. The 
emphasis on &cti shows that Maximus understands the 
denoument of man's ascent to God to take place primarily 
in the hypostatic order. 
206 The emphasis on mode of life 
lets us know that this principle of human existence has 
found play throughout man's search for God, but its 
irreplaceable function in effecting the union of God with 
his creatures reveals its true grandeur here, ensuring 
that creatures attain that 'firm and stable rest' in HiP? 
Since, therefore, when he had been created, man had 
not moved naturally around the Unmoved as his proper 
principle, I mean God, he had been moved willingly, 
foolishly, against nature around the things beneath 
him, over which he was set to rule by God, misusing 
the natural power which was given him to unite what 
was divided, in keeping with his origin, rather to 
divide what was united and by this he risked almost 
returning to non-being again. On that account, 
natures are being renewed and that which is altogether 
unmoved by nature moves, so to speak, in an unmoved 
way, paradoxically, beyond nature, around that which 
is naturally moved and God becomes man, so that He may 
save man, who is lost, through Himself uniting the 
rifts of universal nature in its totality and the 
expressed universal XöyoL of the particulars, by 
which the union of the divided has come about. He 
demonstrated that the great Counsel of God the Father 
was fulfilled, recapitulating in Himself all things, 
those in heaven and those n earth, in the very One 
in Whom they were created. 408 
Here man is portrayed as having failed in his vocation to 
mediation and by his foolishness to have risked being 
engulfed in the meontic. God remedies this by moving 
into the created order of change in order to save man 
and to perform the task of uniting the divisions as the 
193. 
Mediator, and so to restore to man his original place in 
the fabric of the universe. Since there can be no 
question of the introduction of movement into the nature 
of the Unmoved, it must take place in a different 
dimension of being, 'beyond nature'. God cannot cease 
to be God, nor can the creature be elevated to the level 
of essential divinity. But what is impossible in the 
order of Adyoc gßoewr., has been achieved in the order 
of rp61coC buäpFew5 . The Word becomes; it is as 
person that He subsists in a human nature and that a 
human nature exists in Him. His 'movement' in no way 
signifies that He is subject, as God, to the created 
order, nor does it, in the light of what we have seen 
above, have to be made dependent on the Fall in any way 
to account for its having taken place. 
Maximus then goes on to affirm the perfection of 
Christ's humanity and the uniqueness of his begetting 
which is the first indication of the intervention of God 
in a fallen world to restore man to his original status 
and vocation: 
Of course then, having begun the union in general 
of all things with Himself from the division in us, 
He becomes perfect man from us, because of us, for 
us, having all that is proper to us in full, except 
sin, not needing in any way marital succession for 
this. 209 
For Maximus the tragic plight of man, caught into a chain 
of birth and death, of pleasure and pain, is symbolised 
dramatically in the manner of human generation. The 
virgin birth of Christ is evidence for him that the new 
order is being established, in which men can again be 
born as sons of God and not merely the products of the 
194 
will of the flesh and the self-centred will of man. 
r vurioLc is again in keeping with Y6vco,. c . 
210 The 
äxo? ov6Ca yaµLxi that had been reduced to that of the 
animal kingdom, because man had turned his capacity for 
God to matter, is superseded 'in the renewal of the laws 
of the first and really divine creation, so that what man, 
being weak, had lost through negligence, God who is 
powerful should rectify through philanthropy'. 
211 
Maximus puts forward his view in a tentative way: 
Likewise He showed, I think, and in the same manner 
that there was perhaps another mode for increasing 
the number of men, foreknown by God, if the first 
man had kept the commandment and had not lowered 
himself to brutishness in the way in which he uses 
his powers, producing for himself the distinction 
of male and female and the division of nature. As 
I have said, man did not need this for generation 
at all, without which, perhaps, it is possible to 
exist; these things are not a necessity for 
continued survival. 'For in Christ Jesus' says 
the divine apostle, 'there is neither male nor 
femaleg. 12 
Here, it seems that Maximus is saying that the distinction 
of the sexes is the result of the Fall. His teaching 
corresponds to Gregory of Nyssa's doctrine of the 'garment 
of skin'213 added to man, because of his prevarication, 
as an alternate way of ensuring that the divinely ordained 
mankind would in fact be realized. But there are, too, 
texts that imply that sexuality and the passions are 
natural. 
214 While these must be assessed in an attempt 
to establish the thought of Maximus in this area, Maximus 
is concentrating here on the Person of the Word Incarnate 
and on the renewal that He brings to mankind by the new 
mode of His birth without seed or corruption which 
restores incorruptibility. 
215 Maximus does not use the 
term, but we have evidence here of his sympathy with a 
195 
'physical theory' of Redemption. He then proceeds to the 
other mediations which the Word Incarnate performed on 
behalf of mankind. The way in which Maximus handles this 
subject shows clearly that his theology is poles apart 
from a Ne©-Platonic philosophy. The solution of the 
divisions that inflict man and the world is to be found 
in the concrete history of the God-man, not in an abstract 
return, counterbalancing an abstract emanation. The 
healing of the cosmic rifts continues to be in keeping 
with the unification of male and female brought about by 
the paradoxical birth of the Son of God in the flesh: 
Then having sanctified our inhabited earth by His 
mode of life in a way that befits mankind, He enters 
paradise without impediment after death, as he 
candidly declared to the thief when he said: 'To-day 
you will be with me in Paradise'. From there, since 
our inhabited earth from then on was not distant from 
paradise, He again appeared in it, conversing with the 
disciples after His resurrection from the dead, showing 
that earth is one and not separated from itself, by 
preserving the principle according to which it is free 
from the difference of division. Then through His 
ascension into heaven, He clearly united heaven and 
earth and having gone into heaven with this earthly 
body, which is the same as ours in nature and substance, 
He showed that the whole sensible nature is at one with 
its more universal principle, annulling that particu- 
larity which caused in itself the division due to 
difference. Then, in addition to this, going through 
in succession all the orders of divine and spiritual 
beings of heaven with His soul and body, that is our 
perfect nature, He united the sensibles and the 
intelligibles and showed that the convergence to unity 
of the whole creation, in keeping with its most funda- 
mental and universal principle, was altogether undivided 
and stable. And finally, added to all these, according 
to the human way of understanding, He arrives at God 
Himself, having appeared on our behalf, as it is 
written, before the face of the God and Father, as man, 
He who never in any way was capable of being separated 
from the Father as Word, having fulfilled as man in 
deed and truth, by an obedience never transgressed, 
whatever He Himself, as God, had foreordained should 
take place. He also carried out the whole will of the 
God and Father for our sakes, we who had rendered void, 
by abuse, the power naturally given to us in the 
beginning for this. First of all, He united us to 
ourselves in Himself, through the removal of the 
196 
difference of male and female and instead of men and 
women, in whom the manner of the division is especially 
discerned, He revealed men alone, exactly and in truth, 
formed entirely like Him and bearing altogether pure 
and unadulterated His image. 216 
For Maximus, the relationship between the sexes is 
now marked by sin. The quest for sensual pleasure 
replaced the search for God and so a7opä issued in 
c0opä Man is tied to the existential dialectic of 
fiöov j- 6Hvii 9 
217 Through his y1vuiio t. c , which is 
not in keeping with his genesis, man is bound to death on 
account of Adam's sin. While his nature is basically 
integral, his mode of existence is that of a slave bound 
by the shackles of lust and death. Man, in the distinct- 
ness of male and female, is the subject of passionate '' 
action which reveals a disordered use of 91 OvpLCQ and 
6vµ6;; 0 
218 The sinful use of the passible powers of 
the soul and the disordered manner of generation, now 
peculiar to man, are so intertwined, that Maximus can see 
in aggression and passionate desire the signs of a nature 
subject to corruption and generation. It is only in 
Christ that man is freed from this misery and his way of 
life restored to the primordial divine intention. Christ 
was born as man, but undid the sinful law of procreation. 
Thus He was in a position to take death on Himself in a 
voluntary way and change the death from sin into a 
sacrificial judgment on sin itself. 
219 He liberated the 
common principle of human nature from the division into 
male and female, that is expressed in disordered passion. 
As we have seen, Maximus considers that Christ has removed 
'the difference of male and female and instead of men and 
women, in whom the manner of the division is especially 
197 
discerned, He revealed men (&vepw'xouc ) alone' 220 Christ 
effects this, not by pruning away anything that is proper 
to human nature, but by ensuring that it will be hypo- 
statically subordinate to its normative principle, the 
X6yoC cvoewc . Time in the Pater Noeter we find 
that the passible faculties are subsumed into man's higher 
powers and become energy in his quest for God. 
221 The 
paradoxical birth of Christ is the foundation on which 
this human possibility is now founded. The mode of His 
birth from his Mother is at the same time evidence of his 
being son of God in the flesh and the basis of the 
possibility of his taking on man's tipöioc of slave in 
order to change it into filial obedience. 
222 
Maximus knows from Scripture, which he has just 
quoted to that effect, that the good thief is to be with 
Christ in Paradise after his death and also that Christ 
returned to the inhabited earth to converse with His 
disciples. This is evidence that, for him, the paradise 
in question is the earthly paradise so that the entry of 
Christ and the thief there shows that the 'earth' is one. 
The thief, then, represents all those who make that 
transition. In a cognate text, Maximus says that Christ 
removed the difference between Paradise and the Oikumeno 
by constituting the unity of the 'earth'. 
224 
Man is now 
meant to participate in that process of unification, made 
possible by Christ. Man's way of life must conform to 
the mode of life that befits mankind, which Maximus sees 
as explanatory of Christ's having performed this 
mediation. 
225 This conduct is to be marked by the 
practice of virtue which will undo the effects of the 
198 
wilfulness of rebellious yvwµaL , especially the 
divisions between men. The way to Paradise has been 
opened by Christ, because of his conduct and his death. 
It is for men now to live harmoniously in a comparable way 
and thus anticipate beatitude in a paradise of moral 
virtue. This would be a radiation of the unity of the 
whole 'earth', the created world, in the Logos. Thunberg 
has pointed out that in Maximus' interpretation of Luke 
23.43, 'Christ's death and resurrection safeguard the 
literal and historical relevance, while his promise to 
the penitent on the cross seems to imply immediate 
spiritual consequences related to this age'. 
226 It is 
the presence of the Logos in the virtues appropriated 
by men that opens the way to Paradise, unites men to 
each other and leads to union with God. This will require 
the spiritual transformation of pain, those 'labours' 
which are the consequence of sin and which become, in 
man's ascesis, a participation in the sufferings and 
death that opened the way to Paradise. 
227 In this way is 
preserved 'the principle according to which it is free 
from the difference of division', 
228 
says Maximus, 
referring to the new unity of inhabited earth and paradise. 
The Ascension of Christ into Heaven demonstrates for 
Maximus that 'the whole sensible nature is at one with 
its more universal Xdyos '. 
229 
In the Quaestiones ad 
Thalassium, this elimination of the particularity, which 
caused the division of heaven and earth, shows that there 
is only one nature of sensible things. 
230 
The ascension 
of Christ is here not merely the historical object of the 
act of Christian faith, but it also has to do with the 
199 
incarnation of the Logos in the world, so that the 
realization of the union of heaven and earth by Christ 
implies a restoration of man's original power to mediate 
between heaven and earth. The literal interpretation of 
the mystery of Christ's Ascension is accompanied in the 
thought of Maximus by a more allegorical understanding 
of its significance for men, because of the unity of the 
logoi in the Logos. 231 The historical and metahistorical 
achievement of Christ provides a concrete foundation for 
another kind of exposition which has bearing on how man 
can now so conduct his life as to participate in the 
mystery of the Ascension. 
232 His virtuous endeavour 
enables him to break his affective ties with the world 
and to ascend in an angelic fashion to a higher kind of 
knowledge of the whole sensible order of creation in the 
Logos. 
233 
The simplification of affectivity will free 
the contemplative voür. to discern the unity that binds 
the differentiated order of the sensibles. Maximus 
combines his twofold understanding of the Ascension when 
he says: 
The Lord does not ascend to the Father for those who 
examine the A6ToC of God in a fleshly manner; He 
does ascend to the Father, however, for those who 
search for it spiritually through lofty contempla- 
tione; 234 
and 
As long as one manfully engages in divine struggles 
through practical philosophy, he holds on to the 
Logos who came into the world through the precepts. 
When, however, he has performed contests against 
the passions by ipär.. c , obviously victor over 
passions and demond, he turns his attention to 
gnostic philosophy through contemplation, he allows 
the Logos to leave the world again and to go to the 
Father. 235 
200 
The Logos, who was condensed or made 'thick' in His three- 
fold incarnation, 
236 
and in man's virtues, 
237 becomes 
'thin' in the contemplative who ascends to the undiffer- 
entiated Logos who accounts for the determining principles 
of the sensible creation. 
238 He is admitted to an 
N 
QXp Golk- Oki CA'tý. f c"TlV ) 
appreciation of the ýý diastolic-systolic, action of the Logos 
in the universe, realizing that its manifold X6yoL 
radiate from the Logos and seek their unity in Him. 
239 
Ambigua 41 makes it clear that this knowledge is made 
possible by the Incarnation of Christ, culminating in His 
Ascension. 240 
Then Maximus, in his mind's eye, follows the 
trajectory of the ascending Christ through the order of 
intelligibles. 241 He emphasizes that it is in the 
fulness of His humanity that He ascends and thus shows 
that man is at home in the world of the intelligibles. 
It is this actual presence of Christ, the Word made flesh, 
in the angelic world that demonstrates the unity intended 
by God for all His creation. Maximus thinks of the 
diverse orders of being as converging to that unity in 
virtue of a common X6 oc . 
242 He has already discovered 
a human Xöyoc as principle of unity for male and female, 
a human X6yoc from a social point of view which reveals 
the unity of mankind, a higher X6Yo( in virtue of which 
the whole sensible domain can be understood as one and 
now he is confronted with a final X6yoC , which binds 
together the total span of creation in all its dimensions, 
its 'most fundamental and universal principle'. 
243 Hero 
again, the literal sense of Scripture, provides a basis 
for understanding the dynamism of a spiritual anthropology. 
201 
Man's vocation to mediate the union of the sensibles and 
the intelligibles is seen to be no mere philosophical 
project, because the Incarnate Logos, the first-born of 
many brethren, has gone before and actually entered the 
loftiest created realms, ensuring hypostatically the 
entrance there of 'our humanity in its perfection'. 
244 
Having established that, Maximus can deploy the resources 
of other systems to explain how man may now appropriate 
what Christ has done for him. It must be remembered that 
the orders of the sensible and intelligibles are, for 
Maximus, ontological entities, part of the original 
divine plan, not merely a basic spiritual order plus the 
adventitious order of sensibles, due to some pristine 
spiritual boredom in the Henad. 
245 Then it should be 
remarked that the ascension of Christ corresponds to an 
inclination in creation itself towards its unity in the 
Logos. 246 His ascension facilitates the realization 
that there is, in fact, a common X6yo4; which holds the 
creation as a whole together. 
247 Man shares in an 
angelic insight into the mystery of God's leading being 
out of the-abyss of non-being, which is at the same time 
a contemplative discovery of the inexpressible contrast 
between Creator and creature which can be, Maximus assures 
us, the threshold, "to an immediate knowledge of God that is 
heralded by a 'plentiful effusion of wisdom' .2 
48 The 
associations of wisdom, for Maximus, indicate that man 
is going beyond the resources of his nous and entering an 
area that is more properly hypostatic, the world of 
dyawn 
. 
249 Because man can grasp the whole created 
. 
order, the intelligible and the sensible, open to the 
202 
former through intelligence, open to the latter through 
sense informed by intelligence, he can hold it together as 
seen in relation to the Logos Creator and so is disposed 
for the grace of mystical knowledge or OcoXoYCM 0250 
Maximus sees this human possibility as a share in what 
was achieved by the Incarnate Logos, who 
recapitulated into Himself, in a way that befits 
God, all things in the way put forward above. He 
showed that the whole creation is one, just like 
another man, consummated by the reciprocal nexus 
among themselves of its single parts and converging 
to itself by the wholeness of subsistence in keep- 
ing with the one and single undefined and indisting- 
uishable notion of the production from non-being. 
In keeping with this, the whole creation can receive 
the one and the same and altogether undifferentiated 
k6yor. in that it had 'it was not, before it had 
'being'. d51 
Again in the fifth mediation Maximus sees the original 
divine intention of the union of God with His creatures 
fulfilled in the final phase of the Ascension of Christ 
who, 'according to the human way of understanding', 
'arrives at God Himself'. 
352 We are reminded that there 
can be no question of the Logos having ever forsaken hie 
substantial unity with His Father. His becoming is 
personal to Himself; it is hypostatically that He becomes 
the 'man' who reaches the Father as the term of his ascent 
and this He does 'on our behalf'. He is also said to have 
attained to this human fulfilment through an obedience 
that ensured the accomplishment of the divine will in 
regard to man, a will which is here identified with the 
Logos himself as co-possessing that Counsel with the 
Father and the Holy Spirit. 
254 The filial upftoc , 
discarded by man become slave, has been reaffirmed by the 
Logos precisely as 'obedient'. Obedience is a way of 
describing human life as God intends it to be lived and 
203 
is the pledge of the 'reward of the ascent undertaken to 
God' by man in Christ. 
255 It is the final development 
of the ascent of Christ to His Father that most clearly 
reveals the principle from which it began and in virtue 
of which it is achieved. It is the principle defined so 
comprehensively at Chalcedon of the hypostatic union of 
the two natures. This union is wrought beyond the limits 
of nature, but involving the natures in perichoretic 
communion. It bridges the chasm between uncreated and 
created nature. The principle of the union is unequivo- 
cally 'above nature'. 
256 It is realized in Christ in a 
unique way. The union of men with God is in function of 
that ineffable hypostasisation which has taken place in 
Christ and it is revealed primarily in the mystery of 
&YcAi poured into human hearts by the Holy Spirit, 
ensuring that men become 'sons in the Son' and so capable 
of a union with God analogous to that achieved by the 
Logos made flesh, when He 'appeared on our behalf, as it 
257 
is written, before the face of the God and Father as man'. 
The union here does not take place in terms of %6yoc , 
because there is not any common X6yoG in terms of which 
God and His creatures can be grasped. 
258 So it must take 
place in the order of ¶pftoc 
saying that it must take place 
. This is another way of 
o äYäx-nr. . 
259 In this 
way the foreordained union of man with God is accomplished 
in Christ and thus man attains to God 'as the end of the 
movement of moved beings, and the firm and stable repose 
of the things which are borne to Him, the End of every 
end and rule and law, of reason and intelligence and 
nature and the infinite boundless and unlimited limit'. 
260 
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Mediation Effected in the Church by the Spirit 
For Maximus, the divine Counsel intends the X VWOLC 
with a view to the divinisation of man. 
261 As we have 
seen, the x¬vwoLc is the divine adaptation of the 
original intention that the union of God and man should 
take place through the mystery of the Incarnation. 
Because of the failure of man to live according to the 
%6yos of his nature and to accept the invitation to 
become a son of God, the Logos took our nature in his 
Mother's womb and, in addition to that, the filial 
tip61os which God intended for Adam in the beginning. 
Adam, having voluntarily abandoned the birth from 
the Spirit for divinisation, was condemned to be 
born corporally for corruption.... Undoing in him 
for us the chains of corporal birth, He has given 
us by the voluntary birth according to the Spirit, 
the power to become sons of God in place of being 
sons of th flesh and blood, to us who believe in 
His name. 2°2 
Maximus associates the taking on of the adamic 'rp67or. 
with the baptism of Christ by John: 
He was baptized, entern. voluntarily into 
birth to spiritual filiatfn to suppress the birth 
in keeping with the body. 2°3 
The paradox for Maximus is that it was precisely through 
this voluntary assumption of the cpdnoc of Adam that the 
Logos incarnate wrought our restoration to sonship lost in 
Adam. By contrast, it is the baptism given by Christ that 
effects that restoration. The baptism is bound up with 
faith: the power to become sons of God is given 'to us 
who believe in His name'. It is in this way that the 
divinely intended y6veoLc and Yevviioar. of man are 
recovered and bestowed on man anew, thus reconstituting 
him in the condition which, in the beginning, God willed 
205 
for him: 
In the beginning man came to being ( yPyev'jaOac ) in 
the image of God; added to that he was born (yevvi- 
eývaL ) to the Spirit in accordance with free choice 
and received, besides, the coming to likeness by 
keeping the divine commandment, so that the same man is 
the image ( 7, Xdoµa ) of God by nature and the son of 
God and god because of the Spirit through grace. For 
it was not otherwise possible that created man should 
be able to be son of God and god by divinisation by 
grace, if he were not first of all born of the Spirit 
according to free choice by the power which is in hi 
which moves of itself and is not subject to mastery. 
b4 
The sonship of God conferred on man could not be realized 
without synergy. This is why Maximus emphasizes the 
freedom of man, his divinely endowed aüTcEovoCa , 
265 
which is how God ensures that He is present in the world 
in the way He intended from the beginning in the tri- 
Hypostatic Counsel. 
The x6vwoLr. is, therefore, coterminous with the 
creation of the universe in the divine intensions and 
because of the divine foresight. It is this self- 
emptying in redemptive Incarnation that ensures that 
God's purpose for man is realized. The mystery of the 
btdotiaoas oüvecToc, , 
266 
with its actualization in 
synergic perichoresis, expressed in the history and 
metahistory of Christ, ensures that the cosmic mediations 
originally entrusted to man are achieved. It is obvious 
that the five divisions to be overcome are due to the 
failure of man to realize his hypostatic vocation, to 
move from eZvaL to e? elvau, from image to likeness, 
in a word, because of his failure to accept his vocation 
to divine sonship. 
267 Maximus understands the composition 
of the whole created universe and its relationship to God 
to require hypostasioation. This it acquires in the 
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mystery of the Incarnation by the hypostatic union of the 
divinity and the humanity in the Person of the Logos, 
dav'X3Twc, dbtacpdrwC, &tip6, xrwC, &XwpCarwC , which 
is articulated in the mysteries of the birth, baptism, 
life, death, resurrection and ascension of Christ. In the 
light of these reflections it becomes obvious that the 
Church is prior to creation in the divine pouXA , that 
the creation is conceived as being within the Church 
rather than being the field in which the Church is built, 
so to speak. Maximus thinks of the order of nature as 
being preceded by the intention to divinise in the divine 
Counsel, so that the Economy is not to be thought of as 
within the context of a pre-established natural order, 
even if that order chronologically precedes the Incarna- 
tion. If the Church is the mystery of the synergy of 
the Holy Spirit and man's freedom for sonehip, the 
hypostatic encounter of God and man, the mode of the 
passage of the Mystery into the world and of the world's 
passage into the Mystery, then the Church is the new 
creation, in which the world rises afresh to the freedom 
of filial existence. 'The Church is a spiritual man and 
man is a mystical Church'. 
268 
This shows the philosophical understanding of the 
relationship of the created universe to God in a new light. 
In the Mystagogia Maximus reminds us that God, who has 
created all things and led them into being by His infinite 
power, contains, conducts and circumscribes them; He 
binds them together, both to each other and to Himself, 
both sensibles and intelligibles, by His Providence. In 
maintaining them about Himself 'as cause', principle and 
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end, He binds them to one another by the very power of 
their relation to Himself as principle. It is this 
communal share in existence through the power of God, 
that forms the basis of the unity of creation and 
ultimately that makes them to be like Him. 
269 In this 
context, Maximus emphasizes the causality of God and 
the caused character of creatures; God in relation to 
the work of His hands is understood: 
as the whole appears above the parts, or again, 
as the cause is manifested above this whole, in 
keeping with which the whole itself and the parts 
of the whole naturally have the appearance and the 
being in so far as possessing entirely the cause 
which shines above them, and as the sun eclipses 
the stars in nature and power, so the cause hides 
the existence of the beings in so far as they are 
caused. 270 
Behind this affirmation there is a strong perception of 
the inability of the creature to account for itself and 
so of its demand for the presence of the Cause. This 
call for a reason is stronger in the light of the ensemble 
of creatures, since it is existence itself, and existence 
which is not self-accounting, that binds them together. 
The principle of their 'wholeness', being in the order of 
existence, must be beyond the realm of the created, in 
another order of being: 
for just as the parts proceed from the whole, it is 
likewise from the cause that caused beings have 
their proper being and can be known, that they have 
their dependent particular existence, when, placed 
in relationship with the cause, they are entirely 
qualified, as was said by the act of the power of 
their relation to it. 211 
Garrigues has pointed out that Maximus has here transformed 
the aristotelian metaphysic of the causality of movement 
into a creationist doctrine of the causality of being. 
272 
Maximus is here describing the benefit of natural 
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contemplation. Once the spirit is purified and the work 
of collecting the evidence for God's causality has been 
done, then the point of view from which the creatures are 
contemplated is God himself, the 'whole' in terms of 
which the parts are intelligible, the cause in the light 
of which their being, beginning and end is grasped: 
because being all in all, God who is in an infinite 
measure above everything, will be contemplated 
only by those who are pure in spirit, when the 
intellect, gathering analogically in its contem- 
plation the Adios, of beings, will repose in God 
Himself as cause, principle and end of the produc- 
tion and of the creation of the whole universe gýd 
as the inseparable foundation of its structure. ý. (3 
The existence of created things is obscured in this 
contemplation by comparison with the brilliant obvious- 
ness of the reality of God, the Cause. Man has moved from 
the knowledge of God in creatures to a knowledge of 
creatures in God. It is 'the power of their relation to 
it', 274 the Cause, that qualifies created beings. This 
power has its source in God, not in the creature. It is 
the divine energy, here conceived in terms of causality, 
which is the 'power' of the relation of creatures to their 
Cause; participation is to be accounted for by the 
causality of creative Being. It is the contemplative 
amazement at the gratuitousness of the act of created 
being that discerns the declaration by that being of its 
springing from the Cause and its being caught into the 
teleological sweep of all created things to their End. 
They cannot but be seen to be contained, conducted and 
circumscribed. 
275 
However, while there can be no question of abrogat- 
ing the principles of causality and the grasp of the 
created order as effect, Maximus thinks of that order as 
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provisional, and possibly, in the light of the Econony, as 
the order of the world during the interval between the Fall 
of man and the Incarnation. 
276 It was the divine intention 
that the whole of creation should be united to God, not 
merely as the effect of His omnipotent efficiency and as 
that which is drawn by His limitless finality in a process 
of %pöoöos and 1ict, ctipocpij , but that it should be 
united to Him hypostatically as well. This is brilliantly 
obvious in the fact that the Incarnation is the primary 
object of the divine ßou? Aj . It has been realized in 
its irreplaceable principle in the Logos incarnate; it 
is made effective in the world through the communication 
to man of His hypostatic presence through the action of 
the Holy Spirit in the Church, a presence that ensures 
that God is in the world in synergy with man and that man 
becomes, in the iconic Church, the icon of God. 
The Holy Church is therefore an icon of God, in so 
far as it accomplishes the same union as God among 
the believers. No matter how different they may 
be by their properties, and their differences of 
places and modes of life, beings find themselves 
unified in it by the faith. God accomplishes this 
union naturally Himself with regard to the essences 
of beings without confusing them, in making to be 
silent and in rendering the same what there is of 
difference among them, as was shown, by their 
relatQn and union with Him, cause, principle and 
end. 2 
The Church is icon of God in that it is the mode of His 
hypostatic presence in the world and the point of inter- 
section between the divine and human energies. Man is 
introduced into that mystery through faith, received in 
conjunction with baptism, so that he is in a new relation- 
ship with God and his fellow-men. The constitutive 
causality of God is complemented by His hypostatic 
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presence with its implications of synergy and perichoresis 
in the joyful dance of a cosmic liturgy. That divine 
presence is realized through the mystery of the Logos 
Incarnate, extended to men by the action of the Holy 
Spirit, in such a way that they become sons in the Son2? 8 
in Him who has become 'the first-born among many brethren'. 
279 
Although Maximus does not have an elaborate teaching on 
the Eucharist, he is unambiguous about its relevance to 
the life of the Church: 
However, Christ being come, high priest of the good 
things to come, He sacrifices Himself an ineffable 
sacrifice and in addition to His flesh gives His 
blood to those who have the senses of their soul 
exercised by perfection, for distinguishing good and 
evil. 280 
At the end of the Mystagogia he speaks of the reception 
of the Sacrament by which the recipients are made like to 
it. 281 
We have seen already that it is faith that consti- 
tutes the new relationship with God, so that His causal 
presence in the world is complemented by his iconic 
presence in the Church through the sons in His Son, 
generated by the Holy Spirit in baptism and sustained in 
sonship by the mutuality of their action with the same 
Holy Spirit. Maximus visualises man's present life as 
progress from one incorruptibility to another: 
Baptized in Christ by the Spirit, we have received 
the first incorruptibility of the flesh; we await 
the final incorruptibility according to Christ in 
the Spirit. This takes place by keeping immaculate 
the first incorruptibility by a voluntary gift of 
good works and by the death that is entered 
deliberately, incorruptibility by which none of 
those who have acquired it lose the benefits they 
have acquired. 282 
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This means that man lives in hope, while he accepts the 
death, that has been transformed by Christ, by voluntary 
mortification. 
283 Maximus understands the actualisation 
of the hypostatic renewal of man to take place through 
his identification with the mystery of Christ, so that 
the process of divintsation cannot dispense with a share 
in Christ's sufferings. Since xguwaLr. is ordered to 
6EwoL4 69wßLr, requires a deliberate entry into 
xevwoaS : 
Already consummated in Christ, the world above must 
be consummated in those who come afterwards, behind 
Christ, when they too will be planted in the 
Resurrection, those who have already become by 
their sufferings in the likeness of his death. 284 
It is above all through dy&ui that x9vwoLr. will issue 
in O woLC for mankind, renewed in the mystery Christ 
by the Holy Spirit. It is thus that man freely wills what 
God wills primordially in the mystery of His Trinitarian 
Counsel, namely, that man should be united to God and 
through him God should be united to the whole of His 
creation. 
For the Spirit does not engender a yvwprj that is 
not willing, but models it end wed with willingness 
with a view to divinisation. 285 
Charity is the fulfilment of faith and hope. It 
embraces entirely the entire supremely Desirable One 
and makes to rest in Him the movement towards Him of 
faith and hope. For faith in His existence and hope 
in His coming, it ubstitutes by itself the enjoyment 
of His presence. 28° 
It has been said aptly of Maximus' view of the process of 
the making of a Christian that 'we must not forget that 
the habitue of grace which man receives from the humanity 
of Christ is nothing else than the created imprint which 
the hypostatic mode of the Son of God, who has enhyposta- 
sized it, has sealed on it'. 287 
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Christ is the Head of the Church by reason of His 
humanity. Having then the Spirit by nature, as God, 
He has given to the Church the energies of the Spirit. 
For me the Logos has become man and for me He has 
wrought the whole of salvation. In taking that which 
is of my nature, He has given to me in exchange that 
which belongs to Him by nature. It is why he became 
man. He has accomplished the manifestation of what is 
proper to Him in that He accepts it for me. He 
reckons as His own, in being a Lover of men, the grace 
which is for me and He ascribes to me His natural 
power of the virtues. Because of this, even now He is 
said to accept what is His eternally and supernaturally 
by nature. 288 
He is, as man, always receiving the Spirit which, as God, 
He gives. 
289 This He does for us. We are enabled to 
participate in the filial rpdror. that is proper to His 
humanity because of the energies of the Spirit that He 
has, received as man and Whom He communicates to us. 
The process of hypostasisation is central to Maximus' 
understanding of the recreation of man in the Economy. It 
depends on 'a created disposition to act with a view to 
the birth of virtue, by the grace of Him who is good by 
nature'. 
290 Maximus considers that this disposition is 
something primarily proper to Christ, which belongs to Him 
in virtue of the Hypostatic Union : 
By charity, the Author Himself of nature - something 
fearful to see and hear about - has put on our nature 
and, without change, united it to Himself by way of 
the hypostasis to arrest its conduct and bring it 
back to Him, pulled together in itself and no longer 
having in itself a difference of free-will with 
regard to Him. He has brought to light the most 
glorious way of charity which is truly divine and 
divinising, since it leads to God and which is even 
said to be God. This way which, in the beginning, 
the thistles of passionate self-love had hidden, by 
His sufferings for us He has first of all impressed 
on Himself and given it by grace to all who are free 
from obstacles. 300 
'Ay vi is the actualisation of the Hypostatic Union in 
the life of Christ here seen in His Kenotic obedience. 
It is his rpd, xoC kQpaewC 
301 
and requires for its 
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actualisation those 'energies of the Spirit' which He has 
released first of all in His own humanity and which, as 
Maximus assures us, 'He has given to the Church'. 
302 In 
giving us 'what belongs to Him by nature ', 
303 the Holy 
Spirit, He gives us the One which pours out this 
divinising äYäxTj in our hearts. In this way He imprints 
on us the ¶p61or. that is proper to His own humanity. 
Since this is a 'created disposition' it is the effect of 
the causality of God, but it is a causality that is 
exercised in a way proper to man alone, giving him that 
'c. eov tii, which entitles him to be called a son of God 
and to inherit the Kingdom of Heaven. When God, through 
His energy, has caused this operative disposition to take 
root in man, he is then prepared to engage in the human- 
divine synergy proper to a son of God and to allow God to 
be present and active in the world in a new way, bringing 
into being that union of God and man-and through_nan of 
the universe, willed by God in His eternal ßovXi5 . 
This intentional presence of God, of the Known in the 
knower and of the Beloved in the lover is peculiar to man 
graced with a participation in the mode of existence 
proper to the Logos Incarnate. Man cannot become the Son 
of God in the flesh, but because of the imprint of the 
'pöxos of the Son, he can live His life in a personal 
way : 
The most holy and venerable invocation of the great 
and blessed God the Father (in the liturgical use of 
the Our Father) is a symbol of the really existing 
and hypostatic filial adoption, granted by the gift 
of the grace of the Holy Spirit : by means of this 
every human particularity is overcome and covered i2p 
by the coming of grace and all the saints will be 
called and will be sons of God, who from now on will 
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illumine themselves with the divine beauty of odnese 
splendidly and gloriously by means of virtue. 3U4 
It is this above all that will ensure that man follows 
Christ 'upon the ascent of divine realities to the Father 
of lights'. 
305 
Garrigues insists that 'in centring the divinisation 
on the habitus of charity, Maximus has not impoverished 
the realism of divinisation: intentional being is not 
less real than entitative being; it constitutes simply 
the mode of participation proper to the liberty of a 
person, the only one which would be hypostatic'. 
306 By 
the entry of the eternal Logos into the 'organized 
movement' of our nature the twofold dislocation, which 
characterized man's existence since the Fall, was 
rectified in principle. The dislocation of the relation- 
ship between man and the Logos was set right when the 
Logos became man; this in turn ensured that there would 
be no longer a destructive tension between man's will and 
his nature because the human will of Christ was in perfect 
harmony with the principle of human nature, which embodied 
His eternal will as God. There could not be inconsistency 
between a divine will and a human will enhypostasised in 
the same Person. Obedience, even unto death, would 
express the äyc that expresses His filial 'pö or. 
as man. It is the communication of this divine gift to 
man that ensures that he becomes a son in the Son and 
enters into the work of mediation performed by the Logos 
Incarnate, that he can undo in turn the twofold dislocation 
in himself and accept his vocation to work with God the 
final union envisaged in the eternal Counsel. Man can 
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again enhypostasize the whole universe in the filial 
tip6, xo4; , by means of the cosmic syntheses through his 
union of love with God. While the thesis of Garrgues 
about the imprint of the Tp6noc of the Son on the sons 
is impressive, it also highlights the apophatic character 
of this dimension of human being. Granting that it is a 
useful way of speaking about divinisation, since the 
Fathers normally discuss this from the point of view of 
its actualisation in a life lived, yet it does not link 
man's basic capacity for being a possessor of divine 
nature in participation, his hypostasis to the Logos. 
The uniqueness of hypostasis constitutes a special 
difficulty with regard to the question of participation. 
How can one participate in a principle of uniqueness? 
Yet the fact that Maximus understands us to have been 
conceived as 'sons in the Son' in the original divine 
plan would seem to point to a fundamental relationship 
to the Son as Son. This would mean that since it was 
God's intention from the beginning that we should be 
'sons in the Son', it is not improbable that He gave us 
the basis for sonship, not merely as nature, the 
capacity for organized movement in synergy with the 
Logos, but also that He willed that our role of being 
possessors of that nature should be an extension of His 
filial character too. This is a way of saying that the 
capacity to be released into the freedom of sonship by 
the action of the Holy Spirit would seem to presume an 
ontological ground and that this is a mysterious share 
in the personal uniqueness of the eternal Son that is 
more basic than an intentional participation. We shall 
run into this problem again in our examination of the 
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main parts of the Pater Noster. 
In the first five chapters of the Mystagogia Maximus 
takes up again the question of the divisions and he 
expounds his understanding of how they are to be solved 
in synthesis. Chapter One deals with the synthesis of 
Uncreated and created, chapter two with the sensibles and 
the intelligibles, chapter three with heaven and earth. 
Chapters four and five do not deal with the divisions of 
inhabited earth and paradise and of male and female, but 
show the work of synthesis in terms of psychological 
anthropology, with chapter four comparing the Church to a 
man analysed as body, soul and spirit, while chapter five 
is concerned with the 'reduction of the ten to unity', 
that is with the synthesis of the powers of the soul. In 
his splendid study, Le Monde et 1'Eglise, Riou has 
demonstrated how the primary concern of Maximus in these 
chapters is the Church as the -zp6r-oC of the free union 
of His creatures with God 'from the boundaries of 
creation to the depth of the human heart'. 
307 He sees it 
as 'the great matrix which restores creation, in all its 
levels, to the play of love of the cosmic liturgy'. 
308 
Man can enjoy his predestined role when he is divinized 
in the unconfused union of the soul with God: 
On the blessed and most holy couch of God is 
accomplished this redoubtable mystery of the unity 
beyond intellect and reason, mystery by which God 
with the Church, the soul, and the soul with God, 
become one only flesh and one spirit... For 'they 
will be two in one flesh and this mystery is great; 
I speak of Christ and the Church', says the divine 
Apostle; he adds: 'He who adheres to the Lord is 
only one Spirit'. 309 
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Maximus then goes on to say that this divinising union 
enables man to grasp the unity of the creatures in the 
Logos. In synergy, man can be brought back to God by the 
X6yoL , which, in his fallenness, lured him down the 
roads of division: 
The soul therefore having arrived at this simplicity 
and being thus recollected in itself and in God, 
there is not, as far as one can divine, the reason 
for dividing it in many parts, that which is crowned 
as a head by the first, only, unique Logos and God; 
in Him, who is the artisan and creator of beings, in 
a unique and incomprehensible simplicity under one 
form, all the ? u5yo i. of beings have being and 
hypostasis. Fixing its regard on Him, who is not 
outside it, entirely in it entire, it will understand, 
even it, having been espoused by God the Logos, by a 
simple elan _the 
X6ToI and the cause of beings, 
through which, perhaps, it has gone away by the roads 
of division; it which through them is carried in a 
saving and harmonious manner towards Him, who contains 
and creates every Xdyoc and cause. 310 
Because man has regained his personal existence and 
function, not only does the rest of creation bring him to 
God, but in doing so, it regains too the fulness of its 
purpose in the divine Counsel. Not alone is man himself 
synthesized in his soul and body because of the recovery 
of hypostatic being, but the world too is now unified in 
unconfused perichoresis. By becoming in the Church the 
iconic presence of God in the world, man is able to bring 
the universe to its true destiny. As Riou points out, 
while there is nothing original in comparing man to the 
world, it is new to root the comparison in the mystery of 
hypostasis and thus centre it in the unifying and synthe- 
sising vocation of the new man, enhypostasised in the 
Logos : 
As the soul is in the body, the intelligible is in 
the sensible, and the sensible is combined with the 
intelligible as the body with the soul. From the 
. 
two there is only one world, just as from soul and 
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body there is only one man. Neither of those which 
have arisen together in the union, either denies or 
repels the other because of the law of Him who has 
bound them together. According to this law, there 
was sown in them a Xdyoc of unifying power, which 
does not permit that the identity in the union 
according to hypostasis should be ignored because of 
the natural differences, nor that the property 
circumscribing each of them in itself should appear 
more powerful, causing distance and fragmentation, 
than the loving affinity, mystically inserted into 
them by the union. 311 
Here we find that Maximus elaborates his view, put forward 
in Ambigua 41, that 'the whole creation is one, just like 
another man', 
312 
except that here the hypostatic principle, 
which accounts for the unity, is mentioned explicitly. In 
fact. in the Mystagogia, the anthropological model is 
uppermost in his mind, in his understanding of the whole 
of the divine plan. 
In Ambigua 33 we have a magnificent passage outlining 
the three-fold incarnation of the Logos in creation, in 
scripture and in the hypostatic Union: 
The Logos is said by the inspired teacher to be 
condensed, in this sense, I think, either that the 
Logos, being simple and without a body, nourishing 
spiritually in an orderly manner all the divine 
powers in heaven, deigned even by His incarnate 
presence from us, for us, like us apart from sin, 
to be condensed and to suitably reveal doctrine to 
us by words and examples about things secret and 
surpassing the power of every word... or that 
hiding Himself mysteriously for us in the inner 
X6yoc, of things that are, He is signified 
analogously through each of the visible things as 
if through some written characters, totally present 
in each one in His plenitude and complete in each of 
them, totally and not diminished, He who is undiffer- 
entiated and eternally identical in the different 
things, the One who is simple and without composition 
in the composite things and the One without principle 
in the things dependent on a principle and He who is 
invisible in the visible things and He who is 
intangible in the tangible things, or for us who are 
slow to understand He was embodied for our sakes and 
endured being expressed in letters, syllables and 
sounds, so that from all these He might gather to 
Himself, after a little while, us who follow Him, 
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made one in spirit and that He might lead im to the 
simple unconditioned idea about Him, so drawing us 
together to union with Him to the extent that He 
himself, by reason of his condescension, differentiated 
Himself for us. 313 
We have to content ourselves with remarking that the three- 
fold embodiment of the Logos, a teaching derived from 
Origen, 314 is still markedly gnostic in its conception 
here. The Logos transcends the embodiments: He is 
simple and without a body; capable of being totally 
present in each of the expressions; undifferentiated and 
eternally identical; simple and without composition; 
without principle; invisible; intangible. These are 
predicates of the divine Logos and He is presented 
primarily as one to be known in the variety of his 
expressions. Maximus might even be interpreted as 
describing the phenomenal manifestation of a Platonic 
Idea. But we know that concrete reality is, for him, 
hypostatic. He substitutes for the philosophical concept 
of essence: 'a reality in itself necessitating nothing 
else in order to exist', 
315 
where the quid est and the 
quod eat are identical, that of the Fathers: 'a natural 
entity proper to numerous and different hypostases'. 
316 
Nor must this substitution be thought of as a preference 
of Aristotle to Plato. 'The hypostasis is, according to 
the philosophers, an essence with characteristics; for 
the Fathers, it is each man in particular as distinct 
from other men'. 
317 As Meyendorff says, the hypostasis 
is here presented as 'the concrete sourse of existence'. 
318 
It is the irreducible centre that determines the 'mode of 
existence' or 'movement' of nature. 
319 A new reality has 
been introduced as primary and basic and totally 
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irreducible to nature. Maximus is here content to draw 
our attention to its non-essential character by limiting 
himself to a denotative definition: 'each man in 
particular'. We have seen already how this mysterious 
dimension of human being is released and restored by the 
play of agape, so that we are not surprised to find 
Maximus in the Mystagogia presenting the teaching on the 
three-fold Incarnation of the Word in a personalistic way, 
rooted in the grace of the Holy Spirit: 
If anyone, therefore, desires to live and have a 
logos beloved of God and agreeable to God, let him 
esteem the better and more honourable dimensions of 
these three men, I mean the world and Holy Scripture 
and him who is one of us. And, in so far as he can, 
let him have care of the soul, which is immortal and 
divine and vivified by virtue, and let him despise 
the flesh, which is subject to corruption and death 
and capable of corrupting the neglected dignity of 
the soul. 'The corruptible body' in fact, it says 
'weighs down the soul and the unquiet mind oppresses 
the earthly tabernacle' (Wis. 9.15). And again: 
'The flesh has desires against the spirit and the 
spirit against the flesh' (Gal. 5.17). And then: 
'He who has sown in his own flesh, from the flesh he 
will reap corruption' (Gal. 6.8). On the contrary, 
let him struggle towards the incorporeal and 
spiritual powers with his intellect by thought, 
setting aside present and visible matters. 'The 
things that are visible', it says, 'are temporal; 
those which are invisible are eternal (2 Cor. 4.18), 
in which, through the fullness of the habit of peace, 
God reposes. And let him rise to the Holy Spirit, he 
who, by a wise meditation on sacred Scripture, has 
surpassed the letter. In Him is the fullness of 
benefits and 'the hidden treasures of knowledge and 
wisdom' (Col. 3.2). If anyone will be shown to be 
interiorly worthy of these things, he will find God 
himself impressed on the tablets of the heart through 
the grace in his spirit, seeing as in a mirror 'the 
glory of God in the unveiled face' (2 Cor. 3.18), by 
the removal of the veil of the letter. 320 
Because of the strength of his hypostatic vision Maximus 
can take hold of the Origenist triad, µovA , xCviioLS , 
Y6u, £0LC , now rectified as y veaLC, xCvrocc and 
d't6oLS 
321 
and show how mans destiny is stabilized by 
enhypostasisation in the Mystery of Christ. He tells us 
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that the principle of the origin of rational beings 
comprises the X6ioc of being, well-being and over-being; 
the first is given to beings by essence, the second by 
free choice in that they are capable of self-movement, the 
third is given by grace. He then introduces another triad 
to incorporate another philosophical tradition: the first 
has to do with the power, the second with the act and the 
third with repoas. 
322 In Ambigua 42 we find him integrat- 
ing these categories into the mystery of the Incarnation 
in which the three-fold birth of man is seen to attain its 
predestined purpose and man finds his beginning in his 
end: 
By his Incarnation our lord and God has honoured our 
three-fold birth, that is to say in general the 
modes of our genesis to being, to well-being and to 
ever-being: the first birth is from bodies (which 
is one from two at the same time by the simultaneous 
co-existence of the parts, body and soul, a co- 
existence that is divided in two because of the 
distinct mode of each of the genesises) according to 
which we receive being, the second birth from baptism 
according to which we receive abundantly well-being, 
the third birth from the resurrection according to 
which we are transformed by grace with a view to 
ever-being. 323 
From this examination of mediation that is comple- 
mented by teaching on the Holy Spirit and the Church, we 
can presume that a maximian spirituality will bear 
predictable well marked traits. If for Maximus the filial 
'vpd&oc of the Incarnate Logos is imprinted on man by 
the energy of the Holy Spirit in the mystery of the Church, 
then his spirituality is bound to be christological, 
pneumatological and ecclesial. Although we have chosen 
to concentrate on its christological dimension in this 
thesis, the foregoing outline should show that this would 
be largely unintelligible without the other two 
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dimensions since it is obvious that the chrintological 
considerations of Maximus spill over into pneumatological 
and ecclesial concepts. A spirituality of faith, hope 
and charity must be seen in the perspectives of the 
mystery of Christ, the Holy Spirit and the Church. We 
can now proceed to some enquiry into the chrietological 
and anthropological ideas of the main parts of the 
Pater Noster. 
The Seven Mysteries 
Here we shall accept the divisions of the Main 
Commentary, which is Part II in our structural analysis 
of the Pater Noster. 30 This means that we shall treat 
the Invocation and the first two petitions of the 'Our 
Father', together with the first and second mysteries of 
Maximus' commentary as given in Parts I and III, under 
Part II(a): Theology and Sonship grace. Under Part 
II(b) we shall treat Maximus' commentary on the third 
petition of the 'Our Father', and incorporate the 
parallel handling of these themes in Part 1,3 and Part 
III93: Equality of honour with the angels. The fourth 
petition will be commented on under Part II(c) together 
with the cognate passages from Part 1,4 and Part 111,4: 
Participation in divine life. Under Part II(d) we shall 
see the exegesis of the fifth petition and include the 
commentary given in Part 195 and Part III95: Restoration 
of nature to itself.. The sixth and seventh petitions of 
the 'Our Father' will be handled together under Part 
Vide APPENDIX III (v) and (viii) for the relation- 
ship of the petitions to the maximian 'mysteries' 
and the relationship of the parts of the Commentary to each other. 
223 
II(e), paralleled by Part 1,6,7 and Part 111,6,7: 
Purification from the 'law of ein' and abolition of the 
tyranny of the Evil One. 
(i) Theology and Sonship by grace 
In this section we find Maximus dealing with 
Theology and the adoption of man into filial relation- 
ship with God through grace. For him, as for his great 
predecessors, the circumincession of the three equal but 
distinct Persons constitutes the mysterious life of the 
Holy Trinity. Although this life is revealed to men, it 
remains wrapped in obscurity; even the Incarnate Logos, 
through whom the revelation comes is Himself incompre- 
hensible except to the Father and the Holy Spirit. 
324 
The mystery of the divine life is extended to man in the 
grace of adoption. This too is the effect of the 
Incarnation, the ground of our becoming the brethren Of 
whom He is the firstborn. He is the author and the 
model of this filial life, which is made possible by the 
gift of 7'PocCPSGLC through which we can distinguish 
in man the process of Yevv'9oLc from that of Y6vCQLC- 
Birth as son of God implies the glorious freedom which 
is the birthright of a son. 
The first and most obvious comment to be made is 
that the Logos is the subject of all the sentences in 
Part 1,325 so that grammatically we are left in no doubt 
but that the Logos is meant to dominate not only this 
section but the whole treatise which holds true even when 
some anthropological aspects of Maximus' thought are 
given a more complete elaboration. Without more ado it 
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can then be said that A6yoc is the synthetic principle 
of this section and this will provide an immediate bond 
with Part II326 where we shall see that %6(oC is the 
source of the unity of the thought there. Here the 
A6To4; is presented as the source of the seven mysteries 
conferred on man so that man's being and destiny are 
totally bound up with the A6yog and without Him man is 
for Maximus unintelligible. Christology is the key to 
maximian anthropology and the inextricable quality of the 
treatment of these themes is meant to be a, reflection of 
their ontological coherence. This finds its explanation 
in the mystery of the Incarnation where humanity and 
divinity are united in Christ with the qualifications 
spelt out so firmly by Chalcedon, principles in fact that 
operate at the very foundation of Maximus' system, 
explanatory not only of the mystery of the Incarnation 
but as we have seen, of the whole relationship of 
creation to God. 
Part 1,1.2.327 
We are not surprised then to find that the Logos 
teaches theology ( ecoXoyCa) ! Maximus is here 
concerned with the mystery of the Blessed Trinity in so 
far as it is communicated to man through Christ. The 
mystery is first presented to us as OEoXoyCa , so that 
the mystery of the Trinity itself is thought of here in 
an anthropological context, in so far as it is communi- 
cated to man, so that we do not find an abstract treat- 
ment of the mystery but sufficient elaboration to enable 
us to identify Christ the Logos Incarnate as One of the 
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Three in One, who puts on humanity by hypostatic union. 
It is the very being and life of the Incarnate Word that 
is presented to us as revelatory of the mystery of the 
Trinity because he remains gvv-ovc and WY, in His 
incarnation, with the Father and the Spirit approving and 
co-operating respectively, even if it is the person of 
the Word himself who effects the Incarnation in the sense 
that it is He, and not the other two persons, who becomes 
man. The inseparability of the Persons in the mystery of 
the immanent Trinity ensures that they are manifested in 
the mystery of the Incarnation ( aäpxwoac) of the Logos, 
that the economic Trinity is brought to our attention 
because it enters our life through Christ. The distinct- 
ness of the persons is emphasized by the use of their 
hypostatic names while their perichoresis is equally 
stressed in the epithets applied to the Logos: EvvovC 
and ? wv where voüc is a way of designating the Father 
and rwA the Spirit in so far as they comprehend or even 
penetrate ( xwpovµero(; ) the Logos by being said to be 
in him and in some way His being alive. We should note 
too that they are said to be in Him entirely ( ovoLwÖic ) 
substantially and that He is comprehended by them xmT' 
oZoi: av This refers to the substance and nature of 
God so that the coinherence and mutual indwelling of the 
three persons, while it is in the personal realm, is 
required by their equally possessing the same godhead. 
This must have bearing on what is to follow where Maximus 
is so concerned with the question of unity so that he is 
adumbrating in the very being of God the principle of 
unity; the divine otoCa which will finds its created 
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counterpart in the cpi5o , r. shared by men, and which has 
to be restored to its proper place and function in the life 
of men. The revelation of the Father and the Spirit in the 
Logos incarnate is significant for man because he becomes 
'son' and shares in divine life; man participating in the 
Logos will be analogously evvovs and rww . Finally, 
pLAavepwr'ta is thrown into relief here. It is given as 
the ultimate reason for the Hypostatic Union on which 
depends the whole possibility of the manifestation of the 
Trinity implied in Öx n3C ,a manifestation that is 
meant to enable man to realize the implications of the 
mystery into which he has been drawn by the love of God 
expressed in the personal love of the Logos, who enters 
into the human condition to communicate the life of God 
to man. 
In Part 1,2, Theology and Sonship by grace are 
treated concurrently so that thematically they are 
correlatives, the self communication of God being 
realized in filial adoption which the Logos effects. 
This section falls easily into two complementary parts: 
the theme of utoOccCa which is referred to as 
XdpLS , xdXXos, 9e6Trrt; os and the theme of 
-ApoaCpcoic explicated in the notions of cherishing, 
adorning and laying claim to. It is the Logos who confers 
the grace of sonship as we have noted. He is personally 
responsible for man's being endowed with this gift. The 
gratuitousness is underlined by !v Xcip vcL . The 'birth 
from above' which results in vtoecoCa is related to 
the logos and it is said to transcend nature. Since the 
Fathers saw human sonship of God in the personal order 
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Maximus is reminding us here that man has a twofold 
relationship to the Logos : that of kdoTao . to 
`Y; 6cTaot, C and that of the objective coincidence of 
the energy of the Logos and of man in nature or 9vaLc 
By breaking his relationship to the Logos in the personal 
order in the Fall, he incapacitated himself for co- 
operating with Him in the order of 95aLc . The 
restoration of man to his pristine condition is said here 
to be Wpp cp 5a v: it is beyond his own capacity to 
achieve; it is too in the hypostatic order so that he 
becomes one on whom God can look as a person in depend- 
ence on the person of His Son: 'He gives sonship' 'from 
above', that is from His own in which man participates by 
the enjoyment of that %Xeov 'zL which he aborted so 
tragically in the Pall. By being restored to personhood 
he is restored to sonship. His rebirth is the birth of 
a son, a Y6VU71OLC . Part of the newness, which 
Maximus does not elaborate here but which is implicit in 
his emphasis on aäpxwoLS , is that the sonship is now 
conferred on man from within the realm of human nature, 
into which the Logos has entered oLä cpt. Xav6pw cCav 
so that human nature can never again be deprived of the 
personal presence of the Logos, now realized as a union 
xa6' b7c6oicatiov : that is part of the implication of 
Iv xäpvr4. 
It is of paramount importance to note here the 
function of the Spirit. It is through the Spirit that 
vi, oeeoCa is given by that birth from above in which 
man emerges as a person. The concept of person here 
should be understood in a dynamic way: it is a process 
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of hypostatic becoming which is expressed in free activity, 
so that the Spirit is introduced as the immediate source of 
the Ev9pyc a that brings about man's sonehip through the 
synergy that requires the exercise of man's freedom. 
Although Maximus does not mention it here, we know from 
elsewhere that the upshot of that synergy is agape, poured 
into man's heart by the Spirit, ensuring that his exercise 
of free-choice is loving. This is brought out in the 
complementary theme of this section: Xcpoatpcoi, C which 
is said to be proper to those born in God, a birth given by 
the Logos through the Spirit and throwing man into a filial 
relationship with the Fether. The dynamic character of 
this sonship and the function of %poaipeaLc in its 
evolution is underlined by attributing to the latter the 
cpvAaxj and rAjplatC of the grace which it cherishes 
with a genuine disposition, by a basically right orienta- 
tion, one might say by a willingness to correspond to the 
grace, a kind of promptitude in man's freedom to accept 
the gift of God which must precede every other vital 
manifestation of the exercise of freedom: the adorning of 
the beauty by the practice of the commandments, which 
provides us with a context in which to see how Maximus 
relates the commandments to the gift of sonship and 
virtuous exercise of freedom: the energizing of the 
commandments by freedom and the reciprocal information of 
the free-choices by the commandments issues in a splendour 
proper to divine filiation; finally it is xpoaCpeßcc 
that lays claim to divinity, the grace of sonship of God 
by an emptying of the passions that are subsequent to 
the Fall and which mar man's being and impede his becoming 
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a person in the true sense, because of the submergence of 
his freedom in self-love, orchestrated in itt, 6vµCa and 
6vp. s and their multifarious expressions. fpoaCpcOL( 
then is here presented as the key to human being from a 
subjective point of view and on it depends entirely, from 
a created point of view, the reception and growth of the 
grace of sonship implanted in man by the Logos through 
the Holy Spirit. 
It should be noted too that Maximus hero introduces 
a favourite theme of his: the roaoV rov - öoov by 
which he expresses his insight into the reciprocity of 
the exchanges implied in the mystery of the Incarnation 
and analogously in the divinization of man. 
328 Here the 
parallelism pivots on the idea of x6vwot, C derived 
from the Epistle to the Philippians. 32 9 There is a 
proportion between the emptying by which the Logos 
emptied himself of his glory in becoming man and the way 
in which man's freedom appropriates divinity by his 
expropriation of the passions which is markedly inverse, 
an appeal to man to set going in himself the process by 
which he is divinized through the Logos having foregone 
the glory proper to Him as God-made-man, by foregoing 
his passionate attachments. This is an exemplification 
of a theme common in Maximus: God becomes man to the 
extent that man becomes god, something modified in this 
particular instance by the historical conditions of the 
x6 i oLs of the Logos's bdýa and the passionate 
character of the terminus a quo proper to man, but it is 
the same principle that is at work here : something 
realized par excellence in the Logos incarnate, to be 
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participated in by those endowed with vi. oOeaCa . 
We should note particularly here the notion of 
ipoaCpcaC4; with its associations and its complementing 
the action of the Holy Spirit. This emphasis throws 
light on the idea of birth and adoptive sonship as some- 
thing dynamic and evolutionary in the thought of Maximus. 
Part II(a) 
In Part II(a)* 330 'Theology' is elaborated as a 
statement about the Three Persons of the Trinity where 
'relationships' are stressed as a significant clue to 
the mystery. The Son is identified with the 'Name' of 
the prayer and the Holy Spirit with the Kingdom. The 
trinitarian context of the whole treatise is emphasized 
in this way and leads us to consider that Maximus wants 
all his subsequent reflections to be related to and 
understood ultimately in terms of what we know of the 
Trinity in its immanence and its economy. We are here 
in the realm of the apophatic and have to tread warily, 
trying not merely to know something of God through His 
revelation, but to establish rigorously how we know, the 
precise kind of knowledge that is available to us and 
the function of differential concepts, based on the 
language of Scripture. We shall see that it is kenosis 
that opens up the inner life of God for Maximus. 
The hallowing of the Name and the coming of the 
Kingdom are given a firm anthropological interpretation 
in terms of A6yoC and 7tpm6tiTjQ . We find %6yoc 
* Vide APPENDIX III(vi) for a schematic presenta- 
tion of this most complex section of the whole 
Pater Nos ter. 
associated here with dt0vpCm and Oui. C . The 
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platonic psychological triad takes on a complex of mean- 
ings that enables Maximus not merely to distinguish 
between faculties of the soul and their disordered use ad 
passions, but %6yoC is transposed from being the innate 
ýYEµovLx& to being the divine Logos, so that the 
establishment of authentic human being will have a 
transcendent reference. The ascetical implications of 
x6yoc are clarified in its relation to ! %t, 6vµCa 
and Bvµ6S so that human integration is thrown into 
relation with the divine order and recognized as a 
hallowing of the Logos. It is not only an immanent 
perfection of man that is at stake, but its implications 
reveal the fundamental role of Logos in creation and 
salvation and the relevance of the %6yoc in the consti- 
tution of man and his development. This is paralleled by 
the introduction of tpa6TTje with its evangelical 
connotations. Gregory of Nyasa had taught that the 
request for the coming of the Kingdom was asking for the 
coming of the Holy Spirit, 
331 
an interpretation which 
Maximus-accepts here. Since the Spirit has promised to 
332 
rest on the meek and humble, therefore 7. pa6tirj,; 
assumes in man's life a function that will be comple- 
mentary to that of Xdyo4; . Dalmais rightly points out 
that in the oeuvre of Maximus rpa&TB6 and &YduB are 
easily identified. 
333 But in the Pater Noster it is 
used especially to emphasize man's dependence on the 
Holy Spirit to become his true self, so that it connotes 
a wise passivity in his relationship with the Holy Spirit: 
'he is meek too, because he realizes that the use of his 
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powers in keeping with nature has been donated to him'. 334 
It is assigned the function of ensuring that the man, who 
possesses it, will enable the Kingdom to come, that is the 
Holy Spirit to act freely in his life. It is tied to 
notions of human freedom, synergy, stability and ultimately 
man's becoming a person. At this stage we can discern the 
play of a polarity in the evolution of man and acknowledge 
that Maximus relates it to the economic intervention of 
the Son and of the Spirit in the life of man. 
The twofold activity of the Son and the Spirit 
produces a conformation to Christ, to elaborate which the 
Pauline quintet is used. 
335 The Incarnation is stressed 
in the abolition of the categories of male and female and 
the other divisions which St. Paul listed. For Maximus, 
male and female represent &4evµCa and 6vµac , 
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so that he provides further elaboration of the influence 
of Christ on the healing of man's passionate malaise. 
The tragedy of man's situation before he is redeemed by 
Christ is that he turns his capacity for God to creatures 
and in doing so inverts right order in himself. This 
abandonment to passionate desire turns him into a 
rapacious aggressor if and when his concupiscence is 
foiled. Man cannot be himself unless these powers, by 
which he was meant to interact with his environment, are 
subjected to X6yoc , so that Maximus insists on the 
need for the reign of Myoc in the life of the 
spiritual man. 'Jew and Greek' takes up the theologi- 
cal theme again and elaborates it. This is paralleled 
by 'circumcision and uncircumcieion', signifying for 
Maximus an attitude to creation consistent with the 
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contrasting theologies of Jew and Greek. 'Barbarian and 
Scythian' symbolise the rifts introduced into nature by 
the abuse of free-will while 'slave and free' testify to 
the tyranny that is consequent on such abuse. Under the 
comments on 'male and female' above, the theme of Elijah 
and his sheepskin is introduced and prefaces significant 
references to the couplet, image and likeness, which is 
used by Maximus to describe the unfolding of nature in 
person and the innovation of nature by person in relation 
to the creative and redemptive action of God. This 
process is described frequently as the development of 
elvat. into &e C ctvaL through Eli cIvai, . In this 
context we have too a refreshing reference to the Mother 
of Gad in the idea of the soul as virgin-mother on the 
model of the Theotokos bringing to birth in personal life 
the logos in each individual man. 
337 The Christian has a 
X6yo4; deiform by yvwoLC and yv4x that chooses 
ape' 
0338 This twofold activity perfects man in his 
twofold potentiality: for truth and for goodness. 
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A, &Yoc is used here as the principle of man's contem- 
plative capacity while Yv4LTI is entrusted with his 
practical perfection. This leaves the way open for 
another use of vo%is to which we shall return below. 
rv4ITI being the faculty of freedom and so that 
through which dyc is poured into nature, is being 
used here to remind us of the counterpointing of X&(oC 
by 'rp6=u in the thought of Maximus. That prepares 
the way for introducing further references to humility 
and meekness and that we have seen is what opens man to 
the personalising action of the Holy Spirit, perfecting 
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in him the life of Christ, who thus becomes 'all in all'340 
This means that 'he is always moved towards God with 
respect to voüC ', 
341 
while he enjoys & OcLm in 
his sense life. His one delight is 'intercourse of the 
soul with the Logos'342 which is the ground of e&woLC 
Maximus may seem here to dismiss the bodily dimension of 
human being in an evagrian way, but he wants to 
emphasize what man must 'seek first'. We know from other 
parts of his works, including the Pater Noster, how 
integral and humane his doctrine is in regard to the 
body. 393 He concludes this section by exhorting his 
readers to purification with a view to hallowing the 
Name by X6yo4; and receiving the Kingdom through 
7cpaöT%, . 
Having seen the principal themes of Part II(a) in 
outline it will now serve our purpose to look at some 
aspects of it more carefully. 
We are told that the Lord initiates men 'into the 
mode of existence' of God, that He is Father, Son and 
Holy Spirit. 344 This initiation is the basis of 
'theology', so that knowledge of the Incarnate Logos is 
an introduction to the inner life of God. Insistence on 
the 'mode of existence' is a reminder that in God the 
one essence is identified hypostatically with the trinity 
of persons. Because of its inaccessible transcendence 
man requires the mystagogia provided by the Incarnate 
Logos. The God who is in some way apparent to His 
creatures through the radiations of His creative energy 
is revealed as a Father with a 'Name' and a King with a 
'Kingdom' in the language of the 'Our Father'. The God 
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of revelation is characterized by the irreducibility of 
the persons to the substance in the godhead; in Him is 
found a mysterious identity of unity and trinity. That 
the Incarnate Logos is not indulging in a merely 
speculative exercise in teaching the 'Our Father' is 
obvious because of the implications of the mystagogia : 
men are to invoke, venerate and adore the One Trinitý45 
They are being invited to enter the life of the Trinity; 
this is 'to honour the Trinity as creative cause of our 
being'. 346 Maximus may be merely saying that 'from the 
beginning' man should pray so, but the text allows us 
to understand that he wants us to begin from the 
Principle in the Trinity, the sourceless Source, the 
Father, when we say 'Our Father'. 
347 It is to the 
Father that man is being led through the Son in the 
Spirit. Therefore even though the Persons, in their 
indivisible distinctness as One God, created and 
redeemed man, man is called to discover them in their 
personal distinctness through his use of the 'Our 
Father' and ultimately by his ascent to the Father with 
the Risen Son. Maximus here confines himself to speak- 
ing of the Trinity in the way formulated after the 
Council of Nicaea. He insists that the Son who is the 
'Name' of the prayer and the Holy Spirit, the 'Kingdom', 
are co-eternal with the Father, that there is no 
question of Origenian subordinationism. He invokes the 
category of 'relationship' to account for the mysteri- 
ous simultaneity of the processions and circumincession 
within God. 
348 The implication is that the personal 
order cannot be deduced from the essential order in God, 
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that the movement of divine life is not subject to the 
limitations of the created order, that man has to bow 
before the apophatic irreducibility of the Persons to 
the divine Essence in the Holy Trinity. In fact, it will 
be seen that this very irreducibility is what makes the 
Incarnation of the Logos intelligible. Maximus is keen 
to root the mystery of the Economy in the mystery of the 
Holy Trinity, prepared to see the temporal missions of 
the Son and the Holy Spirit as in some way an extension 
of their eternal procession in the life of God. 
Maximus returns to the subject of the Trinity when 
he introduces the excerpt from Galatians 3.28: 
'neither Greek nor Jew'. 
349 This provides him with an 
opportunity of elaborating the deficiencies of the 
hellenic and semitic views of God as he understands 
them. He examines the contrasting positions of Greek 
and Jew in the light of the knowledge of the God of 
Christian revelation: One and Three. He criticizes 
the Greeks' failure to appreciate the Unity of God and 
their being seduced by polytheism. He will complement 
this with an unfavourable comment on their consequent 
view of creation, their tendency to divinize its powers. 
He does not honour the views of the Greek philosophers 
with criticism, so that we cannot say how he might have 
found their highest conceptions wanting, except perhaps 
to guess that they would then have been pilloried with 
the Jews for an arid monotheism which was either 
abstract or mono-personal. For Maximus the austere 
monotheism of the Jews fails to make room for Word and 
Spirit and so the life of God is impoverished 
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unspeakably. Their attitude to nature is consonant with 
this severity and so he welcomes the rite of circumcision 
as evidence of an outlook that would fit more comfortably 
the followers of Marcion or Manos. In a series of 
negations he denies to the Trinity the kind of inter- 
personal dependence that created causality would suggest, 
so that it is not a case of one thing in another, one 
thing after another, of universal and particular, one 
thing through another, one thing from another. Because 
'God is identically monad and triad'350 there can be no 
question of attributing to Him the kind of determina- 
tions that would imply something less than perfect 
immutability. But the same is said and understood to be 
truly Unity and Trinity, the former by reason of the 
principle of essence, the latter by reason of the mode 
of existence. The same is entirely Unity without being 
divided by the hypostases; the same is entirely 
Trinity without being confused by the Unity, so that 
polytheism is not introduced by fragmentation, nor 
atheism by confusion. 
351 We have to remember that these 
trinitarian observations, so purely Cappadocian in their 
inspiration, are placed by Maximus between the poles of 
kenosis and theosis which control the entire field of 
his theological reflections in this treatise, so that 
together with confirming the eternal identity of Jesus 
Christ, he wants us to grasp the relationship of Economy 
to Theology and realize that it is the irreducibility of 
the Persons to Nature in God that makes the redemptive 
Incarnation possible. 
238 
It would be difficult to rebut Daimaio' charge that 
Maximus' critique of Jewish monotheism, by faulting them 
for not having attributed Logos and Spirit to God at 
least by appropriation, gives the impression of 
archaism. 
352 Not alone, he thinks, does it not show 
awareness of the riches of the Fourth Century Fathers 
and Cyril, but much less does it show any development in 
the direction of an Augustine. However, what Maximus 
says here may be seen to have some significance within 
the structural limits of his treatise as a whole, some- 
thing to which Dalmais does not advert. Having rejected 
the inadequacies of both Judaic and Hellenic religion, 
he then says that they are not to be found in Christ at 
all, 'but only the conception of true religion, a firm 
law of mystical theology'. 
353 This will eventually be 
seen to be the mystery of Three Persons in One Nature, 
but before going on to that Maximus says, summing up his 
criticism of the Jews 'and Greeks' notion of God: 
That would mean deprived of Logos and Spirit or 
qualified by Logos and Spirit, but then God is 
not worshipped as Intellect, Logos and Spirit. 
It teaches us, who have been introduced to a 
recognition of the truth by the vocation of grace 
through faith, to know the one nature and the 
power of the godhead, that is to say One God, 
contemplated in Father, Son and Holy Spirit. 
That means the unique uncaused substantially 
subsistent Intellect who is the Generator of the 
only Logos, who subsists substantially without 
cause, who is the source of the only eternal Life 
that subsists in a substantial manner as the Holy 
Spirit, a Trinity in Unity and a Unity in Trinity. 354 
Here Maximus distinguishes the Persons of the Trinity as 
NoüC , A6(oc and IIvcU a and again as Noüc,, 
A6yoc; and Zwo . It would be ill-judged to 
attribute this usage to levity in the author; on the 
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contrary, we know already from our examination of his 
structural style of thought and expression how carefully 
he chooses every word. We shall restrict our observa- 
tions to two comments on this passage. Firstly, the use 
of Noür. to express the hypostatic distinction of the 
Father and of Zün to perform a comparable function for 
the Holy Spirit enables us to establish securely that 
when Maximus said that the Incarnate Logos continued to 
be evvovc and Zcuv 9 
355 he was affirming the 
continued perichoresis of the Father and the Spirit in 
the Son, even when the Incarnation had taken place. 
They were present by virtue of their personal character- 
istics and the circumincession that their common identity 
with the one divine nature warrants. It is this that 
underlies the fact that the Father is present as 
ev&oxw". v and the Spirit as avvepyo3v 'in the whole 
Son entirely even made flesh'. 
356 It is impossible to 
identify the Subject of Chrietology without recognizing 
His eternal relationships in the Holy Trinity. It is 
these relationships that validate the Economy as a 
revelation of the inner life of God and make it a 
declaration of q i. XavOpwi Ca . 
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The other observation that may throw some light on 
Maximus's understanding of man in his relation to God 
has to do with the way in which the life of the Holy 
Trinity is described: The Father, described as No 9 
is the generator of the Logos and source of the Life. 
The Life has already been designated as IIveüµa in 
this paragraph, so perhaps we can speak of No, 
A (oc and IlveUga- Zw, j . 
358 If this is the 
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application to the Trinity of an understanding of the 
dynamics of the human person and life then perhaps it 
will tell us something of how Maximus understands that. 
In this whole section, dealing with the hallowing of 
the Name and the coming of the Kingdom, the ideas of 
k6'or. and ipchr are fundamental. The Name io 
hallowed, that is the Logos is hallowed, when %6yo6 
finds its true level in the life of man; this is 
further elaborated by attributing to XoyoC the order- 
ing of man's passionate life: his IXL9vµCa and 
his Ou tö . 
359 This results in d., tä0e t, a , that 
state of harmonious feeling which disposes man to engage 
with God in prayer and virtue. ApadtitC is linked 
with the Kingdom or the Spirit and His coming in the 
life of man in such a way that his freedom is moored to 
the freedom of God. 
360 The evangelical -npafty1c can 
be identified with äYäx-n ; 
361 it is what character- 
izes the son who enjoys freedom because the whole power 
of his soul(life) is moored to the freedom of God. His 
freedom is identified with the divine freedom and so he 
is free indeed, willing what God wills, loving as God 
loves, living in Truth. It is the life of a son of God. 
This coming of the Kingdom is then aligned with the 
restoration of man to his personhood; it squares with 
what Maximus has to say of X6yoc and ¶pd, xoC : 
through the äYä111 which the Spirit pours into man's 
willing soul (%pa6TIc) the X6yoc of his nature is 
innovated and transposed to the level of filial rp koc 
His capacity for being a son, his status as ctxwv 
362 
of God is actualized in dµoCwvLC; 0 This 
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actualisation is not out of relation with the X6yoc, 
CWvoewc of man, made functional in his faculty of 
X6yoC by which he hallows the Name; it is rather the 
making personal of that X6ToC cp$ocwc expressed in 
X6Tos by the action of the Spirit through tpa6'rr)c . 
Tp6, xo6 b%CLpFewc must have an ontological root, as we 
suggested and to which we shall return, but it refers 
too to the mode of life of the subject and that is meant 
to be filial, so that the %6yoc that is energized by 
the Spirit through %pa6TTIc releases the relationship 
of man to the logos not merely in terms of nature, but 
in terms of hypostasis. The A6yoc 'oti ic etvaL 
363 
of man is activated through the gvep(e La, of the 
Spirit, by the coming of the Kingdom. Man is truly alive 
with the personal life of God, the Spirit. 
Obviously, if man's personhood is a participation 
in the Son's, then Myoic should be used to indicate 
the personal element in him. If we become X6yot. , then 
it would be in order to think of us as in some way being 
9vuouS and r. cuw" , but our perichoresis would be only 
analogous to that of the Logos. We become sons by 
becoming persons, by rp6=c innovating X6yos. , so 
that we are XßToL , when X6ioC is personalized by 
the action of the Spirit who makes us like the Logos. 
There must be a root to this which the action of the 
Spirit releases in man as his participation in the Logos 
as hypostasis; he has in him an ontological root that 
vie can designate as X6yo4; käpEcwc and it is this 
which is the personal ground of the exercise of his 
freedom, which is synonymous with Tp&or. kdpýews. 
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If we settle for X6yo6 käpeew4 as our personal 
participation in the Logos, then we might say that man 
becomes evuovc and rar analogously to the peri- 
choresis of the Father and the Spirit in the Logos. 
Their circumincession is not in any way a relinquishing 
of their personal characteristics, but because they are 
identical with the same divine nature, they are 
obviously intimately bound to each other personally, 
giving and receiving a nature with which they are 
identical and doing so in perfect freedom, something 
warranted by the irreducibility of the Persons to the 
Nature in God. 364 When Maximus speaks of 6vvovC in 
this context, he is referring to that personal co- 
inherence and for the purpose of insisting that the 
Three are bound up in creation and redemption, albeit 
according to their personal traits, which enables the 
Son to assume human nature without involving the other 
Persons as He is involved. We might say that They act 
in concert to produce it and that He does so as the 
Term of this trinitarian action, that the humanity 
exists in Him because He subsists in the humanity. Our 
analogous perichoresis would not have to be anything 
more than an assurance that the Three make us to be sons 
and X6yoa kdpEewc and that because our status as 
persons is constituted as a participation of the Son's 
personal character, then the Father and the Spirit must 
indwell us too since participation in his Personal 
character entails the perichoresis of Father and the 
Spirit, that they would indwell us as Persons because 
the perichoresis that obtains in the Trinity is 
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analogously established in man. If we love the Son, - due 
to the action of the Holy Spirit making us to live as He 
does through äiä%j - then the Father will come to us 
and make his abode with us; 
365 
we become temples of the 
366 Holy Spirit, not merely the objects of his hypostasiz- 
ing activity. That action of the Holy Spirit releases 
our X6yog b7cäprewc. and we can enter into the life 
that circulates perichoretically in the Holy Trinity, 
becoming Evvovs I, and 40v . The basis of perichoreois 
cannot be divine nature held in common in our came. But 
the hypostasization that makes us sons in the Son, 
%6yoL in the Logos together with the äY&1 , that 
expresses this and informs our lives, ensures that we are 
caught into the perichoretic life of the Trinity, not 
merely in terms of nature, but as participators of 
divine nature, as persons in relationship to Persons, 
sons who are identified with the Son, who can call God 
Abba and whose life is the fruit of the personal indwell- 
ing of the Holy Spirit. 
once the analogous perichoresis has ensured that 
the Father and the Spirit are within us, then the pers- 
pective can be changed, just as it can in the case of 
Christ. It is as God-man that He is evvovc and ruZ ; 
it is as divinized men that we are gvvovc and 4-ay 
analogously. He is evvovs and ffiv as man because as 
Logos He lives in perichoretic concert with His Father 
and the Spirit. But from the point of view of the 
eternal processions in the Holy Trinity, the Father is 
Nods 
367 
generating the A6yoC. -Son and Source of the 
rý Analogously too, voüs in us can assume 
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a generative and fontal role. It can become the source of 
X6yoc and yvwµ71 tw1j , that from which they flow, that 
through which the divinizing action of God enters the 
being and life of man. We might even dare to say that as 
logically procession precedes perichoresis in the Trinity, 
in the case of man it is perichoresis that establishes 
procession. The mystery of divine life in us can never 
be natural and personal in the way it is in the Holy 
Trinity so that voUQ, ? 6yoc and YV401 can never be 
hypostatic traits in the strict sense, but if we think of 
them as a threefold activity by which we participate in 
the life of God who is not merely Nature but Persons, 
then because it is through vok that we are basically 
open to the divine invasion of our beings, vo{ic assumes 
in the dynamics of the life of grace a role that is 
analogous to the role of the Father-Noun in the Trinit 
ý8 
%6yoS will liken us to the Logos-Son and yvcuµ7j - rwA 
to the Spirit who is understood to be not merely alive in 
the Trinity but life hypostasized, binding the Father and 
the Son. What we cannot afford to suggest is that voüC 
is person. We have suggested that it is where person 
emerges in nature, where nature is innovated in person so 
that it would be where &y&i 11 encounters X6yoC or where 
? 6yoc is enlivened as person. This would give it 
affinity with the 'ground of the soul' or the 'apex of 
soul' or the 'substance of the soul'369 of later formu- 
lations as well as the xapUa. of Scripture. 
370 it 
would also perhaps square with Augustine's memoria. 
371 
If we keep in mind that this is a way of describing 
activities and experience rather than an attempt to 
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provide a faculty-physiognomy of the soul, then if the 
constitution of the XöyoC bnap ewC in act by the 
action of the Spirit can be said to be wrought basically 
in vo'Dr. , then it leaves the XöyoC as man's basic 
personal relationship to the Logos and assigns to the 
Spirit the energizing of the 
releases the X6Yoc gnocwc 
X&roc bxäpFewr. which 
into the order of person, 
there is no reason why voiic cannot be aakd to be where 
this 'takes place' and so to be where X6yoc and 
Yvwµ-r), reassume their functions in a proper way, that 
from which they flow. 
We have translated voUC as 'mind' and as 
'intellect', but we cannot forget that this philosophical 
term acquires new meanings and new associations in the 
theological context of the usage of the Fathers. We 
find it eleven times in the Pater Noster, and while it 
must not be restricted to one sense here, it does seem 
open to the interpretation which we have suggested in 
some places in this work. Apart from the texts which we 
have mentioned it occurs in 876A: 'ask the Lord, the 
teacher of this prayer, to open my mind to the appre- 
hension of the mysteries it contains'; 885D: 'Since 
such promises were for those who love the lord, who then, 
if he gives his mind only to the word of Scripture and if 
he is moved by reason and longs to be a servant of reason 
.... '; 888D: 'The spirit 
is still perfectly master of 
nature, persuading the intellect to forego ethical 
philosophy when it ought to unite itself with the super- 
essential Logos through simple and indivisible contem- 
plation, even if this contributes naturally to the easy 
246 
cutting off and transcending of things fleeting in the 
realm of time'; 893D: 'And in this way he is always 
moved towards God with respect to intellect'; 896C: 
'let the whole intellect strain towards God as if it 
were stretched through a forceful exertion by way of the 
irascible power and on fire with longing though the 
supreme yearning of the concupie cible power'; 896D: 'For 
by imitating the angels in heaven in this way, we shall 
be found to give worship to God in everything and show 
ourselves to have on earth the same kind of citizenship 
as the angels, having, just like them, our intellect in 
its integrity moved to nothing that is inferior to God'; 
897C: 'He gives Himself more to those who have done 
great works, but less to those who have done less of 
them, to each one, however, according as the worth of 
his intellect is capable of receiving'; 901C: 'he 
forgives those who have offended him, not allowing the 
intellect to be impressed by any memory of the fore- 
going injuries'. 
There is not room to comment on these texts in 
extenso, but voüt is obviously the primary openness 
of man's being to the mysteries revealed in the 'Our 
Father'. It is the part of man which above all must be 
kept free from God, so that its capacity must not be 
marred by irregular concern with what is not Gad. It is 
that by which man receives God and the measure of his 
receiving-power is the measure of his vo3« 0 It is 
that through which he is primarily moved towards God. 
It is vovc, that ultimately draws on the energies of the 
soul in its stretching out to and yearning for God; it 
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is where he becomes ecstatic and cleaves to 'the super- 
essential Logos through simple and indivisible contem- 
plation'. Finally, it is what likens man to the angels, 
emphasizing the aspect of his being that is ordered to 
the contemplative glorification of God. 
All of this takes voDc beyond the philosophical 
connotations of 'mind' and 'intellect', even understood 
as man's passive power for conceiving reality intention- 
ally. It describes a depth in man that only God can 
discover and explore. This gives nous a certain primacy 
in the constitution of man and enables us to see how 
Maximus, while he does not organize his thought in this 
area, thinks of it as the source of man's AdyoC and 
Yywµn in their divinized activity. While acknowledging 
that Maximus is more concerned with realities than with 
systems, and recognizing that he draws his language from 
different sources and uses different anthropological 
models with the freedom of a spiritual realist, we can 
see the outline of an anthropology here that is meant to 
help us to understand the life of man as image of God. 
We shall now examine more carefully the place of 
Xöyo(; and *cpa6'r. . After the introduction in 
which the Trinity is taken primarily in its communal 
sense, with emphasis on the godhead and unity, once the 
tri-hypostatic character of God is established, Maximus 
then proceeds to underline the distinctness of the Son 
and the Holy Spirit because of the bearing of that 
distinctness on the being and life of man. We are 
taught to hallow the Name on earth. Here the Son is 
singled out for a peculiar glorification and it is not 
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by a mere declaration that this will be effected, but by 
something more deeply existential, by mortifying the 
desire for material things and purifying the passions of 
concupiscence and aggressiveness, the basic emotions in 
the anthropology of Maximus. 
372 Here q as we noted, 
e, x aeuµta and 6vµ60 are at once faculties and the 
passions they express and more specifically their activity 
as indicative of the fallen state of man. They indicate 
that man has perverted the original intention of God in 
his regard and has plunged into a heedless cult of 
creation, allowing himself to be submerged by creatures 
precisely in that part of himself destined to unite him 
with God. It is the function of X&Yo5 to restore order 
in 17CLftµCa and 6vµdc 9 to draw them back to their 
rightful function in nature, because informed by the 
Xdyoc coewc 
373 which is meant to integrate all 
the faculties and activities proper to itself. That 
principle of the nature, exercises its hegemony over the 
lower faculties through the mediation of the faculty of 
X6yoc . The Fall brought imbalance to man and it is 
the function of Adyor. to restore the lost equilibrium. 
The A6yos that emanates from the Xdyoi: cpßoewC is 
ultimately derived from the Adios in whom the Adyot. 
of all the rationale are to be found. 
374 That is why 
Maximus says that we 'hallow the Name on earth', 
375 
'show ourselves children by our actions'. 
376 We 
glorify the n6yor. when our lives are resplendent with 
the impress of their source, when our conduct shows that 
we are children because of our affinity with the Son, 
'by what we think (vootiµev ) or do (%P&MOµev. ) 0377 
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Besides the Son is here declared to be 'the author of 
adoption'. This throws us back to the earlier passage 
where the Persona of the Trinity were characterised as 
taking part in the Incarnation and Economy in different 
ways, the Son being described as being the 'author' of 
that mystery. 
379 It is definitely the logical element 
in our constitution that is being emphasized here, so 
that it is better to leave the further implications of 
adoption for the intervention of the Holy Spirit. We 
cannot separate XcyoC from 
must become personal X6Yoc 
Tp6 oc, since Acyoc 
; the stability of 
tip6 oc will confirm the innate stability of Xöyoc 
The inextricability of X6roc and -rpö, xoC is brought 
out in the next sentence where we are said to 'hallow 
the Name of the Father by grace by mortifying desire 
( Exi. Ou a)'. 
380 The reference to 'grace' keeps us 
aware of the unfettered benevolence of the Trinity in our 
regard and that this is personally to be found in the 
Father as gracious source, and whose sons it makes us to 
be in the Son by the action of the Holy Spirit. While 
Maximus is dealing explicitly with the logical character 
of our relation to the Son, he does not allow us to over- 
look the intervention of the other two Persons in our 
adoption, each bringing it about in a way that is in 
keeping with His personal attributes analogous to the 
Father delighting in ( svöoxwv ), the Spirit co- 
operating with avvepyoüv the Son effecting 
(avTovprovvti`) the incarnation. 381 This we also do by 
hushing aggresiveness which is not stimulated by 
I%Levµia , that is said to be 'already mortified ýy 
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the holiness that is in keeping with reason (? 6yoc)'0382 
Jdyoc is the principle of the sanctity which enables us 
to sanctify the Name of God. It is the holiness of our 
being that honours the 'Name' since he is the source of 
that holiness. We testify to Him by being like him. 
Then Maximus goes on to indicate the way in which 
the Holy Spirit intervenes in the lives of men. He says 
that 'in those mortified' by the influence of %6yoS 
in their lives, 'the Power of the Kingdom comea'. 
383 
The sequence here is not temporal, but logical: the 
power of the Kingdom cannot come where nature is not 
restored to its integral harmony by the pacification of 
desire in d ccc i. a . The turmoil of a life 
dominated by passion is inconsistent with the reception 
of the Holy Spirit and his gifts. We become temples 
for God through the Spirit by the %OyoG and rpkoc of 
meekness xpa6T-nC . 
384 There is another dimension to 
man's being that is not derived from ?6 oc nor can 
it be reduced to it. It is something sovereign and 
independent, a mode of being. Here Maximus admits that 
meekness has its X6yQc , the essential principle of 
being and intelligibility that gives it place and 
identity in the fabric of created reality. But he 
points out too that it has another side to it, some- 
thing that is not restricted to the field of the 
logical. He takes two images from Scripture to evolve 
his understanding of this twofold aspect of meekness: 
the 'earth'385 and 'rest'. 
386 For him the 'earth' 
means 'the middle position of the universe'387 and so 
it symbolizes stability and immutability that comes 
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through meekness, a stable habit and power. This is 
exemplified by the stability of the impassible man who 
retains his freedom of nature when caught between good 
and ill-repute. He is impervious to inclination, not 
swaying from side to side, but holding to the mean of 
virtue in meekness. There is a significant emphasis in 
the next clause : 'and moored the whole power of the 
soul to the divine and imperturbable liberty'. 
388 This 
is consistent with what we have seen of X6yoC above 
and how it opens the way to the coming of the Kingdom. 
Stability must be established through freedom and if 
that freedom is to be genuine, then it has to take its 
source in divine freedom. Freedom indicates the 
Tpö*xoS side of being; it reveals the personal, it is 
an epiphany of the possibilities of existence that 
cannot be confined to the essential. If nature is to 
achieve its destiny and find an existential stability 
consonant with its X6io4; , then it must be innovated 
in a personal way. Freedom is the basic expression of 
that hypostatic appropriation. It is the way that 
nature is meant to exist. 
The synergic character of that freedom is under- 
lined by the other image take from Scripture, that of 
'rest'. This is not meant to be a static image. 
Maximus has already spoken of the immobility (äx`vncC aj; 
that marks sense desire (kL6vµCa ) when A6yoC 
informs it. But movement is at the very basis of his 
cosmology, linking as it does the primal y vcaLg 
with the final aTcoLC . 
390 Here he gives us insight 
into the kind of movement that he visualises in the 
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hypostatic evolution of man : it is the play of personal 
freedom, which is made possible by the interaction of the 
human and divine freedoms in synergy and which excludes 
the impulsiveness of cgLXav'Ca 
391 taking its rise in 
personal will, just as the waywardness of passion is 
stabilized by ? dyo5 . The primacy of the personal in 
Maximus is in no way a declaration in favour of the 
irrational; it is an act of faith in the primacy of the 
intervention of the divine freedom in our lives, here 
attributed in some special way to the action of the Holy 
Spirit. The idea of man must come to life in the 
freedom of the person interlocking with the freedom of 
the Holy Spirit. 'Rest' is the power (xp& oc) of the 
Kingdom, that is the Spirit, producing in the worthy a 
mastery ( öcwxoticCa) that is freed from all servitude 
(öouket; a) . 
392 'Avd%avoLc, , in the ascetical usage of 
the Fathers, indicates spiritual perfection, the result 
of the practice of virtue and is marked by refreshing 
repose in prayer. 
393 Here we have 'Rest' as the 
paradoxical possibility of human action because of the 
interaction of divine and human freedom. Paradoxically 
again, it gives rise to öeoxo-vcCa ,a word that 
denotes ownership, and here obviously self-possession. 
A man can only give himself to God when he has himself 
to give. Mastery is acquired by submission to the 
mastery of the Spirit and this gives rise to freedom 
from all servitude, not alone from passion, but from 
the caprice of self-will as well as the influence of 
the demons. 
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Humility is now introduced in association with meek- 
ness and we are asked 'who would be so devoid of love and 
entirely without longing for the divine benefits as not 
to desire limitless humility and meekness'? 
394 The 
reason for this is that man might become the imprint of 
the Kingdom (Xapax'r p) This powerful image is 
common in Maximus although he uses b-xoTVxwoLc 
395 
to convey his meaning more often. The Spirit is the 
matrix in which man is formed and again we must not 
think of this in a static way; it is the energetic 
encounter of two personal freedoms so that the person 
is the knot in which are joined two energies: that of 
the Spirit and that of man. Man is what he becomes and 
he becomes what he does because of the way the Spirit 
acts in him. Maximus then goes on to say that the man 
in whom the Kingdom had come 'would bear in himself by 
grace the exact form in spirit of Christ, who is truly 
the great king in essence'. 
396 We do not have to delay 
on the attribution of kingship to Christ. It will 
397 
suffice to refer to his treatment of ö . d. 
floe 
to provide a foundation for the title, even within the 
Trinity. What interests us in this context is that the 
form of Christ is produced in man by grace. The 
participation in ? 6Toc would not be merely a Neo- 
platonic declension of form. Indeed, it is precisely 
to Christ as Person that man is conformed. His parti- 
cipation in the Logos is hypostatic, energized by the 
Spirit in and through his receptivity to the divine 
inpouring of &1 1c1 : Upa6' i disposes him for the 
Kingdom. It binds him to the Logos not merely as 
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nature, but as person, so that his whole being is 
filialized precisely by the coming of the Kingdom of 
Christ in him. This is the force of 'by grace'. 
Part III, 1,2. 
In this final retrospective summary of what Maximus 
has to say about the 'mysteries' of 'theology' and 
'adoptive sonehip', having reminded us that: 
He constitutes us co-worshippers with the angels 
in fulfilment of the Father's will, manifesting 
in a well imitated way, by the conduct of our 
lives, celestial satisfaction, 
he then goes on to say: 
and from there again he is a leader upon the 
ascent of divine realities to the Father of 
lights (Cf. James 1,17) and makes us sharers 
of the divine nature (Cf. 2 Pet. 1,4) by 
participation in the Spirit through grace; 
through this we are given the status of eons 
of God, all of us having within us the entire 
author himself of this grace : the Son of the 
Father by nature, without any limitation and in 
a pure way. From Him, by Him and in Him, we 
have and shall ha being, movement and life 
(Cf. Acts 17,28)8 
The first thing to note is that it is 'Christ' who is 
the subject of this sentence again. He is the author 
of our salvation and divinization given to us in the 
seven 'mysteries' made the object of prayer in the 
'Our Father'. The reference to the 'Father of lights' 
recalls James 1,17 where I 'äca bdat, t &YaOi xaC ßäv 
b(Lpýµa TeXE Lov ävw6ev EoTLv xatiaßaivov decd roV 
IIoTp6s rWv gxfrrCwv '. We recall that in this 
section of his commentary Maximus has reversed the 
order of the 'mysteries' so that we can presume that 
the previous acta are the dycLM or µvo'Ap. a 
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already mentioned, beginning with petitions to be 
delivered from the Evil One and not to be led into 
temptation. The supreme ascent will then be initiation 
into the inner life of the Trinity by which we encounter 
the Father as Father because we are sons in the Son, 
being made sharers in the divine nature by participation 
in the grace of the Spirit. Anthropology here again 
takes on an unequivocal trinitarian character. We 
attain to the Sourceless Source in God, from Whom 
proceeds every uncreated and created gift. It is by 
participation in the grace of the Spirit that we become 
xoLvwvoC of the divine nature, that is personal 
participants in that nature through synergy with the 
Spirit, with whose freedom we interlock in becoming 
persons through His anointing of our being with His 
aycnn It is as persons that we are participating 
sons and it is the Son who brings this about in us 
through the action of the Spirit. Christ is the 
avtiovpyac ; we have seen in Part I, 1, that he is 
described as avtiovpyO V' L adpxwo-LU and here he is 
credited with the sharing of sonship with us because of 
that redemptive incarnation. In fact we are said to be 
identified with Him to the extent of always bearing Him 
about (7cepLxoµCrovti6S ) without limitation and 
defilement ÖCXa %EPLYPac? C xaC &XPd-v'CwC . This 
is further strengthened by attributing to Christ our 
being, movement and life, something claimed for the God 
of his preaching by St. Paul in the Athenian agora. 
Maximus again elaborates the mode of our relation to 
Christ: 'from whom, by whom and in whom' we have these 
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fundamental prerogatives thus sealing in a definitive way 
his affirmation of the indissolubility of christology and 
anthropology. 'The bearing him about' would seem to be a 
gloss on Paul's: 'I live, now not I, Christ lives in met, 
(Gal. 2,20) a matter of belief for all Christians, of 
experience for mystics. The epithets that qualify this 
claim are meant to disarm 'somatic' or 'psychic' objec- 
tions. The mode of the presence is not bound in any way 
nor defined by the limitations of the created order, even 
if it implies the presence of Christ in his humanity to 
his faithful. 'Ax, pcLv rwr. is applied by the Fathers to 
the mode of Christ's generation as Son and his birth as 
son, so that here we are being reminded that his presence 
in us in no way resembles the presence of flesh to flesh, 
much less the presence of sinful flesh to sinful flesh. 
The rp67LoC of Christ's presence is apophatic. In the 
light of what we have seen already of triads used in the 
Main Commentary: voüc, A6yoc , 2: faA we may suggest 
here that r6 etvaL, xLvc aOaa and dtv refer to 
dual., e? i E'Cvac and äeC atvmL , 
399 We are in the 
image of God, growing in his likeness entirely in 
dependence on Christ: 1F. oý xaC ö t. ' o$ xaC lv 
The clvac of the formula in question here can be 
thought to correspond to the atva. of the more familiar 
triad of EIvcLL, Eli cIvaL and &c C cIva, . KCviio 
from the triad y9veOLC, xC efot, S and o'täoi. r. which is 
the ontological terminology that becomes ethical in 
elvaL, e; cIvc and deC eivaL turns up as xt, veioeaL 
and is obviously meant to be understood as e? i elvac . 
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The third member of the triad rv cannot be derived 
from either of these other sets but we have already 
encountered 2ýwij both in the language applied to the 
Persons of the Trinity and, by implication, in man 
where we have found voüc , X6yoG and yvwµn " rvwµn 
or personal will is most obviously related to the Holy 
Spirit, through freedom and ultimately &r i1T which 
would give us an anthropological triad votC , %6yoC 
Yy(4ui ). The Pauline triad, transposed 
here, would then be a way of saying what Maximus has 
been saying in so many different ways : that Christ is 
the source of man's being, his growth in well-being and 
its definitive state of ever-well-being or the fullness 
of life which the Holy Spirit pours into man as &ydxn 
and which stabilizes him in God. The most significant 
aspect of all this in regard to the passage of the 
Pater Noster under consideration is that the being, 
movement and life which characterize the beneficiaries 
of the Word made flesh are derived immediately from Him. 
The text is emphatically Christocentric, but it avoids 
the charge of Christomonism because of the adroit 
references to the Father and the Holy Spirit. 
The Ultimate Source of Christology and Anthropology 
We have seen already that in the theology of St. 
Maximus the world does not have an immanent end, but 
that in the eternal ßovXi of God it was destined to 
be united to Him through the mediation of man, become 
a son in His Son. Maximus sees this realized in the 
xEVwoL4; of the Logos, so that everything that he has 
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to say in this commentary on the 'Our Father' is set in 
the framework of x6VWOLC - 6&oLc . It was only the 
x*ywotc of the Logos that enabled God to enter the 
tragic condition of man and to revive him to his 
vocation to divine sonship. In this way the freedom of 
man was left intact; no external pressure was brought 
to bear on him; salvation would not be effected by the 
violent imposition of a divine nature on a human nature. 
For this reason Maximus would find the traditional 
image of the union of soul and body defective as an 
analogy for the mystery of the redemptive Incarnation 0400 
The Incarnation for him was grace , some thing that 
entirely transcended natural necessity. It was a 
mystery in another dimension of being. In the Incar- 
nation and Redemption the divine nature acts through the 
movement of personal xeVWOLC . It is in this sense 
that the Logos, while not forsaking His divinity nor the 
mysterious perichoresis with the Father and the Spirit 
which is the eternal life of God, can be said to be the 
avtiovpyös 
401 
of the Incarnation. It is in Him alone 
that it is wrought hypostatically. It is His hypostasis 
that enhypostasizes the human being and life of Jesus, 
thus opening to men the new birth as eons of God in the 
Spirit through His obedience unto death, death on a 
cross. The dynamism of the filialized being and life 
and death of Jesus is &Tdxr1 . As Maximus sees it, the 
law of nature and the written law are surpassed and 
perfected by the law of grace : 
402 'For there is no 
greater love than this that a man should lay down his 
life for his friends'. 403 
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Because in Him we find a 
hypostatic subject of human being and life, we find too 
of 
ature ; AYäxTJ a hypostatic transposition of the laws n 9 
is the impress of the hypostasis of the Logos on a 
human freedom enabling His human will to move freely 
from within, preserving the &auy)vTwc , 
ärp6, cTwc 
of Chalcedon not merely in the natures, but in His 
willing and activity as Maximus would have occasion to 
remind the Monothelites and Monenergists in his tire- 
less defence of orthodoxy. 
404 
Maximus' doctrine of the b1doTaot, t 
ovvOe'coC405 enables him to see that the Logos, 
enhypostasizes a human nature by assuming it into His 
personal mode of existence so that the Hypostasis of 
the Son becomes the source and mode of the human 
existence of Jesus. It is the Son who innovates this 
individual human nature by transposing it into His 
filial mode so that the mode of the Economy in the flesh 
is the hypostatic mode of the eternal Logos. The 
individual traits of this human nature express the 
hypostatic uniqueness of the Logos: 
By the things through which He is distinguished 
from the extremes (natures) He showed the identity 
of the parts in the Hypostasis. Therefore Christ 
had the common and the proper of the parts of both 
of which He was composed. The common by reason of 
the identity of nature between the extremes and 
His parts, an identity according to which He keeps 
and saves the difference of the parts among them- 
selves, after the union. The proper by reason of 
the hypostatic union of the parts, in so far as He 
is distinct from the natures, keý$ýng unconfusedly 
His distinction in their regard. 
As Garrigues says so aptly: 'For Maximus, the hypostatic 
union rests on two isomorphic but asymmetrical distinc- 
t 
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tions: the individuation of the human nature in the 
existence of Jesus and the irreducibility of the 
hypostasis of the Son in the divine existence'. 
407 We 
do not have a tertium quid in the mystery of the 
Hypostatic Union, but we know that it is the identical 
Person who makes the divinity His in the mystery of 
the Trinity and who makes the humanity His in the 
mystery of the Incarnation. It is because of this that 
He manifests the Father and leads men reconciled in the 
Spirit to the Father. It is the philanthropic x6vwOLC 
which enablva us to penetrate to the eternal Counsel of 
the Trinity. Because Christ, One of the Three, has 
become the 'Angel of the great Counsel' we can surmise 
why Incarnation has to be rooted in the mystery of the 
Trinity. The created reality of Jesus of Nazareth, 
because it subsists in the eternal Logos, expresses the 
eternal Counsel of the Trinity in man's regard. 'As 
the Father has loved me q so have I loved you, ; 
408 
'having loved his own who were in the world, He loved 
them to the limit' . 
409 The fact of Jesus is a revela- 
tion of the divine philanthropy: 
For the Word rem, 
Intelligence and 
by no one at all 
Father alone and 
hypostatic un yn 
philanthropy. 0 
'ined in possession of his 
of his Life and was comprehended 
in substance except by the 
the Spirit and effected the 
with the flesh because of His 
Just as each of the Persons in the Trinity possesses the 
nature, substance, power and energy of God in a distinc- 
tive way, 
411 
so each of the Persons possesses the 
divine will and ßovXA in regard to man in a charac- 
teristic manner. In the same way the Three Persons 
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were involved in the mystery of the Incarnation accord- 
ing to their hypostatic identities; referring to the 
Father and the Spirit, Maximus says : 'for the formor 
delighted in and the latter co-operated with the Son, 
who Himself effected the Incarnation ( ai'rovpyo{Sv'rt, ) 1 *412 
While the Son alone assumes flesh, the Father and the 
Spirit do not renounce their eternal properties in their 
relationships with the Son; where He is They are; 
where He acts They act. The Son in the flesh can 
embody the eternal Counsel of God the Father because 
the eternal Son makes his own entirely what He receives 
from His Father: His nature, His energy, His will, His 
counsel: 
'The great Counsel of God the Father is the secret 
and unknown mystery of the divine Economy. By 
accomplishing it through the Incarnation, the Only- 
begotten Son has revealed it and has become the 413 Angel of the eternal Counsel of God the Father . 
Maximus does not merely include his trinitarian. 
meditations here to satisfy a need for formal complete- 
ness, to present a comprehensive picture of Christian 
doctrine. The very fact of the x15vo a c, would be 
unintelligible, as he knows, without the mystery of the 
irreducibility of the Persons to the Nature in God. In 
the Pater Noster he insists that in the dominical prayer 
the Lord 'initiates them into the mode of existence of 
the creative Cause of beings', 
414 that is into the 
mystery of that irreducibility, which He goes on to 
account for in terms of relationship: 'For relation- 
ship possesses the power of simultaneously demonstrating 
the terms of which it is and is said to be a relation, 
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without allowing them to be thought of as one subsequent 
to the other'. 
415 Because theology has to rely on human 
language a human logical category has to be invoked to 
try to account for what transcends the order of nature, 
even in God. The co-subsistence and the co-inherence of 
the divine Persons can be intimated, if not explained, 
by insisting that the one nature is identical with 
Three Persons whose distinctness cannot be abstracted 
from their relationship to one another and whose 
character of being Persons cannot be deduced from nor 
reduced to the mystery of the unique divine substance: 
The knowledge which man has of the movement 
according to-which the Monad is a Triad is 
incapable of grasping the simultaneous mani- 
festation in God of His principle of being 
and of the mode of His hypostatic existence. 416 
The incomprehensibility of the trinitarian mystery is 
partly bound up with the inability of man to conceive 
of threeness without opposition of individuals in nature 
and to conceive a unity that does not remove distinctness. 
In God, 'the absolute irreducibility of three persons 
among themselves is not in conflict with the absolute 
uniqueness of the divine nature'. 
417 Maximus uses the 
language of the Cappadocians to account for this trans- 
5/ 
cendence of the mystery and its supreme "apophasy! (' 
lI 
5) 
God is Monad and Triad, comprising, without 
confusion, the unconfused union and the undivided 
and division-less distinction: Monad according 
to the principle of essence, that is to say of 
being, and not by synthesis, assembly or any 
confusion whatever; Triad according to the 
hypostatic mode of existence and not by division, 
by diversity or any kind of partition. For the 
unity is not divided by the persons nor is it in 
them or contemplated in them by relationship; 
nor do the persons come together in unity by 
composition nor fill it by contraction but it 
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itself is in itself the same thing, but in different 
ways. For the Holy Trinity of the hypostases is 
unconfused Monad ih essence according to its 
simple ? 6yoc and the Holy Monad is Trinity in thQ 
hypostases and their mode (tipotoc) of exietence. 418 
It is this mystery of the contrast between the W6yoC 
and rpöxog in God which allows us to grasp in faith 
why One of the Three can assume human nature and also 
to have some idea of why the ärci7.1 that is manifested 
in the redemptive Incarnation is an expression of the 
mysterious possession of one nature by three persons and 
how they communicate to each other the fullness of 
divinity in perfect freedom. As Maximus says God is 
, more than good', 
419 
which is glossed by Garrigues as 
meaning that the life of the Holy Trinity transposes 
hypoetatically the properties of the divine Essence and 
enables God to come in Person as philanthropist and 
messenger of the eternal ßovXij of the Trinity. 
420 
In this way, because of the hypostatic emphasis in 
interpretation, Maximus can find the Trinitarian 
Economy through the xtvwOLC , without that dread of 
implying subordinationism which overshadowed the ologi- 
cal reflection since the Arian controversy. He can 
hold in creative tension the complementary doctrines of 
the consubstantiality of the Three Persons and, like 
the anti Nicene-Fathers, the 'condescension' of the 
Three in their Economy centred on the x¬vcots of the 
eternal Logos. 
421 Christology and anthropology are 
seen to have their ultimate source in the life of the 
Holy Trinity and the Mystery of God's plan to draw men 
into union with Himself in O woLC to be accomplished 
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in the x6vwoi. s of the Logos: 
The voluntary xevwaLc. of God gave rise to the 
Mystery through goodness towards men. But His 
voluntary condescension ( ouyxatiä. paot, c) through 
the flesh was not a falling away from divinity. 
For being immutable, He remained what He was and 
Hebecame what He was not. He preserved what He 
had become, while remaining what He was in the 
beginning for He is a Lover of men. 422 
(ii) Equality of honour with the angels 
Part 1,3.423 
In this section, we find Maximus making use of another 
tradition and seeking to understand salvation as the 
establishment of some kind of parity between man and 
the angels. At the same time he integrates the insights 
of Dionysius the Areopagite to give us a vision of human 
destiny as a vocation to cosmic liturgy. Again it is 
the Incarnate Logos who achieves this by having made 
peace through the blood of His Cross between those in 
heaven and those on earth, by having undone the evil 
spirits, denizens of some vague world between heaven and 
earth, by having formed into one a heavenly choir of men 
and angels and by Ascension having entered definitively 
into the angelic world and thus made way for the entry 
of those He saved in the integrity of their human being, 
body and soul. The use of Adyoc , to make this 
aspect of the Economy intelligible, is to the fore here 
and Maximus employs it with considerable subtlety, 
binding together both Origenian and Dionysian ideas, as 
Dalmais says wittily, in 'a union without confusion'. 
424 
The notion BEX-%ta. occurs here too. It could be 
argued that it does not enter into Maximus' articulation 
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of his understanding of this petition of the 'Our Father' 
and that the term is restricted to its application to the 
Will of the Father. But in the light of his teaching as 
a whole it is reasonable to understand him to refer as 
well to the 06%71µa of men and angels and above all of 
the saving Christ. We have explicit references to the 
distinction between 66XTµm gvatxöv a. ind e xTLµa 
yvwµcx6v in his later works and he acknowledges that 
he got it from 'a venerable monk', who may have been the 
redoubtable Sophronius, who was alorted to the dangers 
of the new thinking as early as 633, and we know that 
Maximus was exercised about these problems from the 
start and so more or less contemporaneously with his 
writing of the Pater Noster. His concern with yv4S .i 
later in the work as pertinent to man's integration, the 
link between yvw'p and &peTA and the function of 
apctiT'I in this section shows his concern with will, 
even granting the nuance of personal modification 
implicit in yvwµrj . In Part 111,3 we find too that 
the language of Maximus can be interpreted to give the 
sense suggested here to OtXTLUa , without doing 
violence to grammar or syntax. The least that can be 
said for thid suggestion is that it squares with the 
developed thought of Maximus on will. The probability 
is that he was aware of this implication of e&Xjjµa 
in this context of the Pater Noster and it is as such 
it is put forward here. 
The overriding concern here is that of unity and 
the principle of that unity is said to be eeýrýµa 
and ? 61os . Again the Logos is credited with having 
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achieved this unity in himself and of communicating it to 
man. We note too that the mysteries of the Incarnate 
Logos are brought to the fore no that there is no question 
of a merely philosophical principle as the ground of this 
unity nor can we predict an a priori unity in his treat- 
ment of this petition but rather it is based on the data 
of revelation and is moulded by them. Already in I, 1, 
we have had reference to His a pxuOLc and to kenotic 
incarnation in 1,2; here we are reminded of His having 
perfected the Economy by fulfilling His human existence 
by the paschal mystery; the Cross is mentioned, the 
Resurrection is implied and the Ascension is affirmed 
explicitly so that we are being confronted with the 
historical Christ. It is He who made men of equal 
dignity with the angels: He showed that the multitude 
of earthly and heavenly powers are one and that He 
united heaven and earth, intelligibles and sensibles. 
The implication is that it is first of all in the 
Logos incarnate that human nature celebrates with the 
angels the glory of God. The possibility of that con- 
celebration relies on the unity obtaining between the 
powers of the heavenly and, earthly orders, evidence 
for which is here adduced as xaTci ¶6 Ev xaC Tö 
ak r6 6E0425 The 'thy will be done' of the 
'Our Father' is realised in this way. The 6EXTIµa 
of God finds a response in the created O Xi a of men 
and angels. Maximus distinguishes O Xjµa gvc. xöv 
and . eexipa yvwµcxöv 
426 
and we might think of him 
as emphasising the former here because of his reference 
to ävOpwtCwrt Cüat, c . Christ does not have yvwµi 
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in the developed theology of Maximus, 
427 but even here he 
finds a common term to cover Christ, the angels and men. 
The emphasis is on cp3Qt. c and %6yoc and 6eXT4a is 
undoubtedly capable of bearing this connotation, as we 
have just noted, so that the whole section can be thought 
of as basically concerned with unity because of the 
unity of cpvoi. c and what is proper to the %6yor. of 
(PoLC rather than to 09XTIµa yvW LLxbv with its 
ancillary ideas of yvc)µB and xpoaCpeoLC 
428 
as if 
Maximus were assuring us that if c $o t. c through Xdyoc 
is realized through eA%Bµa proper to it, then the 
unity that is proper to cvocc will be preserved in the 
order of 06%Tpa In the concrete we cannot divorce 
eeAiµa from the personal qualification which it 
receives in the concrete decisions of the XoYtxoC , 
but to use UTJB Jm in conjunction with (pia is a 
way of stressing the possibility of the realization of 
cpvac(: in its voluntary dimension, consistent with 
the basic integrity of cýaLc and its X6'oo; . 
Since the 66X71µa of God is operative here, we may 
well wonder if Maximus wishes us to return to the 
OUQ'id 
of God which we have seen to be ground of the unity of 
Blessed Trinity and if he is not suggesting that, by 
the observance of the unity of nature, man realises in 
his own order a dimension of being that has its 
exemplar in the transcendent being of God. We Imow 
that for Maximus the o& Ca of God is shrouded in 
absolute mystery, but we know too that there is only 
one 06XBµa in God proper to his nature, the 
evidence of the one being as the source of activity so 
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that he is putting this before men here as demanding a 
unity of e XTµa among men to thus share with the 
angels the unity that is presumed to be operative among 
them. This aligns 69Xr1µa with cpvoaG and the unity 
of 9v0LC but does not exclude the personal imprint 
that willing gets from its hypostatic appropriation by 
'the multitude of earthly and heavenly powers'. 
429 Nor 
does it encourage us to pry into the mystery of the 
personal determination of the exercise of will implied 
in evooxwv, ovvepyoüv and autovpy .v 0430 But 
the affinity of ovoCa and cpvat. c and their 
structural relationship in this passage entitle us to 
draw attention to the possibility of an emphasis on a 
principle of unity analogous to that hidden in the 
splendour of the godhead; a triadological anthropology 
cannot neglect the question of unity. 
431 Just as in 
the language of the Trinity we find proof of Maximus' 
holding that, while 7. ept, xwp7jaLC was hypostatic, 
unity is grounded in one o5oCa , so here he would 
seem to be suggesting the one WATµa willed by God 
for men will demand a principle of unity in created 
cpnoL(, cüobs xtiLatiTl 
the personal 'poaLp6QcLC 
. The subsequent union of 
will accept this 
physical basis for volitional unity brought about by 
the infusion of charity in the case of men. 
432 
The Incarnate Word is also said to have united 
heaven and earth, the sensibles and intelligibles. 
These are two of the five great unifications attributed 
to the incarnate Logos by Maximus. 
433 He is said 
explicitly to have united heaven and earth Sa'ga. vtiby 
434 
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having ascended with an assumed body; the reference to 
the 'body' is calculated here as this dimension of 
created being is stressed in the third mediation while the 
soul and its activities, here virtue and knowledge, are 
given emphasis in the fourth mediation. The fact that 
human nature re-echoes the glory of God with the powers 
on high in one and the same will demonstrates that 
angels and men are one 'with regard to the distribution 
of divine gifts+. 
435 This participation in a divine 
liturgy presumes being, and well-being, vo% and 
e&xTIua , nature and personal existence. But 
Maximus is here emphasising unity, as we have seen, and 
he develops this in his treatment of the way in which 
the Logos incarnate united the separate heaven and 
earth, intelligiblBs and sensibles, a process that 
converges on the idea of ?. dyoc . The mention of the 
First Cause in this doxological context is an indication 
that what both the sensibles and intelligibles have in 
common is their createdness and it is the X6yoc of 
this that they discern as binding them in common to the 
creative love of God in his Logos. 'The divine principle 
which holds the entire creation together is that it 
would have non-being as the ground of its being'. 
436 
This is a principle of unity since it is a participation 
in being through creaturehood, common to men and angels 
and opens up the gratuitousness of their existence, 
offsetting heterodox opinions of a pantheistic or 
emanationist stamp and revelling in the gift of depend- 
ent being, rooted as it is in a common Logos and stable 
with the absolute character of the First Cause. 
270 
If we work backwards we may get some insight into 
what Maximus is driving at here. He exhorts in to acquire 
X6yoc by practice in order to be united not only to the 
angels in virtue, but to God in yvOoLC , by withdrawal 
from things. It is to this parenetic conclusion that this 
whole section moves, so that Xdroc emerges as the basic 
principle of understanding the whole passage since it is 
central to Maximus' thought here and thus adds a new 
dimension to the synthetic use of X6yos which governs 
the whole of Part I, elaborating its unifying function in 
a clearly defined instance. The exhortation follows the 
affirmation that the Logos shows, by the things he did 
mystically, how X6yoC is the union of things separated 
and how its contrary c. XorCa is the source of division 
for things united. 'Mystically' 
437 is used to remind us 
of the hidden character of all the mysterious events of 
Christ's life and work because of his unique being: 
God and man united hypostatically. The previous refer- 
ences to the Cross, the Resurrection by implication and 
to the Ascension point to his referring to them in 
particular here; these particular manifestations of tIn 
mysteries of His hypostatic union and salvific history. 
This to Maximus demonstrates the power of the %6ioC 
to unite, since it is seen so evidently to do so in its 
eponymous Source. Although we are not told openly how 
He did it here, the reference to 8t, ' &av' 6v 
438 
points to the hypostatic union as having made possible 
the entering of heaven by 'body', a natural denizen of 
earth and that ape and EýCri oýý articultre the way in 
which 'soul' contrives to unite intelligibles and 
sensibles. It is by Aöyoc that the Incarnate Logos 
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effects these unifications, so that our acquisition of 
%6yo4; is a becoming like Him by participation: hypo- 
statically and naturally, our becoming persons in the 
act of appropriating the 93oLC which, as created, we 
hold in common with the angels, an appropriation that 
presumes &pe'uA and matures into knowledge of the 
First Cause. 
'AXoyCL is presumed to be holding sway as the 
source of division: it is an absence of %6yoC and man 
is exhorted to acquire XdyoC by ApäF. LC, IIpä, ýLC 
is a technical term in Maximus for the active effort to 
acquire moral virtue and to live by it, by which 
e7U6vµca and 6vµcC , as inordinate passions, are 
eliminated, the powers of the sensible soul are reduced 
to order and their energies assumed into the higher 
order of X6(oC . The realization of the first two 
mediations, that between male and female, between the 
inhabited and paradise is brought about by 'xpdEtc ; here 
X6yo4; is given a higher task, that of uniting heaven 
and earth, sensibles and intelligibles, so that 7. pä Lc 
is given a more extensive role that has to do with 
uniting men with angels in virtue. flpäELC can there- 
fore be described as the affirmation of A6(oc , the 
application of 1ýdTos to man's activity, the process 
of the realization of the order of X6yoC in the whole 
being of man. AdyoC which is realized perfectly in 
the Second Person and communicated flawlessly to his 
humanity must be introduced into every dimension of 
man's existence, a task that is ascribed to 7. päELS 
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We know from other schematizations of man's powers and 
activities that X6ioc , as distinct from voDc has 
to do with the practical order, 
439 that the virtues are 
the impress of X6ioC on the active powers of man and 
that this is the first project assigned to the ascetic by 
the tradition formulated so clearly in Evagrius, 
440 but 
modified in Maximus. The further claim here is that 
this unites men not merely to each other, but to the 
angels and that it is precisely by virtue that this is 
achieved. Above it was said to be brought about 
xaxä '6 Ev xmC aütiö e9Ar1µa so that there is 
obviously a link between the affirmation of X6yoc 
through %päFLc and the exercise of O XrJµa. 
npa Lr. and dpe'r are by implication not merely the 
expression of X6yo4 but involve O TIILa too. We 
are entitled to think also that the realization of 
X6yor. in man would ensure the presence of O Xvi La 
which is a component of his incorruptible nature, but 
freed from what impedes its proper functioning. This 
introduces the cognate notion of %6yoc cpvaewc, and 
recalls the way in which X&Yos as faculty, through 
%paELS allows the ? dyoc cpßcEwc to assert itself 
in man's life. 
441 Maximus is very concerned with the 
idea of cps a; w; here, and, as we have seen, it is 
precisely as cpýoLr. that men and angels are united by 
the Logos and the imprint of X6yoc on the life of man. 
, DÜQLS and unity are correlatives in his system. There 
is no attempt to say that angelic and human nature are 
identical, but that they have a fundamental natural 
factor in common and 66X-%tm is probably tied up 
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with that in this context. Nature is the locus of the 
intersection of the activity of the Logos and of men; it 
is the objective order in which synergy takes plabe(. where 
the personal activity of the Logos and created persons 
concurs in keeping with the uncreated %6yot. , espec- 
ially in this context with the %6roc shared by men and 
angels of spiritual endowment and of being drawn from 
nothing by the creative power of God. ee*Ki a is 
invited to adopt this truth as its own, to be consistent 
with the X6yoc of nature, and to ensure its doxologi- 
cal expression. The created nature is one and in that 
sense it has one edXT)µa . The Logos is related to 
the angels then in precisely the same way as He is 
related to men: a similar synergy that is free and 
consistent obtains between them and the Logos on an 
objective basis: the basis of commonness being 'the 
having of non-being as the ground of their being'. Here 
Maximus is suggesting that Xöror. through "tPäF. LC will 
enable man to appreciate this fact and so release his 
eEx-%La for the praise of God. From another point of 
view it is the very condition of X6yor. realized as 
äpc'n that is the will of God and the fact that this 
is realized presumes that man's eeX'1µa is in concord 
with that of the angels and ultimately with that of God. 
There is the further question of JXCYuwo 
which is said to depend on X (oC through , APä L. *442 
This knowledge is a form of contemplation but falls short 
of ecoxoYCa 0443 It is the apprehension of the 
Logos behind. the common X6yor. of the sensibles and 
intelligibles which in turn manifests the First Cause or 
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is identified with the First Cause. The exercise of 
knowledge is not strictly within the realm of %päELC nor 
is it designated as äpe' . Therefore we must 
conclude that our union with God yvwarLxwr. by with- 
drawal from things is not effected directly by %paELC 
nor by Aöyos, exerting itself as xpaELC , but that 
-K PELF. Ls precedes this knowledge and accompanies it in 
the sense that the elevated knowledge in question would 
be impossible without the detachment from passionate 
involvement and carnal modes of apprehension which are 
its necessary preliminary. We know that in another 
context X6yoc mediates between atoeiatc and 
voUs and this can be said to be operative here. 
444 
Since Maximus does not introduce the notion of vo{34 
here we can take it for granted that XdioC usurps its 
function in this context and is a way of describing 
man's capacity for insight into the ultimate intelli- 
gibility of the whole cosmos by grasping its foundation 
in the Logos. If man appropriates X6yoC in the wider 
sense than that of meaning the faculty that impresses 
order and humanity on man's activity, as the full 
realization of humanity, then we can take it for granted 
that it includes e7CyvixLc , something in keeping 
with his A6yoC Vp crews. /and restored 
to him by the 
Logos incarnate. 
Working backwards thi we find that x6yo6 is a 
principle of being, order and intelligibility with its 
ontological ground in the Logos and by means of which 
the whole created order is sustained and given coherence 
and order. This is actuated by the exercise of X6yoc 
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by men, something that emerges as a participation in the 
Logos incarnate and with him unites men to angels in 
worship. The whole scale of referents resonates in this 
word: faculty, principle of 9-6oLC , Logos in person 
and as such it points to a unity that finds its ultimate 
source in the otaCm of God. 
Part II(b)445 
There seems to be little emphasis on human will in 
this section, if any at all. It must be there by impli- 
cation. The emphasis is rather on ? 6yoc which ensures 
the continuity between II(a) and II(b). This is the 
notion by which Maximus can extend his reflections and so 
we see him using .?, O-or. as the focus of the section II(a), 
that around which he organizes the rest of his insights. 
Undoubtedly TpakTic and its attendant notions form a 
cluster of complementary ideas, but equally clearly it is 
WoYos rather than Ayv4µr1 , that enables him to co- 
ordinate his ideas on worship-with theology and anthro- 
pology in II(a). It is A6yoC that makes union with 
the angels feasible since when it is allowed its proper 
function it leads to Logos. Acyoc then must be the 
principle of worship and the principle of unity. It has 
not yet been defined more accurately. It implies X6yoc 
cpvoewt as is obvious from the relationship to 
Logos, which entails some reference to the root of man's 
being, the principle of his humanity and perhaps it even 
connotes the principle of his personality. It also 
means Xöroc as the faculty of rationality, or the affir- 
mation of the higher aspect of man's nature, his reason. 
More precisely it can denote his reason in so far as it 
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is extended to the ordering of the practical dimension of 
his life. Here, because it is used in relation to the 
Logos, in whom are to be found the %6yot, of creatures, 
its use is disemantic: referring to the higher aspect of 
his nature and at the same time to the faculty by which 
in practice his life can be related to the A6yoc and so 
become consistent with the Xdios gvocwC . The 
implication of ? 6yoC k6pýcwc can be thought to be 
secondary here, but it will come into its own later in 
the commentary with the introduction of yv4Ln , 
which implies the impress of the bx6oTaat, C on the 
act of willing. 
446 The introduction of e'cc6vµCa and 
6vp. 6 as the disordered passions which are sympto- 
matic of the failure of man to become himself in ecstasy 
towards God, ensures that %6yoC is still being 
thought of in an ascetical way. A6yoC must impress 
itself on man's passionate life if he is to worship as 
the angels and be properly united to them and to the 
Logos. Man's becoming himself implies his becoming 
angelic: his life is not dominated by animal passion; 
his proper assertion of his ?d oc is itself worship; 
he becomes what God intends him to be, what God wills, 
so that the will emphasized here is the Will of God and 
it is His Will that man should be Xoyi, x6 . that is 
realizing the intention of God in his regard by the 
harmony of his life considered immanently and trans- 
cendentally: by the inner ordering of his being and by 
the proper ordering of his being to that of his fellow 
XoYLxoC and the Logos. This is attained when the 
Logos is allowed to exercise His role in regard to the 
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Xoy xoC . The angels in heaven are already in a right 
relationship to the Logos; when man becomes rightly 
ordered to the Logos he is a fellow of the angels; he is 
logical. 
We have seen how Maximus uses the notion of X6yoc 
to spell out, with the Cappadociane, 
447 
some of the 
implications of the triune life in God. The ascetical 
use to which he puts the term to denote the process of 
liberating man from passionate obsession and which he 
identifies with the hallowing of the Name is largely 
derived from Evagrius. 448 In this section he refers back 
to that emancipation from concupiscence and aggressive- 
ness, but now his inspiration in the use of the notion of 
A&yos is primarily dependent on the Alexandrian 
tradition, with its emphasis on the function of the 
angels in the divine scheme of things and man's vocation 
to enter into the angelic state. 
449 With this he 
combines a vision of man as primarily a being destined 
for the worship of God, which puts him in line with 
Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite. 450 In the Mystagogia, 
we find an extended liturgical commentary, which assures 
us that there is nothing fortuitous about the cultic 
bias of this passage. In the system of Maximus the 
metaphysical transposition of Origenian mythology makes 
the Logos to be the origin and end of the %6Toi, 
which proceed and return in a diastolic-systolic action 
that is unambiguously free from pantheistic or emana- 
tionist associations. Angels and men share the title of 
XOYLXOL, , that is a6yot, which enjoy subsistence 
and they have a common destiny, e woLc , and a 
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common responsibility, the good use of their freedom in 
order to achieve it. 
451 While we have seen that in Part 
1,3, the theme of will is probably introduced in terms 
of human as well as angelic and divine 6tXi a 
human will does not appear here. It is, of course, 
understood, since the human being is inconceivable for 
Maximus without the dimension of freedom and it is what 
regulates the process of the evolution of etvaL into 
Eli EZvcu. , of man's growth from being in the image 
of God to being in His likeness. The emphasis here is 
rather on the progressive coincidence of beings with 
their Adios , the emergence of the idea into the 
realm of personal existence, the attainment of which 
must be finally grace since the idea is divine and 
man's entry into the state of äsC chat. must make 
him surpass the limits of his created nature. 
452 
Since for Maximus, both angels and men are 
XoYLxoC , it is obvious that the union of angels and 
men is in the process of being realized when X6yoc 
µovwtiarco<; 
453 leads men to the Logos. When we 
recall that for Maximus the creative ? 6yoL are 
synonymous with the divine 6eXýpaTa 1454 and that 
the dominical prayer assures us that the angels are 
doing the will of God in heaven, then we can see why 
the acquisition of logical status is the fulfilling of 
the Will of God and the basis of the union of the 
XoYcxoC . Being logical is an existential acknow- 
ledgement of the supreme dominion of God. Not alone 
does asceticism ensure that man's being is simplified 
by singular reason and rendered consistent with his 
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Aöroc c-ooew which anchors him to his ground in the 
Logos, but this spiritual activity is integral to man's 
liturgical tribute to the majesty of God. He 'offers 
mystically to God the cult of worship with a reasonable 
power alone'; 
455 'he becomes in all things a worshipper 
like the angels'; 
456 'nothing is offered to God in 
heaven apart from the rational worship, which he expects 
from us when He teaches us to say in our prayer: "Thy 
will be done on earth as it is in heaven"'. 
457 Maximus 
has blended the angelology of Origen and the liturgy of 
Dionysius through his deft use of X6'oc 
In his elaboration of the theme of 'reason in its 
singularity' naturally leading reasonable beings to the 
first Logos, we find Maximus making an interesting 
distinction: 
Let our reason, therefore, be moved to search for 
God and let the concupiscible power strive to 
desire Him and the irascible power to hold on to 
Him. Rather, to speak more properly, let the 
whole intellect strain towards God, as if it were 
stretched through a forceful exertion by way of 
the irascible power and on 'fire with longing 
through the supreme yearning of the concupiscible 
power. 458 
We shall return to the development with regard to 
! 1L6vpCa and 6vµ65 . Firstly, we shall examine 
the function of different models in this statement of 
Maximus. Maximus amplifies his exhortation to let 
X6yog be moved to search for God by saying: 
'Rather, to speak more properly, let the whole noun 
strain towards God'. 
459 The choice of X6yoc in this 
context is dictated by the whole concept of the Pater 
Noster, which is bound together from the point of view 
of conceptual articulation by this idea. We have 
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already noted that it can be referred to Cappadocian, 
Evagrian and Alexandrian usage. Basically it forms part 
of a platonic triad, but it has undergone a transforma- 
tion in its use by the Fathers, primarily because of its 
Johannine associations and the osmosis of scriptural and 
philosophic ideas in patristic theology. As part of the 
original platonic triad it was associated with dxt. - 
evµCa. and ev. 6C and it represented the higher or 
spiritual part of man, r6 XoytorLxdv 0460 We 
have already found Maximus using it in this way, not 
least in its role of mastering the irregular movements 
of the lower appetitive powers. But in that kind of 
context it can too assume the role of contemplation and 
extend its activity from 7Z pä. L6 to eewpCm . In 
fact, used thus it is synonymous with voDC in the 
usage of Maximus. 
461 It can be the power by which man 
searches for God and relates to Him noetically. Used 
in opposition to e7CL6vµCa and evµ6C it denotes 
spiritual activity in so far as it reflects directly the 
divine Logos. Dalmais has pointed out that it can be 
used thus in preference to vok. because it comprises a 
reference that transcends every particular determinatio462 
It has a scale of meanings ranging from the humble 
exercise of human reason to the person of the Son in the 
mystery of the Holy Trinity. In the Pater Noster as a 
whole, and not least in this section, we can see this 
observation verified, because it is %6yoc that 
provides the intellectual bond between the different 
orders of reality considered by Maximus and in terms of 
which he undertakes to account for the unity of angels 
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and men. It is X6yoc that is used to bind man to the 
XoYLxoC and to the Logos. 
N. o% 
463 descended from the Aristotelian triad of 
mtoeiaLc , xcyoc and voti( 9414 Where the 
emphasis is on man's powers to know with aXo6rioiC 
having for its object the sensible realm, while %6yoC 
and voDC pointed to a distinction in man's intellectual 
equipment between his practical and speculative abilities. 
97C LOvpCa and 6vµk are the appetitive counter- 
part of atoOiIoc4; and when Maximus uses Xdioc and 
voiis in the same context we find him inclined to 
relate AcToc to the more practical of man's concerns, 
to his concern with the acquisition and practice of 
virtue, while votS is given a more contemplative 
function, but as we have seen already, this should 
465 
not be restricted to the merely natural identification of 
man with the objects of his intellectual knowing. It has 
acquired mystical and personal associations as a way of 
knowing in patristic usage. It is never an ambiguous 
term but in contrast to frvxjj ,a way of referring to 
kovµCa and 6vµ6( 9466 it is always thought of 
as a divine power in which man participates. Frequently 
it is qualified as xyevµL=Lx6c 9 
467 to indicate that 
it is 'where' man is open to God and the inflow of His 
Spirit. While %päýLc 9 
468 
as the exercise of A6To( 
is concerned with the making logical of man's 7. aerrrcxc. 
övvciµeLs 9 tiö 'aeTrLxöv . 
Epos, 17c L6vµCm 
and ovµör. 9 his *vXA in the restricted sense, 
469 
YvwaiS is thought to be the proper occupation of his 
vo , 
470 
or more correctly, of man in his capacity as 
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voIDs . While X6yoC then is concerned with the eatab- 
lishment of äräOc t, a in man's lower powers, voUC 
will 'strain towards God'471 by yvwat, c or 6ewpCa 
, cve vµati Lxri or ecwp Co. yvwa'c t, xrj 0472 It is 
primarily in this way that Maximus understands man to be 
like the angels and to exercise a liturgical function. 
Since vo% is the place of the divine illumination, 
the yvc3ot, c in its higher forms will become the 
6eoXoyCa of another triad: %pECL4, OcwpCa, 
Os oXoy Ea . 
473 Maximus obviously has the twofold 
division of *vxij - voü4 in mind here since he describes 
the embodiment of the Logos in the XoyLxoC as a 
nourishment by virtue, the fruit of xpdCLC corres- 
ponding to the rendering of *vxý logical, and 
wisdom474 which in the Mystagogia is the power at the 
basis of yvw&LC and is seated in voüc . 
We can say then that when the Platonic triad is 
being used, Xdyoc stands for the whole intellectual 
spiritual dimension of man with the advantage of implying 
the relationship of Xdyot cpi5aewC , and A6yor. the 
faculty, to the eternal Logos. When the Aristotelian 
triad is employed then %6yo5 tends to become discur- 
sive and prudential, while voüc is entrusted with the 
more contemplative aspects of man's life and experience. 
Because of the Platonic usage X6yo6 and vote can be 
employed interchangeably; when they are used in con- 
junction with each other, X6yor. becomes the organ of 
dpe, rAj and äxä6ELa , while retaining its transcen- 
dental associations, and voü4 is then available for 
describing man's more immediate openness to God. This 
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accounts for µäAXov in 896C. We can sum up by saying 
that X6yoc is used here to underline the unity of the 
realm of the XoTI. xoC , which is accomplished in their 
common doing of the Will of God, which is the worship 
which is His due. Since the XoTLxoC are derived from 
the A6roC and ordered to the Logos, the choice of 
X6yo4; is meant to throw into relief the principle of 
their unity, because of the common source and end of 
their being and the common inner principle of their 
structure and movement. When this has been established, 
Maximus can use voiis, , with its connotation of 
yvwaLc , to bring out the concrete way in which he 
visualizes the union to take place. Angels and men are 
united by the virtue that A6yoC establishes and even 
more radically because of their union with God through 
YvwoL4; . This ties in with what Maximus had already 
said in Part 1,3: 
Let us learn then to strive for the Logos through 
virtuous activity in order to be united not only 
to the angels in virtue but to God in gnosis by 
detachment from things. 475 
In this section there is little or no concern with 
the first two mediations performed by Christ and to be 
appropriated by man, that of male and female, inhabited 
earth and paradise, but considerable attention is given 
to the union of earth and heaven, and the union of the 
sensibles and the intelligibles, between men and angels. 
We recall that these mediations were associated by 
Maximus with the Ascension of Christ476 and that accounts 
for his concern here with the integration of the energy 
of e%aevµLa and 6vµ&; into the Godward thrust of 
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man's XdTo(; and the exercise of his voUC . Since the 
passions have a psycho-somatic character, to underline 
their vital potential in the search for and union with 
God is to set a seal on the abiding validity of man's 
somatic dimension and to extend to all men the possi- 
bility of that final ascent to God with Christ in body 
and soul. It is also a maximian gloss on the evangelical: 
'Seek the kingdom of God and these things will be added to 
you'. 
477 There can be no question of the unification of 
man with the angels and with the Logos until he has been 
simplified in himself. Rather we might say that simplifi- 
cation is the reverse of the desired unification. A6yoC 
has reduced the impulses of the passions to order; 
äiciest, a reigns in his passable powers. But now 
their potential is redirected and they become sources of 
energy for ? 6ioc in its search for God by intensifying 
its drive towards Him and enhancing the tenacity of 
X6yoc in its hold on Him. The integration of 
ýýc8vµýa and 6vµ64 is then made more specific and 
the former is compared to fire lending ardour to voü6 
in its yearning for God while the latter is likened to a 
bowstring, the tension of which facilitates the flight 
of vo3iC to God. 
478 Maximus is advocating not merely 
longing for and loving adherence to God, but passionate 
longing and love. 
In fact, love is not mentioned in this section of 
the Pater Noster, but we can assume that the inclusive 
ayci, Xj , which we have seen in the Prologue, is here 
too the inner law of love ( QTopy C) and appropriates 
everything related to it by nature'. 
479 It can be said 
then that ä%dOeLm does not imply the destruction of 
the sensible order; it does require a 6ewga 
g-00Lxi that enables man to overcome hie tendency to 
be captivated by material things because thus he can 
take hold of the *tXä vo1jµara of things and 
eliminate distorting passion; 
480 he must discover the 
world for what it really is by reaching its %6yoL 
and then passion is not alone a hindrance to his self- 
realization but becomes in the words of Von Balthacar 
'a salutary and necessary weight of terrestrial 
existence'. 
481 To approach God without passion is to 
linger in an area of ambiguity: 
To have cut back one's passions and simplified 
one's thoughts is not, for all that, to have 
turned them entirely towards the divine. One 
is no longer attached to the human, but neither 
is he to the divine. This happens in the case 
of men in the active life, who have not yet 
merited knowledge; they put off the passions 
either b fear of punishment or hope of the 
kingdom. 8 
Elsewhere he points to the porcine condition of those 
whose knowledge does not free them from immersion in 
materialism: 
The knowledge of divine things without passion 
does not lead the spirit to a complete scorn of 
the earthly. Its action resembles the simple 
representation of a sensible object. So, many 
men can be found who wallow all the same in 
bodily passions like pigs in the mud. 483 
In the Capitum de Caritate Quattuor Centuriae we find 
285 
complementary teaching to that of the Pater Noster, but 
the function of äyäxi is made explicit: 
For him whose mind (voVC) is continually with 
God, even his concupiscence is increased above 
measure into a divinely burning love (epcwT(L) 
and the entire irascible element is changed 
into divine charity (c. Yä ciiv) . 
484 
In this perspective man's evaluation of creatUrely 
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being undergoes a remarkable adjustment: 
Knowledge is good in itself, health is the same. 
But for many their opposite is more useful. 485 
In the Ambigua we find a synthesis of the virtues that 
squares with more than one statement of the Pater 
Noster. In the latter we find that 'the great Elijah 
advanced towards God, absolutely untrammelled 
in any way in his relations to things, simple in 
desire and uncomplicated in free-will, he made 
for his dwelling with Him, who is simple by nature, 
by means of interconnected cardinal virýues, yoked 
together in gnosis like fiery horses. 8 
In the Ambigua we find the cardinal virtues further 
generalized as wisdom and meekness -. and that the virtu- 
ous man ultimately brings all his good qualities 
together in & &xi 
Again from the general virtues he learns to make 
two more general still by composition, I mean 
wisdom and meekness. Wisdom, indeed, is the end 
of things perceptible and meekness is the end of 
things practical, for from prudence and justice 
he makes wisdom, as being the conserving cause of 
gnosis in keeping with prudence and of exact know- 
ledge in keeping with justice and because of this, 
it is, as I said, the end of things perceptible; 
from courage and temperance he makes meekness, 
which is nothing else than the perfect immobility 
of aggressiveness and concupiscence with regard to 
what is contrary to nature j which some people call 
apatheia and so it is the end of things practical. 
These again he unites in the most general of all 
the virtues, I mean in charity. This removes what 
is apart from it; it collects what pertains to it; 
it unifies what takes its rise in, moves in and 
ends up in itself and which is especially the 
cause of divinisation in every way. 487 
Finally Maximus sees the activity of x6yoC and 
voüs as ensuring that the Logos w 
us, 
488 thus summing up this petition 
and at the same time introducing the 
'Give us this day our daily bread'. 
of the Logos in virtuous men he sees 
ill be embodied in 
'Thy will be done' 
following petition: 
In the embodiment 
the logical conse- 
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quence of Christ's claim that 'I am the bread which has 
come down from heaven and gives life to the world'. 
489 
'Living thus we shall receive the Word as daily bread'. 
490 
Otkw refers to the function of Xdyoc in affirming 
its detachment from concupiscence and aggressiveness and 
then in ensuring that the passions are integrated into 
the life of man in his search for and union with God and 
more specifically in his contemplation through voUC 
In this passage we have a striking convergence of the 
christological and anthropological themes of the thought 
of Maximus. It is Christ's embodiment in man that 
ensures that man will become his true self as God 
intends. We shall receive him 'as our substantial and 
living bread for the nourishment of our souls and the 
preservation of the good condition of the benefits 
bestowed on us'. 
491 
The presence of the Logos ensures the preservation 
of the good condition (evcF. Ca) of the goods 
(ti(Zv &Ya6wv) bestowed on us. Tä d. Ayaeci in the 
language of Maximus comprise the sum total of what God 
has bestowed on man in creation-salvation and culminate 
in His self-gift, which here is renewed and confirmed 
by the Bread which is Himself as the Word. The possi- 
0 
bility of the deterioration of the good condition of 
the goods indicates that man is still in via, that 
c? cIvc has not yet given way to &&C e'vaa , so that 
man needs some kind of principle of stability on his 
pilgrimage through life and Maximus does not find that 
within man, but rather in the Logos, who is ontologi- 
cally his source and who offers Himself in free-gift to 
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him as his Bread and indefectible life-principle: 
He becomes everything to us in proportion to how we 
are nourished by virtue and wisdom and He is 
embodied in a variety of ways, as He himself knows, 
in each of the saved while they are still in this 
age. 
The indwelling of Christ in the virtuous and wise in 
proportion (ävaX6yw ) to the strength of these 
qualities gives this idea a new synthetic power: virtue 
and wisdom are no longer merely human qualities, but 
ways of the embodiment of the Logos. 
491 
The Word becomes everything ('cävtia) to us ; he 
is the meaning of our existence, the centre and circum- 
ference of our universe. He is the risen Lord, who 
fills all things and accounts for all things . 
492 Virtue 
is what effects in man the irreplaceable function of the 
Word. This is complemented by wisdom so that here 
Maximus is again concerned with the contemplative and 
practical activities of man and finds in them, thus 
marked by AdToC and releasing voVC to its proper 
activity, evidence of the embodiment of the Logos. In 
Scripture He is the one bread that makes the one body; 
that is to the forefront of the thought of Maximus here, 
even though the interpretative terminology may seem to 
be more akin to Stoic philosophical language. The bread, 
suggested by the words of the 'Our Father', draws our 
attention to a concrete presence ofnthe Logos who is 
said to be embodied ( cmµatiovµcvov ) in man. 
493 
This goes beyond anything that the Stoics might claim 
for their Xdioc , which remains a principle of order 
and intelligibility. Here we see Maximus trying to 
transcend the limitations of philosophical models and to 
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communicate, with the help of a more concrete and Semitic 
language, the indefinable dimensions of a religious and 
Christian understanding of the universe and its ultimate 
structure : the varied expression of the A6yor, in 
nature, law and Incarnation is being extended in those 
who freely become virtuous and wise and above all possess 
&Yd, X-n so that they can say: 'I live, now not I, it is 
Christ who lives in me'. 
494 The way for the following 
exegesis is opened up by reference to Logos as 'daily 
bread', so that ? dyoC is explicitly used as the link 
term between II (b) and 11(c). If man does the Will of 
God, then he receives the Logos in a more intimate way. 
The hypothetical character of this reception is not 
merely a question of contraries, but of proportion. Man 
may receive the Logos, but it will be in proportion to 
äpEti-0 and oocpta . The capacity of man for God, 
his voVis , is modified directly by aocCc and 
indirectly by &pc' . 'Capacity' has then a volun- 
tary aspect as well as a practical side. It is 
realized finally through äydnij . It is 'by living 
thus'495 that man is disposed to receive the Logos. 
Here it is virtue and wisdom that open man to welcome 
the Logos. They are in this context to be associated 
with X6 'oc and volir. respectively. In II (a) we 
found c, pc' rj associated with yvwµrt and yvwoc4. was 
associated with X6yor. . This does not surprise us 
as we have seen something of how Maximus articulates 
X6yo;; and volir. , but it does assure us that yvt, i7j 
is never far from his meditations on anthropology which 
gives some support to the interpretation of 66X1 cL 
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in 1.3 above, as referring not merely to the unique Will 
of God, but to man's will as well. 
Part III, 3" 
He constitutes us co-worshippers with the angels 
in fulfilment of the Father's will, manifesting 
in a well imitated way, by the conduct of our 
lives, celestial satisfaction. 496 
This obviously understands the Father's will to be the 
union of men with angels in common worship. The Logos 
has achieved this. IIX11pcLoct, might equally be 
translated as 'by the fulfilment of the Father's will' 
which would imply that it was the way in which Christ 
met His Father's will by his obedience and love, in 
other words by the way in which He exercised His own 
will, that He made us co-worshippers. That would leave 
the way open to interpreting the 'one will' of 1,3 as 
covering the will of man as well as the Will of God. 
This would be enhanced by understanding the will of 
Christ to embrace His human will as well as His divine 
Will. Maximus had not necessarily made that distinc- 
tion as clearly as he would under the pressure of the 
Monothelite debate, 497 but we cannot exclude its 
presence here in a less well defined way. Christ is 
presented here as the cause of our being made one with 
the angels in worship. It is Christ who achieves this 
union in His own person by the Hypostatic Union and by 
His willing Ascension. Our doing the Will of the 
Father is the way in which we appropriate what Christ 
has accomplished and this constitutes us as co- 
worshippers with the angels. EvapeoTHQLC can 
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mean the state of being satisfied or that of satisfying. 
Either would fit the context. If we opt for 'being 
satisfied' then doing the Will of the Father is the 
source of man's happiness, in imitation of the happiness 
that characterizes the angels in heaven. The adverb 
EvµLµLA, VWs may well tilt the balance in favour of 
rendering evapeotiTIaLC as 'a state of being well- 
pleasing' to God. This would give our earthly existence 
an angelic character and heaven would have broken into 
this world. 
All this conspires to show the sacredness of 
human life, as Maximus understands it, when it is lived 
as God wills. The seemingly pedestrian fulfilment of 
one's duties becomes in itself a celestial liturgy and 
a humdrum existence takes on the splendour of angelic 
homage, provided that XdyoC and votC have 
enabled man to integrate the totality of his powers and 
activities into the godward orientation willed by the 
Father, which is imprinted in his %6ioS 9aewc 
and which must be transformed into personal being by 
the exercise of human freedom. 
(iii) Participation in divine life 
Part I, 4 
Again the obvious concept in this section is that 
of W6yoc which is the subject of the sentence and is 
the basic idea running through every consideration as 
well as linking this statement with the other six 
'mysteries'. The Logos is here identified with the 
bread of the petition and the language of the prayer is 
interpreted as another facet of the communication of the 
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innumerable divine mysteries, recapitulated in seven, 
discerned by Maximus in the Pater Nos ter. In giving us 
his Logos, God has given us everything and whatever the 
commentator has to say is bound to be another aspect of, 
that basic endowment, throwing into relief, from another 
point of view, the immeasurable love God has shown us in 
Christ. The idea of participation is brought out in 
ioý, ctTat µetiäboaý. v 
499 
and µeTaxt, pv iv ; 
500 
the Logos described as 'bread' imparts divine life and 
imbues those who eat Him with a divine quality. This 
terminology is deliberately calculated to bring home, in 
the strongest possible terms, the presence of the Logos 
in those to whom He communicates Himself and who partici- 
pate in Him so that the relationship of men to the Logos 
is not merely an extrinsic dependence but an immanent 
realization. The indwelling of the Logos in men in some 
way constitutes them as men, by imparting to them divine 
life because of the divine quality in which they partici- 
pate by eating of this Logical bread. The participation 
through eating ensures that the Logos is within, communi- 
cating ? öyoc as the foundation of divine life shared. 
We remember that it is the Logos incarnate who is the 
subject of this sentence together with the rest of the 
statements of this section. It is the Incarnation that 
ensures that the Logos is within the created realm, in a 
new way identified hypostatically with human nature, so 
that any Neoplatonic associations that the term 1.6yor, 
carries with it in this context and which help to 
elucidate the Christian mystery in terms of participation, 
must be counterbalanced by the fact of the Incarnation and 
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its wholly unforeseen character as a mode of presence in 
and to man from a philosophical point of view. The 
ontology here is the ontology of the Mystery of 'Christ 
in you the hope of glory', where ontology, as Riou reminds 
us, is not metaphysics so much as a synonym for the 
mystery itself. 
501 We are dealing with a mode of presence 
that eludes philosophical categories by which the Logos 
incarnate can be so intimately present to man as to be the 
life of his life, the ground of his Christian being, 
something conveyed by images of vine and branches, head 
and members of a body, ultimately due to a hypostatic 
relationship with its associations of synergy, enhypo- 
stasisation. If Logos is embodied in man, then man too 
becomes ? civ 0502 
It is divine life that the incarnate Logos imparts 
to man and we have noted already the reference to the 
fact that the Logos is alive with the personal perichor- 
etic presence of the Holy Spirit, even in his Incarnation, 
so that in communicating life to us He is bound to do so 
by a communication to us of 'Life' in the Trinity itself, 
that our life in dependence on His immanence within us as 
bread-Logos implies the presence of the Personal source 
of Life in the Trinity with Whom we co-operate synergeti- 
cally in a loving iccpax p11oLS , which ensures that 
we are imbued with a divine quality that is a participa- 
tion in the Logos and is activated in knowledge and love, 
thus finding ourselves caught into the divine interplay 
of the Persons of the Trinity as well as participating 
in divine nature. The divine quality is said to have 
been given %pd 6dwot, v 9 
503 
an expression to 
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connote the perfect actuation of the divine life in man 
because of his being caught into the life of the Blessed 
Trinity, having fellowship with the Father and the Son 
and the Spirit, something communicated to him from the 
Father, through the Son in the Spirit, constituting him 
son of the Father, in the Son, by the action of the 
Spirit, and connoting the full flowering of his power to 
know and love within the perichoretic movement of the 
divine Persons. In this life, this is primarily the 
exercise of myd%Tl , the dominant factor in Maximien 
anthropology so that ? cij and &' fl will be 
almost synonymous, perhaps rm connoting the active 
exercise of dyti by which the 8ewo ic, with a 
view to which the divine quality is bestowed, is 
realized. This understanding of c yd%Tj - ZwA will 
facilitate the link with the WY of I, l, which is 
proper to Logos and the reference to the life that is 
presented anthitetically to death in Part 1,5504 and 
7505 below. 
The notion of ioc6Trs would seem at first sight to 
evoke essential, natural associations as if the entity 
communicated had in some way a role in relation to 
cpüo L6 or o1 c3Ca as it would in an Aristotelian 
schema, so that the Logos would then be credited with 
imparting to man an entitative habit by which his basic 
nature would be modified in such a way as to become the 
principle of activity, not merely proper to man, but 
proper to God: it would be a divine quality, given for 
eIwoLs. ,a term that connotes energy not merely a 
static predisposition, but rather the expression of 
295 
nature in living activity. But it is doubtful if this 
two-tier notion of regenerated man is dominating, If 
at all relevant, to this way of thinking. It presumes 
that man has some perfection as man in the intention of 
God which is not necessarily bound up with his relation- 
ship to God in a living interchange, as if God had one 
plan for him at the created level and another at the 
supernatural level, so that he would need to be re- 
created in the sense of being entitatively enhanced in 
order to become capable of participated divine life, a 
notion of habitual grace common to the scholastics and 
generally held by western theologians since. 
507 This 
may be, in some way, implied in the thought of Maximus, 
but it is hardly the primary way in which he thinks of 
divinization. The grammatical root of 7coL6, v% 
would rather seem to point to 't and we know that 
this is used in a personal way by Maximus so that the 
6e Ca %oL6'ti1 would seem to designate a personal 
endowment rather than a natural one in this context and 
so be a personal category, indicating that what- the 
Logos is doing for us, by feeding us on Himself, is 
giving us the possibility of becoming persons who 
appropriate and innovate nature in such a way that 
man's primordial relationship to the Logos is not 
merely as his partner in objective activity but in a 
relationship that is intersubjective and hypostatic. 
4Aaw: itself is a term that partakes of the 
associations of both oüoCa and bm6aTaoL4 -508 and here 
it is obviously implied as related to e woLC an 
active and dominantly hypostatic category. 
On the other hand we have tended to associate the 
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XoyoC and ? 6io4 Oaswc with the Logos and it 
might be well to stress that here, and to put it forward 
as the logical and natural foundation of life realized 
through synergy by the intersection of man in hie 
personal freedom with the Holy Spirit, but on the basis 
of his cpva LC and its " %6yoC which are participa- 
tions of the Logos, whom he 'eats' as bread. We could 
then underline the emphasis on life and the hypostatic 
character of xow6' ic but not neglect the correspond- 
ing and complementary role of Xdyor. and Logos. The 
synergic action of the Spirit and man must be thought of 
as taking place between the Logos and man, something 
that activates that relationship rather than being 
isolated from the Logos, so that there would be no 
question of etwa Lt without a personal factor in man 
which is activated as Oewalc . We may ask ourselves 
how it differs from the X6yoc 9oewc . This is the 
basic ontological infrastructure of man, which he holds 
in dependence on the Logos and which refers man to Him. 
If something is added to man by the Logos, partaken of 
as bread, what can it be? Is it the restoration of 
A6 (oc Oaewc to its proper functioning, something 
occluded by cpt, XaurCa and released by d. Ydx71 ? 
While this is true, dries it still define with sufficient 
precision what this divine quality is or does Maximus 
think in this way? The %6y o6; .q 
5oewc 
, as we know 
from other contexts, enters into the fullness of human 
being as an irreplaceable factor, 
509 but is there a 
further development implied here? It would be quite 
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coherent to speak about man and his deification on the 
basis of the 15Yoý; 9aewc and the cp6 oc 
kdpýCWS and to confine oneself to these terms on the 
principle of entia non aunt multiplicands praeter 
necessitatem, which would imply that the 'imparting' and 
'imbuing' was in fact the restoration of man to his 
pristine condition by the release of %6yoC cpvaewc 
to its proper functioning. This would leave the ioL- 
6, c-or. on the logical side of the line so to speak, but 
guarantee the possibility of O WOLC with the proviso 
that man was freely engaged with the Holy Spirit in the 
innovation of His Adyoc . This would not have to 
exclude the immanence of the logos as. the ground of the 
X6ioc cpvocwC nor would it render superfluous the 
presence of the Holy Spirit as the agent of the deifica- 
tion that guaranteed the bearing of Xdyo6 käpýewC 
on man's evolution. We have already suggested in the 
commentary on Part II(a) above that this factor might be 
called X6yo4,; k prewr. , connoting 7u; 3c , while 
explicitly referring the ontological root of person to 
the logos. This is a way of saying that the whole of 
man's being is dependent on and derived from the logos 
both in its physical and existential or personal aspects, 
that it requires the agency of the Holy Spirit to 
activate the Xd-os näpEewc and through it the 
x6yoc cvosws by means of a rpd, xoc U.. pEewt 
which would ensure that the totality of man's being was 
related to the Logos, but that his actual taking possess- 
ion of that being in a personal way was equally dependent 
on the synergy of man and the Spirit, so that while person 
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as well as physis is rooted in the Logos, the activation of 
personal existence requires the intervention of the Spirit 
who dynamizes created person and makes man to be ? &v in a 
way that is analogous to the rcv proper to the Word, but 
on the assumption that man embodies the Xdyoc cpvocwG 
and X6yo6 kdpeewr. imparted to him by the Logos. Other- 
wise there would be nothing to dynamize, no one to live 
with shared life. This leaves us with the question of 
whether the %o Ldti1S is to be thought of primarily in 
terms of person or nature. It can be safely said that 
this is wrapped in some obscurity, both because of the 
intrinsic opacity of the problem and because we have no 
specific statement from Maximus on the subject. We can 
hazard the guess that it is in some way bound up with 
both aspects of human being: with its nature and its 
? 6Toc , which it either restores to its proper 
functioning or enhances in a new way, the former alterna- 
tive being more probable in the patristic context of 
Maximus' system, but not excluding the personal dimension 
and its innovatory function, so that like cýo'C itself 
it can be thought of as partaking of oZo Ca and 
b%6otiaoLc and so, in some way, as being expressive 
of them both. If 66woLS is understood to be the 
culmination of the process of the evolution of man under 
the influence of the Holy Spirit, then we can think of 
this quality as O wots in the making: it is 
, xpds 86wa. s510 either basically logical with a 'tropical' 
bias or primarily 'tropical' on a logical basis. The 
affinity of 70G and %oi&Tf6 makes us incline to 
the latter option. In a trinitarian context we can 
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definitely say that enhypostasisation take© a place in 
relation to the Logos and that the synergy which effects 
this is due to the Holy Spirit and His inpouring of 
äYä7LTI being received by man in personal freedom. 
A6yoc b'xap cwc can be aligned with CCxwv while 
tip67, oc b7ý4cwC refers rather to 
bµoCwoLc 
This would claim that man is fully constituted as human 
person in relation to the Logos, but that the actuation 
of his personal being requires the intervention of the 
Spirit with its connotations of hypostatic synergy and 
%e P LXW pTlQ Lr, so that the person in act is the 
living person, a dynamic and existential concept. 
This is revealed in a scrutiny of the simple 
language used by the Christian man who knows that he can 
say: 'I am', referring to his person; 'I have', with 
reference to his nature and 'I do' as expressive of his 
living activity by which he is what he becomes and he 
becomes what he does. In this scheme man will be 
ccv as 'I am' and 'I have' ; 
`Oµo two t, ý as 'I do'. 
The possibility of being what I do is already present in 
what I become. It is to that possibility that e txwv 
primarily refers while 6LoCwOLc undoubtedly refers to 
actualisation, something indicated in our present text by 
e9Wa LS. This is an analysis of the Christian 
possession, in the act of Christian living, of creature- 
hood. An advantage of this way of thinking is that the 
'I' is common to the three statements but with different 
connotations because of different ways of looking at the 
concrete man and by isolating different relationships for 
clarification while not suggesting that there are 
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fragments bound into a whole at this level. 'I am' and 
'I have' refer primarily to man's relation to the Logos 
and his character as c txc5v ; 'I dolt not discarding 
'I am' and 'I have', refers above all to the relationship 
to the Holy Spirit who energizes man in his personal 
evolution. This does leave us with some obscurity with 
regard to the distinction between A6yoc and rp6, Ko4; 
when used in conjunction with DxapF. cc : it suggests 
that there is a 'principle of existence' and a 'mode of 
existence'. Heretofore we have given the rpd, xoC the 
function of being the distinctively personal factor, 
something not in the essential line. We cannot think of 
v7EapE, Ls in itself as being the constitutive element 
in person as it is common to the whole existing man both 
Aöyoc and up k-ort cýoLc and b7ý6oTaacc 
511 
What is at stake here is the reality rather than the 
language. We have distinguished X6yoC from ¶P67LOCand 
aligned X6yoS with cpi5otC and Tpd=c with 
irca. pýcs . This has been adequate for a description 
of the realities in question and it is founded on maximian 
usage. The question is whether in this kind of context we 
need a further refinement and whether the use of X6' oc 
with Di7. apELs is justified because it brings out a 
nuance, enabling us to refer the whole man, in his basic 
structure of nature and person, to the Logos while retain- 
ing rpftor. in this context for the personal evolution 
of man through energy interlocking with the intervening 
Spirit; this would seem to be required by the 'imparting' 
and 'imbuing' of the Pater text. 
512 VT%CLPF. Lr. is 
associated with the idea of person in both schemes . 
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OýOLr. is what men hold in common, that in which they 
participate, but the other terms refer to the possessors 
of the nature in the actuality of existence, the one 
pointing to the principle of that possession, the other to 
its existential evolution. The divine quality would then 
definitely seem to refer to the hypostatic aspect of man 
rather than his physical one, although necessarily imply- 
ing it. There is not a renewal of the Xcyoc cvßswc 
or a modification of that, but rather its innovation 
considered in two phases: woI&ri tp6c OtwaLv and 
6gwmr. : etxwv and 6µoCwoiC , ?ö of 
üiäpecwc 
and ¶pö, xoc kdpFews, 
The other idea in this section has to do with the 
knowledge ( &CYuwoL« )of God. The object of the know- 
ledge is that 'the Lord is good'. 
513 This in turn is the 
way in which those who eat know how the Logos make e 
himself to be 'eatable'. In a previous section we 
interpreted this I7ccYVWßK as knowledge of the X&Yot. 
and eventually the only Logos from whom and to whom the 
x6yo t are derived and return. 9 Ex Ci vcio LC here 
seems to be of a more developed kind. It is undoubtedly 
a spiritual knowledge, something that involves man's 
voVr. , but it partakes too of the properties of 
ai, Qer) ßLC., . This has the immediacy of sense knowledge, 
its experimental character, except at this stage the 
knowledge has to do with the highest object of man's 
perception: the Lord. It is the Logos who gives this 
knowledge: He is the source of this intellectual 
perception and this is bound up with the tasting of the 
food which is the Logos himself the 'bread of life and 
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strength'. 'Taste' corroborates the notion of ato6rraiC 
and strengthens our impression that knowledge here is 
mystical in character and transcends the logical 
categories, whose oblijueness it forsakes for direct 
apprehension of the Lord. 
514 Everything in ultimately 
derived from the Logos and here Maximus is primarily 
concerned with the experience so that we can take it 
that the fact the Logos as bread is apprehended in this 
way is what conveys to man in a superlative way the 
conviction that 'the Lord is good'. 'The Lord is good' 
is a scriptural phrase and so we do not have to think 
that the Lord is necessarily distinct from the Logos 
who imparts this knowledge. If the Lord refers to the 
Father or the Holy Trinity, then the object of the 
knowledge is extended in a personal way but not sub- 
stantially, since to know the Logos is to know God and 
it is in and through the Logos that the Father and the 
Spirit are known. Whether the humanity assumed by the 
Logos is here in question as object of the knowledge is 
not clarified. To taste the food is to have intellectual 
perception that the food, which is the Logos, is good. 
This kind of immediacy in knowledge presumes that it is 
taking place with another kind of relationship than that 
demanded in noetic appropriation of the Xbyot. and even 
of the Logos perceived as one. Here there is a 
distinctly new kind of apprehension and we know that it 
takes place within the relationship of & d%Y or 
synergy about which we have spoken above, that 
ecoxoYCds the knowledge proper to 6two ., which is 
the unfolding of the life made possible by that Oe Ca 
7Co a dTIC granted by the Logos to those who eat him. 
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We have to remember too that Maximus dea cribe s the 
bread as 'of life and power'. AvvaµLC is a divine 
attribute515 made manifest in Christ516 and through him 
in the Christian life of grace, 
517 the power of God 
expressed in his operation518 and in this context issuing 
in the divine quality that makes 8twoLC. possible, 
comething in which man participates because he is fed on 
the Bread which is the Logos. Christ himself is the 
bvvaýtLg of God, 
519 to participate in Him is to parti- 
oipate in that power; the Holy Spirit is the büvap. c 
of Christ520 and as we have seen it is through this power 
and synergic 
in 
it that O woir. is brought about. 
In this section then, the Logos is the dominant 
notion, weaving the other ideas together and providing 
the basis of integrating these considerations into the 
Part I as a whole and beyond that into the whole treatise 
and finally in the thought of Maximus in all its length 
and breadth. 
Part II(c) (897A-900D) 
Before we look at the content of this section it 
will be advisable to take note of terminological factors 
that have bearing on what Maximus wants to say. Firstly, 
the 'Our Father' describes the bread for which man is to 
pray as 97ct, oßacoc . If this is derived from the 
verb el C, 'I am', then it can mean 'substantial', 
'suited to one's nature', or 'supernatural', 'super- 
substantial'. This is the primary sense attached to the 
terms by Maximus since his exegesis is dominantly 
spiritual here. But he does not neglect the other 
304 
possibility either, presuming that the adjective may be 
derived from ct. tL , 'I go', and then it could mean 
either 'pertaining to the future, to the world to come', 
or in a more down to earth sense, 'daily' or 'for the 
day'. In fact when Maximus wants to introduce the latter 
meaning of the word, he gives Uptµepo, 
521 
as its 
equivalent. The qualification oAµepov will have to be 
modified according to the way 97CL0v0 ior. is intended. 
If it means 'supersubstantial' then, as Maximus points 
out, o1jµepov must mean 'this age', 
522 the present 
state of the world in its post-Resurrection and ante- 
Parousia condition, while it must mean 'to-day' if 
97CLovaLoC; is interpreted to mean 'daily', 'for the 
day'. 523 
Here we find Maximus concerned, first of all, that 
524 
we should ask for 'the bread of life and knowledge'; 
then he raises the problem of how to reconcile this 
petition of asking for bread with the command of the 
Lord not to be solicitous , but to seek the kingdom of 
God and His justice above all. Here there has obviously 
been a shift in the meaning of 'bread'. He then provides 
ascetical principles for the use of temporal goods and 
finally exhorts his readers, in a splendid parainetic 
passage, to regulate their lives on'the basis of the 
distinctions he has made between what is eternal and 
what is passing. 
Maximus shows his hermeneutical preference in dealing 
with this petition by identifying the 'bread' with the 
Logos. In the previous section we have seen that the 
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Logos becomes everything to those nourished on virtue and 
wisdom, that He is the 'substantial and living bread for 
the nourishment of our souls'. 
525 Here, He becomes 'the 
bread of life and full knowledge' and at the beginning of 
the next section 'the incorruptible bread of wisdom'. 
526 
In the corresponding Part I, 4, He is described as 'the 
bread of life and strength'527 and later again as 'the 
bread of knowledge', 
528 
while in Part 111,4 we find that 
He is 'the bread of life, wisdom, knowledge and justice'. 
529 
These are obviously glosses on the Johannine 'I am the 
bread of life '530 and Maximus bolsters up his interpreta- 
tion by citing Matthew 6,25,32-33, in which men are 
exhorted to seek first the tingdom and justice of God. It 
is noteworthy that Maximus does not interpret the 'bread' 
in a eucharistic way, at least not overtly. In fact, here 
Maximus is more akin to Origen than to any of his other 
great predecessors, with his emphasis on the spiritual 
character of the Logos-bread and the relation of the 
recipients' capacity to subjective worthiness. 
531 It is 
the relationship of the Logos to men, whose Aöyoi, are 
dependent on Him and who need to be nourished by Him, that 
ensures the continuity between here and the hereafter. To 
use the words of the dominical prayer is to ask for fuller 
participation in the Logos so that man, the existent 
? 6ioc Oacwc , may 'to-day' become more identified 
with the Source of his being, progressing from civat, 
through ski eivag, to disc swat. . Maximus will 
refer to this below as a formation 'by firmness in good- 
ness'. 
532 The scriptural sequence of the prayer is under- 
pinned by the variations in the use of X6T0C so that we 
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find the themes of 'Name' and 'will' of God given further 
development here where the one praying asks for a fuller 
personal identification with the Logos for Whom he wants 
to find a new embodiment in himself. 
The bread which the prayer would have us ask from 
the Father is described as the 'bread of life and full 
knowledge' and immediately life is contrasted with 
'death' . 
533 Man was made for life, for incorruptibility 
and immortality. This life was to have been a participa- 
tion in the life proper to God, but man rejected the 
divine offer by sin to death. It is crucial to note that 
the immortality of mankind was 'in the beginning'534 to 
have depended on the Logos. But the mystery of man's 
freedom is respected too by the indication of an interval 
between his creation and the eating of the bread that 
would have assured his immortality. As Dalmais points 
out, 
535 the whole question of the relationship between 
life and knowledge in the destiny of Adam presented 
Maximus with a thorny problem, which he does not attempt 
to solve in the Pater Noster. The fruit of the tree of 
knowledge could not have been denied to Adam indefinitely 
in the perspective of an Alexandrian view of sin, which 
was so tied up with the notion of ignorance. Origen and 
Gregory of Nyssa even seem to suggest that an experimental 
knowledge of good and evil was a stage on-the way to the 
realization of the plenitude of life. 
536 
Maximus 
prudently sensed danger in that kind of hypothesis and 
suggested to his friend Thalassius that there may have 
been two trees, that of life and knowledge, which would 
be ways of describing a twofold power of discernment in 
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man, one corresponding to the tree of life would be wisdom 
in man's voUis , enabling him to distinguish the intelli- 
gibles from the sensibles, the temporal from the eternal, 
the other at the level of sense would enable him to 
distinguish between bodily pleasure and pain. 
537 In the 
Ambigua we have an interpretation that corresponds to 
that in the Pater Nos ter. Referring to Adam he says : 
If he had trusted in God rather than in his mate 
he would have been nourished on the tree of life; 
he would not have lost the gift of immortality but 
would have 14ept it for ever by participating in 
life, because all life is conserved by right and 
fitting nourishment. Now, the nourishment of this 
happy life is the bread that comes down from 
heaven and gives life to the world as the Word of 
truth has revealed about Himself in the Gospels. 
The first man, not having been willing to nourish 
himself on it, was rightly deprived of divine life 
and fell into another from which death took its 
rise. He decked himself out in irrational wear, 
obscured-the ineffable beauty of the divine life 
and handed the whole of nature over as food for 
death. 538 
Man disqualified himself from sharing in the bread that 
would have enabled him to avoid sin and death. The 'over 
and above' held out to him as a possibility on condition 
that he feeds on the Logos who is 'the bread of life' 
may evoke platonic associations here because of its 
Alexandrian provenance, but it is hard to avoid the 
conclusion that we are again being confronted with the 
distinction between principle of nature and principle of 
hypostasis. It is the first man's failure to accept his 
invitation to hypostatic status, to become a son in the 
Son, that deprives him of the consequences of that 
condition: incorruptibility and immortality which are 
necessarily divine gifts, in no way within man's own 
competence to create. 
539 Without the Logos, who is the 
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bread of life, he dies. It is the Logo, who by His 
condescension entered man's condition and put 8n his 
humanity, who restores that lost immortality. The mystery 
of His feeding man on bread is the mystery of man's 
dependence on Him to become a person, not alone to share 
in the nature that is proper to Him with His Father and 
the Holy Spirit, but to participate in His sonahip. He 
the Logos in nature, gives man Xdyoc in nature and 
invites him to the ), oc of pe rs onhoo d, so that 
caught up in His filiation, the Father might take His 
delight in him too and that he. might, through the agency 
of the Spirit, be enabled to say Abba. This is another 
way of saying that man, made in the image of God, was 
destined to become, in dependence on the Logos, also in 
His likeness. As we shall see, this would be in some 
way extended to man's body, become the messenger of a 
soul that was the herald of God. The body too would be 
drawn into the realm of personhood. Because the 'bread' 
has come down from heaven man can ask for it with 
confidence 'to-day', 'in this present age'. 
Maximus then proceeds to remind us that the 
principle formulated in another tradition as quidquid 
recipitur ad modum recipientur recipitur is operative 
here. We are reminded that the Logos is both willing and 
able to provide Himself as bread and this is attributed 
to His being TL%CLV-6pwRoC 1540 which ensures that 
this gesture of benevolence has the same root as the 
whole divine Economy, which has its ultimate source in 
the tender love of God for men. There is no limitation 
in the bread itself. It is men who condition its 
reception. This is measured by the quality of the 
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r% Al ----- 'works''-r+ performed by the recipients. This puts before 
us an anthropology in which man is at once endowed with 
and burdened by freedom and responsibility, while being, 
from another point of view, unconditionally dependent on 
the Logos for whatever is in him. The 'works' evoke the 
idea of the virtues so that coupled with votC 
542 
here we are back to the familiar pair: virtue and wisdom. 
The capacity of man for 'the bread' of life and knowledge' 
will be in proportion to his being when he receives it. 
The relevance of worthiness to voUC is underlined. 
Here we can recall that, while . ubUC does not necessa- 
rily have to relinquish its intellectual connotations, 
it is primarily understood as a capacity for God, 
543 
and 
more specifically in this context, for the Logos. 
'AF. Ca 544 implies due or merit, but since this implies 
a modification of the ability to receive, we can translate 
it as 'capacity'. 'A? Ca would then be something more 
than a moral claim on the fuller participation in the 
Logos that it undoubtedly implies; it would seem to touch 
man at the basis of his ontic structure as capacity for 
God. Another way of putting this would be to suggest that 
voüs and Yv4LT connote personhood and that knowledge 
and virtue at their apex are fused into a single experience 
of the self-giving of God in Christ. 
The quotation from Matthew 6545 provides the way of 
transition from bread understood as the Logos to bread in 
its mundane sense. Maximus shows that there is no 
opposition, apparent or real, between bread understood as 
the Logos and this passage from Matthew. Most obviously 
310 
the 'kingdom and justice' of Matthew can be identified 
with the Logos and there the difficulty would end. But 
it is possible that Maximus intends a more nuanced 
squaring of the two scriptural passages, the dominical 
petition in the 'Our Father' and the injunction of the 
Matthew text. If Maximus is identifying the 'kingdom 
and justice' of the commandment given in Matthew with the 
foregoing petitions, 'Thy Kingdom come, Thy will be done', 
then we have further evidence of his concern to highlight 
the play of human will when he deals with the theme of 
the intervention of the Holy Spirit and more pertinently, 
when he interprets the doing of the will of the Father as 
union with the angels in cosmic liturgy. He is saying 
here that if there is union between the divine and human 
wills with regard to the coming of the kingdom and the 
doing of the will of God, then the '1 uävTa of 
Matthew will be added to man and it is as such that he 
must ask for them, as bread for the day. Maximus then 
accepts, if in a secondary way, the realistic tradition 
with regard to this petition of the 'Our Father' to be 
found in the teaching of Gregory of Nyasa, John 
Chrysostom and Cyril of Alexandria. 
546 The dominical 
emphasis on the priority of the transcendental order 
makes the first interpretation of 'bread' necessary, as 
Maximus sees it, but he does not fail to turn his 
attention to the humbler semantic possibility, that 
'bread' also refers to the Tpognj a. Coernij , 
necessary to the preservation of man in so far as he 
makes part of the x6aµog atoeTrroC , the order of 
Vkq 9 He introduces it by saying 'if', 
547 his 
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treatment is hypothetical, which ensures that he does not 
neglect a possible meaning of the language of the prayer, 
but it leaves the symbolic interpretation beyond argument 
for him. 
What Maximus wants to ensure in our use of the 
temporal goods is that we do not forget our mortal 
condition. This will be expressed in confining our 
petition for bodily bread to the needs of each day, thus 
eliminating solicitude from our attitude to earthly goods, 
which will be in turn a free anticipation of death and a 
liberation of man's natural inclination to the good. The 
bread which sustains our fleeting life on earth, 'lasting 
for a day' is corruptible, pertaining to the order of the 
sensible which has not yet been integrated into the order 
of the spirit after the model of the ascended Logos 
incarnate. Since the äp'coc Z'gAj Lepoc is necessary in 
our present condition which is 'passing like a shadow', 
548 
that is subject to mortality, then it must be sought in 
the light of that sobering truth. To identify a state of 
material change with the permanence of beatitude is to be 
totally confused; it is to forget man's mortal condition 
and to indulge in a XAOI 
549 that deprives men of 
dxMecLa . The basic illusion would be to miscalculate 
the meaning of time, 'envisaging with cupidity many 
periods of years'. 
550 
fAeovcECM is here a blanket 
term for the helplessness of man, fascinated as he is 
with the material, because of his subjection to the 
passions. The radical character of man's perversion is 
seen as the 'turning the use of the natural inclination 
towards matter' . 
551 Man's X6yoc 9 3oewc necessarily 
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/ 
relates him to the Logos, but in his fall he substituted 
CPLXavtiCm for cY&. 71 . Instead of fulfilling his 
mediatorial vocation, he tried to divinize matter and 
assume the role of God, only to find himself the slave of 
his passions, bound to corruption and generation, caught 
into the fallen dialectic of pleasure and pain and bound 
to his ego as the false pivot of the universe instead of 
being related to God and the willing recipient of 
, rd xdv'ra, of His Providence. 
552 Asceticism for the 
Fathers is largely a matter of remembering death, 
precisely because that places us squarely in the truth. 
Dalmals has pointed out that Maximus here recalls a pre- 
occupation of Platonic-Stoic553 philosophy and we note 
that Maximus introduces the adverb 9 ooögw6 
554 
But the philosophy of Christ is based on the Paschal 
Mystery in which death undergoes a total transformation, 
so that the willing anticipation of death, which Maximus 
recommends here, is a progressive identification with what 
Christ achieved and a preparation to enter into it fully 
at the moment of literal death. Death is the absolute 
detachment; it is inevitable, in the way of cpvoLc 
555 
as man possesses and experiences it and it will cut him 
off at a stroke from the life that is tied to corrupti- 
bility. To enter into it by willing degrees is to substi- 
tute the nails of Christ for the material nails that pin 
man to corruptible things and to release himself for the 
reception of the 'abundance of divine benefits'. 
556 
Contemplation is inaccessible without the virtue that 
ensures detachment from obsession with the material. 
557 
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The series of exhortations which Maximus appends to 
these reflections are the practical counterpart of 
Christian insight and they are remarkable not merely for 
their uncompromising character, but also for their 
refreshing equilibrium. They may be summed up as a 
directive to eat to live to God which will typify cleaving 
tenaciously to 'the only life of the spirit' and using 
'the present life in order to lay hold of it'. 
558 This 
will depend on valuing God 'as we have been taught'559 
and consequently having the ability to evaluate every- 
thing else in relation to Him. A6yoC demands that 
man should live consistently with his participation in 
it; to reverse proper order is to be liable to the 
charge of 'living for the sake of eating'. 
560 That is 
to live below the human level, in a way that befits 
cpv0LC äxoyos 0561 To 
live in keeping with 
93GLC XoYLxq is to be disposed for 'the life of 
the spirit'. 
562 As we have seen Adyoc and vo% 
may be used interchangeably, depending on which model 
Maximus has in mind at the time. IIvct a is thrown 
into relationship with X yo« here, where X6yoS 
designates the spiritual dimension of man's being. 
563 
If there is to be a nuance in the use of voür., it 
has possibly to do with what is uppermost in the mind 
of the writer in any particular context. If vo1C or 
%6yor. can designate the openness of man to God, then 
, XV8%La- will describe the same situation, but with 
more emphasis on the divine activity. This does not dis4v- 
allow the use of %veüµa as virtually synonymous with 
. voSC 
or X6yoc when the occasion demands. In this 
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context to be 'logical' is to 'cleave tenaciously to the 
one and only life in the spirit'. This means that wo must 
'use the present (life) in order to lay hold of it' . 
564 
The perfection of the life in spirit is for the hereafter, 
but it is being appropriated by every logical gesture 
which man can produce in this life, so that the regulation 
of the humbler side of human existence is a matter of 
considerable importance for Christian spirituality: 
For that reason we love to make use of it to this 
extent that we do not avoid sustaining it by bread 
alone and preserving incorruptible, in so far as it 
is allowed, its natural healt, not that we may live, 
but that we may live to God. 5 
Here the upward thrust of the argument of Maximus breaks 
through to its object: the life to which we are called is 
not merely that of the urbane philosopher, regulated by 
reason, but a life centred in God. In fact the bond 
between the ? 6yog 9*6oewc and the Logos so far 
transcends a theory of world-soul that Christian reason- 
ableness is a factor in an interpersonal relationship 
between man and the 'Logos. This humanizing truth ensures 
that there is no trace of an unbalanced asceticism here, 
but rather an exhortation to take reasonable care of one's 
bodily health. 566 This seems to be the first time that 
such teaching is made so explicit in the ascetical teaching 
of the Church. It is something new. But we are left in 
no doubt about the quality of the attention which the body 
deserves: we are not to avoid sustaining it by bread alone, 
but always confining our reasonable concern 'to one day'. 
There is to be no enthusiasm, just the minimum of attention 
required for basic health and given in a way that will not 
distract man from 'living for God'. Maximus goes on to say: 
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We make the body, rendered reasonable by the virtues, 
the messenger of the soul and we make the latter, 
formed by firmness in goodness, the herald of God. 567 
TMµm will extend beyond man's physical body to his life 
characterized by somatic dominance so that the virtues will 
have to do with the regulation of psychosomatic functions, 
that is the passions, with their neuro-endocrine dimension, 
as well as keeping the body as such in ascetical trim. 
Maximus requires vigils and fasts as well as singing the 
psalter and praying. 
568 It is clear : thiA here crux j 
represents the higher principle in man, 
569 that by which 
he relates directly to God and which is set in order by 
the higher virtues of faith, hope and charity, so that 
here we have the traditional hierarchy of body, soul and 
God, where body must be subject to soul and soul must be 
subject to God. 
570 In another scheme, this is how image 
grows into likeness or again how etvaL evolves into 
&e C stvai. through chi elvat. . The reference to 
'messenger' and to 'herald' remind us of the role of the 
Incarnate Logos as 'the Angel of the Great Counsel' and 
5? 1 
man's vocation to participate in that angelic role, 00 
that here again the presence of X6yoC in the life of 
man is a guarantee of his being enfolded by the Counsel of 
God and a striking manifestation of the presence of God in 
his people. 
Part III, 4,572 
In this final resume, Maximus simply says: 'He who 
is the bread of life, wisdom, knowledge and justice, moves 
our appetite insatiably to Himself'. The singling out of 
appetite is suggested by the notion of the Logos as bread. 
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It emphasizes the volitional and conative aide of man's 
constitution and this is how Maximus primarily inserts man 
into the great sweep of yt veot, 6, xCvjotC and o'tdot. c , 
a process that is perfected when yvwµT is informed with 
divinizing &yd, -n 0 
573 The adverb 'insatiably' is 
dictated by the character of the Logos, not to be defined 
in merely creaturely terms; He is the eternal Logos, the 
beginning and end of man's being, the principle of his 
teleological bias and movement. The question of the 
affinity of the notion of dxopeoTwc with h9xtaoLC 
associated with the teaching of Gregory of Nyssa, might be 
574 
raised here. Garrigues has pointed out that even in 
his earlier works we find Maximus balancing the play of 
free-will with the silent aspiration of nature towards 
God. 'This natural dynamism, when it is freed and 
transposed by grace Ahto personal liberty, gives to nature 
the stability and the energy necessary to attach itself to 
its ultimate Good'. 
575 So in Maximus the insatiability 
will be finally satisfied in hypostatic aTd1oLc 
Here, Maximus describes the logos as bread in the 
0 
language of Scripture : he is 'the bread of life g wisdom, 
knowledge and justice'. These qualities are said to be in 
Christ or they are identified with Him, so that they 
primarily refer to the Logos himself. But He shares these 
qualities with us in making us to participate in his 
property of being Logos. That is why we are taught to ask 
for this bread in the 'Our Father'. Zwfj is basic 
enough to precede definition, but in the Fathers in general 
and in Maximus in particular it has the nuance, if nuance 
be required, and eternal life in contrast to physicgl life 
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and the life of sin. 
576 XoCPCa is a supreme category 
in the thought of Maximus and it is communicated to men by 
God. 'God knows Himself from His own ble©oed e©senoe, and 
the things He has made from His Wisdom, through which and 
in which He made all things' ; 
577 'The mind, joined with 
God and abiding with Him through prayer and charity, 
becomes wise, good, powerful, benevolent, merciful, long- 
suffering; in a word, it contains in itself practically 
all the divine attributee'. 
578 In Capitum de Caritate 
Qua or Centuriae, Maxiaue argues that if Christ 
579 
dwells in our hearts by faith and if all the treasures of 
wisdom and knowledge are hid in Him, 'then all the 
treasures of wisdom and knowledge are hid in our hearte'580 
too. We have already seen something of the place of 
yvWQ LC in the theology of Maximus. Here it is 
attributed primarily to the Son who knows the Father and 
Who reveals Him to those whom He chooses. 
581 It enables 
man to know the Holy Trinity, Providence, things invisible 
and things visible. In its higher reaches it is identified 
with eco)oyCa , the supreme knowledge open to man. 
Finally the Logos is said to be the bread of justice or 
righteousness. Maximus has already associated justice 
with the kingdom of God and we suggested that he may have 
referred it to the third petition of the 'Our Father', 
582 
so that here it would refer to the identity of the will of 
the Logos with the will of His Father. Elsewhere we saw 
him link justice to exact knowledge, 
583 but we have no way 
of knowing if he intends that here. The dubious Loci 
Communes quote Scripture, but deal mainly with justice as 
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an ethical virtue. 
584 In the usage of the Fathers we find 
that ö xmLwß 11, can refer to justice or righteousness 
in general585 or to the justice or righteousness of God, 
586 
587 
especially to Christ as the justice or righteousness of God. 
Christ's righteousness justifies sinners and the justice of 
man is obtained from Christ. 
588 We can reasonably take it 
for granted that Maximus has this in mind here and that 
justice, associated with the Logos, is salvific justice, 
that is the merciful fidelity of God. Again we are 
confronted with the interplay of Christology and anthro- 
pology, where our becoming what God wills in His merciful 
fidelity is at once dependent on the initiative of Christ 
and on man's fitting response. 
(iv) Restoration of nature to itself 
Part I, 5.589 
In this section we are presented with the vision of 
the Logos restoring nature to itself and so creating one 
new man. It is concerned with the personal way in which 
the Logos effected this and the implications that this has 
for the rest of men. Again the evidence for what the 
Logos achieved is found in scripture and interpreted by 
means of fundamental anthropological concepts in the 
f N; laximian system: 440 LS and 7v(1'1 . It is His 
Incarnation ( yevdµsvoc äv6pwwoc ) 
590 first of all that 
brings about the condition of the relationship of yvt p 
to nature that ensures the integrity of human being and 
is the source of the unity of all men in human nature. 
We should notice here the use of TV4LT to designate the 
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human will of Christ, something that Maximus will 
abandon later in his theological development. 
591 This 
does not mean that there is anything heteredox about 
its usage here. It merely affirms the presence of 
human will in Christ and the right use which He made of 
it. Here we may recall that O Xiµa was used in Part 
3, where Maximus was concerned with a will that was 
common to all the XoyLxoC as created. Here he is 
more concerned with the personal determination of will 
and the bearing that has on the oneness of mankind. 
rvwµq connotes this. The dispassionate tolerance 
of Christ's Passion provides evidence of this 
äýcä6e La and even more of a strong decision to die 
on behalf of His executioners, evidence of supreme 
love: in this way 'the voluntary character of the 
passion ratified by the philanthropic disposition of 
the one who suffered is shown'. 
592 In this context 
Maximus is concerned with the unforgiving spirit that 
blights every relationship marred by hatred; he finds 
this exemplified in the opposition of those under the 
law to those outside the law, who are reconciled in 
principle by His having broken down the wall of 
partition. The language here is somewhat obscure: 
Maximus may have written äcav CaaC not aacPiv Coat 
593 
the sense seems to be, at any rate, that the Old Law 
was surpassed by the New, which was realized by Christ 
on the cross: the laws of love and forgiveness would 
be common to all His followers and so unite 'those far 
away and those who were near', 
544 
used paradigmatically 
here for all forms of opposition in human relationships. 
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The 'one new man', created by the incarnate Logos making 
peace and reconciling 'us' through himself to the Father 
and with one another, is not confined to a reconciliation 
of Jews and Gentiles. Because the 'one man' extends to 
us, He extends in intention to all men, and demands the 
healing of every kind of division that springs from 
hatred and the cure for which is the kind of forgiveness 
exemplified in the crucified Christ, something that can 
be realized only because of the presence of a new kind 
of love, the &y&q shown by Christ, and communicated 
to us by the Holy Spirit. 
The implication here is that nature was, in some 
way, estranged from itself and is in need of reconcilia- 
tion with itself. Nature here is considered to be the 
basis of yvWpTj , that on which YvwµrJ is founded, 
from which it springs. It is the ground of Yvw4L11 
This nature was implacably at war with itself because 
of the sin that Christ nailed in record to the ,; cross. 
The source of the division is clearly defined when we 
are told that the new unity achieved by Christ is 
because of 'no longer having the Yu44L71 at loggerheads 
with the principle of nature, ( ? 6yor. cpvaewr. )#0595 
The idea of ground is alluded to agairihen we are 
reminded that men bound into the unity of the new man 
would be 'immutable in free-will as well as in physis'596 
The adhesion of yvw4TI to cpvoL( would ensure the 
stability of yv4. T and the unity of men_ with one 
another and with the Father through Christ and in the 
Holy Spirit. 
Nature here is what men hold in common and what the 
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Logos took hold of hypostatically in his Incarnation. 
Maximus obviously thinks of nature as a unity and a 
principle of unity. Nor does he suggest that it has its 
source of division in itself, but rather in the 
s 
yvc: µAt that tear it asunder and make it to be at war 
with itself, where will, while being a constituent 
element of nature itself, must be thought of as having 
a personal determination. The idea of nature as a unity 
must surely have associations of the concrete universal 
of Gregory of Nyssa597 and, beyond that, in the notion 
of the one nature of God possessed personally by the 
Three. 598 In Part 1.3. Maximus was concerned with the 
unity of created nature but here it is undoubtedly the 
unity of human nature that engages his attention and we 
have already marked the difference in terminology by 
which he speaks about the faculty of will in both 
contexts : in the former as 6 X-nµm , as if to choose 
the most generic term to indicate the ability to will in 
man which he holds in common with all the ? oYLxoC ; 
it is this coupled with a common createdness that 
initiates him into the company of the angels in their 
common response to God as First Cause; in the latter as 
Yv(iµi. where he is concerned with a principle of 
division, which cannot be O XTIµa as such, which is, 
as we have just pointed out, an element of cýoLC 
itself, and so it must be will with a difference, will 
determined in a personal way by the individual possessors 
599 
of the common nature. This does not suggest that 
YvwµTI is not active in the union with the angels, but 
it is not so basic a principle of voluntary unity as 
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e6XTµa is. rv4 rj must identify itself with 
UX71µa , as rooted in the X6yo4 9acwc , which 
is the principle of consistency of the order of nature. 
In this discussion we have to keep in mind the 
theological conception of man and his relation to God 
which modifies everything that Maximus says, and which 
is marked by the contrast and complementarity of two 
irreducible orders of being: 4üaLC and k6or. .o, 
600 
Both are relationships to the Logos, created participa- 
tions in what is proper to Him. 44OLC is the result 
of the free and consistent synergy between the Logos and 
man on an objective basis. It is what man has from the 
Logos. From another point of view, it is what he is in 
contrast to who he is. `Yxdotiaoi. C on the other 
hand is the basis of the synergy between man and the 
Logos on a subjective basis: who man is. The former is 
objective, the latter is subjective, the former is 
immanent, the latter is transcendent, 601 the former is 
ovo Ca or cpvo LC, the latter is k6crao t, t, 
the former is ? cyoc cpüaewC , the latter is 'rp&or. 
b7capF. Ews : the former I have g the latter I am, 
both of which issue in what I do. What I have from the 
Logos is nature; life is what I freely do with the 
X&Yoc on the basis of what I freely have from the 
Logos. In the theology of the Fathers this ideal state 
of affairs either never obtained in fact or was short 
lived because of the cataclysm of the Fall, 
602 
so that 
cpvoýs, is in reality the result of a refracted 
interaction between the Logos and man on an objective 
basis. Man negates Him and He negates man's negation 
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to redeem him. In this phase b7c6o'tao i. c in man 
implies the mystery of the refracted interaction between 
man and the Logos on a subjective basis whereby man 
negates Him as his Myoc b7Ip&MC and He negates his 
negation as a presupposition to man's redemption in 
order to redeem man. While historically this state 
obtained before the Redemption, it is now present in man 
to the extent that he is not yet fully redeemed. 
If we think of YvwlLIl as the immediate source of 
man's wrong use of his freedom and hie setting in train 
the baneful effects of his perversity, then we realize 
that yvwµi is man's ability for freedom, marked by 
his kdßuaotc 0 
603 that the divisions in nature 
created as one are due to personal waywardness on the 
part of men. The implications from the text are that 
YV4Ln was not preserved passionless in its relation 
to nature, that it was in a state of revolt, that it was 
shaken from its basis in nature, that hatred is of prime 
importance in considering the rifts in nature, implacably 
at war with itself, that Yuwµ11 opposed the X&(o 
cps oswc and that men were changeable in YVC 71 
The principle of stability is therefore X6Yo6 c5ocwc. 
and it is obviously meant to have a bearing on the state 
and condition of YvCZµTI . In the context of what we 
have outlined above the A6YoC 93ocwc will be the 
principle immanent to man which constitutes him as a man, 
a member of the human race, possessed of a nature that is 
human, enjoying access to the locus of interaction between 
the Logos and men on an objective basis. The idea of 
xayor. as fundamental to cpvoLC 9 while it is 
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undoubtedly immanent to man, has a relationship to the 
Logos whoL. 'ia the transcendent source of the Xöyoi, 
604 
the basis and ground of natural consistency, the 
incorruptible reason of nature's constancy, the secret 
of its objectivity. To recall the terminology above, the 
%6yos cpvacws is the immanent principle of what man 
has or even of what he is in contrast to who he is. 
PvW%µn on the other hand is presented here as subject 
to inconsistency, to liability to change and to becoming 
the source of fragmentation and disorder. The (v(LAn 
is subject to passions and the possibility of revolt and 
of being prized away from its basis in c3OLC , of 
opposing the X6yoC cvaCw6 The X6yoc cvaswC in 
this context is definitely thought of gs normative and 
foundational. This is obviously because of its being 
rooted in the Logos, and in some sense indefectibly so. 
rv4µn , on the other hand, bespeaks a possibility of 
failure and while it too must signal acceptance of the 
primacy of the Logos, we know from man's history that it 
has, or he through it, has attempted to throw off this 
'given', this ontological necessity. 
605 Here Maximus is 
suggesting that Tv(Z4n and more radically its hypostatic 
source, will be in a proper relationship to the Logos if 
they accept the exigencies of ? 6yoc gvoewC This 
is the norm for a proper relationship to the Logos in 
the hypostatic order. Man cannot indulge in the luxury 
of wanting a personal relationship to the Logos while 
neglecting the correspondingly necessary relationship of 
(PvoLr. and its X6yo4 . To attempt this is to be 
divided in himself and to cause division in society, 
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because of the dominance of passion and its divisive 
effects. This shows that man in his person had chosen 
to condemn the dictates of nature as a whole, which is 
Godward in its essence. Maximus does not here treat of 
the complementary possibility for man in his person and 
freedom, that of innovating nature, in an explicit and 
positive way, but he does so by simply affirming what 
the Logos Incarnate has done and the implications for 
mankind which are evident in his saving action. 
Maximus puts the fact of the hypostatic union at 
the basis of the unification of man visualized in this 
section: ycvdµcuoc ävOpwoQ 0 
606 There could 
be no rift in nature as the result of the abuse of 
freedom in His case since He personally is the Logos 
from whom the %6yoc gvocwc of his humanity is 
derived and who imparts a personal impress to His use 
of will; in the language of this phase of Maximus' 
theology His yv4 was indefectible as well as His 
Myos , since it is rooted in the same Logos as 
Hypostasis, so that inconsistency in the use of His 
human will would imply some kind of inconsistency in 
the divine Logos himself, something unthinkable, so 
that the principle that is deployed in the whole of 
this Christology is here applicable too: 'To speak in 
general, all that is natural in Christ has also, joined 
to its a6yoc , the mode 
(4p &ýoc) which is above 
nature'. 
607 Besides in his divine and unique hypostasis 
there is no place for fluctuation and hesitation. 
608 
So 'he preserved YVt Tl passionless in its relation to 
the nature'. 
609 Likewise it was not in a state of 
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revolt from cpva Lc nor shaken from its base in 
(pßß LC . Christ's personal human will was in perfect 
harmony with the totality of hie nature as a man and, 
beyond that, with its ground which was Himself in 
person. Maximus appreciated the historical unfolding of 
that perfection, especially in its expression in the 
Passion, where the Hypostatic Union takes on its 
historical dimensions and retains its transcendent 
consistency even to the acceptance of death to give 
life to man. 
610 
The measure of the unifying love 
displayed by the Incarnate Logos was in His choice of 
death instead of life on behalf of His persecutors 
paradoxically producing unity through the result of 
Adam's sin. The annulling of hatred is then invoked 
as further evidence for and a key to the restoration of 
nature. 
611 The 'one new man' who is created is capable 
of embracing everyman with his yv4r, through the 
logical use of his yvuiµrý There is a depth of meaning 
behind the expression 9va xaavdv ävOpwcov into 
which the two were created. Here Maximus is not 
discussing the unity of nature merely. He is treating 
rather the total unity of each man because of the 
harmony of his A6yo4; cpýaewc and his yvWµ'n and by 
implication his int6otiaot. ; since OaLc is 
thought of as one because of its X6ioc , then the 
/ concert of yv(Zpcti will ensure the union of all men 
in one nature, that there will be a hypostatic unity 
because the bxoordoa. a, c. accept the unity of 
cpiia, tc demanded by its one X6yoC , rooted in the 
Logos. "AvOpw7coC here then will have basically a 
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natural connotation but ordered to a hypostatic one. 
This brings us back to the considerations of patriotic 
anthropology which we have outlined above and the twofold 
relationship of man to the Logos. Because the koor&- 
oea4; are derived from and dependent on the Logos when 
they accept the unity of X6yoC c i5ocwC, , then they 
are united to the Logos as koo'rcioe. c . We do not 
have to deal with the innovatory character of the 
hypostatic influence on cpvoi, t here, apart from 
pointing out that it is undoubtedly an aspect of 
Maximus' teaching and would certainly enter into his 
later reflections on this mystery, the mystery of the 
xmt. vör. ävepw cod, , who is one. Ultimately, it is 
the uniqueness of the bx6a'rcto c of the Logos, that 
accounts for the unity of the bioacdacLr. that 
constitutes one new man. 
Although this problem of the relationship of 
Yvwµrý to cpvoc. comes laterýthan the treatment of 
the healing of the divisions through the Incarnate 
Logos and derivately through the mediation of man, 
612 
we can take it from the evidence of this section that 
he considers the unity of man in himself as basic to 
the reconstruction of the fragmented universe and the 
restoration of man's proper relationship to God. This 
he sees achieved in and exemplified by the Incarnate 
Logos himself in whom two natures, human and divine, 
are united in one Person. It is that astounding and 
unprecedented union that makes the other unities 
possible. This is achieved in man analogously. Man 
becomes a true person when (VU T) and cpvo Lr. are 
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co-ordinated in the way that Maximus outlines here. This 
signals the restoration of man to his proper relationship 
to the Logos both as 9vot, c and as bxdoTaoLC and 
we might suggest that the bx6araoLr. has a certain 
priority in this new condition which entitles man to 
participate in the unifications wrought by the Incarnate 
Word. In His case we find one 1xacTaoe` and two 
natures so united that He can restore to unity male and 
female, inhabited earth and paradise, heaven and earth, 
intelligibles and sensibles, God and creatures and this 
He articulates historically by His virginal birth. His 
entry into paradise with the good thief, His ascension, 
His recapitulation of all created powers and finally by 
sitting in His humanity at the right hand of the Father. 
613 
The possibility of these unities obviously hangs on the 
union of divinity and humanity in the one Hypostasis. 
In an analogous way we can claim that the becoming 
mediator by man, in dependence on Christ, will necessitate 
his achieving personality in the way suggested in this 
section with all the overtones of st clvaL and 
dµocwaLr. that it necessarily possesses in a 
maximian context as well as the necessity of the inter- 
vention of the Holy Spirit in terms of synergy, ensuring 
that man is truly related in a hypostatic manner to the 
Logos and through him to the Father whom he addresses as 
Abba. This can be referred to as the mystery of 
enhypostasisation whether we extend it to mean that the 
created hypostases emerge fully when they realize their 
ontological dependence on the Logos and accept it in 
consciousness and will or whether we think of the term 
329 
as pointing out no more than that they are kdoraoLc , 
existing on their own, in contrast to their cilia 
or accidents, that they become truly instanced natures 
in the fully human sense even if they do not yet enjoy 
mystical awareness of this. This would still require 
the ontological support of the Logos in person, so that 
we are left with the vision of all men being one in Him, 
Who is one. Once this integration has been attained, 
then man is ready for the fullness of mediatorial role 
in the universe, capable as he is of &pEtiij, OswpCa 
and 6eoXoyCa in the mystery of 06waLr . It is 
because he enters the mystery of person that this becomes 
possible just as it is because of the int6otiaoLr. of the 
Logos that divinity and humanity can be united uniquely 
in Jesus Christ. 
The fundamental role of A6yoC is again evident in 
this section. It appears in the Person of the Logos and 
His saving intervention in the world. It appears too as 
the foundation of cpi5aic and the source of its 
transcendental relationship to its ground in the Logos. 
The stress on (V LTI must evoke the presence and 
activity of the Holy Spirit, as well as the whole realm 
of btdatacL« , ¶pfto4 
brcQpýcw and so the 
polarity and dialectic of %6yoc - tipd, xot , cpva. Lr. - 
kdotisaL C which is maintained with such finesse 
throughout this work. This is constantly revealing man 
as caught into the mysterious circulation of divine 
life in the Holy Trinity. 
Part II(d) 614 
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In this section Maximus proceeds to assure us that 
he who seeks the 'bread of wisdom' forgives easily 
because his detachment from the visible order renders 
him immune to rancorous vulnerability. His one 
pleasure is the attainment of divine benefits, his only 
pain failing to do so. Then he points to the paradox 
of the words of the dominical prayer which exhort man 
to set himself up as a model for God in forgiveness. 
God wills this to purify him from passion and to remind 
him that his disposition must correspond to the grace 
of divine forgiveness. Since human nature in dissension 
with itself cannot receive the divine condescension, 
free-will must harmonize with the principle of nature. 
The one who asks for 'the bread of knowledge', that is 
for the Logos in person, is disposed to this when he 
prays; so is he who seeks the empirical bread only for 
the day. Both kinds of men need a pure disposition 
towards those who cause them sorrow in order to lay 
hold of the divine benefits that have already been 
detailed and also in order to be freed from temptation 
and evil. 
The root of forgiveness as Maximus understands it 
is the freedom experienced by the man whose good is 
inviolable and cannot be touched by any enmity. What 
that good is we have already been told: it is bound up 
with Tci, äraed conferred on man by God and the 
petition of which takes shape in the Pater Noster. It 
implies the mystery of the hallowing of the Name, the 
coming of the Kingdom, the angelic worship and the 
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Logos-bread and the process of divinization by which man 
shares in God's nature and lives His life. Some of the 
implications of that grace have been spelt out in terms 
of %6ioC as we have seen; and the final touch was 
that those fed with the Logos and in search of the 
Kingdom of God and his Justice are disposed to forgive. 
Behind this claim is the assumption that man is liable 
to hurt and injury and that the instinctive and 
passionate response to this is vengeance. Maximus is 
reminding us that the man whose good transcends the 
conditions of temporal existence is not vulnerable in 
this way, that he cannot be deprived of the Logos and 
all that that implies by any hostile man and so he 
cannot be injured in the essence of his being. There- 
fore there is nothing on account of which he should 
retaliate. He lives on another plane and is invulner- 
able. 
In this section we find a reciprocity of causal- 
ities and influences: seeking the Kingdom and Justice 
of God, of which he cannot be deprived by human male- 
volence, he is disposed to forgive; conversely, 
because he is disposed to forgive he is well placed to 
receive not only the Bread of life but the bread for 
the day which sustains his transient life. To close 
his heart to man is to close his heart to God and so 
to be incapable of receiving the gifts of God, eternal 
and temporal. 
Maximus elaborates the basic tenet in this 
section by reminding us that, while man is subject to 
pleasure and pain in his fallennees, he reaches a stage, 
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through the embodiment of Logos with all its implications, 
in which his one pleasure is , the .. attainment of divine 
things and his one pain the forfeiting of these. 
Pleasure and pain are the product of the Fall as Maximus 
affirms in more than one context; they are the terms of 
a tragic dialectic bound up with generation and corrup- 
tion in which man vainly tries to discover that for which 
he was created and destined. The relative cannot replace 
the absolute, that is God, in man's life. Pleasure and 
pain can only be rectified when, as Maximus avers, man 
returns to his true good and attains 'divine things'. 
In some sense, pleasure and pain are tied to the order 
of cpaMµcva and the a1a6ntiä , but Maximus 
transposes them here and the implication is that the 
appropriate response to aCoernä will be possible 
when God becomes man's joy. 
615 
Then there will be no 
contrary to joy or pleasure, because the alternative to 
the possession of God can in no way be entertained 
together with Him. The pleasures associated with sense 
will be integrated into man's possession of God, adding, 
as Maximus reminds us in the Pater Noster, their own 
energy to man's longing for God and firm holding on to 
Him. 
61 
The distinction which Maximus made between the 
'bread of wisdom' and the bread that sustains man's 
temporal life, in his exposition of the mystery of 
participation in divine life, is carried over into 
this elaboration of how he understands the restoration 
of nature to itself. He organises what he has to say 
primarily around the notion of bread as being the Logos 
and then he turns to the benefits of using the empirical 
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bread in relation to the work of unifying human nature. 
Here he combines an interest in the role of the Logos in 
the life of man with some consideration of how man should 
use his freedom, thus maintaining the co-ordination of 
theological and anthropological concepts in hie exegesis. 
The quality of man's response to the self-offering of the 
Logos-bread is the link for Maximus between the fourth 
and fifth petitions of the 'Our Father' and their corres- 
ponding mysteries. If man appreciates the Logos then he 
is so far removed from the relative trivialities of this 
life that forgiveness comes spontaneously to him. Here 
we have insight into an ascetical emancipation that has 
its focus in the Logos. It is not anthropocentric but 
related to the Logos primarily, another facet of seeking 
firstly the Kingdom of God and His Justice. Because it 
is relational it is basically personal so that although 
we have a precise reference to the faculty of %po- 
aCpeot. , 
617 it is inserted into a personal context: 
'this man holds his free-choice inclined to nothing of 
the sum total of visible things'. 
618 
In the Fall, man 
was seduced by the 'visible', so that here it is 
paradigmatic for the created in so far as it becomes a 
temptation for man and prevents his proper response to 
the logos. Concern with the bodily is presented as the 
source of man's liability to pain. Maximus contrasts 
pleasure and pain and observes their dialectic in the 
context of Fall and Redemption. For him, if man enjoys 
the Logos then the question of pain preventing his 
forgiving the hurt done him does not arise. If 'he 
seeks the incorruptible bread of wisdom', he cannot be 
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diminished in his basic being, which is actuated in what, - 
he does, that is the holding of his icpoaCpeaLC 
inclined to the same sapiential bread. 
619 
The qualifi- 
cation of this maintenance of freedom by ä, xaew6 
620 
evokes the whole patristic tradition of asceticism. 
'A%IscLc is stabilized by freedom in the will; it 
is from this that the inner serenity, impervious to the 
disturbance of passion, comes. Behind this association, 
of freedom and spiritual serenity, Maximus perceives 
the presence of a icii , which informs man's capacity 
for freedom, his wi11,621 which dv2-aelhaf'ev5 his passions 
from their roote dnese in 9LXGUTCa obtaining since 
the Fall622 and which becomes the grouni and unifying 
principle of the virtues in his state of regeneration. 
623 
The implication is that 'the bread of wisdom' is 
incomparably worthy of the striving of man's freedom; 
the co-ordination of the use of the other bread will be 
touched on in a parallel way. Here, the freedom that 
comes from unqualified dedication to the Logos is seen 
to be the basic principle of an ascetical anthropology. 
The whole power of the soul is bent on the Logos; the 
greatest commandment is implemented; &y-ci confers on 
its subject a sovereign freedom in choice, because in 
giving man to the Logos it gives him to himself in 
c rcFovoCa . 
624 'Absolutely no one can lay a hand 
on the good which he strives for longingly'. 
625 That is 
why man cannot be damaged essentially and so does not 
experience the need to forgive as in some way beyond his 
power. 
In his elaboration of why forgiveness comes easily 
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to the man who seeks the Logos-bread he says: 
he knows that the one pleasure consists in the 
attainment of divine things, the giver of which 
is naturally God, the guardian of which is the 
choice of free-will of the one who receives. He 
also knows that the only pain is the failure to 
attain to these; the devil instigates this, but 
everyman, who grows weary of divine things because 
of slackness in his free-will and does not preserve 
the hcnarable with lg g by a disposition of free- 
will, is its author. 
In this classic sentence, thrown in as a kind of 
parenthesis, we find a vivid contrast between the 
possibilities that confront man in his freedom and 
between the role of God and the role of the Devil in 
his destiny. Man can either opt for the restoration 
of the or4gin al state intended by God, which was to 
have depended on his eating of 'the bread of wisdom' 
or he can continue in the condition set-in train by 
the primordial transgression. Union with God is 
presented as the 'one pleasure', reminiscent of the 
Augustinian victrix delectatio. It is 'one' in the 
sense of being fundamental and incomparable. Nothing 
can compare with it and without it no other pleasure 
can have its proper quality. 'Pleasure' rather than 
'joy' is chosen here to contrast the experience of the 
possession of 'divine things' with the enjoyment of the 
sensibles. It is the 'one' pleasure in contrast to the 
pleasure which seduced man and caused him to plunge 
vertiginously into a despairing search for his good 
where it is not to be found. Since the one pleasure 
can only consist in the attainment of 'rG 6e Va 9 
only God can give it. He is the giver xatiä 
997 
(PüßLv - Although God is the ultimate source 
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of the good things, the responsible freedom of man is 
not irrelevant to his laying hold of what will serve to 
poaCpeaLC xatiä: 06XncLv 
628 
satisfy him. It is his 7 
that preserves the pleasure by holding to good things 
granted by God. The combination of %pocLCpeot, C and 
eex. noLC is to remind us that freedom is not fully 
human until the generic orientation to the good has 
become a decided choice. G XXnaLC must take on the 
personal connotations of yvcSp. M, and issue in 
'tpoaCpeot, S after a process of alternating reflec- 
tions and choices that constitute the human act. The 
thrust of A6(oc cpvoewc and 'the natural desire of 
the mind for God'62 
9 have to be personalized before 
man can attain to the divine things that will guarantee 
the 'one pleasure'. Again the contrasting pain is 
characterized as 'only'. Maximus does not think for a 
moment that it is literally the only pain; the dialectic 
of pleasure and pain embraces cruder distress in his 
system, but here 'only' is to be construed again as 
incomparable and unique, because it has to do with man's 
ultimate finality. It is a kind of ontological agony, of 
which the superficial losses and frustrations of temporal 
life are merely symptomatic. In the grammatical symmetry 
we discern a conceptual assymetry: God is the giver of 
the beta , but the Devil cannot be the giver of 
anything. He is master of privation merely, an instiga- 
tor. The contrast of the causality that is proper to 
God and that which is peculiar to the Devil is comple- 
mented by the contrast in human response. With regard 
to God, man can only receive. Since there is nothing to 
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receive from the Devil, man can be merely prompted to 
refuse being and life, to frustrate and annul the 
benevolence of God. So 'everyman' is the 'author' of 
the pain that besets him for having failed to acquire 
'the divine things'. He is in some sense the first 
cause of evil. This tragic failure is attributed to 
(1-Coy Co. in his yv(iµn . 
630 He lacks vital tension 
in his personal will. The implicit torpor is akin to 
the Origenian xdpoc , but without the Origenian 
ambiguities. Even in a negative context yvc44i 
emerges as central to the anthropology of Maximus. 
Through it man has the capacity either to accept the 
destiny held out to him by God or to refuse it by 
ultimately choosing himself. 
Maximus now sets himself a problem. The 'as' in 
0 
the fifth petition seems to exhort us to propose our- 
selves as a model to God in the matter of forgiveness. 
As Dalmais says, 'Maximus, doctor of the Incarnation and 
deification, loves to consider this dialogue between man 
and God, where the Creator deigns to permit his creature, 
His image and mirror, to remind Him of this likeness and 
to confirm himself in the hope of divine benefits'. 
631 
Maximus soon dispels any impression that man anticipates 
God in forgiveness. The true state of affairs is 
introduced by ö, nXaudtic, 
This means that just as God forgives dispassionately 
those whom He forgives, so likewise remains 
impassible in whatever befalls him. 6ý 
One might say that while understood from a temporal point 
of view, the forgiveness of God extended to man is 
conditioned by the disposition to forgive found already 
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in man, yet the impassibility of man is at once a 
participation in and an imitation of God's impassi- 
bility. The order of true dependence is not disturbed 
by the temporal sequence, so that the petition for 
forgiveness, on the basis of having already forgiven, 
does not reverse the roles of God and man in this 
particular relationship; it merely insists that man 
must imitate God in impassibility, from which flows 
ma 
forgiveness, in order that man/in turn experience the 
forgiveness of God. To deny forgiveness to his fellow- 
man would be to render himself impervious to the mercy 
of God. Even though God may require the temporal 
pcedence of man's forgiving his fellow, there can be 
no question of causal precedence. This phrase can be 
used authentically provided that the one praying-does 
not confuse the temporal and causal orders. 
Maximus then draws attention to an obstacle to 
forgiveness: 'not allowing the voSC to be impressed 
by any memory of foregoing injuries' . 
633 The ditc - 
eeLa which is the ground of forgiveness demands that 
memory should not be engaged in preserving in the 
present what was distressful in the past, but should 
rather concern itself with constituting in the present 
the heia , from which arises the unique pleasure 
that satisfies man. Memory was central to the ascetical 
preoccupations of the whole monastic tradition 
634 
and 
its inclusion here in such a deft way demonstrates 
Itaximus' understanding of the interaction of the 
cognitive and conative aspects of man's spiritual 
psychology. Since yv4 presumes a more specialized 
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faculty and activity than OeXiIoLr. , its function- 
ing depends on the presentation of particular goods. 
Memory is here given the task of that presentation. The 
control of memory with regard to what may stimulate the 
will to a desire for and choice of revenge is seen as the 
way in which to liberate the will for forgiveness. A 
touch like this reveals how a practised master of the 
ascetical life can evoke a whole tradition in a phrase. 
We should note especially the reference to voOC here. 
As we have seen, voDQ in the thought of Maximus is 
often the faculty of the divine, so that the concept of 
memory has to be extended from sensitive or even 
intellectual power or activity in the philosophical 
sense, to which we have alluded above, being a mode of 
the exercise of voVC , understood as man's specific 
capacity for God. This puts Maximus squarely in the 
tradition of µv1jµq GeoU 
635 
and makes him a fore- 
runner of St. John of the Cross in his teaching on the 
anagogical method. 
636 It may also show the affinity of 
his teaching with the trinitarian thinking of St. 
Augustine, whose memotis we have had occasion to recall 
already. It certainly gives us a glimpse of how the 
cloistered life of Maximus opened onto the limitless 
mystery of the presence of God. The perversity and 
tragic character of the Fall can be seen mirrored in 
this passage of Maximus. Man bends his voüs to the 
created order, allowing himself to be submerged in the 
finite precisely through his capacity for God and so 
to become depersonalized. Thus he rejects his vocation 
to relate to God in divine nature and, divinized by 
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äYä7CY , to men in human nature. The purpose of not 
allowing his vo 6 to be impressed by painful memories 
was to prevent the severing of nature by free-will. This 
is the main concern of Maximus in this section: the 
restoration of nature to itself. 
The hypostatic character of the rupturing of nature 
is brought out clearly here: man severs nature by 
YucLµ, TJ when, swayed by passion, he sets himself up 
in opposition to his brother-men. On the contrary, 
'when free-will is united to the principle of nature, 
the reconciliation of God with nature naturally takes 
place'. 
637 It is nature as a whole, hypostasized by 
men, that God wills to be in harmony with Himself. 
There is a delicate balance between nature and person 
throughout all the teaching of Maximus, but here the 
emphasis seems to be on the Xdyos 9paz C, as a 
principle of unity. This is reminiscent of the concrete 
universal of St. Gregory of Nyssa. 
638 
Maximus presumes 
that God wills mankind to be reconciled to Him. This 
cannot come about until the nature that is made 
concrete in its several existents is accepted in its 
specific integrity by everyman. This in turn will 
ensure the harmony of men among themselves, incorporat- 
ing, as they must, the W6yoc cpýocwc and accepting 
its exigencies in the very act of transposing it to the 
personal level. Passion leads men to something less 
than a full innovation of nature; men identify them- 
selves with an aspect of nature at the expense of its 
entirety. There is a twofold failure here : men fail 
to personalize nature in its integrity; nature 
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becomes less than itself in their distorted activity, 
where ignorance g self-love and tyranny make it a 
caricature of its true self. 
639 Since it is one in 
principle, the men who would personalize it in its 
integrity would have to be at one among themselves. 
The passionate opposition of men to each other 
prevents nature from rising to the personal level to 
which it is destined and so nature as a whole, 
because it is not completely possessed in its complete- 
ness by men, cannot be at one with God. In passing, we 
can note how this combination of irreducibility and 
co-ordination in the relationship of person to nature 
emancipates man from the Greek problem of primary 
substance. 
640 Once it is realized that the mystery of 
person is not an individuating condition within the 
realm of nature itself, then the possibility of the 
realization of the X6yoc cpvoawc; in the order of 
spiritual existents is open. In his remarks on the 
restoration of nature to itself, Maximus shows that 
for him, there is a profounder reason for the fragmen- 
tation of human nature than passion. 'When free-will 
is united to the principle of nature, the reconcilia- 
tion of God with nature naturally takes place'. 
641 
It is YW(Aun , which participates in both co- 
ordinates in the structure of man, that is at the root 
of cpi, Xav'Ca and that is crucial in the work of 
unification and reconciliation. It is through will 
that man can impress the uniqueness of his person on 
nature, raising it to the personal level while accept- 
ing its logical integrity. Once the Logos becomes man 
342 
nature is healed in principle. This becomes obvious in 
the historical dimensions of His human existence, not 
least for Maximus, in His forgiveness of His tormen- 
tors, 
642 
which has such bearing on his understanding 
of this petition of the 'Our Father'. Maximus insists 
that the disposition of those forgiven, unsullied by 
passion, corresponds to 'the relationship of grace'643 
that is to the status of sonship of God, with which 
anything at variance with the faith that finds 
expression through love is incompatible. We find the 
ecclesial aspect of this truth in the Mystagogia: 
The Holy Church is the very type and icon of 
God, because just as He effects, according to 
His infinite power and wisdom, the union with- 
out confusion with regard to the different 
essences of beings, attaching them most 
intimately to Himself as creator, likewise 
she binds in one form only the believers to 
each oth r by the unique grace and vocation of 
faith. 64' 
Maximus then goes on to say in the Pater Noster: 
He has clearly made it evident that, while the 
free-will is united to the principle of nature, 
the free-choice of those who have put this right 
will not be in revolt against God, because 
nothing that is illogical can naturally be 
discerned in the principle of nature, which is 
both natural and divine law whenever it possesses 
the movement of free-will that operates in keeping 
with itself. 645 
Here we find that the X&Yoc cpvocwc must in some 
way be the ground and norm for ivan if YvC64Ti is 
to be in harmony with God in its free-choices 
( %poaCpcoLS ). We should note here the relation- 
ship of Yv T1 to %PoaCPccLC ; it is obviously 
the source of tpoatpcOLc , something potential of 
which %poa(psaw; is the actuation, so that we can 
safely conclude that here it means the power of 
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freedom, while xpoaCpeoL4 will be the actual 
exercise of deliberate choice. The contrast between the 
%6. yoc cvocwr. and the yvcLµij makes it evident that 
Yv(S4cri is not, from some point of view, in the order 
of nature, that it stands over against it and must be 
co-ordinated with it. It is in fact personal will or 
the personal mode of will. We know that Maximus 
refined the use of yvZµn , but the analysis of the 
text reveals this here; it does not make explicit the 
personal character of yv4kTi , but it certainly 
conceives Yv4ui as in some way in contrast to 
cpva LC , and we know from the basic distinction of 
%6yor. - rp67_oi , cp. ßoic - k6araaLc that what is 
not in the order of X6yor. - cp $o L,: must be found in 
the order of '¶Pkoc - k6o'zaatC . The Xd oc 
c40ew4; is given a definite normative function here ; 
the personal exercise of freedom will be rectified when 
it is regulated byv XdToc cpdoews There is no hint 
of the innovatory character of the exercise of YvC LV1 , 
at least not explicitly, so far in this statement. The 
deeper concern is to show that what is in keeping with 
X6yoc is in keeping with God, 'because nothing 
illogical can naturally be discerned in the X6 -or., of 
nature'. 
646 
A6io,; is here a relational concept; 
nature is not conceived as something closed after the 
model of the philosophical µopgA and its X&Yoc 
is the principle of its openness and relatedness; 
ontologically the nature is in reference to the Logos, 
in whom are the principles of all natures. 
647 
There- 
f ore it must be in harmony with God and it ensures 
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that what is in harmony with itself is necessarily in a 
similar relationship to God. We may note in passing 
that this is tied up with the notion in Maximus of the 
incorruptibility of the %6Yo4 cpßoew4 and the 
preservation of the image, while the likeness which is 
in the order of rp& o4 can be corrupted; it is 
necessary to mention too that this does not exclude the 
damage done to nature by original sin, animal genera- 
tion, vice, suffering and death. 
Personal existence will be right for Maximus, when 
it expresses in freedom the consistency of nature with 
God which is dictated by the X& o( cpl5aewc 
This is a way of saying that Yv 1. T1 adds its own 
dimension to human existence but that it must not 
indulge in what is 7. apd Myow . It is inter- 
esting that Xdyoc gveswC in this context does 
not become law, natural or divine, until the will has 
intervened. 648 The 'natural or divine' is obvious if 
we accept what has just preceded this phrase: the 
relation of X&y oC to Logos. The interesting 
development is that which has to do with law. The 
Xcyo4 9 ocs as it stands is not considered to be 
law; it requires a movement of free-will that is 
however in keeping with itself. This is a dynamic 
concept of law and if we are to retain the cpftoc 
emphasis when we speak about Yva5pTl it is also a 
personal one. Law comes to be when the %6yoc 
CPvßEwS is transformed into free-will, consents to 
the movement of free-will which is energized in it or 
more properly in keeping with it. 'In it' would have 
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interesting implications: we have seen already references 
to the will being rooted in some way in 95oLC and 
here we see what is natural becoming personal. Even if 
Maximus does not intend that, there can be no doubt 
about what he is claiming for law in general. It is not 
at all law in an abstract and impersonal way; it is not 
a mere canon to which man must adjust himself; it is 
rather the living willed orientation of man to the 
object of the inclination of X6yoC 9aewC . It is 
not like the law of nature in this respect, which is the 
pre-volitional inclination of irrational creatures to 
act in accordance with their nature; this is a more 
splendid concept: it includes the freedom of man; that 
the 'divine law', becomes 'natural' through the persona- 
lisation of A6yoC cpi$oewc through YvwµT1 , means 
that God is there at the heart, not merely of man's 
fundamental natural inclination to his good, but also 
through law, in the sense of a fully human canon when 
it is adopted voluntarily by man and becomes personal to 
him. 649 Its necessity embraces the flexibility of human 
freedom which is informed by X6 'oc cpvocwr, and in 
turn transforms 'köyoc cpüccwc by personalization. 
In this twofold participation in the Logos through 
? 6'(or. and yvc4ii) man enters the process of becoming 
in the likeness of God : he is caught into the movement 
(xCvgois, ) that is characteristic of the surge of 
creation from y vsaLc to erdot, C , the transition 
from r6 ctvat, to T6 LC elvac through r6 e? i 
cIvaa , the progress from image to likeness. We can 
note here the relevance of X6yoc qvaewS and 
Yyw to this development and the way in which 
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Maximus understands law, human and divine, or divine 
become human, not as something imposed on man from with- 
out, but an inner drive that at once shapes his freedom 
and is lifted by it into the personal order. The Logos 
then is not exemplar for man merely in the order of 
cpvo t. C but also in the order of kdoTao t, C and 
the exemplarity is not something extrinsic, but rather 
a real dependence and relationship. 
650 Natural will 
(O XTjQt, r. ) becomes natural law through the recipro- 
city of A6YoC 95c we and Yv4171 ; since it is 
divine law as well, man is made to become exactly what 
God wills. 
Whereas he has stated above the necessity of the 
harmony of man with God if the X6yoc cpi5ocwc 
and yvý vj coincide, he reiterates that principle 
now in a positive way: 
'And if nothing illogical exists in the principle 
of nature, naturally the free-will moved in 
keeping with the principle of nature will have 
an activity ( ývgpycicr that is in all things 
in harmony with God'. 651 
Again the bond between the X6yoc of nature and 
Logos guarantees harmony with God in the will if it is 
aligned with Adyoc qüaewr., ; that is self- 
evident to Maximus once the terms are understood. 
IvEpYc. a is the evidence of harmony with God; the 
whole process of 6& takes place as gvgpystm 
and Maximus normally speaks about the spiritual life 
from the point of view of activity rather than that of 
the powers of the soul. He is primarily interested in 
free activity, the product of the interaction of the 
activity of God and the activity of man, that of God 
being sovereignly free while that of man is so in a 
dependent way. He concludes: 
This is the efficacious disposition, created by 
the grace of Him who is good by nature, for the 
production of virtue. 652 
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Virtue is the logical activity of man. Here it is said 
to have its source in the goodness of God, so that we 
are back to that cp i. XavOpwt Ca which is the basis 
of the whole Economy. It is virtuous activity that 
will ensure that man attains the oxo7.64 ©coD 
653 
which controls and articulates every facet of the 
Economy, enabling him to hallow the Name and welcome 
the coming of the Kingdom. The addition of 9L pa- 
xtio(; to 6t, 4Oeot, c is to emphasize the order of 
activity. Man is to attain the realization of his 
being by becoming what he does. While bad6eoLC 
would more easily refer to yv4SµuJ , it is also 
possible to understand it to refer to lv6pycaa , 
so that we are confronted with man in the process of 
evolving into sonship of God. He is actually being 
moulded by the energy of divine and human law. 
Maximus then turns his attention to the relation- 
ship between forgiveness and an attitude to bread 
understood as the humbler sustenance of man's temporal 
life. He admits that the demands of nature have to be 
satisfied, but he insists that this must be done in a 
way consistent with the transience of mundane things. 
This is a further elaboration of the ascetical 
directives which he gave in the previous section on 
'bread for the day'. Here it is thrown into relation- 
ship with the disposition to forgive. The habitual 
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realization of mortality produces a detachment that 
enables man to forgive hie trespassers willingly. In a 
sense, the very act of preserving his temporal life with 
empirical bread is a meditation on death which puts the 
injuries suffered at the hands of others in proper 
perspective. The willing uncertainty with which one 
accepts the precarious succession of days and what is 
required for self-preservation is in itself to antici- 
pate 'nature with his free-will' and so too is to die 
to the world. It is äW&6et, a the fruit of the 
rectification of &LOvpCa - OvµdC , that makes 
this possible. Maximus also hints at a sacrificial 
aspect to this mortification which raises this fore- 
bearance above a Stoic indifference and may even 
invest it with the highest kind of love and give it a 
vicarious character in the hidden life of the Church 
654 
Part 111,5 
In this part, the order of the petitions has been 
reversed in the interests of the ascetical perspectives 
with which Maximus wants to conclude his treatise, so 
that the reference to the subject of this mystery is to 
be found in a sentence that refers to final petitions 
of the 'Our Father' which have already been dealt with 
summarily: 
And we shall trample on the one who begat this, 
the evil serpent from whom we ask to be delivered 
with Christ, who conquered the world as our 
leader, arming us with the laws of His command- 
ments and binding nature to itself thrgu gh charity, 
by lawfully laying aside the passions. 655 
Here again, Maximus attributes the initiative in the 
restoration of nature to itself to Christ, so that we 
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are again reminded of the subordination of anthropology to 
Christology in his theology. The binding of nature to 
itself is associated with the commandments of Christ and 
especially with &ycxl . It is remarkable that 
&ydtc-n 
has not been mentioned in either of the other two treat- 
ments of this subject, but as we have seen in commenting 
on the Prologue above, it was the intention of Maximus 
that it should be understood to have relevance to every 
aspect of this work. That is made explicit here. We 
must also take note that it comes in a passage, the 
parallels of which introduce the idea of of yv4L i 
so that Maximus is obviously associating &rci with 
yvczµn in a special way. 'Ay(i, li enters human life 
through yvt j. The process of restoring nature to 
its integrity involves Yvcwµrj as the organ of 
k6o, va. aLC . The restoration of nature must be seen 
as realized in the evolution of man as image into man as 
likeness of God. This throws a shaft of light on the way 
in which Maximus understands the co-ordination of nature 
and person and how he would interpret the concrete 
universal of Gregory of Nyssa. The following passage 
draws together some of the principal ideas of his 
spiritual anthropology: 
He who has caused his voüc to flash like lightning 
with divine contemplations and accustomed his Xö-oC 
to praise the Creator with divine canticle a unceas- 
ingly and has purified his aXoOlIa is with pure 
representations, this man has added to the natural 
good in keeping with the image the voluntary good 
y x6v &Ya66v ) in keeping with the 
likeness. 56 
The process of the restoration of nature is spelt out here 
and we can conclude that what is done through äY&-r. 71 in 
the Pater Noster is done through YV401 here, so that 
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Maximus thinks of them as involving each other in the work 
of man's salvation. 
(v) Purification from the 'law of sin' and abolition of 
the tyranny of the Evil One. 
Part I, 6,7657 
Maximus now addresses himself to the question of the 
removal of the obstacles to the divine beneficence in 
man's regard. As in the preceding mysteries of Part I, 
the Logos is given the initiative. It is He who primarily 
establishes nature free from 'the law of sin' and who 
destroys the tyrany of the Evil One. This will require 
the willing co-operation of man, but consistent with his 
practice in dealing with the previous petitions of the 
'Our Father' and their associated mysteries he will deal 
with that more extensively in Parts II and III. Here he 
concentrates on the Christological dimension of the 
questions. The fact that the Logos is the subject of the 
principal statements is in itself bond enough with what 
has gone before. We are meditating on further aspects of 
the mystery of xevww - egwoLr. 
Temptation 
At a glance we can see that Maximus understands that 
there is a connection between pleasurable procreation and 
'the law of sin' which is the equivalent of the 'temptation' 
in the 'Our Father'. The manner of the conception and 
birth of the Incarnate Logos has a direct bearing on the 
abolition of 'the law of sin'. The usual 'corruption' 
that marks human birth was not realized in the case of 
Mary. In fact, Maximus claims that her virginity was in 
some way enhanced. 
658 Maximus then transfers his 
v 
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attention to the death of Christ, saying that He frees 
nature from the 'law of sin' in those who willingly imitate 
his voluntary death. Men cannot be born free from this law 
as Christ was, but by being baptized into his death and 
living consistently with that they can be reborn and 
progressively rid themselves of this impediment to their 
identification with the Logos. The mortification which was 
inculcated in the previous sections is now seen in relation 
to purification from the 'law of sin'. 
In order to grasp more fully what Maximus is saying 
here we must look more closely at his teaching on sin and 
especially at the äpymCa xap&PaGLc 9 of which every 
other sin is in some way a dark reflection. Maximus finds 
the abuse of free-choice at the core of Adam's sin. Man 
was created with the gift of self-determination in the 
image of God and it was God's intention that he should 
grow into His likeness through the proper exercise of 
freedom: 'every reasonable creature is the image of God; 
but only those who are good and wise are in His likenes6s59 
Since he was cvoct. OeXTITtx6c '660 the exercise of 
his freedom was to have been in keeping with his godward 
nature; it was to have been ý xa'cä cpvaLv a$rs- 
ýovaL6T% 9 
661 Maximus understands that exercise of 
freedom to have been intended as the human way of attain- 
ing to God: 
For thus man must have been in the beginning: in 
no way distracted by what was beneath him or around 
him or near him, and desiring perfection in nothing 
except irresistible movement, with all the strength 
of 1 e, towards the One who was above him, that is 
God. 662 
This was to have been the manner in which man willingly 
entered the cosmic movement of all creation to God. Man's 
failure was the outcome of the corruption of his 
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7CpoaCpeot, C ; 
663 the repercussions from this are the 
disorders to be found in his nature: animal generation, 
corruptibility, passibility, death. While for Maximus sin 
is the transgression of a divine commandment, this 
juridical notion has an ontological dimension. Evil 
Iv Tw µLj etvaL r6 etvai gxei was how Gregory of Nyasa 
put it. 
664 Maximus echoes this and concludes that man's 
substituting creatures for God is to grasp at minus-being 
in the place of being. 'Evil is the failure of the 
operation of the powers that are in nature to attain its 
end' 
665 he says, having shown that it cannot be identified 
with any of the known categories of being. The enormity of 
the primeeval sin is revealedi for Maximus in the fact that 
it is precisely man's capacity for God that he recklessly 
turns to creatures: 
. This power then, I mean the natural power of the voüS which turns to God, the first man, as soon 
as he was created gave to sense: by the very first 
movement through sense to the sensibles he acquire 
the pleasure that is activated contrary to nature. 
66 
Creatures are the 'something besides the end' which man 
pursues in his by 'the unlogical movement of his natural 
powers', 
667 
which is Maximus' alternative definition of 
evil. The notion of 'pleasure' is central to this 
conception of the Fall. As we have seen, maximus has a 
place for ecCa ýöovij 0 
668 
But here pleasure is 
a component of the disorder of sinfulness; it is bound 
up with that abuse of free-choice and perversion of the 
voü;: which are fundamental to this understanding of 
the äpxaLa 7ýapd aoI,; 0 
669 It is an epiphenomenon 
of man's substitution of the created for the Creator and 
itself becomes the object of his desire. In the Pater 
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Noster we find that it plays an essential part in the 
defective manner of human generation that followed mane 
transgression. 670 The Logos becomes man without being 
caught into this fallen process and thus He can institute 
a new order of things. We find an elaboration of the 
process of the Fall in the Quaestiones ad Thalassium: 
Since the creation contains the spiritual AdyoL 
of visible things, which nourish the mind, and also 
the natural power which delights the senses but 
distracts the mind (one might say that it was for 
this reason) it was called the tree of knowledge of 
good and evil; for when considered spiritually it 
contains knowledge of good, but when taken in a 
bodily way, it induces a forgetfulness of divine 
things; and perhaps it was because of this that God 
forbade man to eat of it, deferring his enjoyment of 
it for the meantime until, as was most just, he had 
come to recognize his own cause by participation in 
the life of grace and by the immortality given in 
grace by means of this participation had persevered 
to the state of freedom from passion and distraction, 
so that then he might come to know them, this time, 
not as man, but as God, possessing by grace, the same 
knowledge of what is as God himself possesses, 
coupled with wisdom, by virtue of the deification of 
his mind and the transfiguration of his sense percep- 
tion. 671 
Man could have had a proper appreciation of the created 
order and used it appropriately if he had first partici- 
pated in the grace of eewaLC . This he would have 
attained by partaking of the tree of life which is 
identified with the &rcuofjc %&roc . 
672 Because man 
failed to maintain his relationship with the Logos in the 
personal order, he was unfitted to co-operate with Him in 
the order of nature. 
We can measure something of the depth of the Fall by 
considering God's original intention for man. He was 
created in a state of dynamic potentiality as image in 
order to move freely to likeness of God. His bodily 
condition was to have enjoyed a perfect balance of 
qualities immune to corruption. Being free from sin, 
354 
there would have been no death. 
673 He would not have 
experienced the conflicts of passion since he was to have 
been in a state of serene integration. He was to have 
enjoyed the vision of God and to have chosen Him 
supremely, solely with all the energy of his free-will. 
674 
This would have freed him to choose everything else in 
relationship to that sovereign choice. The manner of the 
multiplication of the human race would have been in 
harmony with the totality of man's constitution. 
675 
Because, of his microcosmic structure, he was called-to 
combine and unify the various aspects of creation: mind, 
soul and matter. 
676 Since man's senses of sight, hearing, 
smell, taste and touch are paralleled and controlled by 
intellect, reason, irascible and concupiscible powers and 
the faculty of life, and in that order, through their 
right use he was to have, by means of the appropriate 
virtues, achieved his own fulfilment and discerned God in 
the universe, thus discovering God and allowing the 
universe to recover its proper relationship to God through 
himself. 677 We have already seen something of the cosmic 
role assigned to man, that of being crvvbcoit6 TLc 
q ct, xdc . 
678 This he forfeited in the Fall and re- 
acquired in Christ. 
In the following passage we see the devastation 
wrought in nature by man's personal failure to use his 
will as God willed:: 
When at the beginning the seductive Devil, by a 
stratagem which his egoism maliciously inspired, 
tempted, man by the seduction of pleasure, he 
separated our will from God and from others. In 
destroying the rectitude of our will he has, in 
this way, divided nature and torn it into a 
multitude of opinions and imaginations; he has in 
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the course of time established as law the search 
for and discovery of all kinds of evil, assisted in 
this by our own powers; and in order that evil may 
dwell in all men, he bolsters it up in them by 
stressing this irreconcilable opposition of the 
will, which had allowed him to persuade man insidi- 
ously to turn aside once from the thrust of nature, 
to divert his desire from that which was permitted 
to him in order to incline towards that which was 
forbidden him and to establish in him the three 
greatest and most fundamental evils and, to put it 
in a nutshell, authors of viciousness. I refer to 
ignorance, passionate self-love and tyranny, which 
depend on each other and strengthen each other. 
For. from ignorance of God is born passionate self- 
love and from this tyranny over the neighbour, 
something beyond doubt. They grow strong by the 
disordered use of our own powers: the irasg3 le 
and the concupiscible appetites and reason. 
This passage is self-explanatory. It will suffice to 
point out that Maximus does not think of disorder in 
human being apart from the malign influence of the 
Devil so that 'temptation' and the Evil One imply each 
other. There is too a polarity of k6a'caocc, , 
through Tvc3µi , and cvooc evident in this analysis 
of human waywardness, so that the twofold structure of 
man is involved in Maximus' s view of sin and Fall. 
Maximus finds that man's body, or perhaps man considered 
as somatic becomes v6cpoC xaC ', tpoxdxvµµa to his 
spiritual self. 
680 His carnal passions impede his 
freµov. xdv and the deceit of sense overcomes it 
with the appearances of the sensibles and prevents its 
passage to the intelligibles. 
681 
Through his body too 
he becomes liable to animal generation, pleasure, 
passibility, corruption and death. The mode of post- 
lapsarian generation plays a prominent part in the 
thinking of Maximus in the passage of the Pater Noster 
which we are considering. It might be thought to 
typify man's fallen condition which was remedied by the 
Logos, so that it will require further examination. 
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In the following excerpts from the Ambi uuaa, Maximus 
contrasts the modes of generation that characterize man 
before and after the ancient transgression': 
The first man is condemned to have a generation 
that belongs to bodies, indeliberate, material 
and perishable, since God rightly judged him who 
wilfully preferred inferior things to superior, 
that is to exchange generation subject to 
passion, servile and constrained like the beasts 
of the earth, brutish and lacking in mind, for a 
generation that is free, impassible, chosen and 
holy and to have dishonourable materialization 
with brute beast instead of divine and ineffable 
honour with God. 
6B2 
Man's aspiration to be like a god have reduced him in 
some way to the condition of the beasts, where with them, 
he wallows in aupxapevv sai, c . 
683 Elsewhere we 
find the pleasure associated with this inferior mode of 
propagation stressed and the consequent paradoxical 
pain and death thrown into relief: 
For as Adam, the first parent, because he 
transgressed the divine commandment, introduced 
into nature besides the first, another principle 
of generation consisting of pleasure indeed, but 
through pain ending in death and invented in 
accordance with the advice of the serpent, a 
pleasure that was not the successor of foregoing 
pain, but rather passing into pain, he had all 
those begotten in flesh from him like him through 
the wicked principle of pleasure, rightly made 
subject to him with death through pain for end. 
684 
We should note here too some kind of solidarity between 
Adam and those begotten of him in flesh. This in turn 
is dependent in some way on 'the wicked principle of 
pleasure', which is synonymous with the fallen mode of 
propagation, so that the changed condition of man is 
transmitted to his successors precisely because of the 
way in which he begets his children, not as sons of God, 
but as the offspring of the will of the flesh and the 
will of man. Maximus says as much: 
Since the first purpose of God was not that we 
should be born through marriage from corruption, 
for it was the transgression of the commandment 
that introduced marriage through Adam's prevari- 
cation, that is his violation of the God-given 
law, hence all those begotten of Adam are 
conceived in si liable to the condemnation of 
the forefather. b 5 
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The 'sin' here does not mean that the act of begetting 
is a sin, but it means that it takes place in the state 
of 'sin' that is consequent on the apXaca 
7capc£ßao cr. ,a state in which the passions have 
replaced the 1X6yoc cpvocwr. as the ground of 
decision and so make part of 'the law of sin' by an 
analogy with the law of nature which we have met above. 
An analysis of Quaestiones ad Thalassium 21,313AB shows 
this as an aspect of the total situation visualized by 
686 Maximus as consequent on the Full,. 
For him, transgression, sin and passibility are 
bound together in a causal sequence. 
687 'Sin' seems 
to be a generic condition of mankind which results from 
the original transgression. It is central to this 
passage and its implications. 'It may include guilt 
or not according to context'. 
688 The wa6nt6v is 
consequent on 'sin' and is associated with the fallen 
mode of generation in particular. Maximus will else- 
where distinguish between the KdOi &Lý. cimr. and 
the 7, d671 li ri µCac, 0689 Man cannot, of 
himself, extricate himself from the %mOTItidy , with 
which he is born. Nature is said to be bound to the 
first transgression through the 1aeTr6z. 'The 
original transgression is active in the %aOitibu 
and so when nature exerts itself through YV(Sp) to 
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maintain itself by y vv-ia it cannot avoid binding 
itself to 'the law of sin'. The irony is that what man 
desires and wills to maintain nature becomes the beginn- 
ing of his dissolution. Pleasure is accompanied by pain; 
life is doomed to death because the 'law of sin' has 
taken the place of 'the law of nature'. 'God' we are 
told, 'the dispenser of our salvation, wisely and at the 
same time mercifully and in keeping with His goodness 
suitably joined to the irrational movement of our 
spiritual power the punishment due to it'. We find that 
7, aOrT6v , which covers the most elementary stirr- 
ings of passion, extended to that final movement by 
which man is deprived of his temporal life: 
The God who created human nature did not produce 
with it sensible pleasure and pain, but made a 
spiritual power with it by which man would be able 
to enjoy Him in an ineffable way. However, this 
power (I mean desire for God in keeping with the 
nature of voUC ) as soon as it came to be, the 
first man gave to sense and with the very first 
movement by means of sense towards sensibles he 
activated pleasure contrary to nature. To this, 
God who is concerned about salvation, providenti- 
ally attached pain as a penalty. In this way the 
law of death was wisely rooted in the nature of 
the body, putting limits to the unnatural desire 
for sensibin which characterized the madness of 
vo3C 
Maximus finds this exemplified in the process of 
generation, which is proper to man in his condition 
since the ancient transgression, in a particularly sig- 
nificant way. In the Pater Koster it is precisely by 
not allowing pleasure to precede His incarnation that 
the Logos frees nature from 'the law of sin'. In other 
words, because the He could be o =pd Tjr. otxe Cac 
aapx6 , 
691 he could become man without being 
caught into the tragic gh gic dialectic of generation and 
corruption, of pleasure and pain, in which man found 
himself since the sin of Adam. 
The following passage from the Opuscula 
Theologica et Polemica enlarges on the Pater Noster 
text. Commenting on a passage from Gregory of 
Nazianzus he says: 
He hints at the same thing in the following 
saying: 'He was conceived without sin from the 
Holy Spirit and from the holy, immaculate, ever- 
virgin Mother of God, Mary, and He was born of 
her according to the flesh without defilement'. 
He adduces indeed the Holy Scripture as remember- 
ing to praise and to blame the flesh, not, far 
from it, that he would suggest understanding the 
flesh of the Lord as different from ours in nature 
and substance, he who understood that this was 
assumed from our substance, that is from the most 
holy womb of the ever-virgin Mother of God, but 
different with regard to proneness to sin, because 
in no way did He have in His members a law which 
is derived from the transgression, contrary to the 
law of the spirit. 'Flesh' he says, 'which was 
corrupted by sin was not assumed by the Saviour, 
which would be at variance with the law of his 
nous'. For He, whose generation the law of sin 
trough seed did not precede, in no way is it in 
His members, but the law of divine justice, shining 
forth to determine us and abolishing perfectly hat 
which befell nature through the transgression. 6 2 
Here Maximus affirms the consubstantiality of the Logos 
with us in human nature, but he makes crucial distinc- 
tions with regard to how the Logos possesses that nature 
in contrast to fallen men. The latter has in his 
members 'a law which is derived from the transgression'. 
The transgression is the apXaCa %apdpaoLC . The 
'sin' which results from that is present in mankind, 
'derived from' that transgression and the basis of the 
'law. of sin', which is a parody of 'the law of nature', 
which we saw to be fundamental to man's being and 
destiny. Besides, 'the law of sin' is not to be found 
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in the Logos because his generation was not dependent on 
procreation by seed. There is an intimate bond between 
'the law of sin', which is identified with 'proneness to 
sin' ('t ä{iaptiia, t% ) and generation Wßä of op . c. . 
Because the Logos is not subject to this kind of generation, 
He is not subject to 'the law of sin'. His norm is 'the 
law, of the spirit', 'the law of his vot3c. 19 'the law 
of divine justice'. As man, these will be aligned with 
His X6yoý cpvoewC , which becomes in Him a component 
of 'the law of nature'. For this man has substituted the 
'law of sin', where passion becomes a substitute for 
reality in the life of man. The rebirth of men as sons 
of God does not coincide with their physical birth. It 
is initiated in baptism and has to be progressively 
appropriated by a death to 'the law of sin'. A new order 
has begun with the conception and birth of the Saviour. 
This was possible because the Christ was 'a man 
above men' and could bring the indefectibility of the 
person of the Logos to bear on the exercise of human 
freedom: 
He was not a mere man indeed, but God as well 
become man in order to renew through and in 
Himself the nature of men grown old of itself and 
to make it a sharer of divine nature, that is having 
cast aside corruption and alteration by which it was 
made like to the beasts and had sense with the 
upper hand over X6-o6 . 
693 
For Maximus the whole human life of Jesus was salvific. 
He overcame the Evil One and every kind of temptation in 
the desert and in his Passion, demonstrating the control 
of eXLO. OµL :a and evµdr. . 
694 
He accepted in our 
place spiritual birth in baptism, putting off fleshly 
birth and conferring divine sonship on man. 
695 
He was 
anointed by the Holy Spirit and showed in His life an 
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example of every virtue and perfection so that men might 
become His imitators. Maximus sums this up by saying: 
'Taking flesh by the Holy Spirit and the Holy Virgin, He 
showed us a godlike way of life'. 
696 In the Pater Noster 
having spoken of His birth, he immediately transfers his 
attention to the death of Christ and its bearing on man's 
salvation. 
697 It is His self-chosen death that is seen as 
particularly significant. The function of the will in His 
agony and death would find a new clarification in the 
Monothelite debate, 698 but as early as Epistola II we 
find Maximus emphasizing the willingness of Christ in His 
undoing of the condition of man brought on by his 
perverse use of free-choice: 
The lord and God of all and Saviour Jesus Christ, 
who willingly accepted death for us and by Hi 
blood redeemed us from the power of darkness. 
°99 
The negative dimension of that freedom is emphasized in 
Quaestiones ad Thalassium as weil as the creative use of 
the 'pathetic' link between pleasure and suffering: 
Just as the pleasurable life of Adam became the 
source of corruption, thus the death of the Lord 
for Adam, being free of the pleasure from Adam, 
becomes the source of eternal life. 700 
Because the Logos is free from the baneful effects of 
Adam's misuse of pleasure He is in a position to use 
suffering and death to undo the condition into which man 
has got himself and which becomes more insoluble with 
every act of wilful yvcwµ-n 9701 The following passage 
from the Quaestiones ad Thalassium, where Maximus 
comments on the scriptural declaration that Christ is 
made sin for us, makes a useful distinction with bearing 
P 
on the Pater Noster text: 
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Two sins took place in the first parent because of 
the transgression of the commandment: the one blame- 
worthy, the other blameless, caused by the blameworthy 
one. Indeed the one consists in the willing setting 
aside of the good by free-choice, the other in nature 
setting aside immortality unwillingly because of that 
free-choice. Therefore our Lord and God, rectifying 
this independent corruption and alteration of nature, 
assuming entire nature, possessed Himself the 
passibility ( 7, ae7rr6v ) in the assumed nature, 
which is put in order by the incorruptibility of free- 
choice. And He became sin for us through the passi- 
bility in nature, not knowing indeed deliberate sin 
because of the firmness of his free-choice; He 
rectified the passibility of nature through the 
incorruptibility of free-choice, that is making the 
end of the passibility of nature, I mean death, the 
beginning of the remodelling of nature to incorrupt- 
ibility. 702 
Beneath the dialectic of this passage we can discern the 
distinction between person and nature and consequently 
that between %6yos and rp6ioc . There is too 
the 
paradox of the Logos isolating the blameworthy 'sin' 
from the blameless one and using the latter to nullify 
the former. It is by the 'incorruptibility of free- 
choice' that he can use the waOrrdv , the effect of 
the blameworthy sin to undo that sin and consequently its 
effect. Maximus puts this very clearly in a passage 
further on in the Quaestiones ad Thalassium: 
Taking on this condemnation of my voluntary sin, I 
mean the passibility, corruptibility and death of 
nature, the Lord became sin because of me by corrupt- 
ibility, passibility and death, having willingly put 
on my condemnation in nature, being without condemna- 
tion with regard to his free-choice, so that He might 
condemn my voluntary and natural sin and condemna- 
tion.? 03 
Because the willing putting on of the penal %a6iiti6ti 
is given the filial character of the Logos, suffering and 
death became redemptive and a way to union with God, not 
merely for the Logos as man, but because of man's 
3 63 
solidarity with Him, for all men in principle. It is then 
up to men to make their own what He has won for them by 
willingly imitating His self-chosen death. In the 
Mystagogia we find woven together the themes of redemptive 
sacrifice, vicarious suffering and the solidarity of Christ 
with all men. Referring to His first 'apovo, Ca, Maximus 
says: 
By that Christ liberated and redeemed the human race, 
enslaved by corruption, subject to death by its own 
fault and because of sin, ruled tyrannically by the 
Devil. He paid all its debt as if He had been 
responsible, He who was innocent and faultless; 
then He led us back into the original grace of the 
Kingdom by giving Himself as a ransom and exchange 
for us and offering in place of our destructive 
passion his vivifying passion salutary remedy and 
Saviour of the whole world. 704 
The link between solidarity and the use of free-choice is 
brought out brilliantly in the following passage, which 
puts the mystery of redemption in a concise formula 
that 
would be elaborated and nuanced in Maximus' later contro- 
versial writings: 
And thus as through one man, turning in free-choice 
willingly from the good, the change of nature from 
incorruptibility to corruptibility took place in all 
men, so through one man, Jesus Christ, not turning 
in free-choice from the good, took place the restora- 
tion in all men of nature from corruptibility to 
incorruptibility. 705 
The Evil One 
Maximus continues to deal with the providential over- 
coming of whatever impedes the progress of man to alwoLr,. 
He continues to be concerned with the problems of sin, 
corruption and death, and their undoing through the 
beneficence of Christ, but here the whole tragic dilemma 
of man is given a new dimension by the introduction of 
the Evil One. There is a subtle play on the ideas of death 
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and life which makes for continuity with what Maximus has 
said in the previous section where he presented us with the 
vision of the Word Incarnate annulling the 'law-of sin' by 
his paradoxical generation and birth and the culmination of 
his sanctifying life in his passion and death. Here we are 
reminded that it was for the purposes of salvation that 
'God becomes man and voluntarily accepts the death of the 
flesh'. 706 He voluntarily accepts on Himself punishment 
for sin, so that by his unjust sufferings our just punish- 
ment may be nullified. He took on the wholeness of our 
human condition, becoming what is described here as odpF. 
but without sin, so that the incorruption of His itpo- 
aCpe aLc might rectify our Wa6Tyc6v . Maximus 
emphasises the redemptive and vicarious character of His 
death : 'giving himself as a redemption and exchange on 
our behalf'. 
707 He the innocent one who has been born in a 
manner that clearly demonstrated His sinlessness had taken 
on through love not merely our common humanity but also the 
consequences of our corrupted freedom. It should be noted 
here that Maximus says that Christ destroys the life of 
the Evil One, presumably in men, 'by a natural death' and 
further on in this passage that He accepts death Ouv" 
This aspect of salvation is wrapped in obscurity. 
Florovsky thinks that 'He was exempt fxom the necessity 
of death, because His humanity was pure and innocent. 
Therefore Christ's death was and could not but be voluntary, 
not by the necessity of fallen nature, but by free choice 
and acceptance'. 
708 This would seem to be demanded by the 
quality of His person and the mode of His conception and 
birth, which Maximus has noted above, but it would not do 
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violence to the thought of Maximus to invoke a distinction 
which he makes elsewhere about the way in which passibility 
is in Christ709 and which is taken up by John of Damascus. 
The latter says that the natural passions were in Christ 
'according to nature' but also in a way that is 'over and 
above nature' .? 
10 Christ according to this view permitted 
the flesh to suffer what was proper to it, but in a way 
that is 'over and above nature', because subject to His 
will, whereas in fallen mankind the passions are undergone 
by necessity. So that although Christ was not subject to 
death in this latter sense it is not inconsistent with the 
teaching of Maximus elsewhere to say that Christ's death 
was according to nature, 
711 
or as he says in the Pater 
Noster, that He died 'by a natural death', but that since 
He accepted it 'willingly', it was-'over and above nature'. 
In this way one would not have to agree with Florovsky and 
interpret Maximus holding that Christ, at His Incarnation, 
did not assume a 'suffering humanity'. 
712 The mystery 
would rather seem to be that in His humanity He was from 
the beginning both sinless and suffering, so that He might 
undo sin and the consequences of sin through His sinless 
suffering. In this Maximus sees the Judgment of God 
complementing His Providence, as we have already pointed 
out. 
The specific characteristic of this 'mystery' is 
Christ's victory over the Evil One, something in which we 
can participate by the vexpwaac described in the 
previous section, but which is elaborated here by 
implication to include the outcome of a mortified life 
in a resurrection made possible by Christ 'the first-born 
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from the dead'. By his willing death and by his blood 'he 
redeemed us from the power of darkness'. 
713 Here we find 
the manner of that redemption outlined by means of favourite 
patriotic images where the 'flesh' is symbolised as 'a 
weapon' and 'a poison' and, by implication, the leaven of 
the whole mass of human nature. We are reminded that 'the 
flesh' was vanquished in Adam, a formula that throws into 
relief yet again the XdToc - rp6roc character of Maximus' 
theological reflection and his abiding awareness of the 
dialectic of person and nature. The vanquished flesh is 
to conquer in the new Adam, the Word Incarnate and our 
author is at pains to show that it is precisely through 
the 'flesh' that the Word achieves His victory: 'he over- 
comes him in order to show that what was previously 
captured for death conquers the conqueror and destroys his 
life by a natural death'. 
714 The role of the Evil One as 
the corrupter of Adam and the malignant source of man's 
misfortune is brought out here. We have noted the 
distinction between the untrammeled freedom of divine 
causality and the instigatory nature of the devil's inter- 
ference. The beating of the Evil One at his own game of 
deceit is emphasized in the passage from Quaestiones ad 
Thalassium, where Maximus comments on the lord as worm and 
no man: 
As well as this putting it (adpr. ) on as a bait for 
the deception of the devil by the fish-hook of the 
divinity so that the insatiable spiritual serpent 
with its mouth open for the flesh because of its 
easily-overcome nature, should be caught by the hook 
of divinity and vomit up, because of the holy flesh 
of the Word assumed from us, the whole human nature 
he had previously swallowed, so that just as previously 
he swallowed man enticed by hope of divinity, so 
enticed by the expectation of humanity deceived by 
expectation of divinity, he, deceived by expectation 
of humanity, would afterwards vomit and show the 
excellence of divine powerconquering the strength 
of the conqueror through the weakness of worsted 
nature and God, using the proffer of the flesh 
would be shown victorious, rather than the Devil 
promising man the nature of divinity. The worm 
struck and withered the gourd: I mean that He 
abolished the law as a shadow and thereby did away 
with Jewish self-conceit. 715 
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The tragic condition of fallen man is reversed by the 
Incarnate Word; the deceiver is deceived and mankind no 
longer languishes under the thrall of the Evil One, subject 
to death because of sin. X&pF. is central to the intricate 
pattern of opposites. Vulnerable in its weakness it is 
the means of &oing the strength of the Evil One because 
of its assumption by the Logos, who being sinless was able 
to negate the wages of sin, death. We find here another 
expression of the truths which Maximus is keen to make in 
the Pater Noster: It is the Logos who destroys the Evil 
One; it is by the very flesh, which the Devil overpowered 
through sin to death, that he is in turn overcome; the 
release from the diabolical realm of death is expressed as 
a vomiting on the part of the Evil One, the deceived serpent. 
We find the equivalent of the 'bait' of the Ad Thalassium716 
in the 'poison' which acts as an emetic in the Pater Noster; 
the notion of 'weapon' in the Pater Noster finds its 
counterpart in the 'fish-hook' of the Ad Thalassium. The 
'deceit' is again the 'hope of divinity', to be like gods, 
which is disappointed to the extent of tasting death, the 
essential flavour of meontic being. 
It is now that Maximus takes the argument forward in 
a positive way: 'the flesh of the Word becomewr life to the 
human race by impelling the whole nature like dough to 
resurrection of life'. In the Amber he tells us that: 
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,ý 
'if (Adam) had put his confidence in God rather than 
in his companion he would have been nourished on the 
tree of life; he would not have lost the gift of 
immortality but would have preserved it for ever by 
participating in life, since all life is conserved 
by the nourishment that is proper and appropriate. 
For the nourishment of this blessed life is the bread 
that comes down from heaven and gives life to the 
world as the Word of truth has revealed about himself 
in the Gospels. The first man, not having wanted to 
nourish himself on it, was rightly deprived of the 
divine life and fell into another from which was born 
death. He decked himself out in irrational clothing, 
obscured the ineffable beauty of the divine life and 
delivered up the whole of nature as food to death. 
Through this, death lives throughout all this space 
of time, making us to be food, nor do we ever live, 
constantly devoured as we are by it through corrup- 
tion'. 717 
The gloomy picture of our condition as 'food for death' 
is accounted for here by Adam's failure to feed on the 
Logos who is described not merely as the 'bread', but 
also as 'the tree of life'. Maximus states very clearly 
what death means in its deeper significance when he 
writes: 
Separation from God is properly death and sin the 
sting of death. In consenting to it, Adam at the 
same time became exiled from the Tree of Life, from 
Paradise and from God; of necessity, bodily death 
followed after. 718 
Then he adds: 'He who says I am life is properly life. 
He, in His death, led back to life him who had been made 
dead'. 719 It is Adam who separates himself from God, 
the same Adam who failed to nourish himself on the Logos. 
'Adam' refers primarily to the person who breaks his 
essentisl bond with the Logos and who as a consequence 
is deprived of the proper interaction of his nature with 
the energy of the Logos which becomes tragically obvious 
in 'the bodily death' which followed of necessity. 
Death is voluntary separation from the living God and 
the sin of the forefather was instrumental in delivering 
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up 'the whole of nature as food for death'. The outcome 
of this for the human race is that 'death lives through- 
out all this space of time'; man cannot find within 
himself the resource to deliver himself from this fate, 
but what is impossible to man is possible to God. The 
Logos himself, who is the source of life, enters the 
human condition, taking on the fullness of humanity, but 
without sin. There can be no deflection of energy 
between his Person and the nature He assumed. Since the 
Word Incarnate was never separated from God in sin, He 
can change the meaning of death and lead men back to 
participate in the resurrection which crowned His 
passion and death. In the following passage, having 
referred to his Incarnation and Passion, Maximus writes: 
'and having willingly gone down to the heart of 
the earth where the Evil One kept us in thrall, 
swallowing us through death and having drawn us 
back up through the resurrection and leading up 
to heaven this whole conquered nature, He is 
indeed our 'rest', 'healing' and 'grace'. He is 
'rest' because he abrogated the law of besetting 
servitude in flesh by reason of timebound life; 
'healing' in that he heals thoroughly the fracture 
of death and corruption by resurrection; finally 
'grace' as dispenser of adoptive sonship in spirit 
through faith and of the grace of deification in 
keeping with one's worthiness'. 720 
There is no need to elaborate this magnificently compre- 
hensive passage, which so deftly enumerates the final 
significant phases of salvation and how they are to be 
appropriated by man, except to note how the Word by his 
ac pr, becomes 'life to the race of men by impelling 
the whole nature like dough to resurrection of life'. 
721 
The resurrection of Christ who never ceased to be God, 
makes the resurrection of the race of men a real 
possibility. The impulsion of the Incarnate Word 
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requires the response of faith so that man may become 
'son', and worthiness that he may be given deification 
and be restored to the Tree of Life, Paradise and God 
from which he was exiled by the ancient transgression 
and his personal sins. In the perspectives of this 
final 'mystery' of the Pater Nos ter Maximus sees this 
salvific achievement as 'destruction of the Evil One 
who dominated us by deceit'. 
In the thought of Maximus we find an acceptance 
of the so-called 'physical' theory of redemption. 
Christ assumes humanity in its physical integrity, 
body, soul and spirit (voü6 ) and the very fact of 
assumption is the source of the vivifying renewal of 
mankind. Referring to Christ, Gregory of Nanzianzus 
says: 'that which was not assumed was not healed; 
that alone is saved which is united to God' . 
722 As 
we have seen, Maximus' view of human nature has affinity 
with the 'concrete universal' of Gregory of Nyssa, so 
that Doucet can conclude that 'nature is completely 
rectified in Jesus Christ, in its "comprehensive" 
totality, and by Jesus Christ, in its "extensive" 
totality, that is to say in all the individual men'. 
723 
Similarly, for Maximus as for Gregory of Nyasa, in the 
person of the Incarnate Logos is to be found the 
ct capX1j of the whole human race. 
724 He is the 
'leaven' of the mass, so that His passion, resurrection 
and ascension can be reproduced in those who are willing. 
It is the & cLpxnj of His flesh that makes possible 
the divinisation of all mankind and which is the principle 
of the restoration of the unity of human nature, 
fractured by the wilful Yv4ti of Adam and his 
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seed. 
7ý5 But we know that Maximus complements this 
teaching with the function of the exemplarity of 
Christ in regard to men726 and also with the role of 
His human will in salvation. 
727 
The latter aspect 
would be developed and refined in the course of his 
dogmatic controversies, but we have evidence that he 
was not unaware of its relevance in his earlier 
thinking. So-, we are not surprised to find him empha- 
sising the role of 'cpoaCpeoIc in relation to the 
resurrection of Christ. Contrasting the corruption 
consequent on the sin of Adam with its denoument in 
mortality he says: 
'thus in Christ the good of free-choice proper 
to Him removes the common shame from the whole 
nature, transformed as it is into the incorrupt- 
ibility of nature by the resurrectio 
'2 8 
in keeping 
with the immutability of free-will'. 
We should also take note of this cosmic implication of 
the exercise of the human freedom of the Word, which 
has a bearing on 'the whole nature'. fpoaCpsaLC 
emerges again as central to both the Christology and 
, anthropology of our author. 
The destiny of men will 
tý. hat 
depend on their ability to appropriate the Word 
Incarnate has acquired. through His free-will by the 
manner in which they exercise theirs. In some way the 
&cps*Ca of free-choice, its incorruptibility, is 
the personal source of the incorruptibility of nature 
to which man aspires and which he finds in Christ the 
first-born from the dead. In the following quotation 
from the Ambigia we find Maximus recalling the basis 
of the whole of man's regeneration and relating its 
phases to their realization in the Incarnate logos. 
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Having insisted on the manner in which the Logos took on 
human nature, he then says a propos of the teaching of 
Gregory of Nanzianzus: 
In this way indeed, as I think, the master says 
that our Lord and God has honoured our threefold 
birth, that is the general modes of our genera- 
tion to being, to well-being, to ever-being: that 
from bodies, which is one from both together by the 
mutual co-existence of the parts among themselves 
at once, I mean of soul and body, but divided in 
two because of the different manner of generation 
of each singly, by which we acquire existence; 
that from baptism, by which we receive well-being 
amply; that from resurrectiori by which we lay 
claim to ever-being by grace. `ý9 
Part II (e)730 
Maximus had concluded Part II (d) by saying that 
the pure disposition is necessary because of all that 
has been said about forgiveness, but also because of 
what he is about to say. The most obvious connection 
between Part II (e) and the previous Part II (d) 
15 is 
that it provides an account of what will happen to the 
unforgiving man in contrast to what is in store for the 
forgiving, so that he now describes the consequences of 
the other possibility facing man's free-will: what will 
befall him if he does not forgive. In this way we see 
the central role of forgiveness in the anthropology and 
especially the ascetical teaching of the saint. Both 
doctrinally and structurally it is pivotal and it, in 
turn, depends on man's personal will and how he uses it 
so that the pairs X6yoG - rp6 coC , cpvot1c - 
kdotiaot, c 
emerge very strongly here. 
If he refuses to forgive, the unrepentant man is 
handed over to Temptation and Evil. The latter are 
given a twofold interpretation, temptation being 'law 
373 
of sin'and consent, evil being understood as the Evil One 
and the activity that follows consent. The Devil is given 
his traditional place in the scheme of Maximus and man's 
life is seen to be bound up with diabolical intrigue and 
interference. 'Consent' and 'action' are moments in the 
monastic analysis of the process of sin. 
731 The basic 
concern of Maximus here is that man, because of his hard- 
heartedness, is overcome by these destructive forces, 
that he is handed over to them, which in turn puts his 
destiny in the hands of God who-respects his freedom even 
when he abuses it. The God who has been portrayed as 
Creator, Father, King, is now cast in the role of Just 
Judge. 
Maximus does not hesitate to define 'temptation' as 
'the law of sin' .? 
32 He is not content with a phenomeno- 
logical description, but tries to understand it basically 
on an analogy with the 'law of nature' which we have met 
already. He hastens to assure us that the first man was 
created without it, that it is in no way constitutive of 
human nature, that in fact it was introduced by the 
agency of the Evil One. He qualifies the causality of 
this malign influence on human destiny by saying that he 
kneaded this into the nature of men and persuaded 
man by deceit to make the desire of his soul pass 
from what is permitted to what is forbidden and to 
turn to the transgression of the divine command- 
ment. 733 
The scriptural inspiration of this statement is obvious. 
Maximus is contrasting the causality of the Devil with 
that of God. The Devil can only be an instigator, a 
deceiver, an anarchist, in contrast to God whose 
creativity is positive, beneficent and effective. 
374 
Whereas God's commandment was designed to ensure that man 
would concern himself with the capacity of creaturehood, 
the Devil leads him to attempt to exploit its incapacity 
and so he is trapped in weakness and degeneration in 
place of that splendid evolution held out to him by God 
as progress from ctvat, to äe C cIvac through Eli 
etvc In place of the %6ToC cvacwc , man with 
his yv(4uTj adopts disordered passion as the quicksand 
ground of his activity and so he institutes a law that 
is the antithesis of 'the law of nature', that is 'the 
law of sin'. 
734 Unwittingly man has substituted µßi 
dust for ctva4 in his reckless pursuit of what 
seems to be good. OLXavuCa undoes the free appro- 
priation of the authentic 'desire of his soul'. 
735 Here 
we are presented with the tragic image of man who fails 
through the perverse use of his freedom to be borne on 
the great wave of created xCviiot, (; to its true goal, 
God Himself. As a result he exchanges corruptibility 
for incorruptibility. 8opd., is the consequence and ("v e2azwe) 
concomitant of the "meonticýdecision of the human will, 
something that infects every dimension of man's being 
because of his rejection of the grace which is the 
foundation of its opposite, ägeapOCm 0 
Maximus then provides an alternative interpretation 
of xeLpaoµ6S and tov7lp6r. : voluntary consent to the 
passions and the mode which consummates in act the 
passionate disposition. 
736 This is a development of the 
interpretation of teipaaµbc considered to be 'the 
law of sin' which is the dynamism engendered in the will 
by allowing itself to be mastered by disordered passion. 
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Elsewhere, in keeping with the ascetical tradition, both 
primitive and erudite, Maximus describes the process of 
moral and spiritual disintegration in clear and virtually 
technical language. 737 For this tradition, 'consent' and 
'action' are the final and critical phases of sinful 
activity. 
738 'Consent' is verbally identical with what 
we find in the Pater Noster; 'action' is the kernel of 
the more cumbersome 'mode which consummates in act the 
passionate disposition', so that in the Pater Noster, 
Maximus concentrates on the stages of sinful activity 
that are characterized by guilt. It is from these above 
all that we pray to be delivered. By the introduction 
of the distinction between xcLpaaµ6C and ito'Bp6 
in this sense Maximus shows that he wished to refer to 
a whole tradition of ascetical psychology and to place 
it in the context of the wider synthetic concerns of 
his anthropology and Christology. 
739 It should be noted 
too that he associates the whole process of sinful 
capitulation with demonic influence so that, in the 
associations of Maximus, the 'evil' of his second inter- 
pretation, while it is primarily concerned with the 
external expression of sinful consent, is not wholly 
dissociated from diabolical interference. 740 For 
Maximus, man is caught up in the warfare of superior 
powers, a stake in angelic conflict, a protagonist in a 
drama that eludes the scrutiny of mortal eyes. 
741 
Maximus then returns to what he considers to be the 
most significant factor in conversion: forgiveness. 
Unless the one who uses the 'Our Father' forgives he 
will fail to obtain forgiveness from God, who now 
376 
portrayed as 'Just Judge', will abandon him to the conse- 
quences of his hardheartedness. Maximus is careful to 
avoid attributing to God the initiative in punishment. 
The verbs which he applies to God's initiative leave the 
freedom of man intact and show that what he suffers is, 
in the last analysis, attributable to his own misguided 
use of his freedom. The Just Judge 'allows', 'abandons', 
'does not prevent' and 'does not ransom' .? 
42 The counter- 
part of human autonomy is liability to punishment for its 
abuse. Maximus is here assigning that punishment to the 
permissive will of God rather than to His positive will. 
The 'law of sin' and the 'Evil One' now have their way 
with the unforgiving man, staining him and mastering him 
respectively. Preference for dishonourable passion to 
nature is given as the cause for this captivity. This 
puts the genesis of the 'law of sin' in a nutshell. 
Again we are reminded of the contrasting sources of these 
gnomic canons : cmopcvs and öL . ovpyk . God is 
the creative source of nature, or reality, while the Devil 
can only be a deceiver, attempting to induce man to substit- 
tute the unreal for the real, groundless passion for the 
Xcioc cp 3oewc , as the co-ordinate of his free-will. 
The role of preference is crucial in this passage. It 
reminds us of the precarious character of human existence 
in the vision of Maximus, where man is liable to plunge 
into the vortex of passion and to become subject to the 
warped power of the Evil One. This does not mean that 
he thinks of the plight of man as desperate, but it does 
mean that he realizes that man is totally dependent on 
the omnipotent mercy of God. In the Capitum de Caritate 
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Quattuor Centuriae, Maximus enumerates five reasons why 
God permits man to be warred upon by the demons, the 
principal of which he says is 'that when we become 
detached we forget not our own weakness nor the power of 
Him who has helped us' . 
743 
Having examined the way in which the Just Judge 
will deal with man in hie relationship to 'temptation' 
and 'evil' in the first sense given to them above, he 
then turns his attention to the alternative interpreta- 
tion of these terms from the dominical prayer and the 
way in which the Judge will deal with them. Again the 
will of God is permissive and again the will of man 
retains its creaturely autonomy: 'He does not prevent 
him from giving in voluntarily to the passions of the 
flesh'. 744 Again it is the passions that seduce man. 
This is an empirical description of temptation; from 
another point of view, it is the abuse of personal 
freedom that constitutes the passions as the basis of 
the law of human activity, as 'the law of sin'. 
745 
Neither will God, he continues, interrupt the externali- 
zation of the sinful consent. The phrase xac' aüTä 
746 
reminds us of the way in which the passions are a norm 
in caricature of the ? 6yot c5ocwS . They are not 
merely an external canon, but rather an informing factor 
in the will. The contrast between the basis of authentic 
human activity and its passionate counterfeit is brought 
out brilliantly in the clause: 'because thinking less 
of nature than of groundless passions he disregarded its 
principle in his eagerness for them'. 
747 The passions 
are founded on the fabrications of man's phantasy. It is 
378 
thus that man enters the realm of minus-being and tends to 
fall back into non-being. 
748 This reminds us of the 
privative character of evil in the theology of Maximus 
and gives us a glimpse of the dark kingdom of the Evil 
One. 749 'Thinking less of' implies a failure in recog- 
nition as well as a defect in appreciation; 'disregarding' 
entails deficiency in knowledge as well as wilful rebuff. 
The twofold implication is made explicit in Maximus' 
treatment of the human act with its alternations of 
cognition and appetite .? 
50 There is an element of open- 
eyed responsibility for failure to accept the proper role 
of the A&-yoc, cpüoewC in human becoming and ale oa 
suggestion that the failure in vision is due to an 
enigmatic bias in man's will towards the insubstantial. 
The o7cov6ij with which man is said to pursue his 
phantom good conveys the impetuosity of passion, but also 
its counterfeiting of an enthusiasm that should spring 
from the highest levels of his being, to which Maximus 
has already referred twice in his Pater Noster. 
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In the series of rebukes which Maximus now hands 
out to the unforgiving man we can discern further his 
notion of genuine moral activity and his understanding 
of the moral imperative. "E&EL 
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governs 'have 
known', 'have preserved', 'have rejected', 'Preserved', 
'have made sure' and the final di ootiýaaL , which 
outline a complete reform of the use of human liberty 
in the context of the forgiveness required by the 'Our 
Father'. We may ask ourselves what the source of the 
dictate implied in söcL is. "Ebe,. imposes an 
obligation on man to act consistently with his basic 
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natural structure. Maximus says that he should have known 
in accordance' with the movement of nature's X6yoC 
what the law of nature is. Here Maximus is claiming that 
man has the capacity to recognize the movement of X6yor. 
95ocwr. as it exercises its influence on the will in 
the process of the formation of the vdµor. OacwC 0753 
What we have seen already of the relationship between 
divine law and natural law will serve to remind us that 
the ultimate source of the movement in question here is 
the eternal Logos, so that so far from being arbitrary is 
human activity, that its rightness is not merely derived 
from consistency with a principle of nature, conceived 
after the closed fashion of the Greek philosophers, but 
rather from a ? 6yoc cpvoswc that is open and 
ultimately rooted in the Logos Himself. Because he is 
endowed with ? 6yo6 , the man of sensitive moral 
discrimination should be able to discern the source of 
the dynamism in his will and to adjust it accordingly. 
In contrast to the 'law of nature' we find here 'the law 
of the passions'754 which is identical with 'the law of 
sin'. As Maximus intimates here, the foundation of 'the 
law of the passions' is illusory. It has its basis, not 
in reality, but in a perverse 'voluntary choice'. In 
place of nature, before man's gaze there opens up a 
moral 'black hole', which is the ironical effect of his 
attempt to play at being God. 
The next phrases have to do with the preservation 
and rejection that should have taken place if man were 
to have been consistent with a right knowledge of 'the 
movements of the soul' 
755 
so that 96e G: is now brought to 
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bear on the volitional and conative aspects of man's self- 
expression. It is 'natural operations' that should have 
preserved the sway of 'the law of nature' in his life; 
man's activities should have been the product of a 
Yvwµn that has adopted the X6 oc cpüocw6 and in turn 
been informed by it, while at the same time raising the 
Myoc cpýocwc to the level of the person. This would 
have required the expulsion of the 'law of the passions' 
from Yv4u just as light dispels darkness. He 
mentions 'hatred and dissension' as typifying passionate 
disorder because of his concern with the final petitions 
of the 'Our Father' and his conviction that man's moral 
and spiritual life pivots on forgiveness, the contrary of 
these vices. Having dealt with (vw4n implicitly and 
negatively, he now turns his attention to it positively 
and rounds off his series of strictures by saying how 
man should have managed his personal freedom: 
Besides, he should have made sure that the free-will 
co-operated with nature, entirely unconcerned about 
anything at all which the principle of nature does 
not bestow. 756 
Maximus concludes that the one who prays must put 
aside hatred and dissension if he is to be heard when he 
prays. He has already drawn attention to the essential 
bond between cüx. fj and %poaevfj 
757 
and here 
analogously he insists that unless man is properly 
orientated to his neighbour he cannot pray effectively, 
because his prayer will be merelip-service. The 
äxoQti'ýoat is governed by the UeL which has lent 
its urgency to the previous infinitives, so that this 
final requirement is pressed on our attention with the 
same insistence and is meant to form a whole with them, 
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bearing the same weight of moral responsibility as they 
did. This is a matter of first rate importance to 
Maximus and reminds us again that his ascetical teaching 
in the Pater Noster is centred on forgiveness. The 
neighbour is said to be a relative xaTc cýaLv , 
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a phrase that evokes the concept of concrete universal, 
Maximus' concern with unity and the tension between 
cpva LC and btdo'taoLC in his work. This tension 
can become either creative in innovation or destructive 
in 9 LWcLut Ca , the former ensuring that men become 
true persons in possession of nature and so open to those 
in the same relationship to the same nature, the latter 
issuing in the stultification of person and the frustra- 
tion of nature as well as its fragmentation through 
divisive yvSc . Maximus sees the consequence of 
forgiveness as the gift of God's forgiveness to the one 
who prays sincerely and protection from future sin, which 
will include freedom from falling into temptation and the 
power of the Evil One. 
Part III, 697759 
We have seen already that this part of the Pater 
Noster is arranged from an ascetical point of view so 
that Maximus deals with the final petitions of the 'Our 
Father' and their corresponding mysteries in the first 
place and gives the desire to be liberated from tempta- 
tion and the Evil One as motivation for undertaking what 
is demanded from man's effort in the other petitions. 
In Chapter III above, we have drawn attention to the 
crucial character of forgiveness and how its function 
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in the spiritual life is emphasized by the structure of 
language in this part of the Pater Noster. This is 
strengthened by the quotation from Scripture: 'If you 
will not forgive men their sine, neither will your 
heavenly Father forgive you yours'. 
760 Forgiveness is 
the guarantee that we shall be forgiven; besides, it 
ensures that we shall overcome the law of sin and not be 
abandoned to the power of the Evil One. The main 
interest of this passage is the way it highlights faith 
and forgiveness as central to the 'Our Father' and so to 
the Christian life, which Maximus sees mirrored in the 
prayer. The exposition adds little to what we have seen 
already. The 'law of sin' is contrasted with actual sins 
and grammatically it is so placed that it is seen as a 
deeper problem than sins committed; it remains with man 
as the perverse dynamism of his gnome and so makes him 
liable to an ever deeper involvement in q)o CLU Ca 
Maximus says that man is not allowed to enter the 
'experience' of temptation. This will at least mean that 
he is assured of the 'way out'761 of which St. Paul speaks, 
but we may too find ih it a specifically monastic pre- 
occupation, to attain to perfect &% Osca . Finally, 
Maximus evokes the Christological emphasis of the whole 
of Part I and the fundamental role of Logos in Part II by 
reminding his readers that it is Christ who wins the 
victory over the world, who gives men the commandments 
that ensure liberating virtue and who unites nature by 
äY&Lln 0 
Conclusion762 
Here Maximus returns to the complementary ideas of 
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66wocs and xevWaLr. around which he organizes the 
whole treatise. He wants the purpose of the prayer to be 
a realization of how x6vwoLC has made aewaCC a real 
alternative to what man's perversity had engineered. The 
immediate consequence of this appreciative knowledge is 
love of God who offers man 86woLC . This love must 
be expressed by a life consistent with the prayer which 
will show God to be our Father and that we have rejected 
the Evil One. On the basis of the principle that each 
shares his properties with his associates, those who love 
God receive life while the devotees of the Evil One 
receive death. The latter is the effect of submission 
to voluntary temptation. Maximus distinguishes between 
temptations that are voluntary and involuntary, pleasur- 
able and painful, deliberate and unbidden. The former 
beget sin, the latter avenge it. The place of the Evil 
One in the work of man's undoing is placed in relation 
to this twofold temptation: he bends himself to the 
first by seducing the soul with bodily pleasure in order 
to avert its desire from God; he seeks to corrupt nature, 
undermined by suffering, by contriving man's slander of 
God. The remedy for the voluntary temptation is to pray 
in order to keep desire informed by äyd. i; the way 
to cope with the involuntary is to endure it and to 
demonstrate that we prefer the Creator of nature to 
nature. Prayer is then shown to be relevant to the 
latter kind of temptation as well. Calling on the name 
of Jesus should ensure that we are freed from present 
pleasures as well as future pains. This will come about 
through participation in the reality of the good things 
to come, 'given us to be seen in Christ himself, our 
Lord, who alone with the Father and the Holy Spirit is 
glorified by all creation, Amen'. 
We should now be in a better position to appreciate 
the theological resonances of that early statement of 
the 'mysteries' contained in the Pater Noster:? 
63 
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The text of the prayer will be found to contain 
the petition of all these things. For it speaks 
of the Father, of the Name of the Father and of 
the Kingdom. Besides, it presents the one who 
prays as being a son of this Father by grace. It 
asks that those in heaven and those on earth should 
become of one will. It commando us to ask for 
substantial bread. It prescribes reconciliation 
for men and binds nature to itself by forgiving and 
being forgiven, not being hacked asunder by the 
differences of free-will. It teaches us to ask not 
to enter into temptation which is the law of sin, 
and it recommends the avoidance of evil. For it 
was fitting that the author and giver of the 
benefits should also be a teacher to those who 
believe in Him and imitate his conduct in the flesh, 
providing the words of this prayer as precepts of 
life. Through these He revealed the hidden treasures 
of wisdom and knowledge that really exist in Him, 
clearly impelling the desire of those who pray to 
enjoy them. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE CHRISTOLOGICAL DIMENSION 
The purpose of this chapter is to complement the 
references to Christ and the Christian Mystery in the 
previous chapters so that we can fill out our understand- 
ing of how Maximus would have explained his Chriatology if 
asked about it. This will require attention to aspects of 
Christology and Soteriology that claimed his attention in 
a special way because of the needs of the Church in his 
time. The point of view will be that of the Confessor 
when he had entered into full possession of his thought 
about Christ and His saving intervention in the lives of 
men. 
(i) The Hypostatic Union 
It is a commonplace of Maximian studies that the 
Christology of Maximus is a development of the dogmatic 
formulation of Chalcedon and his formulae illustrates in 
a concise way his power of enclosing a whole doctrinal 
tradition in the space of a few words. Chalcedon had 
, 
il) 
spoken of Ii Ca k6a raai and ýv övotýv cpýaeaW 
where the principle of contradiction is respected in the 
contrast of hypostasis and nature, so that Christ can be 
both one and two at the same time, but from a different 
point of view, thus transcending the limitations of 
Eutychian monophysitism and the two-person teaching of 
Nestorianism. The language of Chalcedon spells out the 
implications of Cyril's µCa 
(2) by the azQapxwµzßn1 
c5aLr. roV A6yov 
juxtaposition of 
b7,60tiaoLs and cp iL and the use of ýv with the 
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natures p echoing Cyril's 'rgXe L or. 
!v ee 6-rTrc L ...... xa( 
Iv &vepu t6'cTjzL , 
(3) but rounding it off with !v bvaCvf 
cpacoLv , 
(4) 
which in turn is caught in the Iv oIC 
of the Maximian formula that we shall examine below. 
Although Cyril had conceded the appropriateness of the 
Ix bvo pvoscov 
(5) 
as a way of ensuring that the 
duality in Christ was not overlooked in concern for His 
unity, this phrase does not occur in the terminology of 
Chalcedon. Eutychee was prepared to admit that the unity 
of Christ proceeded in some way from bvo , but hie 
intentions are clarified by Dioscorus Alexandrinus' 
Ix övo ov övo "(6) The close association of 
!x and 
ov in this way of thinking accounts for its omission by 
those who drafted the Chalcedonian formula. 
(7) Neither 
ex or lv appear in the language of the Antiochians 
contributing to the Union Symbol, but the duality is 
affirmed by saying that 'Christ is the two natures'. The 
Neo-Chalcedonians, keen to redress the balance by 
Cyrillian emphasis, used Ix and ýv in relation to the 
natures of Christ as in no way mutually exclusive, so that 
we find them co-ordinated in Neo-Chalcedonian writing. 
(8) 
Maximus was the first to add the Antiochian esti to the 
Neo-Chalcedonian pair. He sums up his insight into the 
relationship between the person and the natures in Christ 
in a formula that comprises the distinctness of the 
subject from the natures with the identity of the subject 
with the natures and in such a way that the duality of 
the natures remains intact: the natures 1 wv xaC Iv 
OTC xaC itep go' Cv *(9) 
In the formula of Maimus, the. Ix and the &v indicate 
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some kind of distinction between the unique subject and the 
natures, a distinction that is elsewhere formulated as that 
between the whole and the parts. 
(10) The hx does not imply 
any pre-existence of the humanity of Christ, but emphasises 
the logical anteriority of the natures to their union. The 
Zv emphasizes the permanence of the two natures in the 
union. It is associated with the Leonine view: salva 
igitur proprietate utriusque naturae et in unam coeunte 
personam.. In integra ergo veri hominis perfectaque natura 
verus natls est Deus, totus in aufs, totus in nostril". 
The go' Cv insists on the fact that there is not a third 
quid in Christ, that, whatever hypostasis may be, it is 
not reducible to the essential order and at the same time 
it can be identified with that order, without doing 
violence to the principle of contradiction. 
(12) 
Maximus 
will insist that Christ is not anything else but His 
natures. 
(13 ) The 'who' is identified with the two 
'what's without being reduced to them. In a sense He has 
them. In the Incarnation we have a unique subject, 
distinct in some way from the natures. The Greek philo- 
sophical tradition concentrated on the world of quiddities 
and there is no attempt to define the meaning of hypostasis 
at Chalcedon, but it is affirmed and points the way to a 
resolution of the problems caused by trying to grasp the 
significance of the Incarnation in a merely quidditative 
way. The solutions of Eutyches and Nestorius were seen 
by their orthodox contemporaries and by MPximus to have 
failed to take sufficient account of the way in which 
b7c6atiaßcc at once transcends and is identified with 
the order of cvvcc , how 70S cIvaL can preserve the 
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unity of the being of Christ without damaging the integrity 
of the äýXwC etvaL of divinity and humanity. In the 
development of doctrine that followed Chalcedon, new insights 
would be gained in the order of hypostasis, particularly in 
the work of the Leontii, whose ontological formulae would 
serve to underpin the particularising characteristics of 
Cappadodian teaching already incorporated into Chriatologg14) 
Chalcedon had done enough by drawing attention to another 
order of being. MPximue could availAof the theological 
developments q by which the appreciation of the meaning and 
relevance of hypostasis had been enhanced, to give a 
comprehensiveness to his formulae which had not been attained 
by the theologians at Chalcedon. 
The most systematic exposition of the views of Maximus 
on the Monophysite heresy is to be found in Epi stole XV. 
(15 
After a laborious analysis of the possible types of union 
and the bearing of this on the mystery of Christ, Maximus 
says: 'Christ therefore has what is common and what is 
proper to each of the members of which He is composed'. 
(16) 
This is his answer to Cosmas the Deacon, to whom the letter 
is addressed and who has asked him: 'What is the common 
and the universal and what is the particular and the 
proper, so that henceforth the whole question of the 
union may become clear to us'. 
(17) 
The 'union', to which 
he refers, is that of the natures in Christ. Maximus teils 
him that 'according to the Fathers, therefore, the common 
and the universal is the essence and the nature, for they 
say that the two are identical. The proper and the 
particular is the hypostasis and the person, both being 
(18) 
identical'. In his analysis of the types of union, 
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he rejects the possibility of a direct union of natures and 
throws considerable light on the mystery of the union in 
hypostasis of the divine and human natures of Christ. 
For Maximus the order of nature and the order of 
hypostasis are irreducible to one another and this 
principle holds good in every realm of being: 
For an angel is distinguished from another angel, a 
man from another man, an ox from another ox, a dog 
from another dog, according to hypostasis and not 
according to nature and essence... even in the First 
Cause, without origin and creator of everything, we 
see that nature and hypostasis are not identical, 
for we recognize one only essence and nature of the 
divinity existing in three hypostases, distinct from 
each other by their properties ... unbegottenness, begottenness and procession, which do not divide the 
unique nature and the power of the ineffable divinity 
into three essences or unequal natures, or even into 
equal ones, but which characterize the persons in 
whom is the unique divinity and who are themselves 
this divinity. 19) 
Consubstantiality is only possible between beings that have 
nature in common; distinctness proceeds from what is 
proper to them, or as Maximus says here from what 'charac- 
terizes' them, so that hypostasis is from one point of 
view 'the distinctive characteristics of each being'. 
(20) 
The union of hypostatically distinct beings must be in the 
order of nature : 
The things which are united according to one and 
only essence and nature, that is that are of one 
and the same essence and nature, they are on the 
one hand entirely consubstantial and on the other 
hypostatically distinct. (21) 
They are consubstantial because of their essential commu- 
nity, which they enjoy immoveably because of their natural 
identity; personal distinctness accounts for hypostatic 
difference: 
each one possesses with the complex of 
390 
properties 
that are his the principle of hypostasis that belongs 
to him most properly. (2Z) 
Maximus then comes to the kind of union, for the under- 
standing of which he has embarked on this analysis: things 
which are united according to one and the same hypostasis 
or person are of the same hypostasis but of different 
essences. He elaborates this by saying that they are 
6µot3A6ctiatia (23) by reason of the personal and 
indivisible unit which is realized by their union; it is 
the reason by which the distinctive properties, which 
mark each one off from its own essential community, 
become characteristic of the unique hypostasis wrought 
from them by the fact that they come together in being. 
Hypostasis is that by which their unity, which admits no 
division, is recognized. The beings which find unity in 
this way are necessarily distinct in essence: 'each one 
respects irreducibly the principle of the substance of 
the other'. 
(24) 
To Maximus the X6yos of nature is inviolable, 
something indestructible that retains the consistency 
granted it at creation, so that there can be no possi- 
bility of a fusion of natures. 
(25) 
There can be no 
question of consubstantiality between natures as such, 
but only between individuals of the same species, that 
possess the same essence. The only possibility of union 
for natures is in the same hypostasis and, from what we 
have seen, Maximus understands this to happen through 
the distinctive properties of each nature which mark it 
off in the individual from all the others of the same 
species. The hypostasis of two natures, the common 
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hypostasis or what Maximus calls in the case of Christ the 
kdo'raaLC avvOe coC , would be marked by the sum of 
the distinctive properties peculiar to each nature involved 
in the union. Accepting the current theory of the union of 
soul and body, Maximus sees it as exemplifying the hypo- 
static union of two distinct natures. The sum of the 
properties peculiar to the body and soul of 'Paul' is what 
gives its identity to his hypostasis. They are his. 
Maximus applies the result of his enquiry to the 
problems of Chris t ology : 
The Word of God himself teaches us clearly that He 
is perfect in essence and nature, by which He is 
identical and consubstantial with the Father and 
the Spirit, wholly preserving without confusion the 
personal difference in keeping with his person, his 
hypostasis, according to which He is different from 
the Father and the Spirit. He has taken flesh of 
the Holy Spirit and the holy Mother of God, Mary 
ever-virgin and has become man perfectly. That 
means that He became a perfect man by the assumption 
of a flesh, having an intelligible and reasonable 
soul, flesh which receives in Him both its nature 
and its hypostasis, that is to say being (E vaL) 
and subsistence ( $cpeoTävaL ) From its 
conception it is together with the Word, because the 
Word himself took the place of the seed (or rather, 
He is the seed) of His own voluntary Incarnation. 
Thus He became composite as regards hypostasis . 
who, in his nature, is simple and not compgsed. (2 1 
The union that took place in the Incarnation must belong 
to the second of the two categories which Maximus has 
outlined above, so that he can conclude that Christ was 
not divided by the natural difference of His members, 
nor confused by the hypostatic unity. By reason of the 
community of essence of each of the members of which He 
is composed, He is united to the Father and to his 
Mother by nature, showing that He safeguards the differ- 
ence of the members of which He is composed. 
(27) 
By 
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reason of the hypostatic particularity of his proper 
members which distinguish Him from the individual terms, 
that is his Father and his Mother, the unity of his own 
hypostasis appeared completely without differentiation, 
enjoying the unity of his own members among themselves in 
the highest personal identity. Prom this we can see that, 
for Maximus, Christ maintains community of nature with his 
Father and his Mother; at the same time the particular- 
ities of his two natures unite to form one only hypo- 
stasis. Maximus is explicit about this: 
The hypostatic particularity of each of the members, 
of which Christ is composed in his unity, has 
resulted in a common characteristic (& ew AeaEv 
YvupLQµa xoi, vöv a characteristic which marks 
the hypostasis and which they constitute together: 
for we say that the unique hypostasis has become 
common to the fl sh and to the divinity by an 
ineffable union. i28) 
Here we see clearly that the distinctiveness of the 
characteristics of the natures is identified with the 
unique hypostasis of the logos. 'The hypostatic partic- 
ularity' of each nature marks the hypostasis of the Logos. 
The hypostatic fusion of these characteristics results in 
Yvcýpi. aµa xotvöv . This gives us an astonishing 
insight into the mystery of the Incarnation; the flesh 
is truly the flesh of the Only-begotten Son of God; all 
its individual traits are determined by His eternal 
personality and they reveal it. This extends to every 
dimension of His being and life as man. It marks His 
style. 
Maximus then proceeds to draw out the implications 
of this union in order to offset unorthodox claims and 
to throw into relief the orthodox dimensions of the 
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mystery. This he does firstly from the point of view of 
the flesh that the Logos assumed and then from the point 
of view of the assuming Logos : 
The flesh- has not preserved the difference with 
regard to the Logos by the properties which 
distinguish it from other men; nor again was it 
distinguished from us by the properties that make 
it different from the Logos. But it preserved the 
hypostatic union or identity with the Logos by the 
properties which distinguish it from us, just as 
it has kept the essential difference from the 
Logos by that by which it is united to us naturally. 
Just as the Logos also has preserved the hypostatic 
union or identity with the flesh by the properties 
which distinguish Him as Son and Logos from what is 
common in the divihij7y and being united by essence 
to the Father and the Spirit by the properties 
according to which, as God, He preserves the 
difference of nature in relation to the flesh, He 
combined both the difference and the identity 
between Himself and the extremes. (29) 
Maximus concludes that He has both the common and the 
proper of each of the members of which He is composed. 
When we recall the way in which Maximus has defined this 
for Cosmas, his notion of k6a'caaL avv6e'oC 
forces itself on our attention. We shall examine that 
below. Here he is emphasising that what distinguishes 
the Logos as Son is what unites Him with what disting- 
uishes Him as man, while the union leaves intact what 
He has in common with the Father and the Spirit on the 
one hand and on the other with all men. 
The Cappadocians had established that the three 
hypostases in the Holy Trinity were one ovoCa in an 
absolute manner, not merely as human persons share in 
one human nature, but in that each of the Three Persons 
in the Trinity was identified with the totality of the 
divine substance in its numerical identity. For Basil, 
for instance, the persons were distinguished among 
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themselves by identifying particularities (yvwpLoTLxaC 
CoLatirtcý ), the Father being unbegotten, the Son 
being begotten and the Holy Spirit proceeding. These are 
the only distinctive traits of the Three Persons; all 
the other attributes of God are common to the Three in 
the same way that oü&Ca is, so that the Three Persons 
have only one will and one operation. 
(30) 
In fact, very 
often the unity of the nature is deduced from the unity 
of the operation of the Three Persons. Maximus clarifies 
his understanding of the terminology in keeping with the 
usage of the tradition: 'the essence and the nature, it 
is the same thing' ; 
(31) 
'the hypostasis and the person, 
it is the same thing'. 
(32) 
In fact he sees the applica- 
tion of the notions of nature and hypostasis to every- 
thing that exists: 'the state of existence is contem- 
plated in substance and in hypostasis'. 
(33) 
But Maximus 
is primarily interested in the trinitarian mystery of 
three hypostases in one nature and the Christological 
mystery of one person in two natures. The terminology 
which the Cappadocians had elaborated with such finesse 
in order to speak coherently about the mystery of the 
Holy Trinity without endangering its apophatio character 
was gradually transferred to the area of Christology and 
applied with equal refinement there. While terms like 
üxap LS. Yevvi c$LC, rpfRoc ufw 
bxäpF. cca were 
practically synonymous with k6ß'taaL4 in the evolution 
of this terminology, oüoCa and cpv°Lc found a 
counterpart in X6Yoc. cPc6acwc *(34) The pair ?6 oS 
- rp6 u, would become a way of extending the cpvai4 - 
b, x6atiaaL4. distinction and giving it a wider applica- 
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tion in drawing out the implications of the Hypostatic 
Union. 
(35) 
Before we turn our attention to that it will 
be instructive to consider an extended passage from the 
Opuscula Theologica et Polemica(36) where we find Maximus 
making fine use of Cappadocian terminology not merely to 
show trinitarian heterodoxy because of a failure to do 
justice to the required balance between o&aCa and 
tm6cTuaLc , but in a parallel manner demonstrating 
how a neglect of the same principles in Christology led 
to comparable distortions of Christian truth. The 
principal value of this is that it lets Maximus speak 
for himself! On the two natures of Christ: 
1. Arius confesses the three hypostases, but denies the 
Unity and he does not say that the Holy Trinity is con- 
substantial. Sabellius confesses the Unity, but denies 
the Trinity, because he says that the Father, Son and 
Holy Spirit are the same. The Church of God both 
confesses the Unity and proclaims the Trinity. Macedonius 
honours the same things as Arius because he supposes that 
the Holy Spirit is a creature; the Church proclaims the 
Spirit consubstantial with the Father and the Son and 
affirms that He is God. Similarly, Nestorius says that 
there is a natural difference with respect to One of the 
Holy Trinity, but he does not confess the union, because 
he does not say that this union comes about according to 
hypostasis. Eutyches confesses the union, but denies the 
difference in substance and introduces a confusion of the 
natures. The Church venerates the union according to 
hypostasis because of the inseparability and the differ- 
ence according to substance because of the absence of 
confusion. 
2. How does the strict union comprise both identity and 
heterogeneity, the identity of substances and the hetero- 
geneity of persons and vice versa? Just as in the Holy 
Trinity there is identity of substance and heterogeneity 
of persons, since we confess one only substance and three 
hypostases, so in man there is identity of person and 
heterogeneity of substances, since man being one, the soul 
is of one substance and the body of another; likewise in 
our Lord Jesus Christ there is identity of person and 
heterogeneity of substances, since the person is one, that 
is the hypostasis, but the divinity is of one substance 
and the humanity of another substance. Just as it is 
impossible to confess the unity of the Holy Trinity with- 
out affirming the difference, so it is entirely necessary 
with regard to the One of the Holy Trinity to proclaim 
both the union and the difference. 
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3. Just as in the Holy Trinity the difference and the 
unity are not signified by the same expressions, but in 
saying three hypostases the difference is signified and in 
confessing one only substance the unity is signified, so 
with regard to the One of the Holy Trinity, in recognizing 
the two natures, the difference is signified and in 
proclaiming the one composite hypostasis the union is 
confessed. 
4. For just as we anathematize Arius not for proclaiming 
the difference with regard to hypostasis in the Holy 
Trinity, but for not declaring the unity of the nature, so 
we anathematize Nestorius not for recognizing the differ- 
ence of nature in Christ, but for not declaring that there 
is a union according to hypostasis. 
5. Just as we anathematize Sabellius not for proclaiming 
the unity of nature in the Holy Trinity, but for not saying 
that there is a difference according to hypostasis, so we 
anathematize Eutyches not for saying that there is a union 
according to hypostasis in Christ, but for not recognizing 
the difference of nature. 
6. As regards the difference according to hypostasis with 
regard to the Holy Trinity and difference of nature with 
regard to the One of the Holy Trinity, it must be said 
that it is not in the realm of perception but is known by 
the eyes of the spirit. How as regards the Holy Trinity 
do you affirm the three hypostases because of the differ- 
ence in hypostasis, while with regard to the one of the 
Holy Trinity you do not affirm two natures in one only 
hypostasis because of difference of nature? 
7. Just as because of the consubstantiality of the Holy 
Trinity you say that there is one substance only and 
because of the difference of hypostasis you say that there 
are three hypostases, likewise because of difference of 
substance of the Logos and the flesh say that there are 
two substances, and because of the absence of its own 
hypostasis say that there is one hypostasis only. 
8. Just as in the case of the Holy Trinity it is not by 
the confusion of the three hypostases that we say that 
there is one substance, nor by the suppression of the one 
substance that there are three hypostases, so with regard 
to the One of the Trinity it is not by the confusion of 
the two natures that we say that therd is one hypostasis 
nor by division of the unique hypostasis that there are 
two natures. 
9. He who does not say that in Christ there is union 
according to hypostasis because of the difference of 
natures is Nestorian; he who does not say that there is 
a difference of nature in the union according to hypostasis 
is Eutychian. He who proclaims as regards the One of the 
Holy Trinity both the union according to hypostasis and the 
difference of nature, holds the royal and blemeless faith. 
10. He therefore who says that there is difference an2 
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union with regard to Christ does not suppress the 
difference nor confuse the union. For the divine Cyril 
anathematizes those who suppress the union according to 
hypostasis because of the difference and the Ecumenical 
Council anathematizes those who suppress the difference 
of nature because of the union according to hypostasis 
in the One of the Holy Trinity. 
It would take us far beyond the scope of this essay 
to analyse fully this remarkable passage from the works 
of St. Maximus. Sherwood thinks that it represents the 
position defended by Maximus before the Severian bishops 
in Crete. 
(37) 
It has been introduced here primarily to 
demonstrate how Maximus can combine a survey of Trini- 
tarian errors with a similar conspectus of Christological 
heresies by showing what happens when a proper balance is 
not maintained between the notion of kdotiaoiC and 
the notion of ovoCa in both areas. It also proves 
that by the time of Maximus the transfer of the Trinitar- 
ian terminology to the question of Christology had been 
completed. He was not unaware of the opposition to this 
way of doing theology put up by Monophysites and Mono- 
thelites, but he relies on the resources of analogy to 
guarantee the authentic coherence of his position and 
ultimately this is validated by the fact that the Son 
who became flesh is 'the object of theology'(38) with 
the Father, so that there cannot be a break between 
Economy and Theology. 
In the Disputatio cum P rrho, Maximus insists on 
the analogical character of the notions applied to God 
and to creatures. The term Oac, s is used 
bµ. ovvýIwQ in its application to God, to men and to 
angels. 
(39) The wise theologian uses his terms 
conscious of their analogical flexibility. 
'40) 
But, as 
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Doucet points out with regard to the notion of nature, 
there is 'a unity of signification sufficient to legiti- 
mise the use in Christology of the patristic principles 
of argumentation based on this notion and its trinitarian 
use'. 
(41) 
He illustrates this by quoting Maximus: 'the 
difference of wills entails as well a difference of 
natures'. 
(42) 
Maximus is reversing the direction of an 
argument used in relation to the Holy Trinity: identity 
of will entails identity of nature. Here he argues the 
contrary: if there are two natures in Christ, then there 
must be two wills in Him as well. What matters to 
Maximus is the indissoluble bond between nature and will 
in both Theology and Economy and the necessity of 
equality of number between them: where there is one 
nature there is one will; where there are two natures, 
there must be two wills. The principle survives the 
analogical transpositions. It is this that the Monophy- 
sites and Monothelites dispute. Maximus indulges in 
reductiones ad absurdum to show that their positions are 
untenable. 
The other principle which Maximus keeps in mind in 
his use of trinitarian terminology in the elaboration of 
Christological questions is that Theology and Economy are 
in continuity because of the identity of the eternal 
Logos made flesh. In the courses of his exchanges with 
Pyrrhus, the latter objects to the principle that what is 
proper to the substance is proper to the operation on the 
grounds that it holds in Theology but not in Economy. 
Maximus counters that if this is so then after the 
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Incarnation the Son cannot be the object of Theology as the 
Father is and so cannot be invoked in the baptismal formula 
with the result that the faith and preaching would be in 
vain. 
(43) He then asks Pyrrhus to whom passages of 
(44) scripture, which he cites, can be applied if not to 
the Incarnate Logos. The implication is that the Incarnate 
Logos can be the subject of predication that is equally 
valid in Theology and Economy. 
In Adversus Eunomium Libri Duo(45) we find the author 
illustrating his understanding of rp67cor. rfjr. 
käpceWs 
, with an anthropological example that 
shows different ¶p&oL of one X6ioC ' fjc of aCa« " 
This refers to the birth of Christ from Mary. The concern 
in this context is trinitarian, but the possibilities for 
Christology were not lost on Maximus as we shall see in 
Opusculum IV, where he gives as proof of the consubstan- 
tiality of Christ with us, in spite of the uniqueness of 
His begetting, the example of the the consubstantiality 
of the godhood in the Father and Son, even though they 
have different rpd, xaL U%dpEcwc 
The Antiochians insisted on the reality of the human 
nature of Christ and the integrity of his human traits. 
For them He is 61. Loovßcoc fµ t v, Eustathius 
insists that the soul of Christ as well as his flesh is 
dµoovoc, oQ with that of men. 
(46) 
This is not to claim 
that the humanity of Christ is numerically one with that 
of other men, but it does affirm a specific unity with 
them. For Cyril, the Logos is consubstantial with the 
Father and with us. Cyril draws attention to the two 
meanings of bµooiaLoc 0(47) In the case of the 
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commonness of nature that Christ enjoys with His Father it 
is a matter of ¶av'r& 1c ; with men it is characterized 
by 6p Lo L 6vr . 
(48) 
But even if the Fathers who 
contrived the transfer of trinitarian terminology to that 
of Christology used the xoLvdv of Aristotle, it must 
not be thought that they interpreted it as abstract. For 
them the nature is made to be concrete in the persons who 
possess it, even if, in the case of men, it is not 
possessed in its numerical totality by each one of them 
as obtains in the case of the Persons of the Holy Trinity, 
(49 ) 
identified with the totality of the divine nature. 
The most economic way of discovering the play of funda- 
mental concepts will be to examine Opusculum IV 
According to nature, the human in the Saviour is 
not other than the human in us, but is identical 
with it in essence, without any difference, 
because it was taken from our own nature, by the 
ineffable assumption from the virginal and 
immaculate blood of the all-pure Mother of God. 
United to this blood, like seed, the Logos became 
flesh without ceasing to be God in essence. 
Perfect man, He was like us, with the excepti6i. of 
sin alone. By sin, we often revolt and oppose God 
by the will, which in us inclines from one side to 
the other; but He, being by nature free from all 
sin because He was not a mere man, but God made man, 
had nothing in Him that was opposed to God. He 
preserved our nature completely pure and immaculate. 
It is thus that He says : 'The Prince of this world 
comes and in Me he finds nothing' (Jn 14,30), 
nothing of all that by which we show contrariety of 
will, thus depraving our nature. Because of this 
contrariety which is in us, Christ himself was said 
to be insubordinate until He freed us from it by the 
power of His Incarnation. Because of all that He 
became on our account and because of all He willingly 
did for us, He has confirmed the truth of His 
Incarnation, without ever falsifying our nature or 
anything that belongs to it in a natural and irre- 
proachable manner, even though He divinized this 
nature itself with all its properties, like an 
incandescent piece of iron, rendering it entirely 
capable of accomplishing divine works in concentra- 
ting it by the union, having become one with it, 
without confusion, according to the same unique 
hypostasis. 50 
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Behind this whole passage is the Chalcedionian 
expression 6 ooßoLoc 4LEV Xatic tirv avopW7-dTrTa 0(51) 
Although Maximus is sensitive to the impenetrable character 
of the mystery of the Incarnation, 'the ineffable assumption', 
to which he refers above, he wants to grasp more adequately 
how the physical identity of Christ with us was possible 
without detriment to His divine or human nature. He 
immediately draws attention to the unique manner of 
Christ's conception where the Logos in person assumes the 
function of the seed that plays an essential part in the 
origin of everyman. In this way Maximus can emphasize 
the uniqueness of the conception of the Logos as man. In 
the thought of Maximus hypostatic mode, 'rp6toc ' rfic 
Uäp ever. and rp67. oc T% rcvvAoewcare virtually 
synonymous so that the mode of Christ's conception is a 
declaration of His personal identity. 
(52) This is bound 
up with the trinitarian notion of rpd7roC and its 
implications of origin and relationship and in this 
Christological context it is meant to evoke these associa- 
tions. 
(53) 
Hypostatic assumption does no violence to 
natural integrity. 
Maximus then turns his attention to the sinlessness 
of Christ. Lethel has pointed out that here we are in the 
presence of the first affirmation of the human will of 
Christ in the works of Maximus and indeed that this is a 
totally new departure in the patristic understanding of 
the play of the human will in His humanity and in 
salvation. 
(54) Sin is presented as a perverse attitude 
of the will, opposed not merely to nature, but to the 
God of nature. 
(55) 
The absence of sin in Christ does 
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not imply any diminishing of human nature in Him; on the 
contrary the assumed nature enjoys a wholeness in Him that 
is unique, since there can be no question of that vavtiC- 
WQLC of the will that perverts nature and stunts its 
possibility of actualization in unfettered freedom. The 
absence of sin enhances the fact of His being bµo- 
ovaLoc Attu The divinisation of the assumed nature in 
the Hypostatic Union enables nature to attain to its 
divinely willed destiny by enabling it to go out of 
itself in freedom to share in divine life. It should be 
noted that when Maximus uses the traditional image of 
incandescent iron to suggest the transformation of nature 
wrought in divinization, he is careful to qualify it by 
reminding us that this takes place xa-; ä 'riv ah4v 
xaC µ Cav koa'taa t, v . 
(56) 
Even in the intimacy 
of 1tePLXCP11QL6 the äaU 5 Z)C of Chalcedon is 
emphasized. 
The text of Opusculum IV continues: 
Consequently His humanity differs from ours, not 
by the X6yor. of nature, but by the new cp6%o4 
of His coming to be, being by nature identical 
with it, but in keeping with the absence of seed 
not being identical with it, because this human 
nature was not that of a mere man, but belonged to 
Him, who for us was made man. Likewise His will 
was on the one hand truly natural like ours, on the 
other, it was characterized divinely in a way 
superior to ours. It is clears in fact, that the 
presence or absence of seed do not distinguish the 
nature, but that they are distinguished with regard 
to the same nature; the same holds for unbegotten- 
ness and begottenness. (57) 
Sherwood has drawn attention to the development of 
the use of cp6noc tifi kdpEswc, and X6Yo4 'gf 
oiioCar. by the Cappadocians, which provided new insight 
into the problem of unity in diversity as exemplified in 
trinitarian theology. 
(55) Unity is to be found in the 
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essential realm, the order of what, r6 TC 1o' v, while 
diversity has to do with the dimension of how, 'd Uwc 
9G-VLV 
, the realm of the hypostatic. 
(59) 
We find this 
trinitarian usage in the works of Maximus. For instance 
in the Mystagogia he says that God is monad xatiä tidy 
tier. ovaCo 1jtioi, ToD eIvaL %6yov , while He is triad 
xa'r v6v roD 'ui &itttpxe Lv xaC t9saTävat. 
¶pö7r-ov 0(60) Maximus was probably the first theologian 
to transfer the trinitarian terminology to Christology. 
(61) 
We find it for instance in Ambigua 36. Contrasting the 
creation of the first man with the recreation of man in 
Christ he says of the assumed nature: 
Thus on the one hand it remains in the Xd(oc of 
being according to which it was created and is, 
having properly its being undiminished in any way; 
on the other hand, having taken subsistence 
divinely by the X6ioC of how-being, it neither 
knows nor allows absolutely any ir} cl4nation of 
movement towards any other thing. l62 
The principle is at work here although the terminology has 
not yet attained its definitive form. Commenting on this 
text, Riou reminds us that bQeo'ravaL is the equivalent 
of k6atiaat. s and that ¶p6%os is used for this 
principle from Ambig, 41 onwards in the works of 
Maximus. 
(63) 
The ? 6yoc - ¶p&os distinction enables 
Maximus to transcend the impasse of a theology too heavily 
dependent on hellenistic thought-models, with their undue 
emphasis on the essential dimension of being, something 
exemplified in the aberrations of Nestorianism and 
Monophysitism, the former denying the possibility of a 
real union of natures, the latter blurring the edges of 
the natural components. More profoundly it enables him 
to write lucidly about the relationship of God and man in404 
Christ and through that insight to illuminate the relation- 
ship of the whole creation to God. As long as the principle 
that 'there is evidently union of things in so far as their 
(64) rs /te(d 
natural distinction is preserved' /in the elaboration of 
Christology and anthropology, the human in Christ and in 
all men can be allowed its full scope without prejudice to 
the divine sovereignty or the minimisation of the function 
of 6ewoLS . The terms %6yoC and 'rpd7Lor. allow 
Maximus to extend the implications of the distinction 
between pvoLr. and üm6araoas as we see in Opusculum 
IV. The %6 oc which is associated with nature is here 
contrasted with the rp6, xor. that is associated with 
person, but the latter term can be made to describe the 
manner of His coming to be in a way that the term 
t-ndctiaoLc does not allow. The humanity of Christ is 
identical with ours with regard to its MyoC , but it 
enjoys a difference in its ¶polt. oC . The fact that 
the 
hypostatic 'XeptX4ioLC of the Logos and His humanity 
gives this humanity a unique status does not undermine the 
fact of his 3µoovaooc; ýptv . Maximus insists on 
the natural identity between Christ and other men; a 
difference there may be, but it is not in the natural 
order, but in some other realm of being. This is made 
manifest by 'the new cpkoc of His coming to be'. 
aXopä and (10R op Ca are clues to a contrast in 
hypostases, the former being associated with 'a mere man', 
the latter with Him who became man. But the contrast in 
the manner of coming to be does not have to imply a 
difference in nature. The close link between the manner 
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of coming to be and distinctiveness of the hypostasis has 
obvious associations with the Cappadocian use of tip6toc 
, rijs kdpcemr. and its development from meaning mode of 
origin to relational mode of being in the Holy Trinity. 
(65) 
The example of the will is introduced to illustrate the 
point which Maximus is making. Because the possessor of 
the will is more than a mere man and because He uses it in 
a way above nature, does not in any way change its natural 
status nor undermine its X& or. . 
The Xdioc - rpdxoc distinction then, which St. 
Maximus uses so effectively, has a polymorphous quality 
which ensures that it can be applied in different areas 
of theology and it is the principle of a striking 
synthetic character in his thought. Apart from its use 
in the theology of the Trinity, Maximus transposed it to 
Christology, where he points out that the human in us is 
not other than that in the Saviour but that it enjoys a 
unique mode of existence. 
(66) 
The new mode has its ground 
in the Hypostasid of the Logos and it is demonstrated in 
His paradoxical conception without seed and the miraculous 
birth that tightens the bonds of virginity in His Mother. 
It becomes evidenttoo in the blameless life of Christ, 
particularly in the way in which He uses His human will 
! 68) 
Maximus can extend this polarity to anthropology and 
interpret human destiny as the progressive innovation of 
the ? 6yos of nature by the rp6, xoC of existence, 
(69) 
something realized in Christ and made effective in men by 
the action of the Holy Spirit. 
The Cappadocian provenance of the terminology, 
applied in Opusculum IV to Christological questions, 
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becomes clear in the following comparison with the hypostatic 
properties in the Trinity, unbegottenness and begottenness: 
If the Logos, in so far as He is man, differs from us 
in nature because of His seedless conception, He would, 
in so far as He is God, have necessarily a difference 
from His Father in essence because of His begottenness, 
for unbegottenness and begottenness are not identical. 
We too, in the same way, would differ in nature from 
the old Adam and Eve, who came into existence without 
seed, since the former was the handiwork of God and 
the latter was a slip from that handiwork. In reality, 
the Son is the very same thing as the Father, by the 
divinity, since He is God and consubstantial. Likewise, 
we too, by the humanity, are of the same stock as Adam 
and Eve and God himself incarnate for us; we are 
consubstantial with them. Therefore, just as the terms 
'unbegotten' and 'begotten' are not the essence of God - 
who would dare to say so? - so conception without seed 
and concep qn with seed are in no way the nature of 
humanity. l1 
The rpdxoc of the coming to be of Adam and Eve is added 
to the example of the mysterious hypostatic properties of 
the Father and the Son to show that the order of TPoýs 
does not violate the order of A 6yor, . These examples 
are invoked to strengthen the claim of Maximus that the 
Christ is dioovot. oc 1µty in spite of the uniqueness 
of His begetting as man. Maximus then proceeds to clarify 
a misinterpretation of a passage of Gregory of Nazianzus' 
Oratio I de Filio. 
(71) 
Lethel has remarked how crucial 
this excerpt from Gregory was to the Monothelite debate. 
(72) 
Gregory gives the impression that the human in Christ was 
different from that in other men. Since the will is drawn 
into the argument to illustrate the integrity of the nature, 
it is no surprise that it is the power of willing, nearer 
to the nature, that is put forward here rather than acts of 
will. 
The great theologian Gregory says nothing, not even 
apparently, that would lead to the belief that the 
human in the Saviour is other than the human in us. 
Some have thought so nevertheless because of what 
he says: 'We would say that these words express 
the language of a man, not of him whom we consider 
in the Saviour, for His will is not contrary to God 
since it is totally divinized, but of a man of our 
sort, in that the human will does not always follow 
the divine will, but that most often it resists it 
and struggles against it'. What in Him is human is 
truly His, not being of an essence or nature other 
than ours, but as existing in the same unique hypo- 
stasis, by Him and in Him, and not separately in 
itself nor produced on its own as in our case. The 
human in Him had for its seed the logos himself who 
innovated the super-added mode of birth. Thus what 
is human has contrived to subsist divinely in Him 
and at the same time to exist in a natural fashion, 
so that what is ours should be confirmed M)that 
what is above us should be held in faith. 
The most obvious thing about this passage is again the 
unequivocal assertion of the normality of the human 
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nature of Christ; it is identical with that of other men 
in everything that pertains to nature; it is aµaoüotoc 
But Maximus at once points out the contrast between how 
the humanity of Christ exists and how that of other men 
exists. The latter exists separately in itself; it is 
produced on its own; by implication it exists in itself 
and by itself. These expressions refer to the way in 
which human persons exist: they subsist. Again Maximus 
refers to significant rp6 u yevvAjoswc of the Logos 
as man where He was his own seed. The mode of His 
conception points to the unique mode of existence of His 
humanity. It exists in a natural fashion. The use of 
EIvac should be noted. Here Maximus is saying that 
the state of the human nature's being outside causes and 
outside nothing is comparable to that of everyman. It is 
its subsistence, its mode of existence, that is different. 
It lacks a proper subsistence. This humanity does not 
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stand by itself, nor in itself; it is not for itself nor 
because of itself. The Logos extends His subsistence to 
His humanity so that He subsists in it and it exists in 
Him. 'What is human has contrived to subsist divinely 
in Him'. 
Heinzer has drawn attention to the fact that Maximus 
brings Neo-Chalcedonian terms into play in order to 
confirm what he has already said in a Cappadocian manner. 
John the Grammarian seems to have been the first to comple- 
ment the idiomatic definition of hypostasis by pointing 
to subsistence as the basic factor in its constitution. 
(75) 
Ka6' gavr6v elvaL is what, for him, ultimately 
distinguishes the person as person. The definition of 
$xöotiaaLc as 16a41ara made its use in Christology 
scabrous, as it was open to the exaggerations of both 
Nestorianism and Monophysitism, but emphasis on subsistence 
secured the notion hypostasis for Christology and made way 
for a fruitful use of the bndaTmot. s, - oioCa pair. In 
his acknowledgement of the usefulness of b7c datiaaL:, 
and o5oCa 
(76) in Christology, Leontius of Byzantium 
uses both definitions of hypostasis. We find the Cappad- 
ocian terminology: i µ6v btdoTaoic acpop%c. ro% Xapa- 
xTrpLaTLxotS ZSLwµaa 
(77) 
complemented by 
the notion of subsistence: µ6u ydp 9ßa46 rdv Toe 
etval. A6Yov &LUXETaL " 69 k6QTaa, C xßi TOD 
xa6' t av6v c CvaL 
(78) 
This made it possible 
to use the notion of hypostasis not only for different 
beings of the same nature, but it could henceforth safely 
be made to denote a being made up of different natures. 
With the ontological ground now the predominant factor 
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in hypostasis the assumed nature in the hypostatic union 
can be ascribed &(pop t, o-t i, xä Cb Luiµa'ra 
(79) 
without 
danger of Nestorianism. There is no fear of a second 
hypostasis because the Logos is the principle of individua- 
tion as well. It is this ontological notion of person 
that Maximus is denying to the humanity of Christ in the 
passage from the Opusculum IV that we are examining. It 
is ov xae' Aavtid xwp Cr. , but rather participates 
in the xa9' to 6v of the eternal Logos, being 
St. ' ! xetvov xaC !v 1xeCvy. 
(80) 
The fact that it lacks 
a proper subsistence does not deprive it of what is 
proper to human nature. It is grounded in the subsistence 
of the Logos and thus lacks nothing in the order of 
hypostasis which it would enjoy through a proper 
subsistence. The claim that its 'actual being is the 
divine personal existence of the Logos himself' 
(81) 
does 
not exclude the possibility of holding that the existence 
proper to the humanity of the Logos is created provided 
that we do not deny to it the personal existence of the 
eternal Son of God. We shall return to this point below. 
Maximus concludes his argument by saying: 
In every case we must hold, on the one hand, both 
the nature assumed by the God-Logos himself, who 
became incarnate and was made man perfectly for us, 
and its natural properties without which there is 
absolutely no nature, but only a hollow appearance, 
and on the other hand, safeguard the union where 
the assumed nature is conserved in its natural 
diversity, while the union is recognized in the 
hypostatic identity. Thus it must be shown that 
in its totality, the 76io4 of the Economy fat 
once without confusion and without division. 
Maximus can confidently dismiss any Docetic interpretation 
of the humanity of Christ, not merely in its extreme form, 
but in the more relevant hetereodoxies of his day where 
the emphasis on mono in Christ tended to play down the 
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integrity of His humanity. Maximus is telling us here 
that Christ's humanity is integral, even if it came into 
being and subsists in an unprecedented way. This is 
something of incalculable consequence for mankind and its 
redemption. He has been able to show this by the contrast 
of% os and rp6itor. in the constitution of the 
Incarnate Logos and His coming to be. He has been able 
to strengthen his demonstration by the superimposition 
of Neo-Chalcedonian terminology on that distinction, thus 
deepening the concept of hypostasis and allowing him to 
underline the coincidence of natural diversity and 
hypostatic identity as the status of the human nature 
assumed by the Logos. 
{ii) The Body-Soul Analogy 
Although the Council of Chalcedon canonized the use 
of the terms cpvoLC and k6craaLc as a way of 
speaking about the mystery of the union of humanity and 
divinity in the person of Christ, 
(83) the efforts of 
Monophysites to reject the terminology and of , Nestorians 
to interpret it in a way that would support their 
position gave rise to long and tortuous arguments about 
the precise mode of composition in the mystery of the 
Incarnation. In these debates the analogy of body and 
soul resulting in one hypostasis found prominence, 
especially in the writings of Leontius of Byzantium. 
(84) 
But it was St. Maximus the Confessor who so refined the 
use of the comparison that it could not be turned to 
advantage by heterodox thinkers. He found in the example 
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of body and soul an illustration of the unity of humanity 
and divinity in Christ. Here he considered that there were 
two natures united ontologically and without confusion to 
make one person. 
(85) 
The Monophysites had lighted on the 
weakness of Leontius' use of the analogy by insisting that 
if he were right in claiming that two complete substances 
were hypostatically united in the human person, then there 
must be either one nature in Christ or three. 
(86) It was 
inevitable that this model of unity in diversity should 
lead to monophysite exaggeration since the intimate unity 
of soul and body implies 'one human nature' which can 
refer to k6o' aa4C , but must also denote 004C to 
ensure an ontological union and not merely a relational 
one. 
(87) If a Cyril can select the hypostatic dimension 
for emphasis, a Severus can just as inevitably isolate 
the natural unity for his own purposes. 
(88) 
When Sophronius attacked the christological inter- 
polation of the Trisagion, he showed that it contained 
the refined monophysitism of Severus which attributed to 
Christ a 'composite nature' in the sense that human 
c89ý 
attributes were assumed directly into the divine nature 
St. Maximus was no less concerned because of the insidious 
nature of this caricature of the mystery of the Incarnation 
and it was his desire to expose its heterodoxy that urged 
him to the splendid teaching on composite hypostasis that 
we find in his writings and which served him so well in 
his analyses of the Monothelite and More"rgistic errors and 
his defence of orthodox tradition. 
(90) 
Severus had been 
explicit: 'the properties of the humanity become those of 
the divinity of the Logos'. 
(91) 
It is this which gives 
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rise to a 'composite nature'. Severus thought of the Word 
Incarnate assuming human qualities as a new state of being 
of his divinity, 
(92) 'of the unique divine incarnate nature 
of the Logos'. 
(93) While Severus, in contrast to the cruder 
Monophysitism of Eutyches, held to the permanence in some 
sense of the human element in Christ after the union, yet 
hie teaching constituted a double menace to the mystery of 
Christ: by a docetic-like reduction of Christ's humanity, 
he undermined the reality of His created being; by obscur- 
ing the transcendence of His divine aseity he assailed the 
majesty of His uncreated being. 
(94) 
Garrigues has noted 
that it was the refusal of the monophysites to accept the 
transposition of trinitarian distinctions to christology, 
because of a mistaken fidelity to Cyril's terms, which 
led them to depreciate what enabled him to speak of 
'Christ, One of the Trinity', that is the firm delimit- 
ing of the notion of hypostasis, which would evolve into 
'composite hypostasis' in a christological context. 
(95) 
St. Maximus vindicated the usefulness of the 
psychosomatic analogy by taking into account, in his 
explication of it, the idea of cpßaLC avvee roC 
whereby the two incomplete natures of body and soul form 
one complete synthetic human nature which is realized at 
the personal level as kdoTamr. o3 Oc'roc, . It 
was the achievement of Maximus to have distinguished 
between cvcLc o(6vOetioi: and 6t6oTaoLr. GüUOSTos, 
(96) 
in human being and to have seen that the analogy 
with the Incarnation, in which divine and human nature 
are united hypostatically, is valid when the point of 
the comparison is the k6au oLC av tOc' oc , but 
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that the way to heterodoxy was open if the same use were 
made of (Pýo. c aßvee'oc . In this way he was able to 
nullify the severian formula: pCa pkaýC XpLaroD 
a5uoe'ror., 0(97) 
The inappropriateness of 'compound nature' in the 
use of the analogy becomes apparent to maximus because of 
three properties that characterize it and that can in no 
way be associated with the hypostatic union: the 
composite nature does not have it within its power to 
unite its parts; this takes place by necessity, 
Vdyx. nc 
(98) 
or ý ävdyzqC etpA. T:, vt, cpvaLxcs ; 
(99) 
then the parts of a composite nature are simultaneous with 
each other and with the whole, &av'c; ý xaC &WXA-, dlr. 
6µöxpova (100)coming to be at the same time, without 
either pre-existing the other. Finally, every composite 
nature is created etc avµXMpcºwi, v T jr tioID 1t LV 
dc 
öaaxoo aewC 9(101) a determined species that has its 
allotted place in differentiated harmony of the universe. 
Maximus gives the example of the union of soul and body 
to illustrate this. 
(102) For him, soul and body have to 
be defined in terms of each other, 
(103) 
'so that the 
necessity that obtains between them is because of their 
being essentially incomplete and components of a complete 
nature, that is parts of a substantial whole. 
(104) 
Maximus admits the usefulness of the comparison of 
soul and body as a way to grasping something of the 
mystery of the Incarnation: 
In man there is identity of hypostasis and diversity 
of substance, because while man is one, the substance 
of his soul is one thing and that of his body is 
another. In the same way, in the case of the Lord 
Christ, there is identity of person and diversity of 
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substances, because the person is one, that is the 
hypostasis, while the divinity 11095 one substance 
and the humanity is of another. 
But he is careful to restrict the comparison to unity of 
hypostasis and diversity of substances, thus assuring us 
that it is possible to find in the created order an 
example of one hypostasis in diberse natures, confining 
the comparison to the result of the union and studiously 
avoiding the implication that the manner of the union 
between the divinity and humanity of Christ coincides 
with that between soul and body. In fact, Maximus sets 
the manner of the union of soul and body in contrast with 
that between humanity and divinity in Christ which, for 
him, is µovaxatios : 
(106) 
the former is, as we have 
seen, necessary, simultaneous and constitutive of a 
species, whereas in the case of Christ the union is 
brought about freely, the divinity pre-exists the 
humanity, and Christ is neither individual nor species, 
but unique: 
He who was before all the ages or, better, the 
creator of the ages, became incarnate freely after 
a decree of his will; he emptied himself volun- 
tarily for the egerýeration of the universe and not 
to complete it. oJ 
Maximus avoids firmly anything that would suggest thearchy 
or cosmic theurgy. 
(108) 
The Incarnation is for him the 
revelation of the foolishness of the love of God, of his 
'weakness' and of the play of God in the world: 
The 'folly' and the 'weakness' of God, of which 
the holy apostle Paul speaks (1 Cor. 1,25) and the 
'play' of Gocof which Gregory, the great and 
marvellous master, speaks, is the mystery of the 
divine Incarnation which surpasses superessentially 
the whole order and harmony of the whole of nature, 
power and activity. (109) 
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God's loving liberty would be doubly compromised by a 
union comparable to that of composite nature : 
(110) 
in its 
transcendence and in its generosity, since that kind of 
composition would entail passivity and God would not 
really become man in loving x6vwaLr. Maximus insists that': 
It is by his foolish and infinite love for men that 
he has become truly and by nature that very thing 
which he loved, without losing anything of his own 
nature by the fact of this ineffable kenosis and 
without diminishing anything or changing anything 
of the human composite by the fact of the indescrib- 
able assumption, but, on the contrary, he ass I) 
the maintenance of the latter's constitution. 
The Logos is not drawn within the order of the 
creation by any kind of necessity nor is he thought to 
be the inevitable natural culmination of the cosmos. 
Creation and redemptive Incarnation are the work of 
divine love, even if, says Maximus, referring to the 
body-soul composite, 'such a natural composite is seen 
to be created to contribute magnificently to the fulfil- 
ment of the outline plenitude of the universe's 
(112) 
Maximus insists that nothing of the kind can be discovered 
in the case of Christ, since it would suggest that there 
was something involuntary about his assumption of the 
flesh. It was by a deliberate act of will that the Logos 
accomplished his kenosis and became man, not to be drawn 
into the natural evolution of the universe, but to redeem 
and to restore it. 
It is by the mode of the Economy and not according 
to the law of natt; hat the Word of God came to 
men in the flesh. klb 
And again 
He, unique in his assumption of a flesh endowed with 
a soul, has become man by an ineffable will, remain- 
ing what He was and innovating the natures acTjjýjng 
to a mode above nature, in order to save man. 
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Maximus, in his concern with the paradigm of the soul and 
body, dear-r to the upholders of christological monism in 
its origenistic platonic form, refuses to be trapped in an 
essentialist metaphysics, where the complementarity of the 
natures in the Incarnation would mean an active preponder- 
ance of the superior, but without freedom and liable to 
being itself dominated, a possibility totally inconsistent 
with the divine aseity and sovereign divine freedom. 
The soul dominates the body without willing it 
deliberately and it is dominated by it; without 
choice it gives it life by the very fact of being 
in it; and by nature it is liable to sufferings 
and painilbecause its innate power is susceptible 
to them. 1 
Maximus perceives the limitations of the analogy which, 
while it is useful for understanding the unity of the 
hypostasis, breaks down in its coordination of humanityeAkd 
divinity, which are neither complementary nor come into 
being simultaneously. A twofold flaw is here thrown into 
relief in the body-soul example: lack of liberty in the 
way the dominant member relates to the subject member and 
the subjection of the superior to the inferior in that 
kind of relationship. Neither the divine transcendence 
nor the total gratuitousness of the redemptive Incarna- 
tion can be respected in the misapplication of the analogy. 
Besides, the operation of reciprocity in 'synthetic nature' 
would demand simultaneity in the production of the compo- 
nents of this nature. Literal insistence on a strict 
parallelism would obviously empty the Incarnation of divine 
content and reduce Christ to the status of a mere creature, 
since the Word would be no longer eternal. This is true 
because, 
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Every composite nature holds its own parts simultane- 
ously from the moment of its beginning to be, that is 
its genesis from non-being to being, with a view to 
the fulfilment of the orderly arrangement of the 
universe, produced as it is by the powe t upholds 
the universe and conserves it in being. 
T1th 16) 
Neither is there room for the absurdity of the flesh being 
caeternal with the Logos and the Logos being contemporane- 
ous with the flesh. 
(117) The unity of the composing parts 
of 'synthetic nature' is dictated by a finality that 
transcends them, that of the species, so that the indiv- 
idual man, even though he is a person, is also a compo- 
nent in a greater whole. 
Every synthetic nature has a simultaneous and 
involuntary genesis; it is created having a 
particular place assigned to it in its own world. 
It is ordered to a fulfilment, 
(119) to the fulfilment of a 
whole as species, 
(120) 
something that cannot pertain to 
Christ, who is neither individual ( &roµov ), because 
that would make him part of a genus, nor genus ( YIvcr. 
) 
because that would always imply a number of individualsý121) 
Von Balthasar has pointed out that in Maximus we find a 
constant parallelism between the physical composition of 
the soul and body and the metaphysical composition between 
the individual and the species, because of the identity 
between the becoming of the unique hypostasis of man from 
his physical constituents and the becoming of the indivi- 
dual pertaining to the species. 
(122) 
Some development of 
this observation should enhance our appreciation of the 
strength of the critique that Maximus provided of the 
severian confusion. 
To try to understand the coordination of humanity and 
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divinity in Christ on the model of the soul and body as 
understood in a platonic way would lead to the conclusion 
that Christ was part and parcel of the created universe, 
since things of a composite nature from a physical point 
of view are subordinate to the metaphysical composition 
of species and individual in the porphyrian scheme. 
(123) 
But the coordination of humanity and divinity in Christ 
does not give rise to a species as happens in the case of 
soul and body. As Cyril has insisted, according to 
Maximus, Christ cannot be defined. 
(124) 
The mode of 
union in Christ transcends the necessities of an 
essential philosophy and underlines the uniqueness of 
the Incarnation in which the components, in a synthesis 
of concrete and concrete, because of the enhypostasisation 
of the humanity in the one subsistence of the Word cannot 
be reproduced after the manner of individuals embodying a 
species, since they are already concrete and fixed. The 
coordination of humanity and divinity does not give rise 
to a species; they do not combine to form a nature as 
the relation of soul and body combine in human nature. 
The unity of soul and body in hypostasis can provide a 
model for the unity in Christ, but it fails to provide a 
way of understanding the coordination of concrete 
divinity and concrete humanity in Christ, since the notion 
of species does not intervene between the discrete consid- 
eration of divinity and humanity and their realized union 
in the hypostasis of the Word, as happens in the case of 
body and soul which coalesce as humanity realized in 
hypostasis. If the analytic process is reversed, beginn- 
ing with the 'result', physically the hypostasis can be 
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traced back to body and soul in their coalescence; 
simultaneously, an analysis of the hypostasis from a meta- 
physical point of view shows that the individual has 
emerged from the species. This parallelism is instructive 
because it tells us that while we are comparing the union 
of divinity and humanity in Christ to the union of soul 
and body from a purely physical point of view, inadvert- 
ently we are implying a precise metaphysical structure in 
Christ, the relationship of the individual to the species. 
This means that the example of body and soul undoubtedly 
'limps' and that its limitations must be offset by the 
relevant distinctions. The failure to realize that 
physical composition did not imply metaphysical composi- 
tion in the case of the Incarnate Word had deleterious 
effects in the case of the monophysites who concluded 
that, because two beings had become one, the unity was 
natural as well as hypostatic. 
(125) 
Christ transcends 
the necessity of being s tc avµ, ? djpwawv rnr. 'toü 
tav't64; bLaxoo ujasw4; 9 
(126) 
In his refutation of Severus, Maximus can ask if 
his p. Ca cpßoit XpaoToü a, vevror.. is generic 
(Yevitx'j ) or singular ( µovdbi. x, 6 ) . 
(127) 
For 
Leontius of Byzantium the fact that human nature makes 
part of an elbos, 
(128) 
ensures that its unity is not 
merely hypostatic, the mark of which is xmO' avTöv 
cIvac 9 
(129) incommunicability, so that there must 
be some difference between the nature of Christ and 
(130) 
human nature. Although Maximus did concede that the 
soul keeps, even in its union with the body, its own 
substance, that xa'c 'r6v OVOLW i1 X&YOv it differs 
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from the body, (131) the non-hypostatic character of the 
unity of the human composite thus deriving from genus, a 
logical category, rather than from nature, he advanced 
from this position and insisted on the natural unity of 
human being. 
(132) 
Grumel has pointed out that the 
strength of the argument of Maximus in contrast to that 
of Leontius against Severus, is rooted in the conviction 
that the logical unity of human nature, of the human 
species, is founded on the genuine natural unity of each 
man in particular, that 'one human nature' expresses an 
insight into being and translates physical reality into 
a metaphysical category. 
(133) 
Maximus thought of genus 
as being an ontological fact, not merely a nominalistic 
logical category. For him man is undoubtedly a 
'composite hypostasis', 
(134) 
but just as surely he is 
part of the interlocking pattern of beings that comprise 
the universe, enjoying from this point of view 'no 
advantage over the other species, which make part of the 
whole of nature', 
(135) but subject to passivity, being a 
'composite nature'(136) which ensures that man's unity 
cannot be merely personai. 
(137) 
For Maximus, the species 
truly represents an essence common to many particular 
beings, whereas for Leontius of Byzantium it only desig- 
nates a common name, founded on similarity. Therefore 
Maximus can plant Severus on the horns of a genuine 
dilemma: his µXa 95OLC must be either generic or 
singular; if the former, there can be many Christs; if 
the latter, then he cannot be consubstantial with either 
his Father or with men. 
(138) 
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So the validity of the body-soul analogy in Christ- 
ology resides for Maximus in the fact that human beings are 
not merely characterized by composite nature, but that they 
are composite hypostases as well. In fact, the natural 
composition is what gives rise to the composite hypostasis, 
that is its ground, so to speak. 
(139) 
For Maximus, there 
is composite hypostasis wherever diverse substances, 
whether complete or incomplete, are united in one hypo- 
stasis(140) so that he can say simply that the human 
composite is composite hypostasis. 
(141) 
But, while in 
man there is composition that is at once natural and 
hypostatic, we have seen why natural composition cannot 
apply to Christ; in him the union is, however, hypostatic, 
whereby the divine and human nature are not united 
immediately to make a composite nature, but only in the 
hypostasis, each retaining its natural identity and 
integrity. (142) For Maximus, it is the pre-existing Word 
who extends his proper subsistence to a humanity that 
never enjoyed being or subsistence apart from him. 
(143) 
It is the Word who is born of the Virgin Mary and He acts 
(144 ) (145) 
as his own fecundating sperm; he underwent no change; 
only one person subsists before the assumption of the 
flesh and after the Incarnation; 
(146 ) 
there is not a 
double person because he was before the flesh and remains 
with the flesh one and the eame. 
(147) 
In fact, although 
he does describe both natures as 1uv, t6otiaroQ 9 
(148) 
elsewhere he insists that a contrast between the creaturely 
and untreated attributes of Christ implies a contrast 
between human nature and divine hypostasis identified in 
some way with divine nature: 
For it is not by hypostasis that Christ is mortal and 
immortal; nor again powerless and all-powerful, 
visible and invisible, created and unereat? 149)but he 
is one by nature, the other by hypostasis .l 
As Grumel has remarked, nothing could emphasize more 
emphatically that the hypostasis is divine and pre- 
existent. 
(150) By contrast, 
The flesh of Christ was never an hypostasis, because 
never, not even for what the speed of a more thought 
would accommodate, did it subsist apart by itself, 
separated from beings of the same species by means 
of the properties distinguishing it, or indeed, in 
regard to the Word who is united to it hypostatically, 
having its proper separated from its common (i. e. 
having its own personality); but it is in-existent 
( evvicdoTaior. ) as having received him, and, by him 
the genesis of its bein 'roe swat. ¶1V 
Yeueo Lv . 
(l51) 
Because of this character of Ivvidotia'coc which marks 
the humanity of Christ, Maximus can say that the two 
natures are only one hypostasis 
16Lol37cäarcatios fl 
because they lack 
0 `i'`/ In the concrete reality of 
Christ, divinity and humanity are united hypostatically. 
Because of the presence of two natures in Christ, hie 
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hypostasis can be described as UdoTao. c avvOe'oC 
(153) 
It is by the mode ( vp6noc ) of the Economy and not 
according to the law of nature that the Word of God 
has come to men in the flesh. Thus therefore Christ 
is not a composite nature, contrary to the theory of 
those who void the Gospel, because he exists according 
to a hypostatic mode totally independent of the law of 
composite nature. But he is a composite hypostasis 
which does not comprise synthetic nature which would 
be attributed to him according to essence. This is 
truly paradoxical: to contemplate a composite 
hypostasis without the composite ngt r being attri- 
buted to him according to essence. t1 4) 
(iii) Composite Hypostasis 
Since for Maximus the Three Pereone of the Holy 
Trinity are at once the same being of the Godhead and 
distinguished from each other by the rp6xog 'r 
ntäpýcw( that constitutes their relationship to 
each other, 
(155) 
the hypostasis of the Logos is at once 
the divine etva c and the xa6' av'r6v etvac 
according to which it subsists in Him. Each person is 
God according to the mode of existence proper to Him, 
the Father as unbegotten, the Son as begotten and the 
Holy Spirit as proceeding. The Three are not only 
identified with the one ovoCa in God, but they act 
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in concert with regard to what lies outside the immanent 
life of the Trinity. 
(156) 
Therefore the whole Trinity 
is active in the Incarnation giving the human nature 
existence so that the Logos acts with the Father and the 
Holy Spirit in making His humanity to be, but it is 
assumed into the rp6, xo4; 'r-ýr. dpEcwc which is proper 
to Him only so that it is only the Logos who becomes 
incarnate. He now subsists not merely in divine nature, 
but in human nature too. This is why Maximus can speak 
of the nöoTao LC ovvOe'or, of the Logos. 
Maximus insists that 'it is by the rp6, xor. of the 
Economy a-n d not according to the law of nature that the 
Word of God is come to men in the flesh' . 
(157) We have 
already examined the limitations of the body-soul analogy 
with regard to this aspect of the mystery of the 
Incarnation. We have seen too that: 
the Logos also has preserved the hypostatic union 
or identity with the flesh by the properties which 
distinguish Him Qn and Logos from what is common in the divinity. 
al5) 
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Von Schonborn has pointed out that 'the divine Persons are 
not chained to their nature by the bonds of necessity, 
that They are free by an unspeakable liberty, that They 
possess their nature freely in being totally mutual 
gift'. 
4159) 
This free identity of the persons with the 
nature in God is the mystery of the &Yt7T1 which God 
is. 
(160) 
It is this free mode of existence that the Logos 
brings to the mystery of the Incarnation and 'it is by 
this mode that His humanity exists. The humanity becomes 
His according to the same mode by which He possesses the 
divinity. He subsists in humanity now as well as in 
divinity, while His humanity exists only in Him. Now the 
Logos is not merely identified with divinity; He is also 
identified with humanity. We have seen that Maximus says 
that 'Christ is not anything else except (the natures) 
from which, in which and which He is', 
(161) 
while noting 
the distinctions that have to be made, especially that care 
must be taken to speak of the nature in concreto when 
referring to Christ's relationship to His humanity. 
(162) 
The freedom of the Logos in the Economy uniting human 
nature to Himself is brought out in the term %pdaxw c 
(163) 
Because it is His subsistence that the Logos extends freely 
to a human nature, the mode of the assumption is said to 
be enhypostasisation. His humanity has the ground of its 
existence in the hypostasis of the eternal Logos. Because 
this is so, He can freely assume an integral humanity and 
it can exist in Him without the slightest implication of 
any fusion of the divine and human natures as auch or any 
need to reduce the concrete fullness of the nature in a 
ývoýs ovvO&'co,, (h GavµaarA OZCUV Tc pov ? d-wv 
(164) 
no matter how modified. It is the axp6, xo%Lc ) 
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natures that Christ is, in enhypoetasising their existence 
in His unique mode of existence, 
(165) 
Although Maximus himself did not explicitly use the 
distinction between essence and existence to articulate 
his understanding of the mystery of the Hypostatic Union, 
recent scholars profess to see this distinction at work 
beneath what he does say. 
(166) 
The notions of essence and 
existence undoubtedly occur in the works of Maximus, but 
he had not attained to the later scholastic explicitness 
about the significance of this distinction and it is not 
so easy to determine in what direction his thought is 
flowing, especially with regard to the alignment of 
essence and existence with nature and person respectively. 
For him hypostasis is defined most accurately as xae' 
gavtidv eCvc. A person exists for himself, in 
himself, by himself, something that must precede, at least 
logically, the relational possibilities that characterize 
personality understood ontologically. He speaks of the 
mystery of the Holy Trinity as lvoýoLoC tlapet, c, 
'tpLavxoa'r&rov µoväbo(; 
(167)the 
essential existence 
of the tri-hypostatic monad, where there is identity 
between three hypostases or modes of existence and one 
existing being. We know that Maximus relied on the 
notion of cVaic to account for the distinctiveness 
of the Three in the Trinity, 
(168) in keeping with the 
Cappadocian tradition, but he is here also calling on 
the kind of existence that characterizes the Persons. In 
Christology, he holds f or one haavraaLS and two 
o6oCai. . This would not exclude the formulation of 
the mystery of the Incarnation as one $Tca'r vac and 
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two &tvc 5. We can find a basis for this claim in the 
text of the Mystagogia where he speaks of 'con etvai, 
?. dyoS, trots XaC CZVcL kd. p), s t, v xat k a't vaL 
tiP6io. 
(169) 
with regard to the Holy Trinity and in 
Opusculum. IV, tits, chat quaLxck and 'cö bcpeo' Vc... 
ectx 
(170) 
with regard to the humanity of Christ. 
It is not so clear that when we use the term 'existence', 
we can identify it exclusively with either ctvai or 
bXOO, r pv(L9- in the thought of Maximus. The oüo Ca 
exists as 'what', the hypostasis as 'how'. The problem of 
interpreting the intentions of Maximus is accentuated by 
the attempt to diagnose whether his thought would have 
developed in a Thomist or in a Palamite way. Von Balthasar 
opts for the former, Loesky for the latter when he joins 
issue with Von Balthasar in his In the Image and Likeness 
of God. 
(171) 
Riou makes a palpable hit when he reminds us 
that if existence can be identified, presumably in an (172) 
exclusive way, with hypostasis, then we are into tritheism. 
However, it must be said that the examples, which he 
adduces to prove that in Maximus existence is synonymous 
with essence, are not entirely convincing. The irreduci- 
bility of kbo'rmatC to ovota provides Maximus with 
the essential tool for interpreting the mystery of the Holy 
Trinity and the mystery of the Hypostatic Union, without 
his having to identify existence exclusively with either 
member of the distinction. 
(173) 
While the metaphysical 
principle, ens et unum convertuntur may be at the basis of 
the insistence on the unum esse that we find in Aquinas' 
Summa Theologica(174) with regard to Christ, he does make 
provision for an esse secundarium. 
(175) 
We can distinguish 
between ease personale(176) and ease aecundarium, so that 
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Guillou can write: 'Christ possesses without altering them 
the divine existence and a human existence (esse secundarium) 
which do not penetrate each other in a theandric way, except 
in the hypostasis of the Son of God made man'. 
(177) 
Lethel 
takes Von Schonborn to task for speaking of 'the created 
existence of the human nature of Jesus', claiming that he 
relies too much on one text of Maximus in Opusculum XVI, 
in which he affirms two existences, considering existence 
in the line of nature. 
(178) 
The point would seem to be 
that it is precisely that which Maximus does, while insist- 
ing on one existence from the point of view of the Person 
of the Logos. The enhypostasisation proper to the 
Incarnation then comprises a unity of being between 
Creator and creature in the sense that we find there one 
subsisting thing. The fact that the union takes place 
according to the subsistence that is proper to the Logos 
leaves the way open for a created existence in Christ in 
respect of His human nature, which can express what is 
proper to Him in the uniqueness of his Person. The 
eternal subsistence respects the existential status of 
the human nature. As Garrigues has said: 'By the Economy 
of the Incarnation, all that is personally specific to the 
Son became and was contained in the existence, heart and 
(179) 
aoul of the man Jesus'. 
In his recent study Gottes Sohn ale Mensch, Heinzer 
has thrown considerable light on the notion of nt6- 
dtiaot, C awvv6e'coc by comparing the teaching of the Leontii 
on the subject of hypostasis. 
(180) 
He shows how Leontius 
of Byzantium, having established the ontological status 
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of hypostasis can transfer the idiomatic distinctness of 
hypostasis to a Christological level and distinguishing 
the natural from the hypostatic predicates, can speak of 
the Zbia of both natures as xocvd xa'c(i pCat 
kooTdocwc xaC 'cpoockov 9(181) Heinzer reminds 
us that for Leontius of Byzantium the synthesis of the 
1QLW, 11atia refers to the material, not to the formal 
aspect of hypostasis, 
(182) 
where we are to understand 
formal as referring to that by which hypostasis is 
fundamentally constituted. Hence the formal principle 
of hypostasis is clearly untouched in its unity. The 
commonness of the properties of Christ will refer to 
their hypostatic dimension and it is there we have 
'composition'. It is Leontius of Jerusalem who has given 
us the notion of kdaTaaLc ovvee'coc, . He is care- 
ful to exclude a composite of hypostases and any suggest- 
ion of composition at the basis of hypostasis itself. 
(183) 
It is the 16L(4Lw c. demonstrating the presence of 
hypostasis that exhibit composition. The upshot of the 
Hypostatic Union is Z6Lwµa ovvee'tc&Tepou : 'A more 
composite property of the hypostasis of the Logos came 
into being from the assemblage in it of many simple 
properties after the enfleshmentl. 
(184) 
The profile of 
two natures now existing in the subsistence of the Logos 
has gained its clarity. 
(185) 
Heinzer has shown too that the b7c6oTaa"cc 16tx1j 
of the one corresponds to the xa9' avTöv eCvaL 
(186) 
of the other, so that they both realize the fundamental 
principle of personality. Leontius of Byzantium 
approaches the root of personality through an &epot, oµa of 
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properties, where the idiomata refer to two natures; 
Leontius of Jerusalem speaks of kdatiaoac xotv-i. 
(188) 
where the hypostasis subsists in two natures and thus 
embraces the tbL44a'ra of both natures. The human 
16L41atia have been assumed by the hypostasis of the 
Logos and become proper to it in the Incarnation. This 
idiomatic characterisation of the hypostasis of the Logos 
is not what formally constitutes it and it is essential 
to keep this in mind when speaking of kda'caaK 
dGOSIVOC, . The formal principle is the Tp67 OC TIC 
&dpF, cW, C of the Logos, but the fact of enhypostasisa- 
tion which preserves the distinction of the natures in 
the Incarnation effects köoTaaLC aüvOci oc in the 
material sense, giving to the human nature its personally 
distinctive traits and ensuring that the particularities 
of this man reveal the presence of the eternal Logos. 
Leontius of Jerusalem insists that the XaLVA i. i 6otaaLc 
is that of the Logoe. 
(189) By becoming the subsistence of 
the two natures in assuming humanity it has become 
7EoLXLXoT6pa~ 
(190) 
and is now characterized not merely 
by tid yevvrrr6 , but by the 
Z ö w4kcL'rm of divinity and 
humanity as we11. 
(191) This is the basis of the common- 
proper language which we have seen Maximus use in Epi stola 
XV. 
Maximus clearly considered that the humanity of Christ 
was created in and for the hypostasis of the Logos. That 
is the implication of %p6¢. i4uLQ . He speaks with 
Leontius of Byzantium of a human nature with concrete 
characteristics 
(192) 
and with Leontius of Jerusalem of 
9voLc Zbtxrj PLC 9(193) so that the beirrg, which the 
human nature receives from and in the Logos, is not merely 
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a specific human nature, but an individual human nature, 
enjoying concrete existence. 
(194) 
But for Maximus this 
individuation of the humanity took place in the act of 
assumption. For he and his predecessors did not possess 
the concept of materia signata quantitate of the 
Scholastics, which accounted for the individual character 
of the human nature of Christ, and left to His hypostasis 
the work of enhypostasisation. We have seen in Opusculum 
IV that His humanity differs from ours 'by the new tip6%oC 
of His coming to be' . 
(195 ) From the context it is obvious 
that this refers to the distinction brought to the 
humanity of Christ by His hypostasis so that the subsis- 
tence of the Logos is the principle of the individuation 
of His humanity as well as of its union with Him. 
(196) 
But even if enhypostasisation renders the human nature of 
Christ individual, it does not mean that He assumes an 
individual. Garrigues says finely that the more you 
descend into what is particular in the humanity of Jesus, 
the more nearly you touch the hypostatic character of the 
Son himself and he concludes : 'In exorcising definitively 
the Docetic temptation and a monist Christology, Maximus 
is able to recapture all the psychological richness and 
bodily richnesss of Jesus (Antiochian intuition) as an 
epiphany of the most personal properties of the Son of 
God (Alexandrian principle). He lays in advance the 
foundations of the theology of the ikon of St. Theodore 
the Studite, which constitute by a kind of conversio ad 
phantasmata the return to what is most concrete in Christ 
(197) 
after ages of abstract analysis of His theandric structure'. 
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We have seen already that Maximus holds that the 
humanity of Christ exists ov xa6' av'r6 Xwp Cc j (198) 
8i' eavT6 , but rather 
6c 8L' exe. vov. xaC Iv cxeCvy 
To return to Epistola XV, we find a formulation that 
attempts to outline and delimit this relationship of the 
Logos to His humanity : 
The flesh of the God-Logos is not therefore a hypo- 
stasis. For indeed never, not for the length that 
a swift thought of the mind itself would take, was 
it distinguished through itself by properties 
dividing it off from things of its own kind or in 
the personally conjoined Logos having what is proper 
separated off from what is common, but enhyposta- 
sised, that is in Him and through Him receiving the 
genesis of being and becoming by the union His 
flesh and united with Him according to hypostasis by 
the principle of particularity that divided it from 
the rest of men. To speak more clearly it was made 
what is proper to the Logos through hypostasis, so 
that what is common(by9jubstance truly became His 
flesh by the union. y 
Maximus is denying to the nature the ability to distinguish 
itself from 'things of its own kind' by anything that would 
proceed fron itself as such. It attains to the free stand- 
ing condition of personhood by being enhypostasised in the 
Logos. This is what distinguishes it from the humanity of 
every other man and which can be recognized by the individ- 
uality of its properties. It becomes by the union His flesh, 
'united with Him according to hypostasis by the principle of 
the particularity that divided it from the rest of men'. 
This gives us the basis of the distinction between formal 
and material personhood, between ontological ground and 
idiomatic characterisation. 
In the Ambigua Maximus emphasises that the mystery of 
ntdo'rwwi. s oßvOs'oc extends to every aspect of His 
humanity and that it is within the dynamics of that hypo- 
static mystery that we must envisage the communicatio 
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idiomatum proper to Christ: 
The Logos of God, who as God is entirely complete 
substance and as Son is entirely perfect hypostasis, 
having emptied Himself, became the seed of His own 
flesh; then having become the subject of synthesis 
by an ineffable conception, He became the hypostasis 
of the flesh which He assumed. By this new mystery, 
becoming truly without change a complete man, He 
himself as the hypostasis of the two natures, un- 
created and created, impassible and passible, 
accepted unfailingly all th na ural principles of 
which He is the hypostasia. k200) 
S. vutie0eCC., , etymologically akin to the otuee'roC 
that qualified k6o'rmacc in this context, is linked 
here with the pvaLxoC X6ToL . The human properties 
cannot be enhypostasised apart from their ontic source, 
the individuated nature of Christ. They are properties 
of the nature and become properties of the Person of the 
Logos though enhypostasisation. This will be thrown 
into relief in the polemical works of Maximus where he 
has to insist on the twofold character, not merely of 
the natural in Christ, but also of the volitional and 
operational. They are natural properties, but they take 
on the particularity that radiates from the hypostasis 
of the Logos in Whom they are grounded, 
(201) It is this 
principle that would be of such value to Maximus in his 
conflict with Monothelitism and Monenergiem. He can 
preserve the distinctness of the natures in Christ and 
their proper willing and activity by uniting them in 'the 
highest form of personal identity'. 
(iv) Operation and Will in Christ 
Operation 
The Christological principles, which we have seen in 
the theology of Maximus, emerge very clearly in his defence 
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of orthodoxy during the Monenergietic and Monothelite 
debates. Here the distinction between %6yoc cpvocwc and 
tipawoc Udgcws and the function of txao' ao LC, 
o3 eetioc are used with consistency and finesse. The 
Chalcedonian axiom that the natures are conserved in Christ 
without alteration is analysed to show that His hypostasis 
can characterize His human being in all its dimensions 
without doing it any violence, that He exercises human will 
and produces human operations without a4)pressing or alter- 
ing anything proper to them from a natural point of view. 
For Maximus, because Christ subsists in two natures, He 
must have the wills and operations proper to those natures 
and He must have them in their integrity. 
(202) 
We have seen already how Maximus understands the 
structure of created being in terms of y vsaac, xCnats 
LC . 
(203) 
In that ontological context nature or 
'organized movement' 
(204) 
is defined by operation. Every 
nature is endowed with its proper movement which is the 
way it unfolds in keeping with its Xöyoc . Maximus 
insists that: 
Absolutely no created being, in virtue of its 
X6Tor. or essential element, is without movement, 
not even sensible inanimate beings. That is the 
opinion of those who give themselves up to the 
contemplation of beings. (205 ) 
He then specifies movement as 'a natural power' or 'a 
passion' or 'an active operation' and concludes that 'no 
created being ceases to be in movement as long as it has 
not reached the first and unique cause'. 
(206) 
Needless 
to say, this movement takes on the associations of 
Eivag, c cIvai, äeC stvaL in the case of men, 
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being characterized by the exercise of will. In fact, 
operation understood as power is constitutive of the nature 
and a property, as well as being from another point of view 
that which manifests the nature. Without it nature would 
not be itself: 'Since it is natural, the operation is 
constitutive of the nature; it is its proper mark'. 
(207) 
Because nature is the ontological ground of operation, like 
natures will produce like operations. 
(208) When hyposta- 
sised, natures retain their 'logical' consistency and so 
do their operations, so that the union of divine and human 
nature in the hypostasis of the Logos does not interfere 
with the natural integrity of either the natures or their 
operations. As we have seen in E isp tola XV, it is through 
the particularities which they gain from their common 
hypostasis that they are united, not through any invasion 
of what is proper to the natures as such. 
(209) 
While it is essential to give the ? öyos 9 5aswC its 
rightful role in an interpretation of the two natures and 
operations in Christ, this would be unintelligible without 
a comparable grasp of its complementary principle, rp61coc 
k äpF. eWs They require each other as the two 
necessary dimensions of all existents. It is the existent 
alone that is in reality and that acts in reality. Since 
in God there is one nature, we find in Him only one 
operation, but since in God there are three Persons, even 
though they have a common operation we find that They 
operate according to their distinctive modes of exist- 
ence. 
(210) Likewise with regard to the köcraaLC 
avv6ETOs, of the Logos, about Whom it is said that He 
is from, in and is the natures, 
(211) 
we find that while 
His operations are consistent with the natures, they bear 
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the identical cachet of the eternal Logos. He acts accord- 
ing to the operation proper to His natures, but He does so 
as the eternal Logos Incarnate, so that the mode of action 
is that of the hypostasis of the Son. It is the person 
who acts; it is the hypostasis who has the operations 
of nature or as the Scholastics put it: operatio eat 
personae a natura. 
(212 ) 
The contrast and identity of 
nature and person in Christ means that He can co-ordinate 
two aspects of operation, äi XwC and %6% and He can 
do it at the divine and human levels. While there are 
two natures and two operations in Christ there is only 
one mode of existence. Maximus quotes the celebrated 
formulation of Leo to emphasize the two operations: 
huepyst ydp 6xwr pa µopgA µctiä tiff 6atitpov 
xoL. vW vLar. , 
(213) 
to which he adds in the Disputatio 
cum Pyrrho the observation of Gregory of Nyssa on 
Christ's action at the end of His forty days of fasting: 
Eö6xe a Yäp uý cp ) 6T c ¬6&ATias rd to . a~ 
lvspYgaaL (214) 
. For good measure he throws in three 
expressions from the Fathers without quoting his sources: 
the operations are said to be 'different' or 'double' or 
'one and other'. 
(215) 
But while he.. delimits the natures 
and operations in Christ, he is equally precise about what 
they have in common because of the unity of hypostasis in 
Him. He denies that there is a unique operation in Christ, 
but at the same time he affirms that there is in Him a 
unique mode of operation. He acted µnvaöt. XL yavV 
9vosL6w4; . 
(216) This emphasizes that it is the 
hypostasis that has the operations which take their rise 
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in the natures. The rp&. ac käpEewc extends its unity 
to the operations, which enable us to realize that in 
Christ we have 1 t6o rao Lc, o. fivOstior. , which can retain 
its ontological unity while allowing a composite of 
particularizing characteristics. 
With regard to the co-ordination of the two operations 
in Christ, we have to realize that the Logos does not act 
on His human nature, but rather in it. 
(217) He does not 
exert any divine pressure, so to speak, on his human 
nature through an external causality. He is his natures 
and He acts as such. Sophronius describes this co- 
operation as avvcpyc Ccn. : 'each operation proceeds 
indivisibly from its essence and respective nature, in 
keeping with the natural and essential quality of each 
nature and each nature cmveys with it the co-operation 
avvepys Ca at once undivided and unconfused of the other 
essence'. 218 Pyrrhus invoked the authority of Dionysius 
in his exchanges with Maximus and quoted with a quanti- 
tative interpretation his xai. vljv timVa xaC TAY 
A. s avöpLxAv IvIpysmw to bolster his views, 
219 but 
Maximus reminded him that the 
determination: (220) it is the 
xaIV1 was a qualitative 
'rp6itoC that changes in 
the operation of Christ while the %6yoc remains intact. 
The rp6a, os which is new is one, while there are two 
X6 ot. , that corresponding to 6c6c and that corres- 
ponding to äuAp . Just as in Christ the two natures 
appeared in a new mode, so each of the operations which 
retains its specific distinctness, puts on a new mode in 
its manifestation. In Ambigues 5, Maximus goes to the 
root of the problem by linking 'newness' with 'mode' and 
that mode is hypostatic: 
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For the essential principle of the things united is 
in no way damaged by the union whether you look at the 
nature or the quality. But he does not affirm, as 
some would have it, a mean, by the negation of the 
extremes. For there is no mediation in Christ which 
would be affirmed by the negation of the extremes. It 
is 'new' because it is characteristic of a new Mystery 
of whigh t le principle is the ineffable mode of the 
union. 1221 
He reminds us that in the mystery of the Incarnation 
divinity and humanity were united hypostatically, so that 
neither loses its natural operation through the union but 
remains distinct from that with which it is united. The 
newness of mode which the natures give to each other is 
rooted in the ineffable mode of the union. Where the 
mode is concerned, Christ operates what is human divinely 
and what is divine in a human way. Maximus calls this 
exchange a xepaXciý, pýßý, ý 0 
(222) 
Christ became man, 
submitted to conception and birth, but in a manner above 
the normal, becoming his own seed; He makes the iu Or 
works of liberty, not having been subjected to their 
necessity. On the contrary His divine operations put on 
a human mode since they are realized through the fleshý223) 
Maximus does not have as clearly as John of Scythopolis 
the distinctions with regard to the operations of Christ: 
those performed as God, those performed as man and those 
that were mixed, like His miracles, 
(224) but in his 
teaching on the operations of Christ we see that they can 
retain their natural identity and at the same time enter 
into an exchange in His hypostasis, which entitles them 
to the epithet 'new' and the theological status of being 
theandric. As Von Schonborn says : 'In Christ, a fully 
human activity has become the activity of the very person 
of the Son of God ,. 
(225) In the following passage 
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Maximus reminds us of the constancy of the %6yog cpisocw6 
and the natural aspect of operations, while they will 
acquire their uniqueness from the mystery of person. The 
nature of the agent is revealed in the nature of the 
operation, the identity of the agent is manifested in the 
mode of operation and Maximus identifies this in turn 
with the exercise of free-will, which we shall presently 
examine briefly as it is to be found in his teaching: 
Each one of us acts, not in that he is someone, 
but in that he is something, that is to say man. 
But in so far as he is someone, Peter or Paul, he 
gives form to the mode of operation by remission 
or intension, marking it in this or that manner, 
in keeping with his free-will. Thus one recog- 
nizes in the mode the difference of persons accord- 
ing to activity and in the Myoc he n changing 
character of the natural operation. J 
will 
In his debate with the Monothelites, Maximus uses 
arguments with regard to the will that are parallel to 
the arguments which he used to prove that in Christ there 
must be two operations. He insists that Christ subsists 
in two natures and that since will is a natural property, 
there must be two wills in Christ. 
(227) Where there is 
one nature, as in the case of God, there is one will; 
where there is one will there is one nature. Likewise, 
where there are two natures, there are two wills and vice 
versa. The possibility of a third quid disappears once 
it is clear that 'Christ is nothing else except His 
natures', 
(228) 
Maximus refuses to make the hypostasis 
the source of the will but he insists that the hypostasis 
has bearing on the will. In the Disputatio cum Pyrrho he 
makes a distinction between tid ä&? xS 6EAc tv which 
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pertains to nature and tid x GC O Xe Lv which stems from 
99o 
the hypostasis. "' Scholars associate OfXT La cpvoLxdv 
with d, xM5C 66'ße Lv and 86%-%La yvwµixdvv with 
7'wc 86WE Lv " 
(230) 
In the course of anti-Monothelite 
polemic, with reference to the claim that there is only 
one will in Christ, he says: 
If it is gnomic, it will be characteristic of the 
hypostasis alone. For the gnomic element iS de- 
limiting of the person and it will be shown clearly, 
(with you for author) that Christ will have7differ- 
ent will at variance with the Father and the Spirit. (231) 
This means that the X6yoc of the will is in nature and 
that it derives its tipawcc from the person. Maximus 
transposes the nature-hypostasis distinction at the onto- 
logical level to the level of the will and maintains, 
with admirable consistency, the principles of Chalcedon 
in an area that until his time had not been properly 
defined. 
In his magisterial study of the Disputatio cum 
rrho, 
(232 
Doucet shows how it took even Maximus time 
to realize that will is rooted in nature and is something 
permanent beneath its passing acts. While the earlier 
works of Maximus speak of 'movement' and 'self-determination", 
he obviously considers only the subject and the acts, but 
he does not focus on the will as faculty until forced to 
do so by his defence of orthodoxy during the Monothelite 
crisis. Doucet shows how appetency in the earlier works 
of Maximus is a fundamental movement of Epwr to God, 
which springs up in a subject master of himself. 
(233) 
It 
was fully natural but not then rooted in 69XroLc 
Perfected by &Yäi11 it underlies successive acts of will 
440 
like a continual tension. The fundamental option passes 
through the multitude of particular volitione, carrying 
them in its elan. To fail to accept the direction of that 
movement was to miss the divine oxoxd and end up in 
gi. Xav-rCa , deceived by a failure to distinguish 
between real and apparent good. Doucet reminds us that 
the Monothelites forced Maximus to make distinctions: 
'the internal act of will and its components, the object 
of willing, a natural as distinct from a personal level, 
in order to do justice to the fixity of nature and 
individual variations, the identification of self- 
determination with the natural will rather than with the 
act of choice, in order to do justice to the perfection 
of M=ist,. 
(234) 
The basic rational power of appetency for Maximus 
is O XToLS or 8gXTUµa , although the latter can 
designate the object of appetency as well as the faculty. 
As faculty he speaks of 06XTLua Xoy , x6v . 
(235) The 
spiritual being possesses a spiritual elan, the will, 80 
that 'our thought is based on willing (O Xovvec 
? oyLL. 4µe6a as the decisions of our will are based 
on thought ( XoYLr6 evoL 667Lovw. cr, ßav7L6µE6a) ' 
(236) 
66Xrµa yvoµLxdv , which issues in 7tpoaC. peat, r, 9 
is 
the will in so far as it is modified by the possessor of 
the nature and the will, the 09XTPa cpvo . xdv . 
(237) 
In the course of his polemics, Maximus saw that he would 
have to preserve the fullness of human will in Christ, 
but eliminate from it what was defective. The latter 
dimension of willing he eventually identified with TV( L1 
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and, together with its consequent xpoaCpeoLC he denied 
it to Christ. 
(238) The equivalence of 6lX-noac and 
w rgejo. voCa~ enabled him to ohow that Christ was endowed 
with the power of self-determination as a man while He 
was free of what impairs that endowment in fallen men. 
(239) 
He possessed a human will that actualized itself in a self- 
determining way without the limitations of hesitation and 
fallibility that beset the exercise of this faculty in the 
case of those bound to 'consecutive choice'. It is a 
spontaneous unfolding of man's capacity for the Good, 
which bypasses the failures that stem from imperfect 
knowledge and partial self-possession. In the Disputatio 
cum Pyrrhol thelesis has become 'an element of nature 
distinct from reason, underlying proairesis and other 
acts of will and enveloping them as a unique power 
(241) 
envelopes its actualisations'. In his analysis of 
the will, Maximus distinguishes objects that at once 
depend and don't depend on us from objects that depend on 
us. It is with regard to the latter that we are free and 
exercise geovoCa . In his expression O&Xov'cC 
ßovAöµeea 9 
(242) he is drawing attention to two 
aspects of the act of will, the former member referring 
to basic movement of man's rational power of appetency 
considered from the point of view of nature, the latter 
referring to its hypostatic determination, both of which 
are immanent to the whole process of 8pcF. Lc aaYLxi 
O ija C xaC Po-S-kBw`C 
(243) 
Because of the 
logical element in the human act, this orientation of 
the will must be impregnated with X -oc which takes 
the form of enquiry, examination and deliberation 
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( rrIaLc, ox6iLc, po x-naLC ), so that the 6pcF. tc 
XoYcxfi becomes 5pcELc 2ý'rlt Lx1 that issues in a 
judgement that what man seeks is, in fact, in keeping with 
his Xdyoc cpßaewc . It is at this stage that man can 
become fuddled in his judgment about what is truly good and 
so mistaken in his choices. The pressure of his passions 
on his judgment will on the other hand put it at the 
service, not of his genuine good, God and the objective 
divine order, but of his gtXav'rCa . The bearing of 
ßoi3 oLc or povXi on judgment and 7cpoaCpcaL. 
is the key to the pov? 6LEea with which Maximus 
qualifies Uxowces . In choice, or %poaCpsaLc the 
will is finally determined by the die cast in judgment 
1244) 
The morality of the act is now determined but it finds 
expression in 6pµA , XpýOLt 
Maximus was not consistent in his placing of rJ4LXL 
in this process. In the Epistola ad Marinum(245) it 
precedes choice, in the Disputatio(246) it depends on 
choice. It is sufficiently characteristic to qualify 
the fallible dimension of human willing and so it is 
excluded from the willing of Christ, whether it means 
primarily 'a qualified will, bound by attachment to good 
or apparent good' 
(247) from which choice proceeds or 
whether it comes between judgment and choice as an 
element of disposition there. In Maximus it keeps a 
cognitive connotation, but is basically an aspect of 
spiritual appetency. 
(248) 
With regard to the Pater 
Noster it is safely translated as 'free-will', where it 
most probably refers to acts of will. Maximus did not 
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apply his analysis of the human will to Christ. Because of 
the integrity of His humanity He possessed O X1ioLC and 
because that humanity was enhypostasized in Him we must 
conclude that it was determined hypostatically. 'Every- 
thing that is natural in Christ, has as well the Tp67, o6 
that is above nature'. 
(249 
But Maximus is reticent about 
the mode of that determination. He excludes 69X714a 
yv, xav Since ignorance can be in Christ, according 
to Maximus, only by relational appropriation, there is no 
room for the fallibility and ambiguity which we noted in 
the evolution of the normal volitional process. 
(250) He 
does not attribute to him poi X-naLC explicitly. It is 
bound up with gnomic will and since this is 'particularly 
a matter of the person and the hypostasis', 
(251) it 
cannot find place in Christ. Von Balthasar says that 
this is so 'because in His unique and divine hypostasis, 
there was no place for indecision and hesitation' . 
252 ) 
In fact we know that, for Maximus, will in Christ 
precedes what is instinctive in other men. We have 
to be content to know that O Xno , 
is actuated in 
Christ, without wanting Maximus to give this process a 
name. Because He possessed 'by His being itself, that 
is by his subsisting divinely, naturally. a propensity 
towards the good and an aversion for what is eviii, 
(253) 
the unfolding of his human will in freedom at once 
transcended yv4tand contained its positive character 
in an eminent way. 
Pere Lethel has brought further refinement to the 
study of the place of the will in the psychology of 
Christ and particularly in His work of salvation. 
(254) 
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In his Opusculum VI on the words 'Father, if it be possible 
that this cup should pass from me', Maximus, commenting on 
a gloss of Gregory of Nazianzen, used skilfully by the 
Monothelitee, says by way of counter argument: 
If on the contrary, you have taken the phrase: 
'not that which I will, but may your will triumph', 
as coming, not from a man of our kind, but from the 
man we consider in the Saviour, then you, by that 
very fact, have confessed the supreme consent of 
His human will to the divine will, which is at once 
that of His Father and His own, and thus you have 
established that in Him, who has two natures there 
are two wills and two operations which exist in 
conformity with each nature. These two wills and 
operations belong to Him who does not have contra- 
riety in either of the two, even although he 
preserves entirely the difference of the natures 
from which in which and which He himself is by 
nature. (25ý) 
Lethal points out that Maximus, for the first time in the 
history of theology, makes it apparent that Christ willed 
to accomplish his Passion with his human will. 
(256) 
Until then the Fathers considered that to have a different 
will from that of God was to have a will contrary to His. 
Therefore they thought of Christ agreeing with his Father 
by his divine will in the Garden of Gethsemani. Lethel 
concludes his impeccable analysis of this passage by 
saying: 'In thus manifesting the perfect accord of the 
human will of Christ with the divine will, Maximus 
destroyed the foundation of Byzantine Monothelitism: 
since this will agrees with the divine will, there is no 
longer any reason to say that it is by appropriation 
alone that it is in Christ. There is no longer any 
reason to deny it'. 
(257) Maximus uses the axiom of 
Gregory of Nazianzen: T6 ydp &%p6oi rrxtiov äOepdRevtiov 
5 69 Tjvw, tiat, tiw ©ew tiotro xaC ou c'raL 0 
(258) 
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In Opusculum VI this teaching finds a new clarity because 
we see that the human will which is a component of human 
nature is united to God not merely in the act of assumption 
by the Logos, but in its exercise by Him, in Whom it 
subsists, for the salvation of the world willed by His 
Father. 
(259) We see that humanity is preserved in Him in 
its integrity at the very apex of its liberty, precisely 
there where person innovates nature. In Epistola II 
Maximus speaks of the rectification of willing in the 
x6v otc. of Christ. 
(260) This is brought about by the 
play of &yd7C71 which in turn will unify men by enabling 
them to be of one will through the ¶pd&oa XpfiaewG 
that ensure that they appropriate personally the one 
X6yoc cpvoewc of their common nature. In the Pater 
Noster, Maximus links the need of preserving unity at a. 
human level as a condition of being united to God: man 
forgives : 
so that he may not be accused of severing nature 
by yvc'µrI , separating himself, though being a 
man, from any other man. For thus when yvwk. l is 
united to the X6yoc cpüoewr. , the recorý cl ation 
of God with nature naturally takes place. (2 1) 
By hindsight we can understand that Maximus would 
eventually see this brought about by the transforming 
influence of &Yd7Crj, poured into man's life through a 
will that bears the mark of a person totally in harmony 
with the action of the Holy Spirit, thus reproducing in 
himself the filial character of the Logos Incarnate. We 
have seen already that Christ was the 'Angel' of the 
Counsel of God and that in Him was realized and revealed 
the purpose of creation, the union of the created and 
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the uncreated, of the human and the divine, in a mode that 
respects the inviolability of the natures, but which confers 
on the human nature a divine mode of being. We have seen 
too that the divine mystery of äyd" implies the free 
possession of the divine nature by the Persons of the 
Trinity and their free communication of that nature to 
each other. The same freedom, identified with the same 
&Yä7L-q characterizes the 'mode of the 'Economy', by 
which One of the Three assumes a human nature, subsists in 
it and expresses ä(ci tit 'to the limit': 'not that 
which I will'. It is through ayd and synergy that 
man is enabled to enter the mystery of eic, wLC, by 
which he makes his own the fruit of the x9vw. aLQ of 
Christ. 
(262) 
We have intimated how Maximus would under- 
stand the exercise of that & cxi through the personal 
use of human will, a process by which man's person would 
take full possession of his nature, and through which his 
nature would attain its end. Men would be sons in the 
Son. Receiving a share in the äycnn which His 
hypostasis guaranteed to His human nature, they would 
become participators in the Logos as Hypostasis, through 
äY6.7-a which confers on the human a divine mode of 
being and thus releases man into the full enjoyment of 
his hypostasis. He is now a son of God, because he is 
now a free person. In the theology of Maximus the full 
understanding of man depends on an adequate grasp of the 
meaning of Christ. 
CHAPTER VI 
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THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL DIMENSION 
The purpose of this chapter is to underline some of 
the aspects of the anthropology of St. Maximus in the 
light of a revision of the main ideas on this subject, 
which emerges from an analysis of the Pater Noster. 
Since the point of view from which the work as a whole 
has been approached is that of spirituality, I intend to 
concentrate on the elements of his anthropology that 
have to do with the daily living of the Christian life, 
the exercise of virtue and the practice of prayer. As 
regards the former, I shall recapitulate the main part 
of the Pater Noster, Part II, in the division of the 
work as I present it. This will be followed by a brief 
account of the purification from the passions and the 
concern for virtue, which characterize Christian 
spirituality. This section of the final chapter will 
come to an end with some consideration of Maximus' 
teaching on 'the three laws', by which it will be seen 
that the life of virtue culminates in and is perfected 
by & tr. q. 'AY&Vq will also be seen as the way in 
which man is perfectly identified with Christ. In the 
section dealing with prayer, I intend to select the 
formal teaching on this subject in so far as it can be 
gleaned from the Expositio Orationis Dominicae. This 
will be followed by a rapid examination of Maximus' 
teaching on the contemplative life. Finally, an 
analysis of the expression aLaOioLý voepä , which 
occurs in the Pater Nester, will reveal the place of 
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äY&ui in Maximus' understanding of the mystical life, 
so that the quality which identifies man with Christ will 
be seen as the means of his union with God in prayer. 
Maximus has suggested that praying the 'Our Father' is 
the way to assimilate 'the mysteries', which God bestows 
on man in Christ. OeoXoYCa will be the way in 
which the life of the man, who has attained the plenitude 
of dydx-q , will be expressed. In this kind of prayer, 
the articulation of the mysteries in the 'Our Father' 
will be summed up in a profound experience of the mystery 
of the Holy Trinity, by which man will anticipate the 
fullness of Sec-. o. c and receive a pledge of what God 
holds in store for him when he enters into the perfection 
of life. 
(i) Virtue 
The Formal Concepts in the Expositio Orationis 
Dominicae, Part II1 
The most elementary concepts of this part of the 
Pater Noster can be set out in this way: 
(1) Theology: Son: X6yoi 
Spirit: 7cpa6tii(; 
Therefore purification! 
(2) Thy will be done: worship: A6yo6 
leads to A6yoC 
(3) The Bread of Life gives Himself in 
proportion to works and worth of your 
Eat to live to God. 
(4) Because his good is inviolable the logical 
man forgives. So he is disposed for the Bread 
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of Life and the bread for the day. 
(5) If he does not forgive he will be handed over 
to Temptation and the Evil One. 
The Just Judge. 
He is heard because he forgives. 2 
In this analysis we have the most elementary links 
between the parts of the Main Commentary. Obviously the 
language of the 'Our Father' is the basis of this system 
of co-ordination, the remarks being an exegesis of those 
words and linked together because of the sequence of the 
'Our Father' itself. But already another kind of 
organic unity is begipning to emerge: that which 
springs from the inner congruence of the ideas used by 
Maximus in his interpretation of the dominical words. 
(1) A6yoc and xp9L6, rTK are associated with the Logos 
and the Spirit respectively and they intimate some kind 
of polarity in Maximus' thinking about the process of 
divine filial adoption, two foci around which all his 
reflections on Christian anthropology tend to rotate. 
They indicate properties of man in his formation as eon 
of God and because he is fallen they demand purification3 
(2) It is the will of God that he should be worshipped 
by man as the angels worship Him and Xcyoc is the key 
to the understanding of this requirement. When it 
becomes dynamic in man's life it leads him to the Logos 
and this ensures that he is united to angels and a 
worshipper of God. flpad&is is not mentioned 
explicitly but it is implied in the dynamism which 
enables ? 6yoc to ensure that man attains to equality 
with the angels. 
4 
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(3) The Logos is the Bread of Life and his new function 
of nourishing is congruent with that union with Logos 
asked for in the previous petition. The embodiment of 
Logos in man will be proportionate to his works and the 
worth of his voiir, ; this refers to the twofold 
capacity of man for the good and the true, hie need of 
dpc'r and oocpta if his primordial relationship to 
the Logos is to be realized. The management of his 
bodily life is to be regulated by the principle that he 
must eat his earthly bread to live to God, by which the 
hierarchy of reality is translated into his being 
through asceticism. 
5 
(4) Man's ability to forgive is derived from his 
relationship to the Logos of the previous interpretation 
which he chooses as his good: 'the incorruptible bread 
of wisdom'. Conversely, his forgiving is a disposition 
for Bread in both the senses given it by Maximus. 
6 
(5) The alternative befalls him if he refuses to forgive: 
he is handed over to Temptation and-Evil so that (4) and 
(5) set in contrast the possibilities held out to man's 
freedom of choice and the consequences of that use of 
freedom. The role of the Just Judge in applying the 
consequences of bad choice is then outlined. The section 
ends on an optimistic note: if he forgives, his prayer 
is heard and he comes into possession of the good things 
he asks for in the 'Our Father' through forgiveness of 
? former sins and protection from future ones. 
If there is already any single notion that seems to 
run through the seven 'mysteries' , treated under five 
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headings by the combination of the invocation and first 
two petitions and the similar handling of the last two, it 
would seem to be X&Yoc . This emerges strongly in the 
first 'mystery', associated with the Son and also with the 
required purification. It is the dominating factor in the 
second 'mystery' where we are told that X&YoC leads to 
Logos. The Logos becomes the 'bread' of the third 
'mystery' and that in turn is the 'good' of the 4th 
section which renders possible forgiveness. On the 
contrary, if it is not effective in producing forgive- 
ness, then 'temptation and evil' hold sway. In section 
(1) we find an exposition of theology and filiation: 
theology is concerned with the Holy Triad and its 
position at the beginning of the whole commentary makes 
it obvious that Maximus wants us to consider it as 
having the fundamental place in reality and in his treatise 
and it would be surprising if what he has to say about 
this supreme mystery was not meant to have a bearing on 
his understanding of man and his divine filiation, so 
that we are not reading into his arrangement and state- 
ments more than he intends if we discover that he tries 
to grasp the meaning of human existence and the unfold- 
ing of divine life in man through what he understands 
of the Blessed Trinity as a consequence of revelation. 
The distinctness of the persons is emphasized and the 
whole elaboration of the mystery of filiation is 
articulated around the bipolarity of X6yoC and 
wpa6T-qC which are the human qualities that 
correspond to the Son-Name and Spirit-Kingdom and in 
terms of which the 'hallowing' and 'coming' prayed for 
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are interpreted as being realized. 
The 'theology' theme is taken up again in the 
exegesis of 'conformation to Christ' under the heading 
of 'neither Jew nor Greek' complemented by the interpre- 
tation of 'circumcision-uncircumcision'. 'Male-female' 
is an elaboration of the OvpCa, 6vµ65 
dyad that has already been associated with A6yoC in 
relation to the hallowing of the Name. The doublet 
image-likeness with its dynamic implication is obviously 
related to the polarity of X6yos - %pa6"4 the latter 
member implying freedom and the synergy of the activity 
of the Holy Spirit and man's. This is further developed 
by the pairs : X6ioc - yv63a Lc yvcZýLTi - äpetilj 
where the fundamental capacities in man already related 
to God through 'Name' and 'Kingdom' by Adyoc and 
%pa&cnC are said to be perfected by Yv(ZoL6 and 
äpc' A so that we discern an alignment of YvC0L« 
with 'Name' and äpe'c with 'Kingdom'. As we have 
noted already the dominant notion in this interpretation 
is X6yor. . It should be noted too that it is not 
to be thought of out of relation to Kingdom, 7cpa6TTc - 
Yv(iµn , which are related to it through the polarity 
that we have already discerned and find rooted in the 
inviolable distinctness of the hypostases of the Three 
in One. This section concludes with an exhortation to 
purification, that is the removal of whatever would 
impede the coming of the Kingdom and the hallowing of 
the Name, whatever is opposed to the full realization 
of X6yo4 and Yvcwµ i. 
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Section (2) on the equality of man with angels is 
linked to the first section formally because of the 
sequence of petitions but conceptually through the idea 
of Xdyos , with all that it entails, especially the 
counterpointing of yvwiB which is not mentioned 
explicitly in this section at all, but its counterpart 
dps"cA is, even if it comes in the anticipatory 
reference to the Bread. It is Xdyoc that leads to 
Logos and ensures that man becomes a worshipper in 
spirit and in truth. This would seem to be, with the 
hallowing of the Name and the Equality of man with the 
angels, a variation on the theme of %6yoC . We do 
not have to analyse it more precisely at this point, 
but we must keep in mind its various meanings. The 
dyad ¬wou tCm - eup. 6 from the transposed 
platonic triad of Xoyoc - xLevµCm - 6vp. 6 
turns up here again, which is inevitable because of 
the association with X6ToC , but now in association 
with voüS ,a member of another triad: voUC 
X6yoc - atoOrlo Lc 'E7r. L 6vµCa and 8vµ60 
are now integrated positively into man's orientation 
to God. The theme of bread is introduced here because 
the equality is considered to be the disposition for 
receiving the Bread but in proportion to dpc' and 
oocpCa . We can equate this dyad with yvGo - 
&pe, rA in (1) and find room for Yvwµr through 
this usage and so for 1&c6oTao Lc , and in the 
context of the reception of the Logos as Bread, so that 
now the third section emerges as another 
variation on the relationship of man to the Logos who 
454 
is embodied in him according to his personal capacity. 
This self-communication of the Logos, as bread, to 
man in (3) is said to take place in proportion to man's 
works (Epr ai ) , that is the works of virtue ( 
dpctiij) 
which emphasizes again the function of man's freedom and 
responsibility and by implication his personal generosity 
and so his person, as well as the &&Cm of his vofic , 
that is his basic capacity for God which we are entitled 
to link up with yvwaLC and oocpCc through logical 
parallelism with äpeTi . The complementary theme of 
eating to live to God ties up with the X&(oC - 
9%0vµCa - Oup. 6 , purification of (1), voUC - 
IxL- 
6vµýa - evµbs and 71 - oopCa 
äpc' of (2). The 
conundrum about the apparent conflict between the 
precept of not being concerned about material welfare 
and the injunction to ask for bread in the prayer 
produces the solution that the intention of the formula 
of the prayer is to join man's yvwµrl to God's 
e9xIJµa . This is another reference to personal 
freedom and so by implication to person. The eeXiµa 
is identical with that which wants angelic worship from 
men in (2) and probably refers to Justice in the 
evangelical precept to seek first the Kingdom and 
Justice of God. (3) disposes for (4) and (5). The root 
of the ability to forgive is described in (4) as the 
transcendence of the good to which the virtuous man is 
attached with the reverse implication of detachment 
from the created order in äidecc . He cannot be 
damaged in his relationship to this good and so there 
is nothing to forgive where there is no injury. 
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A6yoi; must be admitted to be at the heart of this 
good, bound up as it is with the language of interpreting 
the mysteries so far, so that the connection between (4) 
and (1), (2), and (3) is not merely due to the literary 
sequence of the petitions, but is also because of the 
organic function of X&roc in the hermeneutical task 
of Maximus. We must keep in mind too the abiding 
presence of YvwµT , with its associations, as the 
counterbalancing factor always present in his thought 
, with its deepest foundation in the X6yoc and cp67. or. 
about which his whole system is articulated. 
The expression which Maximus uses to indicate this 
mystery is the 'restoration of nature to itself' and he 
addresses himself to the explanation of that 'mystery' 
in terms of X6'yoc cvaewc , yvw*µf and JpoaCpeoLS 
rv44TI and ipoaipeoLC , the faculties which take on 
personal qualification are the principles of unity or 
disunity of nature, depending on how they relate to 
? 6ioc 9 5ccwc , so that the latter is at the centre 
of Maximus's understanding of the unity of nature willed 
by God. This lays stress on X6ios once again and 
makes of it a principle of ontological unity as well as 
of hermeneutical insight. If the presence of X6yoc 
in nature is respected, accepted and personalized then 
all men are united in nature. This unites them in the 
Logos as we have seen in (2) where they are not merely 
united among themselves but with the angels, thus making 
up the great universe of the XoycxoC . It also 
ensures that the Logos is embodied in them as the Bread 
of life and that they use the transient things of 
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creation in a fitting way. In a reciprocal employment of 
'disposition', he now shows that forgiveness is a pre- 
requisite for the reception of the Bread in its twofold 
meaning. We can note, with re-assurance, the association 
in an explicit way of yv .T and %6(oC cßocw6 in 
this context which confirms our claim that they are co- 
relatives in Maximus' system and that they are always 
thought of in mutual association even when this is not 
stated categorically. We can leave aside for the moment 
the problem of the co-ordination of %6yoC and 
Tv4µj in the system of Maximus, but we can be absolutely 
certain that both are essential constituents of his 
thought. We have already noted the linke between %6Yoc - 
mpchrTIC and X6Yoc - (YvtZaac )- Yv4 . TT 
(&PCT l) in 
(1), c. PEti1 - aocpCCL and 9p(ci -d. Ca xa. ' vo{Svof (2) 
with this concern with yvdµil - X6roc 93oewc in (4). 
The ideas of vöµoc cuoLx64 and ecto6 are added 
here too, further developing the dynamic presence of 
logos in men through the Xdyoc and the %6yoc 
(Pvocros in association with yv4 n. They give to 
vöµor. an ontological relevance, emancipating it from 
legalistic concepts and preparing the way for the 
positive commandments of the revealed law and its bearing 
on äpetiij which is seen in this context as a mode of 
existence, and not merely an optional adjunct to human 
being. This associates dPs'ri1 with 'rP&oC k6p ewc 
and is on the way to showing that human existence is 
and 
sonship of God in the Son, since it is the presence of 
X6yoc personalized that makes for dpct 9 
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The 'as' in the petition raises the question of 
whether or not the prayer is suggesting that man can 
become an example to God. The solution of this apparent 
problem gives Maximus the opportunity of returning to the 
theme of purification from passions and its necessity for 
Ogwa ;, the process by which the Name is hallowed 
and the Kingdom comes, which again is linked to the main 
themes through X6Toc and its correlative YvCt11 
We are told here too that the disposition of the 
forgiven must correspond to xdpic a term that evokes 
the initiative of God in all his activity towards man, 
creative and redemptive. It refers more particularly to 
the gratuitousness of the divine ä&ct i1 and of the 
gifts of the 'XE t ov 'c c , by which man becomes a 
participator in the divine nature, in the grace of the 
Trinity which in turn emphasizes the reality of the 
presence of God to man and in him by 68"wac. r. . The 
themes of forgiveness and purification evoke the two 
basic concepts of Maximus' whole treatise: XeUwoLc - 
86wa a, something realized in the Incarnate Logos 
and appropriated by man. Man cannot receive this gift 
unless he is forgiving, open to God because not closed 
to men. 
The theme of 'conformation to Christ' is echoed 
here too since the treatment of the elimination of the 
'categories' of 'barbarian-Scythian' and 'slave-free' 
has to do with removing obstacles to unity of nature: 
another link with (1). At the end of section (3) we 
were told that the man who was disposed to eat to live 
to God could then move on to (4) and (5)t but not as if 
458 
(5) were a development of (4), but rather that in them 
he was faced with a decision and its alternative 
consequences, the decision to forgive or not: if he 
chose the former then he would be disposed for the Bread 
of life and the bread for the day the fulness of being 
willed for him by God, 06wa LC if he chose not to 
forgive then he would have to make do with the frustra- 
tion of his being, implied in the forfeiture of the 
divine &rcteä . We must keep in mind that the two 
final petitions are 'mysteries' too and so among the 
good things held out to man by God. But they are goods 
that obviously entail the presence of evil in human 
existence and in the world of man's experience. His 
coping with temptation and evil is presented here as 
tied up with his willingness to forgive and in this way 
(5) is linked to (4) and through (4) to (1), (2), (3). 
The 'good' here is the good of escape through divine 
intervention but in dependence on man's use of his 
freedom: man will be heard because he forgives and so 
freed from former and future sins and their consequences: 
the privation of the äya, ed of God. 
The main treatment of (5) is taken up with the dire 
effects of not forgiving: If he does not forgive he 
will be handed over to Temptation and Evil. The role of 
the Just Judge in the evolution of man's fate is also 
stated. 
The conceptual continuity of this section with 
section (4) and through it with the whole treatment of 
the mysteries becomes more obvious when he deals with 
the 'law of nature' and its contrary, the 'law of 
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passions'. Man's liability to enslavement to the Evil One 
takes place through his susceptibility to the 'law of sin' 
or the 'law of the passions', so that we are not excluding 
the influence of the devil by concentrating on the meaning 
of 'temptation' which is dialectically related to the fore- 
going interpretations through v6poC, cpvoLC and X6yor, 
with its inevitable correlative YuwµTI already so 
obviously implicit in the 'if', on which the fate of man 
is said to hang. 
As we have seen the 'law of nature' is bound up with 
the Xdyos of nature since it comes to be when Yv4i. ii 
adopts the X6yo4; cpLOcwc, so that X6yoC is again 
basic to Maximus' understanding of the final petitions 
and their corresponding 'mysteries'. 'He should have 
known the law of nature and preserved it'. That would 
have ensured that he was in a proper relation to X6yoC 
that he was freely appropriating it and so expropriating 
the 'law of passions' or the 'law of sin' which substi- 
tutes an unstable and transient foundation for the 
reality of x6yoc so that there is a retrospective 
glance at all the implications of A6yoc, here and so 
at the whole commentary because of the organic systemati- 
zation of all the ideas of Maximus by means of ? 6yoc 
He goes on to say that the man faced with the decisive 
choice 'should have preserved nature by X6T0C ' and 
'ensured that yvw i co-operated with cýot, C ' by 
appropriating its %6Tos . Here we are undoubtedly 
back to our dyad, Xdyoc - yvwµr which is 
ultimately X6yoC - rp6roC " 
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Although the section ends by reminding us that he is 
heard because he forgives, we recall too that he forgives 
because his good is beyond the tampering of created hands : 
it is ? dTos opening out to the fullness of the life of 
the Blessed Trinity. 
We shall now examine more closely Maximus' view of 
Praxis8 
We have seen that in the Pater Noeter, Maximus 
articulates many of his insights into the Christian life 
around the notion of X6yo4 . As we can see from the 
ascetical elements of his work as a whole, the notion of 
X6yos is fundamental to his understanding of the 
plight of man in his post-lapsarian state and of the way 
in which he is to arrive at the condition willed by God 
for him. Maximus, in common with the whole tradition, 
traces the present condition of man back to the Fall and 
considers that it can be undone by the Logos Incarnate 
if man accepts the salvation which He brought. In the 
Prologue to the Quaestiones ad Thalassium he says that 
the first man, 
having become a transgressor and having become 
ignorant of God and mixing the whole of his noetic 
power persistently with the whole of sensation, 
introduced knowledge which is composite and harm- 
ful, in as much as it is productive of passion for 
the sensibles, and became like to the mindless 
beasts and resembled them in wishing and seeking 
and doing in every way the same things that they do. ' 
And also he himself turned to the irrational in as 
much as he exchanged what is against nature for the 
AöYos that is in keeping with nature. 9 
In this unflattering picture of man and the origin of 
his disorders, ignorance of God, which follows on the 
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mysterious perversity of the first man's abuse of his 
freedom, gives rise to a situation in which man turns his 
voD(; which is basically his spiritual capacity for 
God as truth, to the material creation and thus perverts 
not merely his knowledge, but the whole diapason of his 
existence. He has substituted the tXoiCa for the 
realm of X6yor. . The renewal of man will therefore 
require the progressive restoration of Myoc in his 
life. Ignorance of God is at the root of the unreality 
into which fallen man plunges; he prefers phantasy and 
its consequent disordered emotion: 
The mind of the lover of God does not war against 
the realities, nor against their conceptions, but 
against the passions joined to these conceptions. 10 
Passion is a movement of the soul contrary to 
nature, either in irrational love or in ill-judged 
hatred of something or because of something 
material. 11 
This combination of make-believe and irrational move- 
ments of the soul gives rise to a caricature of man's 
true self: 'From the reasonable or unreasonable use of 
things, we become virtuous or vicious'. 
12 The tragedy 
of passion, as Maximus sees it, is that it perverts the 
movement which he considers to be fundamental to man's 
created being and prevents him from identifying with the 
elan of his nature to God. He is misled by the appear- 
ances of things and responds to them in ill-considered 
movement: 'without some kind of subject moving the 
powers of the soul to itself by means of some sensation, 
passion never comes about'. 
13 
In his ascetical writings, Maximus uses the triad 
97. L6vµCa - 8vµ64; - Xayoc to discuss the nature 
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and requirements of 7CpäEa,; These terms relate 
basically to three powers of the soul, man's capacity for 
pleasure, his resource of emotional energy with which to 
undertake what is difficult and his power of reason. In 
the divine scheme of things, the concupiscible and iras- 
cible powers were meant to be subject to reason, while 
reason is by nature ordered to God. When ignorance 
entered A6yos , then the lower powers asserted them- 
selves irrationally and the 7cä6Ti came to be, since 
man's reason had resigned from its role as fycpovLx6v 
Maximus refers to the disorder in %6yoc, as passion too: 
All the rest of the passions take hold of either 
the irascible part of the soul or the concupiscible 
only or also the reasonable part XoYtoTLxdv) 
l4 like forgetfulness and ignorance. 
Corresponding to the three powers, we find three basic 
passions: ignorance, tyranny and intemperance which take 
hold of X6yos - evµ6; and itt, evµCa respectively. 
15 
The fundamental vice for Maximus is cptXavTCa 
16 
which 
can be associated in an especial way with 97C c0vµia as 
love for the body, but which can express itself as inor- 
dinate love of self at a much deeper level and be identi- 
fied with pride. The prolific character of cp0. av'Ca 
is suggested in the following: 
Guard yourself from the mother of all vices, self- 
love, which is irrational love of the body, for 
from this, obviously the first three cardinal, 
impassioned, mad thoughts arise, namely gluttony, 
avarice and vainglory. They originate in necessary 
demands of the bogy, from which the whole catalogue 
of evils is born. 
The core of man's passionate vulnerability is, then, 
self-love. For Maximus there can be no compromise between 
self-love and spiritual growth, so that he bluntly pres- 
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tribes the opposite as the remedy which will purity man : 
Do not be self-interested and you will not hate 
your brothers ; do not be a self-lover and you will 
be a lover of God. 18 
Maximus also knows that this cannot come about unless the 
passions that impede ? ayoS have been corrected by their 
opposite; so ignorance and forgetfulness must yield to 
knowledge and remembrance of God. This aspect of purifi- 
cation will be emphasized much more when Maximus comes to 
deal with 6swpCa , but at no stage is spiritual 
progress in any way due to blind voluntarism: 
The true love of God in keeping with knowledge 
and the complete rejection of the soul's love for 
the body and this world is the liberation from 
all these evils and the quick way to salvation, 
according to which we get rid of the desire for 
pleasure and the fear of pain. We are liberated 
from the evil of self-love ana we are raised to 
the knowledge of the Creator. z, 
The process cf impressing X6ioc on man's passionate 
life is not divorced from a knowledge in his faculty of 
Aöyoc, , which puts him in relation with the Logos 
who is the source of the X&Yot immanent to man and 
the world, knowledge of which corrects his tendency to 
substitute XoXaaµoC of his own devising for the 
objective truth of the divine order and so is at the 
root of his effort to bring his passions into line with 
reality. We know from the Pater Noster how Maximus 
thinks of the passions as being finally integrated into 
man's desire for God, a condition in which they find 
their ultimate meaning. 
20 
Maximus thinks of the purification of the passions 
as being concerned with two areas, as we would expect, 
that of the concupiscible appetite and that of the 
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irascible appetite, the ! ici, 8vµ(a and Ovµk of 
the Pater Noster. He knows that it is easier for man to 
control his attachment to external things than to 
regulate his inner faculties, so that the elements of 
ascesis have to do with externals: food, sexual grati- 
fication, reputation, money. 
21 Predictably Maximus 
thinks that detachment from the objects of sense would 
be well nigh impossible unless desire found a better 
object. 'Now knowledge of God and divine things is 
incomparably better than them'. 
22 Man will have to 
pursue inordinate passion back to its source in his 
disordered complacency in himself. The quality which 
counteracts man's pride is described here, with evan- 
gelical overtones, as 'the loving yoke of true piety' 
by which 'God has freed us from the bitter slavery of 
the tyrannizing demons, namely humility, by which every 
diabolical power is mastered'. 
23 In fact, Maximus has 
a virtuous remedy for every passion and vice. Involun- 
tary pain and suffering, used creatively, eliminate 
disordered pleasure: it is 'the harsh mistress of the 
passions and the modest and reputable mother of the 
virtues'. 
24 Maximus has dealt with this aspect of 
Christian spirituality in the Pater Noster as a form 
of 'temptation'. He sees it in an even more positive 
light elsewhere: 'for godly suffering is clearly a 
divine seed, producing as a ripe fruit the gladness of 
eternal benefits'. 
25 
In the Pater Nos ter, Maximus had said that we 
hallow the Name by mortifying epithumia and he adds: 
'When we arrive at that we hush the unbecoming 
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barkings of the irascible appetite, which no longer has 
the concupiecible appetite stimulating it and persuading 
it to fight for the pleasures that are dear to it'. 
26 
That describes exactly the relationship of the two sets 
of passions. Maximus admits that the pacification of 
the aggressive passions is more difficult than the order- 
ing of concupiscence. 
27 Because their province is the 
difficult, then they present more difficulty to A6Yoc 
Humility extends its influence to ®vµdc since in 
deflating man's bloated sense of hie excellence, toge- 
ther with his pleasure in hie image of himself, it 
undermines as well the source of his sense of injured 
merit and resentfulness. 
28 It is left to meekness to 
curb anger thus deprived of its stimulation: 
Meekness keeps anger undisturbed; huýility frees 
the mind from conceit and arrogance. 
Maximus knows that the irascible passions spring from 
the concupiscible, that the undisciplined drive to 
pleasure becomes the cause of enmity between men. This 
means that the sobriety required by meekness and 
humility will have considerable bearing on the forgive- 
ness, which we have seen to play such a pivotal part in 
Maximus' account of the spiritual life in the Pater 
Noster. Forgiveness cannot begin as long as anger and 
its attendant passions smoulder in the soul. In fact, 
they impede the unfolding of &ydm-n . In answer to 
why the Lord told us to 'love your enemies', he says: 
That He might free you from hate, grief, anger, 
grudges, and that He might grant you the greatest 
of all possessions, perfect charity, which cannot 
be had except by the man who loves all men equally 
in imitation of God, who loves all men equally and 
wills them 'to be saved and to come to the know- 
ledge of the truth'. 30 
0 
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The ascetical life is to a large extent, for Maximus, 
the effort to free thought, that is the activity of 
X6yot , from the passionate accretions that spring 
from 
man's selfishness, so that he may be able to assess 
reality for what it is and allow charity to flow freely 
in his life: 
An impassioned representation is a thought com- 
pounded of passion and representation. Let us 
separate the passion from the representation: 
the thought alone will remain. If we but will, 
we make this separation by eans of spiritual 
charity and self-mastery. 31 
Finally, we find Maximus returning to the subject of 
prayer, which in conjunction with wpa LC , is largely 
the petition for the virtues which at once purify the 
soul from the passions and dispose it for the contempla- 
tive life. With prayer he associates vigilance, which 
is principally concerned with habitual awareness that 
our conflict is with 'principalities and powers'. 
Maximus tells his correspondent Peter: 
If we are alert and vigilant, we know how to keep 
ourselves from the guiles of the demons, and if 
we pray we can acquire the divine grace for our 
help, which fights with us and makes us victors 
against any opposing power and delivers us from 
all deceit and ignorance. 32 
In the Prologue to the Pater Noster we have seen 
Maximus concerned with the relationship of charity and 
fear. He thinks of man's spiritual journey to God as 
beginning in fear and gradually opening out into the 
full freedom of love, when fear itself will take on a 
new mode: 
The fear of God is twofold. The one is born out 
of the threats of punishment on account of which 
self-control and patience and hope in God and 
impassibility, from which charity comes, emerge 
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in us in that order. The other is joined to charity 
itself and constantly creates reverence in the soul 
so that it may not come to contempt of God because 
of the boldness of charity. 33 
We shall see this again in his treatment of 'The Three 
Laws '. 
Maximus does not think of the passions as operat- 
ing independently of the higher part of man's being, nor 
as uninfluenced by malign forces from outside. He says: 
'Again there are three things which move us towards evil; 
the passions, the demons and the evil use of choice', 
34 
which he contrasts with a threefold source of good move- 
ments: natural tendencies, the Holy Powers and good 
choice. 
35 We have seen that he does not neglect the 
presence and influence of the Evil One in the Pater 
Noster, although we should remember too that the devils 
cannot enter the bastion of man's freedom and influence 
him from within as God can. This is rooted in the 
contrast, which we noted, between the causality 
exercised by God and that exercised by the Evil One, 
the former being the Creator, the latter having to 
settle for being an instigator: 
Those that forever seek our soul do so through 
bad thoughts that they may throw it into some 
sin of thought or deed. When therefore they 
find the mind unreceptive, they will be ashamed 
and confounded; but when they find it given 
over to spiritual contemplation, then will they 
be turn d back and utterly put to shame in short 
order. 3ý 
Nor are their onslaughts restricted to attempting to 
manipulate man's imagination and his thoughts: 
The demons make their attacks either with things 
or with the impassioned thoughts connected with 
them. They attack with things those that are 
occupied in affairs; with týpughts those that 
live withdrawn from affairs. 
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But the vulnerable aspect of man, for Maximus, is his 
proneness to passionate self-indulgence and it is 
through that the demons try to subjugate him: 
From the passions embedded in the soul the 
demons seize opportunities of stirring up in 
us impassioned thoughts. Then warring on the 
mind through them, they force it to consent to 
sin. When the mind is overcome, they lead on 
to a sin of thought; and when this is compjgted, 
they finally carry it prisoner to the deed. 
Elsewhere in the Capitum de Caritate Quattuor Centuriae, 
Maximus discusses the various alleged strategies of the 
demons in their corruptive approach to men, either 
through the body, or by directly stirring up passion or 
through the mind, but in every case the principal 
concern is to rouse passion, so that the primary aim of 
his asceticism is to regulate the passions, which here 
are said to be impervious to demonic influence, 'when 
charity and self-mastery are present'. 
In contrast to the malicious influence of the 
demons, Maximus shares with the tradition the conviction 
that the angels play a part in the life and destiny of 
men : 
'Sometimes God Himself enters the pure mind and 
teaches it; sometimes the holy Powers suggest 
good things ; sometimes the nature of the things 
we contemplate'. 39 
As in the case of the demons, the holy Powers cannot 
enter the mind and heart of man as God can. They too 
have to rely on suggestion, except that in their case 
it is benevolent and beneficent. Just as the demons 
take advantage of the passions to gain entry to man's 
life, so the angels avail of the good tendencies which 
they find in man's powers to encourage him in virtue. 
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Likewise, good choice helps man towards the good to which 
the angels exhort him, while evil choice supports the 
attacks of the demons. 
40 
We have seen that, in the Pater Noeter, Maximus 
organizes much of what he has to say about anthropology 
around the foci of X6yoc and 'vwµn , where X6yoc 
is primarily taken to be the principle of nature which 
YW5471 must make its own if men are to be at one 
among themselves and with God. In our examination of 
some of the salient aspects of Maximus' Christology, we 
have seen the prominence which he gave to will and that 
he was forced to refine and make precise his teaching on 
the will in order to defend orthodoxy. In his earlier 
writings yv(Sp. TI and ApomCpea&C are virtually 
synonymous, where they stand for free-will or free- 
choice. 
41 In the Quaestiones ad Thalasaium we find 
Yuwµ-n set in contrast to WaOrydw , in which the 
42 demons lodge in order to attack man in his freedom. 
They cannot reach hie YvwµYl directly, nor exercise 
their tyranny on it in an immediate way. By accepting 
the servitude which the demons impose on it through the 
it aßrrc6v , the yvc4LT binds the whole human nature 
to evil. 
43 In fact, in yielding to the movements of 
%ma'gzc v, the YvwµrI allows itself to be capti- 
vated by what is against nature. 
44 Because of the 
sentence on Adam, the free will of man inclines to 
pleasure and not even the fear of death can free him 
from this yoke. 
45 Christ removed that sentence. The 
yvwµn which accepts the requirements of the A6yoc. 
cpvocws allows itself to be moulded by the Holy 
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Spirit and moves man towards deification: 
The Spirit does not engender a free-will that is 
unwilling, but He t naforms one that wills it with a 
view to deification. 
Maximus does not dissociate charity from faith and 
hope. 47 The spiritual life is founded on them and 
develops in virtue of their development in the life of 
man, and even more specifically, each of these virtues, 
while having its proper function, grows in relation to 
the others. 
48 In the Pater Noster, Maximus associates 
the Name with %6yoC and the Kingdom with %pad&Tjc 
A random selection of texts from his ascetical writing 
would show that this polarity is constantly at work in 
his thought. We have noted already that X&Yoc is 
fundamental to his conception of virtue and that it 
implies a presence of the Logos in the life of man. 
But Maximus associates cLYä7-Tj with X6Yoc in the 
production of the äicäOe m, that is thought of as 
the culmination of praxis. 
49 With 1Yxp& ct, a it 
enables man to integrate the vitality of his sense 
powers into his life as a whole. In that context it is 
associated with 6vµ66 in an especial way, something 
inherited from Evagriue. But we have seen too that 
7cpoaCpeocs is a significant factor in the asceticism 
of Maximus. 
50 If it is a potent source of evil, then 
it is a potent source of good. We know that in works 
more or less contemporary with the Pater Noster Maximus 
associated äYä7T1 with will in a special way, so that 
the proper exercise of free-choice is informed by 
charity. 
51 Already in the Ca itum de Caritate Quattuor 
Centuriae, Maximus gives & di ri a more fundamental 
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role than that of remedy for aggressiveness. It is one of 
the two fundamental options which confront man: 'do not 
be a self-lover and you will be a lover of God' . 
52 
Dalmais, as we noted, thinks that tpc. d' is practi- 
cally synonymous with &Ycii i 053 Because of its 
association with the Holy Spirit in the Pater Noster, we 
can safely think that it refers to äyäin as gift of 
God and that it so implies the receptivity of man to what 
is poured into his heart. In this way by the pliy of 
QYd-c-q in hie life through the exercise of free-choice, 
we can discern the presence of the personal dimension of 
human activity. 
The way in which Maximus uses terminology in the 
Pater Noster is no exception to the way he uses it 
throughout his works, especially in the earlier spirit- 
ual writings. He tends to give the terms the meaning 
they have in the source which he is using at the time, 
without being over concerned about the meaning he has 
given them in other contexts, when drawn from other 
sources. Ao or. is a notoriously flexible term in 
his vocabulary. In the Pater Noster it is used to 
designate the principle of the rectification of 
J, x L6vµta and Ovµ6C , so that it will be related 
to äpeTj , which can be understood as the imprint of 
xoyos on man's concupiscible and irascible powers. 
54 
Further on we find A6yoc aligned with yV WO L9 
so that it has become the faculty of man's knowledge of 
God. 55 In this context it is YV(LTl that is 
associated with dpc'i . 
56 It can be said in passing 
that this is a distinctively Christian development as 
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the Greek philosophers did not speak of the relationship 
of will to virtue; for them that was the province of 
%6yor. . When Maximus uses the triad 
*tt. OupCa. - 
Oup. 6 - %6yoc he assigns a twofold function to 
X6yos : it is the faculty of knowledge of God or 
designates man in his actual knowing of God; on the 
other hand, it refers to his task of rendering his 
sense powers reasonable by informing them with the 
virtues. When he uses the triad atoOiIoLC - %6ToCµ- 
vo1SS , he allots to vo{ic the role of knowing God, 
while MyoC is primarily discursive reason, which 
performs a variety of mediations. When %6yoC is 
paired with yv(Sµ71 , then yvwaLC is the province of 
X6(oC , while yvWµH is assigned the task of the 
virtues. 
57 fpoaCpeot, C at this stage is used 
alternatively with yV4Lf , both terms referring to 
voluntary activity rather than to the faculty. The 
play of yv4L1 - wpomCpcoI( implies the personal 
qualification which the human act acquires in the 
concrete, 
58 
so that nature-person, ßc5 oc - cpo%oc 
are ultimately the dimensions of human being that are 
in relation to the 'Name' and the 'Kingdom' through 
MyoC and 1pa&r1 c. We have suggested in Chapter 
IV that the outcome of this is that man becomes a son 
in the Son through the action of the Spirit. This 
means that the virtues ensure that the Logos was 
present in the life of the virtuous, not merely because 
He is the source of the A6yoL , but in some way in 
His uniqueness, that is communicating to them a parti- 
cipation in the sonship that became the ground of His 
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humanity in the Hypostatic Union, which would in turn 
eorv titute them in the freedom of their persona. The 
virtues reveal this participation because of being 
marked by the , ricii which the Holy Spirit causes to 
flow from the Head to the members in the Body of Christ. 
The Three Laws59 
The synthesis of St. Maximus had its foundation in 
his understanding of the Logos. He thought of the 
Logos as present to His creatures in a threefold way: 
in the principles of creation, in the Scriptures and 
in the mystery of the Incarnation. Corresponding to 
that threefold presence, he discerned three laws, 
which are calculated to bring man to his fulfilment in 
deification. In a passage in the Ambigua, he describes 
the threefold presence. as a triple incarnation of the 
Logos, 
60 by which the preliminary incarnations in 
nature and Scripture prepare for and are perfected in 
the personal incarnation, in which the Logos assumes 
human nature in such a way that His personal existence 
is extended to a human nature. The Incarnation is the 
ultimate realization of the possibility of the union of 
God with man and the most intimate presence of God to 
man which has become the ground and exemplar of union 
for mankind. The 'law of nature' corresponds to the 
natural presence of the Logos, the 'written law' 
corresponds to His presence in Scripture and the 'law 
of grace' has its foundation in His presence as Jesus 
Christ. Although the laws were promulgated in a 
temporal sequence, the law of nature at creation, the 
written law with the Old Testament and the law of grace 
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with the Gospel, they are bound to each other because 
they have the same source t the Logos, and the same 
purpose, the deification of man. Maximus associates the 
law of nature with 'the Logos of God, Jesus Christ' Sts 
the Creator and the written and spiritual laws with Him 
as provider and lawgiver. 
61 
The Logos nourishes men on 
the laws. 62 
We have already seen how Maximus understands the 
notion 'law of nature' in the Pater Noster. There it 
was understood as a spontaneous inclination in man 
rather than an objective canon. Again in the 
Quaestiones ad Thalassium we find law described in 
relation to 'ways of living' : 
The making of a journey of three days then should 
be understood as the different ways of living on 
the journey according to God, that is a mode of 
life that is in accordance with each universal 
law. For by universal law I mean the natural 
law, the written law and the law of grace. For 
each of these has its proper mode of life and 
fitting course, as well as having a different 
ordering of act, vities taking its rise in keeping 
with free-will. 3 
The image of the journey and the days is taken 
from Jonah 3,3. It suggests movement, a basic action 
in the spirituality of Maximus. The image allows him 
to introduce the distinctions that arise from the 
activity of different principles in the evolution of 
man's destiny. The journey demands different ways of 
living, corresponding to the sequence of the days. But 
Maximus thinks of the laws of nature and of Scripture 
as coinhering, while they are transcended and perfected 
in the law of grace. 
64 
A key to the understanding of 
the text is the function of yvc3 n throughout the 
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development of man's spiritual life. This will be found 
to be ultimately linked to the idea of person, so that the 
growth visualized here is not a spontaneous unfolding of 
nature. It demands the presence of another dimension of 
human existence, the mystery of k6o'caaL6 and the 
qualification of tip6Aor. The ordering of human 
activities will differ according to their dependence on 
the different laws 'in keeping with free-will'. Ideally, 
human existence is free existence, human activities are 
free activities, because while being shaped by laws, they 
take their rise in free-will, which is the way in which 
man as person takes possession of man as nature. But 
Maximus draws attention to the formative character of 
the laws. They are intermediary between the principles 
that are grounded in the Logos and the personal realm 
of activity, which requires their information, so that 
will may not be arbitrary in order to be free. But 
Maximus avoids the pitfall of an objective positivism, 
by affirming the actualisation of nature in personal 
freedom, under the influence of ä(äni transforming 
i66os , the expression of YvwµT) . There we find 
the existential epiphany of the rp6 oC bxdpEcwr. 
which is the root of personality. 
As Maximus develops his view of the three laws in 
this passage, we find that law moves from being 'outside' 
man to being 'inside' him. At first it is said to 
create a disposition in man; each law is formulated in 
language taken from Scripture; eventually it becomes 
the principle of activity within man developing from the 
natural principle through CLyd7. i informing the 
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natural principle to being äY&XTI in the full development 
of its hypostatic freedom. The 'inside' is to be under- 
stood primarily in terms of yv4. r , the faculty by 
which the law is appropriated to become the principle of 
man's spontaneous activity. Since it is rooted in the 
presence of the Logos, the full development of the law 
will mean the fullness of His presence in the free 
activity of man, until he can say: 'I live, now not I, 
Christ lives in me'. 
We shall now look at the three laws more closely: 
For each of them naturally creates a different 
disposition in those under it; for instance, the 
natural law, whenever it does not have sense 
gaining the upper hand over reason, persuades in 
a non-didactic manner to embrace all as related 
and of the same race, having the same nature. It 
is the teacher of succour to the needy and that 
all should will for all whatever, according to his 
wishes, each one considers should come his way 
from others. Teaching this, the Lord says: 
'Whatever you would wish men to do to you, do you 
to them likewise'. In those to whom nature is 
ruled by reason, their disposition is naturally 
one; manifestly both the ethical style and the 
way of life of those, whose disposition is one, 
is naturally one; the bond of relationship to one 
another of those whose ethical style and way of 
life is one is obviously one and the same in free- 
will, leading all to the one principle of nature 
by the one free-will, in which the completely 
mastering division of n ture, because of self-love, 
is not now to be found. 
°5 
Maximus says that 'the law of nature is the natural 
principle subduing sense to remove the irrational, from 
which arises the division of things naturally united'. 
The law of nature is founded on the ) 6yoc 9 5aew, ; 
so it requires that man should remove from his life 
what is not in keeping with that nature. This is 
necessary if men are to be united because of willing 
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what is basic. to the unity of nature possessed by each and 
every man. It is this that will heal divisions. Maximus 
refers to 'the same race', 'having the same nature', 'the 
one principle of nature'. That oneness is fragmented 
when sense is not subordinate to reason, the faculty that 
mediates the requirements of the Xcyoc YvoewC to man's 
activity, so that he may become what he is. The Fall was 
due to failure of Yv(SP1 to maintain this integrity 
because of pernicious self-love. Every failure to respect 
the non-didactic ordinances of the principle of nature is 
a re-enactment of that pristine fall. Maximus understands 
the whole of the practical endeavour of man to be the 
mediation of the Myoc gvOewC into the existential 
dimensions of his being so that the law of nature has to 
do with 'ethical behaviour', the creation of virtue in 
his life. Because men will the conformity of their lives 
with a common principle, they are bound to be at one among 
themselves. To fail to will that conformity is to 
introduce division into nature. Maximus finds a scriptu- 
ral maxim to sum up the demands made by the law of 
nature : 'whatever you wish men to do to you, do you to 
them likewise'. 
66 As Maximus understands it, this law 
enables man to lay the foundation of his moral and spirit- 
ual being. It is a sine qua non of further growth and 
progress. It has to be superseded; it cannot be dispensed 
with. It is the first and most elementary way in which the 
Logos comes to be present in men. 
The written law, restraining by fear of penalties the 
disorderly impulses of the more foolish and teaching 
them, accustoms them to have regard only to the dis- 
tribution of what is equal, by which the power of 
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justice, strengthened by time, transfers itself to 
nature, making fear quietly by degrees to be a 
disposition controlled by free-will, directed to 
moral good, a fixed inclination, the habit, 
purified by forgetfulness of former things, giving 
rise to mutual love together with itself, by which 
the fulness of the law comes about when all are 
bound to one another by charity. For the fullness 
of the law naturally is the interrelated joining by 
charity of all those who share in nature, carrying 
along with it the principle of nature , crowned by a love in accordance with charity, making the law of 
nature resplendent by the addition of charity. For 
the law of nature is the natural principle ensuring 
that sense is subject to ethical behaviour; written 
law however, or rather the fulfilment of written law, 
is the natural principle assuming the spiritual 
principle that helps to achieve the reciprocal 
cohesion of those bound by race. For it says : 'You 
shall love your neighbour as yourself', but not: 
'you shall treat your neighbour as yourself'. For 
the one means the union of the related with refer- 
ence to being only, the of her signifies providence 
with a view to well-being. 97 
He thinks of the written law as 'the natural principle, 
after the removal of the irrationality in the realm of 
sense, that takes on as well the spiritual love that 
takes hold of the reciprocal bond that pertains to the 
race'. He makes this more precise by saying that it is 
the 'fulfilment of written law' that facilitates 'the 
reciprocal cohesion of those bound by race'. This 
means that there is a development in terms of the 
written law, that the principle which it involves is a 
source of growth and that its presence becomes unequiv- 
ocally evident when it has reached a certain 'fulness'. 
Maximus describes something of the process by which the 
written law effects the gradual conversion of fear into 
love by way of justice: it restrains by fear of 
punishment, teaches, accustoms men to regard the dis- 
tribution of what is equal so that justice gradually 
becomes assimilated by nature and grows into love. 68 
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Fear of penalties gives way to concern for the good in 
itself, so that the new principle can ensure that those 
who possess it can transform by a succession of acts 
their habitual attitude from being one of fear to being 
one of love. Maximus says that the maxim which will then 
express the basic orientation of man in his freedom is: 
'you shall love your neighbour as yourself', not 'you 
69 
shall treat your neighbour as yourself'. He invokes 
the distinction between eivat and e slvaL to bring 
home what he means. The law of nature by removing the 
passions that prohibit the union of men has reference to 
the %Oyos cpvaswr. . By acting freely in keeping 
with that principle, men are necessarily united, since 
it is the natural principle in each man. By affirming 
the principle of unity, they create unity. But with the 
written law and its principle of äYdui , gradually 
men confront each other precisely as free subjects and 
relate as such, 'for the fulness of the law naturally 
is the interrelated joining by charity of all those who 
share in nature, carrying along with it the principle 
of nature, crowned by love in accordance with charity'. 
While still a human being, man now confronts his neigh- 
bour as another 'self'. He does not neglect the demands 
of the A6yo4 cpvoewS but because of the transcendence 
of person a new relationship is possible, that of person 
to person. This is characterized by a care for the 
neighbour's spiritual welfare, a 'providence with a view 
to well-being'. At this stage of his development, 
Maximus visualizes man looking to the prescriptions of 
the written law in order to shape himself according to 
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the will of the Logos. He understands that this demands 
an inner principle in man, in virtue of which he will 
gradually progress from acting through fear to acting 
through charity. But the Gospel demands further develop- 
ment from those endowed with divine charity. The example 
of the Incarnate Logos reveals possibilities beyond even 
the unselfishness of a charity that enables man to love 
others as he loves himself: 
But the law of grace teaches those being formed to 
imitate in an immediate way God, who loved us to 
such an extent above Himself, who were enemies at 
that because of sin, as to come among us in a 
nature without change and, being above every nature, 
to assume nature in a way above nature and become 
man and to will to be called a man among men; nor 
did He refuse to make our condemnation His own ani 
to divinize us by grace to the extent that He himself 
by the economy became man by nature, so that we would 
learn not merely to cleave to each other naturally 
and love each other as ourselves spiritually, but be 
divinely concerned for one another beyond ourselves 
and display that love towards one another which is a 
desire in keeping with virtue to die of one's own 
will on behalf of another. 'For there is no greater 
love than this, says Scripture, 'than that one should 
lay down his life for his friends'. 70 
The maxim now is: 'there is no greater love than this' 
says Scripture, 'than that one should lay down his life 
for his friends'. 71 This shows that äyäxT1 has a 
resource which invites men to go beyond mutual respect 
and even mutual love, which has the 'self' as canon. In 
this mode of life the hypostatic and ecstatic dimensions 
of man's being become apparent with a new brilliance. 
72 
He becomes concerned for his neighbour in a way that has 
no self-reference, by going out of himself in total self- 
disregard even to the extent of being willing to forego 
his life for the good of his fellow-man. The principle 
of this emigration from self for the sake of the other 
481 
is more than 'the principle of nature'; it is more even 
than the natural principle that takes on as well the 
spiritual principle. The law of grace invites us to 
imitate the selfless love of the Incarnate Logos, who, 
in virtue of the uniqueness of His hypostasis, went 
beyond His divine nature, so to speak, and took on ours, 
even to the extent of making 'our condemnation His own', 
in order to divinize us by grace. The themes of 
xe vwo aC and 69wo c emerge here. Humanity was 
divinized in the kenotic assumption of our nature by 
the Person of the Logos. The dYc ii which He showed 
in His humanity is due ultimately to who He is. We have 
seen some of the implications of His Hypostatic Union, 
His composite Hypostasis and the way in which He willed 
and acted, as Maximus came to formulate them in the 
Christological debates. The basic of those claims is 
firmly stated here: He assumed nature 'in a way above 
nature'; so is the principle of that ecstatic self- 
immolation on our behalf : äYäiii . The presence of 
CLyd, XT) in man enables him to come to the point of 
total self-forgetfulness. In the Ad Thalassium text, 
this kind of love is related to Christ's love for us 
who were His enemies 'because of sin'. It is precisely 
in the love of enemies that Maximus considers that 
&Yäc-Q is demonstrated most clearly and that man 
participates in the cptaavOpwxCa of God-made- 
man, who laid down his life for men. 
73 For Maximus 
this is possible because of the personal dimension of 
man's being, which enables him to go out of himself 
in perfect love. Because of the gift of agape the 
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perfect coincidence of k6ormaLC and xc'UQOLC is 
revealed 'in a desire in keeping with virtue to die of 
one's own will on behalf of another,. Maximus reminds 
us that 'the law of grace is a principle beyond nature'. 
He goes on to say that it shows the Logos, 'the Archetype 
above essence and nature incomprehensibly as in an image 
in the nature of men'. Maximus thinks of the written 
law as preparing man for fulfilment through hope, which 
will issue in charity and in the same context he shows 
how he understands the Archetype to be present: 
'The word of Scripture makes us by hope apt to 
receive the Archetype of all truths, to become 
the living image of Christ, or rather, by the 
grace of Christ, Christ himself' (A 9. ?Gq;, 12S3D). 
This is something beyond understanding and conceptual 
expression. The äyäatr , which has its source in the 
Logos, which is poured into the heart of man by His 
Spirit, so transforms not merely 'the principle of 
nature', but also the 'mode of existence', that man's 
person emerges in all its splendour, revealing him to 
be a son in the Son. It is this that will enable him 
to pass over to the Lord, to enter 'the permanence of 
ever-well-being'. Maximus sums up his teaching on the 
three laws thus: 
To put it summarily, therefore, the law of nature 
is the natural principle subduing sense to remove 
the irrational element from which arises the 
division of things naturally united. The written 
law, on the other hand, is the natural principle, 
after the removal of irrationality with regard to 
sense, that takes on as well the spiritual love 
that takes hold of the reciprocal bond that 
pertains to the race. Then the law of grace is a 
principle beyond nature, remodelling nature with- 
out change with a view to divinization, showing 
the Archetype above essence and nature incompre- 
hens ibly as in an image in the nature of men and 
providing the permanence of ever-well-being. 74 
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While Maximus realizes that we cannot put limits to 
the way in which the Holy Spirit is free to act, he knows 
in faith that the Church is where the action of the Spirit 
is guaranteed. The Church is the extension of Christ and 
so it is 'the mystery of the presence of the Spirit in the 
world. It is a mystery hidden before all ages and 
generations, 
but now appearing through the true and perfect 
"inhomination' of the Son of God, who united to 
Himself hypostatically ur nature without division 
and without confusion.? 
' 
Because of this, we are the members and the body and the 
fullness of Christ who is God and Who fills all things 
entirely 'in accordance with our having been predestined 
before the ages in Him to be members of His body'. 
76 
The Church is the icon of God 'because she brings about 
the union of God and the faithful' . 
77 This is founded 
on the grace of faith: 'The Catholic Church is the 
right amend saving confession of the faith, as the Lord 
himself said'. 
78 We can see Maximus relating the 
presence of the Spirit to the threefold presence of the 
Logos and the triple mode of life in keeping with the 
three laws in this passage: 
The Holy Spirit is simply in all, in as much as 
He holds all together and cares for all and in 
as much as He moves the natural tendencies. But 
in a specific way He is also in all those who are 
under the Law, in that He points out the command- 
ments that define transgression and throws light 
on the fore-ordained promise of Christ. But He 
is also in all who follow Christ, to whom He was 
announced as the author of adoption. As the 
creator of wisdom He does not exist in any one of 
the above mentioned in a simple way except in 
those who endowed with understanding, via have 
made themselves through a godly way of life worthy 
of His divine indwelling. 79 
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We might think of the action of the Holy Spirit as taking 
place between the laws as ideal and the laws as fulfilled, 
which is another way of saying that we become identified 
with the Logos through the synergy of the Spirit's action 
and man's response. This takes place in the measure of 
man's incorporation in the Church through faith and his 
participation in the gift of the Spirit's operation: 
The revelation of the Spirit is given according 
to the measure of the faith, which is in each one, 
by participation in this gift. Each of the 
believers, that is, according to the measure of 
the faith and the disposition of soul, of which 
he is subject, receives commensurate energy of 
the Spirit which grants to him the habit of 
activity appropriate to this or that command- 
ment. 80 
It is against the background of this teaching that 
we must look at the way in which Maximus relates 
1? 6yo4 to the 'Name' and %pa6't1C to the 'Kingdom' 
in the Pater. Noster. We have suggested already that 
, Kpaöti, nc. connotes a receptivity to the Spirit and 
his forming activity. Maximus opens out this 
receptivity in his teaching on the seven spirits, which 
he takes from Isaiah, 11,2. He relates them to 
progress in the spiritual life, or, as he suggests, in 
one place, to the expression of faith in appropriate 
activity: 
81 
The Holy Spirit produces purification in those 
who are worthy of the purity of the virtues 
through fear and piety and knowledge; to 
those who are worthy of light He grants en- 
lightenment with regard to the principles by 
which beings exist through fortitude and counsel 
and understanding; He bestows on those worthy 
of deification perfection through radiant and 
simple and complete wisdom. 82 
Maximus does not forget to remind his readers that the 
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action of the Holy Spirit does not diminish nor destroy the 
native ability of man or what Maximus calls 'the receptive 
habit and power which is in every man'. 
83 He associates 
this receptivity of man with all his powers, 
84 but most 
significantly with Yv4. n , of which he says : 
The Spirit does not engender a free-will that is 
unwilling, but He transforms it when it is willing 
with a view to deification. 85 
In the Greek he contrasts eAAovoav and povl. o- 
µEVv , thus bringing out the free decision with which 
the action of the Holy Spirit must be complemented if it 
is to form man in a personal way and make of him a son 
of God. The teaching of Maximus on the Holy Spirit and 
on the Church is not divorced from his teaching on the 
Sacraments, especially on Baptism and the Eucharist. 
86 
Of Baptism he says : 
We, who have put on the first incorruptibility with 
ritual baptism in Christ through the Spirit, let us 
await the last (which will be) with Him in the 
Spirit, having preserved the first unspotted through 
progress in good works and death voluntarily 
accepted . 
87 
Maximus insists on the need of co-operation with the action 
of the Spirit in Baptism. He says that we sin if we do not 
respond to the grace of Baptism with a will that is free 
from attachment to what is at variance with the grace. On 
the contrary, 
If we prepared the will to receive the energy of these 
things, I mean water and the Spirit, spiritually, the 
mystical water would have cleansed conscience through 
the practice of virtue, and the enlivening Spirit 
would have produced in us the immoveable perfection of 
what is good through the knowledge that comes with 
experience. 88 
We shall now address ourselves to some consideration of the 
place that knowledge holds in Maximus' view of man and his 
fulfilment. 
(ii) Prayer 
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Formal elements of prayer from the Expositio 
Dominicas 
We know from the Prologue 
89and 
Introduction 
90 
to the 
Pater Noster that it was the friend who asked him to 
write this treatise who also suggested that it should take 
the form of a commentary on the 'Our Father', so that the 
first motivation to provide a statement on prayer came 
from outside. Maximus did not approach his subject in 
the spirit of a dilettante, but rather in the spirit of 
the service of his brothers and of the Church. When he 
finds himself committed to writing on prayer, he turns in 
1 
prayer to the Lord in order to find the ability to write. ' 
He wants to grasp the mysteries and the gift of a suitable 
language to express them 
2 
Before he suggests a defini- 
tion of prayer, we find Maximus in the act of prayer: 
acknowledging his dependence on God. An analysis of what 
Maximus asks for shows his awareness of the necessity of 
contemplation in order to apprehend the mysteries together 
with a parallel understanding and, cognate language to (dngmrts) 
express it adequate . 
"Apophasyjshould be complemented C WWrO+O,. tfi5) 
and mediated byý'cataphasy, 
The intrinsic motivation for commenting on the 'Our 
Father', as Maximus sees it, is the connection between 
the prayer and the divine Economy. He understands that 
the prayer is a means of identifying with the divine 
intentions for man and so of appropriating the mysteries 
that God bestows as benefits on man. The prayer is 
related to the divine purpose of deification and the way 
in which God intends man to attain to that purpose. It 
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is this which makes it worth while for Maximus to, first 
of all, know and experience the power of the 'Our Father' 
and so be in a position to write about it 
93 
IIpäEaL can 
also mean 'to do' or 'to put into practice' so that at the 
threshold of his commentary he reminds us of the insepara- 
bility of theory and practice in the Christian life and of 
the need of both in order to speak of prayer authoritati- 
vely. Maximus will not relinquish this point of view, 
but keeps insisting on the need for consistency throughout 
his treatise. Von Baithasar reminds us that in the mind 
of Maximus the perfect man can unite ataOrIai. S to 
voDs through %6ioc and introduce the content of 
ai, o6BoLC into the superior unity of volir. which is 
94_ 
orientated to God. The same process is at work when he 
reads Scripture and, by extension, when he prays the 
'Our Father'. Dalmais speaks of this work of Maximus as 
a mystagogy, a treatise that is not merely an explanation 
of the mysteries, but which is also an affective initia- 
tion into the mysteries 
9S His intention in writing is to 
invite us to share in his appreciation of the mysteries so 
that we too may be initiated into them. Indeed, the 
prayer 'which teaches us to lay claim to the benefits of 
which the God and Father alone, through the natural 
mediation of his Son in the Holy Spirit, is truly the 
giver', contains the whole 'scope' of God mystically 
concealed in its language 
96 
Maximus qualifies this by 
saying that the 'scope' is clearly proclaimed to those who 
are robust in mind. The implication is that the mysteries, 
which are facets of the divine purpceei have become in the 
kenosis of the Son of God obvious realities, but not 
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necessarily amenable to conceptual appropriation and 
expression. In this way, the 'hiddenness' and the clarity 
can be reconciled. The robust in spirit can attain to the 
realities through the inspired language of the prayer. 
The beginning of that process is, according to Maximus, 
power of the prayer is open to those who petition. 
97 
The 
lay themselves open through ai. Trot. c. Petition is the 
bridge between the acknowledged need of man and the 
blessings with which God wills to endow him. It should 
be noted in passing too that prayer is said to teach. 
98 
It is a form of instruction and enlightenment. 
Maximus then elaborates the role of Christ in the 
bestowal of the divine benefits. 
99 He is the mediator 
of the gifts of God and the author and teacher of the 
mysteries. He reminds us that He manifests the Father 
through His flesh and brings men reconciled in Him through 
the Spirit to the Father. Theology and Economy, which 
will find fuller treatment in the course of the treatise, 
are here deftly introduced to remind us of the larger 
perspectives in which prayer is to be understood and 
practised. The end towards which prayer is ordered, the 
obtaining of deification, has already been achieved par 
excellence in the Incarnation. The Logos has identified 
himself with men and entered into solidarity with them 
in order to restore to them the destiny for which they 
were originally created. It is this that makes Him the 
author of the new mysteries. The author is also the 
teacher of the mysteries. Beyond comprehension they may 
be, but no one can teach them with more authority than 
their author. In the 'Our Father', He has focussed on 
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seven of them, throwing light on their meaning and encour- 
aging men to ask for a participation in what He has given 
to them 'in keeping with his exceptional generosity'. 
While the first section of Part I is concerned 
primarily with the content of the 'our Father', the 
Reprise 
ioo 
is more concerned with the formal aspects of 
prayer and helps us to appreciate the nuances of petition. 
Here we find that although the 'our Father' is primarily 
an expression of desire and need, a petition or request, 
because of the one to whom it is addressed, it opens out 
into a declaration of the mystery of the Trinity and 
becomes a disclosure of the new identity of men as sons 
of God because of the one who teaches it. To enter the 
world of prayer is to enter into a new realization of Whom 
we are addressing, a threefold Thou, and a new appreciation 
of the 'I' who prays as one who participates in divine 
nature and, having become son, can address God as 'Father'. 
The prayer is a way of discovery, in which is revealed in 
a sevenfold manner what the Father has done for men through 
his Son in the Holy Spirit. For Maximus, the first 
petitions of the 'Our Father' are primarily declaratory 
and expository, the other petitions are seen as mainly 
supplicatory and parainetic. All through the Expositio 
Orationis Dominicae we find a combination of exposition 
and exhortation, factors that emerge from the nature of 
prayer. It would be accurate to say that they are 
dimensions of ai. 'rDaas as it is presented in the 'Our 
Father'. To recite the prayer is to put oneself under the 
obligations which Maximus rightly finds in the petitions. 
It is to enter a school of perfection. It should be noted 
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that it is the 'Our Father' that is the subject of the 
verbs in this section. This in turn is ultimately derived 
from Christ, who has taught it, so that we can infer that 
He is the subject of what is being taught and inculcated. 
Maximus here envisages man at prayer realising what is 
implied in the words which he recites. If the prayer 
speaks, then praying means listening; if it presents 
something, praying implies acceptance of a truth; if it 
commands, prescribes and recommends, then the man of 
prayer must be disposed to obey, comply and be pliant; 
if it teaches, he must be docile; if it asks, it is 
being true to its fundamental character of interpreting 
man's desires to God. Here Maximus gives us a resume of 
what the 'Our Father' implies, but with an emphasis on 
the existential logic required by prayer. If we identify 
with the petitions, we find that we are being addressed, 
taught, commanded, exhorted. The Commentary, which 
Maximus has decided to provide, is meant to facilitate 
this in others, to encourage a fitting response to God's 
self-disclosure and self-offering through Christ in the 
Holy Spirit. Maximus rounds off this resume with a 
splendid sentence which confirms this interpretation of 
his understanding of prayer and opens up new vistas of 
its mystery: 
For it was fitting that the author and giver of 
the benefits should also be a teacher to those who 
believe in Him and imitate his conduct in the flesh, 
providing the words of this prayer are precepts of 
life. Through these he revealed the hidden treasures 
of wisdom and knowledge that really exist in Him, 
clearly imp Ring the desire of those who pray to 
enjoy them.,,,,,, 
A sentence from the Caitum de Caritate Quattuor Centuriae 
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complements this by emphasizing the ability of man to 
make these treasures his own and reminding us of the indi- 
spensable foundation of the Christian life and of Christian 
prayer : 
If according to the words of the divine Apostle, 
Christ dwells in our hearts by faith and in Him are 
hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge, then 
in our hearts are to be found all the treasures of 
wisdom and knowledge. And they are to be revealed 
to the heart according to the measure of e puri- 
fication of each man by the commandments . 
4. U2 
It is by faith that man appropriates the treasures that 
are hidden in Christ. Prayer is therefore an invitation 
to Christ himself to dwell in the heart of man. To 
select one schem4tization of Maximus, wisdom and prudence 
are parallel in man, the one corresponding to his theoret- 
ical capacity and ordered to the truth, the other concerned 
with his practical ability and ordered to the good, the 
true and the good being ultimately God himself from differ- 
103, 
ent points of view. In this schema wisdom through the 
habit of contemplation becomes knowledge and prudence 
through practice becomes virtue, the former being perfected 
in unforgetting knowledge, the latter in faith. We might 
have expected faith to be aligned with votc, , the 
capacity of contemplation rather than with Xöyor., the 
practical dimension of man's intellect, but we have seen 
that Maximus has associated belief with the imitation of 
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the conduct of Christ in the Pater Koster while in the 
Mystagogia faith is associated with the purification that 
is produced in man by the observance of the commandments. 
He does understand it too as 'a true knowledge, which 
reposes on undemonstrable principles, because it is the 
substance of the things which are beyond theoretical and 
105, - 492 
practical reason. '. In fact, it joins knowledge beyond 
knowledge as yvi .C 7CLoTot&rn where the theoretical 
and practical aspects of mane noetic ability are 
transcended and become one* 
6F 
This unification required 
the intervention of ayci7-1 *9 which ensures that nature 
is personalised. This in turn will guarantee that man at 
prayer is not at variance with his neighbour: 'Ay&%Tj , 
perfecting faith and hope, ensures that we can be united 
to God and to one another 'in one nature, one yvwµn 
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and one will'. This will come about when 'charity 
persuades yv4nj not to oppose the law of nature any 
more' and when 'the law of nature is freely ( yvwµt, xc c) 
renewed through the law of grace'. 
108 
Maximus has not overlooked the place of the will in 
prayer. He says that Christ's revelation of the treasures 
of wisdom and knowledge impel the desire of those who pray 
to enjoy them. E hP esis is used seven times in the Pater 
109, Noater and once in conjunction with Yvc irr- . The 
introduction in a context of prayer recalls the ontologi- 
cal context of the thought of Maximus : 
11Q, 
, -YeveoLcq xCugaLc, a'räoLC and the role of will in the 
articulation of the 'movement' of that triad in the case 
of men, adopted as sons of God. Not alone will d, ydnTI 
'persuade man's personally determined will not oppose the 
law of nature any morel, lu it will ensure that man 
chooses the hidden treasures of wisdom and knowledge in 
prayer. Desire is the experience of c$a i6 as a tk"us t 
to God. Prayer is meant to awaken, stimulate, direct and 
inform that by providing objects for yvcLµi and Maximus 
reminds us in the Pater Noster what those objects are. 
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It is to the enjoyment of these that prayer impels its 
devotees. Again it is Epistola II that enables us to fit 
this nuance into a wider maximian context: 
Faith, in fact, which firmly establishes the truth 
is the foundation of that which comes after it, I 
mean to say of hope and charity. Hope is the 
strength of the extremes, that is of faith and 
charity, showing to them both in itself what is 
credible and what is loveable and teaching by its 
function how to hasten to it. Charity is the 
completion of these, embracing as it does fully 
the supremely desirable One in his totality and 
gives their movement towards Him its goal, substi- 
tuting through itself the enjoyment of His presence 1ý2 
for faith in His existence and hope of His presence.,, -- 
This magnificent passage on the theological virtues 
throws a strong shaft of light into Maximus' understand- 
ing of the mystery of prayer. As he enters on hie main 
commentary Maximus recalls that it is the Logos Incarnate 
who has given us the formula of the prayer and that it is 
He who enables us to grasp its meaning 
113 It is He then 
Who must be our guide and Who will open our eyes to the 
significance of what we say when we pray 'Our Father'. 
In the Coda to Part I, Maximus introduces a 
discussion on the relationship between prayer and vow, 
which is a reminder, if need be, of his concern that 
prayer should not be thought of as divorced from the will 
to live as God wills, that is according to His command- 
ments. Although he takes it from his predecessors, 
u5 
it comes into his treatise quite fittingly at this point 
just before he begins to show in earnest that the 'Our 
Father' will demand a profound reform of conduct from 
those who pray it sincerely. He contrasts prayer and vow 
in terms of petition and promise respectively and then he 
substantiates his definitions with quotations from 
Scripture, to return to two further attempts to define them 
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in which he relates them more closely, firstly by present- 
ing prayer as a petition for the transformation demanded. 
by what has been vowed and secondly as the reward of the 
virtue implied in the vow. In the Quaeationes ad 
Thalassium he provides parallel formulations which pivot 
around the notion of ' good things' : 
Prayer is the request of what C'od naturally gives 
for salvation, and very fittingly indeed. For if 
vow is the pledge of good things offered to God in 
promise, prayer will clearly be likewise the urgent 
petition of the good things provided by God for 
salvation, bringing the reward of thel: gepoeition 
of those who have already made vows. 
The idea of vow is constant and univocal while prayer is 
both petition and reward. The vow is basically a promise 
to God to live according to His commandments, which 
involves struggle. This promise, if effective, will be 
the source of the transformation which God wills for man 
with a view to his salvation. Maximus sees this as the 
gift of God given to man because of the prayer of petitiön : 
the prayer brings the reward of the promise: man becomes 
what he wills through the merciful condescension of God. 
In the Pater Noster, this is not so clear. There the 
prayer itself seems to be the reward, implying that the 
transformation wrought in man by his will to keep the 
commandments disposes him for the gift of prayer. There 
is nothing incompatible between these two views. Rather, 
they complement each other. 
Turning now to Part 111,7 we find Maximus again 
referring to the bvvaµcC of the words of the 'Our 
Father'. This means basically the 'meaning' of the words 
our Saviour taught us, but it has connotations of force 
and power. The prayer, for Maximus, is a way of access 
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to the mysteries which it represents. The language of the 
prayer has the power to transform human lives on condition 
that it is said with the proper dispositions. Maximus 
immediately confronts us with the indispensable condition, 
from the human point of view, for the efficacy of the 
prayer: cti cp Pou? 4LcOa . We must desire and will 
what the 'Our Father' declares to be desirable, in this 
case to be delivered from the Evil One. But this will is 
obviously meant to be extended to the other 'mysteries', 
here presented from an ascetical point of view, in reverse 
order. Because we desire, we ask to be delivered, so that 
desire spontaneously takes the form of petition in prayer. 
Again in this section we find that prayer is intimately 
bound up with volition: 'He who is the bread of life ... 118 
moves our appetite insatiably to Himself'. " In that 
phrase is revealed the source of the dynamism of Christian 
prayer. It is the Logos himself who moves us; He whom we 
know to be the Alpha of our existence is here presented as 
its Omega. The xCv71o'C that is characteristic of our 
ontological condition is specified as öpc L, the 
thrust of man towards his good. In the language of 
Maximus" 6pseLt XoyLxij must become öpsELC ßovMv! LLXA 
The fundamental elan of nature towards the good, the 
anonymity of which veils God, here the Logos, must be 
innovated through personal will, so that the thrust of 
nature becomes the thrust of every man in his uniqueness 
to union with Christ. It is dydxTI that stabilizes the 
will in the course of this transposition, so that here we 
see not merely the basic function of äy T1 but also the 
irreplaceable role of prayer in the being and in the life 
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of man. It is prayer that will bring about the union with 
the Logos for which man was created and thus it plays an 
indispensable part in the unfolding of his destiny. It is 
not fanciful to see in this section a reference to the 
development of prayer as Maximus conceives it. The 
petition which gives expression to the will in prayer is 
here applied to the seven mysteries, beginning with the 
need to be delivered from the Evil One. It covers the 
whole span of the possibilities held out to man by God, 
up to and including union with God himself, because of 
the indwelling in him of 'the Son of the Father by 
nature'. Within the development of wpoocvx we find 
mLTTjG taking on the form of Oeu pCa and es0koYCa 
where asking progresses from concern with the most 
elementary need of man to survive as a son of God up to 
an ecstatic affirmation of God in His Trinitarian life: 
'Hallowed be Thy Name, Thy Kingdom comet. 
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In the Conclusion, 
120 
Maximus recalls the purpose of 
the prayer which we have seen him identify with the 
purpose of the divine Counsel and he encourages his 
readers to make that purpose their own by a contempla- 
tive concern with deification so that they may realize 
contrast between their condition as sinners and what God 
has in store for those who love Him. He adds the 
dimensions of ecwpCm and YvGSoLC to petition 
1211 
The purpose of this contemplative appreciation of God's 
mercy is that man may respond fittingly to the love of 
God by loving Him in return : 'Ay=40wµev , so that 
we see that love is clearly a dimension of prayer as 
Maximus understands it. But again we are reminded of 
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the integration of the theoretical and practical aspects 
of man's power to know in äy&-xn by the exhortation to 
prove that the prayer is being fulfilled in %pa, Lc 
npa Lc. becomes the expression of &y&x-n , an activity 
illuminated and made spiritually significant by 6swpia 
122 
and reaching its climax in OeoXoYCM In this state 
of prayer it is the whole man who enters into union with 
God: 'with a man whose spirit is wholly turned towards 
God, even concupiscence gives strength to burning love 
for God, even the irascible power goes as a whole towards 
, 123 divine charity. In the thought of Maximus, the tension 
between ata6r a and yv SoLC , between %pä. &LG and 
ec pCa is transcended and overcome in &ydfiii ,a 
charity that integrates not merely the two aspects of 
man's higher being, but through his passions extends 
down to the humblest dimensions of his bodily self. 
124 
Prayer here too will necessarily imply the rejection of 
whatever militates against man's union with God so that 
Maximus reminds us that this will be possible if 'we 
call on the name of the Lord Jesus' I. Again it is 
Ecpsoic ]25that needs the discipline and transforming 
influence of prayer to ensure that man is not swept away 
by the seductions of the Evil One, but maintains his 
longing for divine charity. Prayer will deal creatively 
with the temptation to pleasure by discovering the object 
of man's deepest desire; endurance will prevent suffering 
from being wasted by becoming an occasion of an ever- 
renewed preference for God. 
The Contemplative Life 
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Maximus complements his teaching on the active life 
with a traditional account of the contemplative life. It 
has to be said straight away that he has a place for 
prayer in the active life, where man is primarily concerned 
with the acquisition of virtue. For the 'paxrLx6C, 
prayer will be primarily a matter of asking for the 
virtues, whereas the cpvatixdc seeks knowledge of 
things visible and invisible, while the OcoX6yoc, is 
wrapped in a profound silence which characterizes his 
having gone beyond thought and knowledge in a union with 
God that transcends the limits of hie discursive reason, 
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even when it rests in hard won intuition. He speaks of 
the contemplative life as 6ewpCa 
127. 
or 6ewprrtIx! 
128 
and says that if a man lives it properly he will be 
brought through his voür. to YVIZO L C. . In fact, 
yvcoi, r, is used without qualification to designate the 
same contemplative life. 
3.29 Those who devote themselves 
]r30 
to eswp Lat. or ocwp Lai. ive v iwr t, xaC ' are said to 
be 6ewpTr l. xo C 
131 or yvwa r t. xo C 
132 When we look more 
closely at Maximus' concept of the contemplative life, we 
find that the distinction indicated above between 
cpuat. xö and OcoX6yoC is based on the kinds of 
contemplation that distinguish them: sewpCa cpvoixrj 
and seoxoYCa . These in turn are distinguished on the 
basis of the objects of contemplation: ©eu pCa has for 
object knowledge of things visible and things invisible in 
their relationship to God, while OeoXoyCa is concerned 
with God in Himself. ©s o*koy Cm , in Maximus' usage, 
is synonymous with the 6eoXoYLx4 µvoTmymyCmý 
134 
and 
or 
µvaTCxý ray 6e(wv sewpCc 
135 
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Maximus normally thought of development in the 
spiritual life in terms of %päýLC, eewpla , eeoxoYCa 
While 7, päF. Lr. is primarily concerned with the asceticism 
that rids man of inordinate self-love, its inadequacy in 
the face of man's vocation to perfection demands a comple- 
mentary rectification of his mind through contemplative 
knowledge. As Maximus says: 
The practical method is not sufficient for the 
perfect liberation of the mind from passions, no 
that it may be enabled to pray without distraction, 
unless various spiritual contemplations arise in it, 
for the one frees the mind from incontinence and 
hatred only, the other gets rid of forgetfulness and 
ignoraic. Thus it will become able to pray as it 
ought. , ý_ ,- 
We have an intimation here that Maximus understands man's 
being and destiny primarily in a contemplative perspective. 
He will have reached his goal when his knowledge of God is 
freed from the possibility of forgetfulness in YvaaLc, 
äa, -noTO(: 
137 
. Progress from xpä. L r. to OCU)PCO is 
thought of as an extension of the presence of Logos in 
man's life, which will endow him with a vision comparable 
to that of the angels. Comparing the two states, he says : 
The first one, persevering in sufferings without 
being shaken because of virtue, has the first 
presence of the Logos active in itself and the other, 
transforming the mind through eewpCc. to the 
condition of the angels, has the power of the second 
presence (of the Logos), which efts impassibility 
in it and makes it unassailable. .. 
Maximus is careful to remind his disciples that this kind 
of knowledge does not mean forsaking the efforts of ascesis 
proper to the stage of wpäEII6 . Since the contemplative 
knowledge, which he visualises here, is something qualiti±- 
ively different from philosophical reflection, he insists 
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that itrequires a sustained purification from passions, so 
that the mind may be free to catch eight of the XdioL that 
reveal the purpose of the Logos in the world: 
Having been made worthy of a partial knowledge by 
God, do not neglect charity and continence, for 
they purify the passible part of the soul and always 
prepare for you the way that leads to knowledge. It 
is impassibility and humility, without which no 
will see the Lord, that are the way to knowledge. 9q 
In fact, spiritual knowledge will be in proportion to 
this purification of man's passibility 
ý' 
Corresponding 
to the spiritual love and self-discipline which bring 
order to the -xa6rti6w , the %oyLoTLxdvwill require 
'readings, spiritual contemplations and prayer'. 141 
The treasures of wisdom and knowledge 'are made manifest 
to the heart in proportion to each one's purification by 
the commandments'1.4Z There is a rigorous logic behind 
Maximus' conception of spiritual purification. Every 
advance towards the summit of perfection necessarily 
demands an accompanying detachment: the passions, 
impassioned thoughts, knowledge of things visible and 
things invisible have to be left behind in turn as man 
progresses to knowledge of the Trinity 
3' 
Pure prayer 
requires a night of sense and a night of spirit. To 
arrive at it a man must undergo a cleansing of heart and 
mind : he needs äxciec t, a and ä -d x: 
the man who loves God is bent on pure prayer and 
every passion, that hind rý him on his way to it, 
he casts out of himself. `F4. 
Since äy&cTL is that by which he finally enters into 
'knowledge of the Holy Trinity' 
1' 
it is &Yd7Lxj too 
that puts the final touches to his purification, de- 
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spoiling him at a much deeper level than that of his 
passibility. 
We have indicated that Maximus divides the kinds of 
contemplation on the basis of the objects of contempla- 
tion into OcwpCcL c voLxrj and ecoXaYCa . He 
provides a more complex division when the objects are 
defined in a fivefold way: God, visible things, invis- 
ible things, Providence and Judgment. The search for 
the %6YoL is a search for an understanding of the 
whole created realm, both visible and invisible, in its 
ultimate constitution and in its final purpose. For 
Maximus the 6yoL of creatures are also the ßovXaC 
and 6exAjµa' a1477 of God in their regard so that this 
vision of creatures is theological rather than scientific 
in a profane way. The contemplative insight into their 
structure reveals them in their relationship to God, 
which will necessarily include an intimation of how they 
are enveloped in His Providence and benefit by the 
attention that He gives them in the uniqueness of their 
individuality through His Judgment: 
The pure mind is to be found either with mere ideas 
of human things, or in the natural contemplation of 
the visible creation, or in that of the invisible, 
or in the light of the Trinity. 148, 
Settled in the contemplation of the invisible, it 
seeks both the natural reasons of things, the cause 
of their production and whatever is related to these; 
and 1o what providence and judgment there is about 'q 
them. 
With ecwpCa Maximus links the notion of µvotiayc)- 
yCa : initiation into the mystery is brought about 
through eswp. Cm , so that the aim of mystagogy is to 
introduce the initiate into Yv OL . of the mystery. As 
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Bornert comments, 'it communicates a spiritual understand- 
ing and a certain experience' of the mystery. 
i59 
Apart from 
the liturgy, Maximus teaches that there are two other ways 
of entering the mystery: through the contemplation of 
nature and through the enlightened reading of Scripture. 
With regard to the former, natural contemplation 
discovers the X6yoa of creatures, then symbolic contem- 
plation becomes aware of the mutual immanence of the 
sensible and intelligible worlds and finally, transcending 
151; , the world, voVC enters theological mystagogy. 
Mystical experience is something that man cannot learn; 
in a sense it is discontinuous with what has gone before; 
it is given. The corresponding process through Scripture 
is called µvotiaycyCa 'pacpi. x7' which initiates 
ý5 
the reader into the spiritual sense of Scripture. 
Because of the relationship of contemplation to mystagogy, 
the kinds of cewpCa will correspond to the kinds 
µvßtiaywyia , so that we have natural contemplation, 
11 RIA 3 scriptural contemplation and liturgical contemplation. 
For Maximus man, who is a compound of sense and 
intelligence, is confronted by nature compounded of 
appearances and X6yoi. and Scripture which is made up 
of 'letter' and 'spirit'. The pure mind is to be found 
either with mere conceptions of human realities or in 
natural contemplation of things visible or invisible and, 
adds Maximus, 'in the light of the Holy Trinity', 
154ý 
In 
a celebrated passage in the Quaestione s ad Thalassium, 
he shows that a fully human response to both the natural 
order and to Scripture leads to God: 
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He who penetrates with contemplation the symbols of 
the Law or who contemplates with knowledge the 
apparent nature of beings, makes a distinction with 
regard to Scripture, with regard to creation and with 
regard to himself. In Scripture he can distinguish 
between the letter and the spirit, in creation between 
Xdyoc and appearance, in himself between mind and 
sense. And taking from Scripture spirit, from 
creatures Xdyoc and from himself mind, and having 
united them to one another indissolubly, he finds God, 
knowing, as he ouffi and can, God who is in mind, 
logos and spirit. ,,,; 
It will suffice to say here that the threefold discovery 
of man, creation and nature issues in knowledge of God. 
We shall see below that the knowledge of God is of two 
kinds so that the disposing knowledge described here may 
culminate in a recollection in which God can be enjoyed 
as the final discovery of the questing spirit of man or 
in a knowledge that goes beyond any effort on his part 
and which he must simply accept when it is given to him 
154 
by God. Maximus does not think of the perfection of 
contemplation as within the scope of man's powers without 
the intervention of the Holy Spirit: 
The Spirit demands, in order to give them knowledge 
of the mysteries, the collaboration of their natureffi 
faculties, which search and examine this knowledge. ,?, 
The exact knowledge of the words of the Spirit is 158 
only revealed to those who are worthy of the Spirit. 
s,? 
Maximus thinks of knowledge as assimilation of the 
subject to the object so that entry into OcoXayCa 
which is knowledge of God, will require a simplicity of 
voiic that is in some way comparable to the Simplicity 
of God. Referring to the mind in this state of prayer, 
he says: 
When it comes to be in God, it is entirely without 
form and without pattern. For in contemplating Him 
who is simp 6be it becomes simple and wholly transfused 
with light., 
6 "') 
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In the Liber Asceticus, Maximus says simply that prayer 
separates noun from all 1 lughts and puts it naked in the 
presence of God himself. `' 1 It is this condition th2 t earns 
16 
for prayer the epithet 'pure' : xaeapä 7tpooevxjj b. 
Maximus describes the gradual purification of voVC until 
it reaches this sublime simplicity in its contemplation of 
God himself : 
Through the observance of the commandments the mind 
sheds the passions; through the spiritual contem- 
plation of things visible the impassioned thoughts 
about things; through knowledge of the invisible 
things, the contemplation of the visible this 
latter through knowledge of the Trinity. ;FJ 
Maximus considers this phase in the life of prayer to be 
164 
a state, a concept which is bound up with the simplic- 
ity with which, as we have seen, he characterizes 
eeoxoyca. . In its perfection it is without distrac- 
tion, without interruption and unforgetting: 
The man who loves God genuinely prays altogether 
without distraction and he who prays altQ then 
without distraction loves God genuinely. io5. - 
The supreme state of prayer, they say, is the mind's 
being outside the flesh and the world, praying alto- 
gether without matter and without form. He, therefore, 
who keep g6this state intact, he truly prays without 
ceasing. 
He said that the mind is moved through wisdom to go 
to contemplation, through contemplation to knowledge 
and through knowledge to unforgetting knowledge and 
finally through unforgetting knowledge to the truth-1'f757 
The stability of this kind of prayer is linked to dy&i n 
Maximus encourages his disciples not to neglect charity 
and continence, because they correct the excesses of 
irascibility and concupiscence respectively. But we know 
from his developed theology the remarkable role which he 
assigns to &Yä7-TI in the process of the personal 
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innovation of human nature, so that it is not fanciful to 
see & ct i as having a fundamental part, to play in the 
1evolution 
of prayer. '-' It is the way in which man is 
united to God and so that by which he is stabilized. 
Therefore &Yä7-1 will exercise an influence beyonä the 
pacification of eupk ; it will unite man to God and 
so quell the restlessness of his mind, becoming itself 
the mean of his knowledge, so that he can dispense with 
ecwpCai. . This may require us to make a distinction 
even within the l'ealm of OcoXoyCa , accepting the term 
as signifying contemplation with God as its object. 
Maximus, in keeping with the tradition, holds that man 
cannot trespass on the inner being of God. The mind is 
inflamed with desire to know God in Himself, but finds 
no encouragement in what is xac'; o. 
&r6v 
, that is in what 
is proper to Him; it has to be content with what concerns 
Him in His eternity, infinity, immensity, that is with His 
attributes, with what is wepC akov 
When you embark on theology, do not seek the )6YoL 
that are proper to Him (for the human mind cannot 
attain to that nor can that of any being inferior 
to God). But scrutinize in so far as it is possible 
those that concern Him, like eternity, immensity and 
infinity, goodness, wisdom and power thalt 4s creative 
and providential and critical of beings. y-. I 
Although the object is God, the method might still be that 
of 6swp to cpvß txij , except that here the X6Yo L of 
creatures would have to be transcended by extrapolation. 
This would be more than the metaphysical contemplation of 
the philosopher. Maximus does teach that he, who scruti- 
nizes wisely with his voür. the principle of every 
creature, finds God. But the contemplation of nature can 
170 'a contemplation of nature, practised in the Spirit' , 
70 
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which issues in contemplation of the Trinity, because of 
the intervention of the Spirit. Human reason 'scrutinizes 
in the Spirit the things of the Spirit and this reveals 
the hidden mysteries'. 
171 Maximus makes another distinction 
when he says: 
There are two supreme states of pure prayer: the 
one, for those of the active life; the other, for 
those of the contemplative. The one comes to the 
soul from fear of God and a good hope; the other, 172 from burning divine love and maximum purification. 
The signs of the first, he says, are that a man recollects 
himself and prays as though God Himself were at his side. 
He adds that He is really present. This prayer is chara- 
cterised by freedom from distraction and is unperturbed by 
passion. By contrast, the second type of prayer is 
produced by the divine and limitless light taking hold of 
the voUC , when it becomes unaware of the world and even 
of itself and is conscious only of 'Him who through 
charity produces this illumination in it'. We have here 
two forms of pure prayer, the one is obviously acquired, 
the other infused. In the former it is the man at prayer 
who recollects himself and succeeds in resting in the 
presence of God; in the latter it is God who takes the 
initiative in an experienced way and it should be noted 
that &Yä7cT is the mean of knowledge. This accounts for 
the reassurance which Maximus feels he has to give to the 
man who recollects himself and has taken care to 'cast 
away from the mind the mere thoughts of human affairs and 
173 
contemplations devoted to created things' in order not 
to lose what is incomparably greater by indulging his 
fancy with what is less. This activity does not in itself 
give him a self-authenticating experience of the presence 
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of God even although he has attained to a state of pure 
prayer. There is no need to qualify the second kind of 
pure prayer in this way. It is an empirical knowledge of 
God, made possible by myý7c-n . Nor would we have to think 
that in the latter kind of prayer it would not be possible 
to go beyond 'the things that concern Him', provided we 
were not tempted to hold that man could grasp God 'as He 
is' through the idea of any of His attributes. The point 
about this knowledge is that it is not mediated through 
ideas. With regard to the mystery of the Transfiguration, 
Maximus says: 
The light therefore of the face of the Lord, which 
surpassed human blessedness in the case of the 
Apostles, is a matter of apophatic mystical theology 
in that the blessed and holy Godhead is in substance 
ineffable and above knowledge and transcending every 
infinity infinitely, not leaving any vestige, even 
the slightest, of understanding to those beneath it 
nor does it allow to any being the understanding of 
how or to what extent the same Unity is Trinity, 
since the uncreated cannot be naturally grasped by 
the creature , ýo or 
the boundless be comprehended by 
the bounded. 1-, 1 
Unforgetting knowledge leads voUc , which has already 
surpassed the sensible and intelligible of its activity, 
1,7.5, 
to where it undergoes 'mystical theology'.. ' Here man, 
like Moses, enters 'the darkness, the formless and 
immaterial place of knowledge', where he performs 'the 
17.6 
most highly rites'. The peace and stability which man 
experiences in his voür are due to its ecstasy through 
love, by which he is united to God in a way beyond the 
resources of a vo1 , that depends on the ministrations 
of A6yor. 
It is the Sabbath of Sabbaths, the spiritual calmness 
of the rational soul, which has removed. the mind even 
from all those more divine X6yo L which are in 
beings and has bound it entirely to God alone by 
loving ecstasy and made it totally immovable through 
the mystical theology of God. ]77. 
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Although we do not find an elaboration of mystical theology 
in the Pater Nos ter, we do find, as we have already seen, 
evidence that this commentary was written out of an 
experience of God, which gave its author an indispensable 
authority in spiritual matters. It will serve our purpose 
here to examine one phrase from the Pater Noster, 
178 
o. toegot. c vocpä , in the light of other statements 
from the works of Maximus. This will show that he was 
referring to mystical experience, which in turn will have 
bearing on our assessment of the quality of this short but 
very important treatise. 
Aisthesis Noera 
For Maximus atoeiiaLr. means basically the organ of 
sense perception and its function, sensation. It is part 
of a triad inherited from Aristotle and the Stoics: 
aaaeiia c, ý. 6yoc , voi 
X79' 
"' In the Platonic scheme 
xboµoc atoerr. 6c is contrasted with xöoµor. vorrrdc 
It would be a mistake to think that Maximus understands 
the sensible and intelligible worlds to co-ordinate in a 
platonic way. This is obvious from the following passage 
from the Mystagogia which shows us how he understands the 
functioning of atoerio Lr, in symbolic contemplation: 
Indeed the whole intelligible world appears to be 
imprinted mystically on the whole sensible world in 
symbolic forms for those who are able to see and the 
whole sensible exists in the whole intelligible, 
simplified by concepts of the mind in gnosis. The 
latter is indeed in the former by concepts and the 
former is in the latter by imprints. And their work 
is one as if there were 'a wheel within a wheel', 
says Ezechiel, the admirable contemplative of great 
matters, speaking, I think, of the two worlds. And 
again, 'ever since the creation of the world, His 
invisible things are seen to be intelligible by things 
created', says the divine Apostle. And, as it is 
written, if the things that do not appear are seen 
through those that do appear, all the more the things 
that appear will be understood through the things that 
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appear not by those who rise to spiritual contemplation. 
For the symbolic contemplation of the intelligible 
things by means of the visible things is spiritual know- 
ledge and understanding of visible things through 
invisible things. It is necessary indeed that things 
which manifest each other should have a totally true and 
clear reciprocal signification and between themselves an 
unbroken relation. (PG 91,669cD). 
In this splendid passage we find that 6ewpCa ovµpo%Lxi 
corresponds to OcwpCa -xvevpwvLxjj in a way that para- 
llels the correspondence of things visible and invisible. 
The spiritual world in its entirety is expressed mysteri- 
ously in symbolic forms through the sensible world for 
those who have the required power of vision and the 
sensible world is summed up within the spiritual world 
through the activity of mind. To the reciprocal inter- 
penetration of the two worlds corresponds a circumin- 
cession of concepts and imprints. There is no question of 
discarding the phenomena in the interests of the noumena 
nor of renouncing aia, ArioLr., when v6joc. 4. is attained. 
Maximus insists that 'the world is one' and that it 
perdures. AtoOncLC is cognition directly concerned 
with what is perceptible by sense: Td gaLvdµeva In 
this passage we see that it is integral to human knowing 
for Maximus. 
It is paradoxical that Maximus uses the notion of 
QECaT1o c elsewhere to convey a knowledge that is not 
restricted to sense, a kind of knowledge that far 
surpasses that which he describes in the passage just 
cited from the Mystagogia where he contrasts the worlds 
of sense and intelligence in the act of reconciling them. 
In the following excerpt from the Quaestiones ad 
Thalassium we find that aioOiIo . 
is used analogically 
to speak of a knowledge that is open only to man's voi ; 
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Scripture knows a twofold knowledge of divine things: 
the one is relational, as consisting of conceptual 
knowledge and thoughts and not having a perception in 
act of the things known through experience, by which 
we manage in this present life. The other in truth 
consists precisely of experience alone in act, without 
conceptual knowledge and thoughts, providing the whole 
perception ( a,. Qeiic v) by participation according to 
grace, through which we receive, in keeping with 
future rest, the supernatural deification that is 
unceasingly activated. And they say that the 
relational, consisting as it does in conceptual know- 
ledge and thoughts, moves the desire to knowledge by 
active participation while that which is by activity, 
providing perception of its object by participation 
through experience, removes the knowledge that 
consists in conceptual knowledge and thoughts. The 
wise men say that the conceptual knowledge about God 
is unable to co-exist with experience of God or 
thoughts about Him with perception of God. I mean by 
W6yoC about God the analogy from beings proper to 
the gnostic contemplation concerning Him, by percep- 
tion, the experience because of participation of 
benefits above nature, by thought the simple unitary 
knowledge concerning Him from beings. Perhaps, this 
is recognized with regard to everything else since the 
experience of this suppresses the YOC about it 
and the perception of this makes the thought about it 
superfluous. I mean by experience that knowledge in 
act which follows on all W6yoc , by perception 
that 
participation of the known $ject which follows, 
appears after all thought. ,. »-, 
Here Maximus is discussing two ways of knowing God and 
their relationship to each other: the one is intellec- 
tual, the other is mystical, the former prepares for the 
latter, the latter dispenses with the former. Discursive 
knowledge must give way to experimental knowledge; so 
must a simplified knowledge through ascent to a concept 
of God that has affinity with a Neoplatonic 'One'. 
Mystical knowledge takes place in a different order: by 
participation in benefits above nature, ultimately tIugh 
aydron and the encounter of the human person with the 
divine Persons in a union that defies conceptual expression. 
The term atOOiaLC , which we have seen applied to the 
world of sense has been raised to describe a knowledge 
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that transcends not merely sense, but discursive intellect. 
It is ataOrIocs at this level that Maximus calls 
aVaenoLc vocpä in the Pater Nooter, where it is 
associated with mystical knowledge of the Logos, who is 
the bread of life. N. oepc is obviously derived from 
your. and in conjunction with atoOTIot, C it speaks of 
a knowledge that transcends symbolic contemplation where 
aXaOTIat, I; and voüs complement each other in apprehend- 
ing the world simultaneously from two points of view. In 
patristic thought there is a more basic distinction than 
that between x6oµo6 v-oir 6C and xdo LoC atc Oir 6c it 
is that between the created and the uncreated and in the 
usage of Maximus we find that vo 3 becomes the faculty 
of the Uncreated, so that mIo6rat, 6 voepd ., 
instead 
of being a contradiction in terms, denotes an apprehension 
of the divine realm analogical to the relationship between 
sense and the sensibles. Maximus tells us that the 
erudite hold that: 
the soul has three universal movements combined 
into one by grace: that which is in the order of 
the voUC , that which is in the order of X& (oC 
and that which is in the order of mtdZ7 a . r. . The first is simple and beyond understanding, 
through which (the soul), moved without discursive 
knowledge about God, knows Him par excellence, not 
in any way from any of the things that exist. 181, 
Xdpi, c, , which connotes 
äyc i ii , is at the root of the 
synthesis of the three powers described here. Maximus is 
using the language of a spiritual psychology to declare 
that the mystical experience, which we have seen him 
describe in terms of xaT' ! v! pyc Lav and gtOcCLr. is 
the culmination of man's possibility of relating to God 
immediately and so mediates to him knowledge par 
excellence, 'simple and beyond understanding'. It is 
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this knowledge that makes possible the unifying co- 
ordination of the 'three fundamental movements' of the soul. 
It is through XP« that vok receives this supreme 
knowledge, which in turn informs the findings of %6yor, 
as it harvests the meanings sown in the sensible world and 
revealed by mtoOno. C . This ensures that everything 
that proceeds from God returns to Him through the mystical 
operation of the perfect man. In this state, man is 
unaware of everything, 'but only perceives the One Who 
182 
produces this illumination in it ( voUc)through charity'. 
'E. 'xai, oedveaOaL is used analogously of creatures and 
of God. 'A dx7i is the mean, which assures us that the 
unity of the powers is, in the last analysis, brought 
about through the unity of the person who exercises them 
and in such a way that the concomitant knowledge of God is 
itself personal. The contrast, with which Maximus. con- 
fronts us, is between a knowledge that is relational or 
knowledge about its object and a knowledge that overcomes 
the limitations of relational knowledge and enters the 
sphere ofrealization through experience, knowledge of the 
183, 
object. The realization is made possible by the 
gratuitous activity of God. It takes place within the 
experience of the interlocking of two freedoms, that of 
God and that of man, made possible by the divine gift of 
äYä7.7 This is to know God 'under the impact of 
distinctively divine ! vt1pycLa , that is to know him 
through a living empirical relation determined by 
84 
OtWaLc '. Maximus in no way denies the validity of 
the appropriation afforded by conceptual knowledge and 
the mediation of ideas, but he undoubtedly indicates that 
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this kind of knowledge, by which the fabric of reality is 
enmeshed in a network of concepts, must be transcended if 
i 
man is to satisfy his desire to know God. As we noted, he 
extends his caveat to the most comprehensive concept 
available to the human kind. Man longs for the reality of 
God in himself. This is-open to him only through a knowing 
that is more akin to sense knowledge because of its 
concreteness and immediacy. The aXecLC that character- 
izes the inadequate knowledge described by Maximus refers 
to the abstract nature of conceptual knowledge and conse- 
quently its remoteness from what it knows, even when that 
knowledge is valid. This knowledge is mediate; the means 
are X6yoL or voAj Latia . The other knowledge takes 
place within p e&ELC xa'cci 4pLv through which man 
receives 6lwaLC . The object of this kind of knowledge 
is said to be 'divine things' and more precisely lower 
down in the passage 'God' himself 
1P5' 
Although there is a 
means of knowledge here, it is not in the noetic order, 
but in the order of grace and charity. The aitoellacs 
takes place through %stpa made possible by pgOsELS, 
Experience and participation are the context of the act of 
perception above perception of which Maximus speaks in The 
Gnostic Centuries. Referring to the cave of Elijah on 
Horeb he says: 
The cave is the hiddenness of wisdom in regard to 
the mind. He who finds himself there will perceive 
knowledge mystically in a way above perception. 
God is said to be there. 186 
XdpLc is the key to tmEp voßw yL vc&ctaa 
187 
of 
the tradition, where voVC. is raised above itself in a 
personal manner to become a faculty of empirical knowledge 
of God. In the passage where he discusses the movements 
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of the soul, which we have been examining, we find Maximus 
presenting the faculties as suspended from God through 
grace which demands that in their functioning they should 
return to Him, their source. This accepts the traditional 
view of the body as subject to the soul and of the soul as 
subject to God. Adios is the key to the relationship 
between vo3C and aEo6roLC, in its literal sense. 
No'Dr. , the faculty of the divine, is open to the intelli- 
gibility of the world, garnered by ? 6'(og from aEoO11oi. c, . 
Ato6naK, is ennobled by %6yoC and voUC is served by 
X6ioc , so that through voü6 9 transformed by Xdpcc. 
to being the power of knowing God intimately, the whole 
universe can be returned to Him in prayer and praise. 
Maximus knows from tradition that: 
the voles indeed is understood to be concerned with 
God alone and His attributes and that it goes straight 
to the ineffable glory of His blessedness, without 
discursive reasoning; that the X6yoc becomes the 
interpreter of things grasped by vows and sings 
their praises and rightly reasons out the unifying 
ways that lead to them; that atoOnot, C ennobled 
by reason, forms images of the different powers and 
energies in the universe and reveals to the soull, -n 
so far as it is possible, the Xcyoa of beings 18 
This is the notion of voUC , that is the etymological 
basis of the voepd , which we find associated with 
aýQeTIQLC in the Pater Noster. We have seen that 
Maximus prayed that God would open his voüc to appre- 
hend the mysteries and give him matching X6yoc to 
clarify the u, oi5µeva or objects of uoür.. , so that he 
might be able to write fittingly about the 'Our Father'. 
These passages from other writings show us the author of 
the Expositio Orationis Dominicae describing the life of 
Prayer, so that we can conclude that he wrote from the 
fullness of contemplative knowledge, OcoXoyCa while 
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it is obvious that he was granted matching XdyoC for the 
elucidation of what he knew in an ineffable way. The 
Expositio Orationis Dominicae is itself testimony to the 
fact that Maximus enjoyed that union of the three powers 
which he describes in his writings, so that we can be 
sure that his Commentary on the 'Our Father' is the fruit 
of theology in the strict sense. and so that it is an 
expression of theology lived, a splendid work of Christian 
spirituality. 
EPILOGUE 
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In the l yetagogia, Maximus tells us how he under- 
stands the place of the 'Our Father' in the Liturgy and 
in the life of the Church and it will serve our purpose 
to examine briefly the way in which he explains it in 
that context. The deification of human nature began 
with the mystery of the Incarnation and the deification 
of the individual Christian begins with his incorpora- 
tion into the Body of Christ through birth from the Holy 
Spirit and water in the sacrament of Baptism. 
1 Maximus 
knows that man must live consistently with the mystery 
of his Baptism if he is to reach the fullness of 
deification. This concerns the whole man. The soul is 
to receive immutability, the body immortality and the 
whole man the deification ä grace because 'he is 
divinized by the grace of the inhominated God'. Parti- 
2 
cipation in the Liturgy presupposes Baptism and requires 
the practice of asceticism and the exercise of prayer 
which we have seen to be essential to Maximus' concep- 
tion of how man progresses from being in the image of 
God to being in His likeness. In the teaching of 
Maximus we can distinguish Olwa*. c as process from 
egwaLr., as consummation. In the course of this thesis 
we have concentrated on the former meaning of the term, 
emphasizing the virtuous and contemplative dimensions of 
the Christian life. But we have intimated too the place 
of the Church in the spiritual life of man and the role 
of the sacraments in its genesis and growth, through 
which the Holy Spirit gives increment to the fontal grace 
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given to man in Baptism. This is perfected by participa- 
tion in the Eucharist. Maximus has not given us a 
systematic account of 69woLr. ", in its perfection, for the 
simple reason that it eludes the power of eye and ear 
and human heart to comprehend it. In fact, the Scholiast 
is less reticent than the master, but Maximus does provide 
some clues to his understanding of &c C e? i clvaL in the 
Mystagogia and it will be helpful to review them briefly 
as a way of bringing this work to an end. 
In a series of chapters in the Mystagogia, 3 Maximus 
hands on the teaching of 'the blessed old man', possibly 
Sophronius, on the significance of the rites of the 
Eucharistic Assembly. The first entry of the bishop 
symbolizes the first coming of the Son of God in the 
flesh; 4 the entry of the people with him represents the 
passage of the infidels from ignorance and error to 
recognition of God as well as the passage of the faith- 
ful from evil and ignorance to virtue and knowledge; 
5 
the readings from the sacred books show the divine and 
blessed wills and designs of God; 
6 the canticles 
signify the joy in the revelation of the divine benefits, 
which moves souls to the perfect and blessed love of God 
and excites even more to hatred of sin; 
7 the divine 
favours bestowed through the angels are indicated by the 
proclamations of peace; 
8 the reading of the Gospel 
proposes to the zealous sufferings for the Logos, who 
comes down from heaven to purify their minds and lead 
them to the contemplation of the intelligible world. 
When they have closed their senses to every word and 
every activity and are found to be outside the flesh 
518 
and the world, He teaches them ineffable things, when they 
are united among themselves and with Him by the kiss of 
peace and they have offered to Him in return for his 
blessings the unique confession of the act of thanks- 
giving, which the divine symbol of the faith chants. 
Then having placed them among the angels with the 
Trisagion, and having accorded them the same knowledge 
as they have of sanctifying theology, He leads them to 
God the Father, become sons in the Spirit, by the prayer 
through which they have been rendered worthy to call God 
'Father'. And thereupon being raised in knowledge above 
all the principles of existing things, He leads them in 
a way beyond intelligence to the unintelligible Monad, 
by means of the hymn: 'One alone is holy' and what 
follows, united by grace and made like to Him by parti- 
cipation in an identity as indivisible as possible. 
9 
It would be superfluous to point out the similarities 
between this teaching and that which we have seen in 
the Pater Noster and associated texts. 
Maximus then returns to the reading of the Gospel 
and its symbolism. He says that it signifies 'in 
general, the end of this world'. The end will come 
when the Gospel will have been preached in the whole 
inhabited world as a testimony to the Gentiles, when by 
His second Parousia our great God and Saviour, Jesus 
Christ will come naturally from heaven in great glory. 
He will appear as Judge. He will put his adversaries 
to judgment and by means of the holy angels He will 
separate the believers from the infidels, the unjust 
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from the just, the impious from the saints and, in a word, 
from those who conform themselves to the Holy Spirit, 
those who follow after the flesh. And in the infinite and 
interminable ages, He will render to each one the just 
recompense of the life that he has lived. 
10 
In the 
course of the liturgical celebration the faithful have 
now entered symbolically the --eaxatiov. OEwßt. c has now 
developed from being process to being consummation, in 
symbol, but what Maximus tells us of the liturgical 
experience is meant to say something about what lies 
beyond death. 
The ritual closing of the church doors signifies 
going out from material things and entry into the 
intelligible for those who are worthy of it, that is, 
says Maximus, 'into the nuptial chamber of Christ'. 
11 
The entry of the holy mysteries is the beginning of the 
new teaching which will be given in heaven concerning 
the Economy of God in our regard and the full revelation 
of the mystery of our salvation. 
12 The spiritual kiss 
represents the common opinions and identity of views, 
which will mark all at the time of that final revelation 
when the beings endowed with X6yoc will be at one with 
all, because of being in union with 'the first and 
unique Logos, origin of every ? ý6yo4; '. 
13 The confession 
of the divine symbol of faith by everyone signifies the 
Mystical act of thanksgiving, which will last for all 
eternity, for the admirable Providence of God towards 
our natures and our persons. 
14 
The threefold proclama- 
tion of 'holy' by all the people represents the union 
alid equality of honour in the future with the incorporeal 
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and spiritual Powers. 'It is by them that human nature 
will be instructed to chant and sanctify, in harmony with 
the Powers above, the unique Divinity in Three Persons in 
a threefold hallowing'. In this way men will participate 
in the angels ''motionless ever-motion about God'. 
15 
Maximus then comments on the symbolism of the 
recitation of the 'Our Father', emphasizing the signifi- 
cance of the introductory phrase and what it tells us by 
implication of the destiny of men whose existence is 
worked out between the poles of x6vwoL4 and O wo : 
The most holy and venerable invocation of the 
great and blessed Father is the symbol of the 
real and intimate adoption, granted by gift and 
grace of the Holy Spirit, by means of which 
every human peculiarity, being overcome and 
covered up through the intervention of grace, 
all the saints will be called and will be in fact 
sons of God. They, by their virtues, will be 
adorned from now on splendidly and gloriously by 
the beauty of Goodness. 16 
Maximus then proceeds to the chanting of the 'One alone 
is holy', which for him represents the union beyond all 
reason and intellect, which is given to those who have 
been initiated 'mystically and wisely'; they will be 
united with the mysterious unity of the divine simplic- 
ity in the endless eternity of the intelligible world; 
they will have part with the Powers on high in blessed 
purity. 
17 
Finally Maximus arrives at the moment of communion, 
in which the Eucharist is received, and in which he sees 
the consummation of the liturgy and a symbol of the 
consummation of the destiny of man: 
After that, as the end of everything, the distri- 
bution of the mystery takes place. It transforms 
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into itself and makes like by grace and by partici- 
pation in the Good as cause those who partake 
worthily. They will lack nothing of that Good in so 
far as that is attainable and is possible to men. 
Thus they can be and can be called gods by the gift 
of grace, because God entire fills them entirely and 
does not leave any of them empty of His presence. 18 
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177 ORIGEN. De Principiis, 3.5,3; ibid., 2.9,6. ed. 
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232A; ibid ., 19. PG 179 209A. 
184 De Princ. 2.10,8; ibid., 2.1,3; Vide DANIELOU, J. 
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Asceti ue et Mystique (3) 295, is not convinced by the 
modest claims or maximian authorship, put forward by 
VON BALTHASAR. 
544 
204 Vide SHERW00D, P. An Annotated Date-List of the 
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ibid.. 8,1. PG 9,561A. 
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16 Cf. BASIL. Sermones Ascetics, 2,2. PG 31,885B; Regulae 
Fusius Tractatae, 3,2. PG 319 917C; E. 70, PG 32,4330; 
, 
ý. 03, 'G 2,741A. GREGORY OF NYSSK De Hominie 
0 ificio, 5. PG 44,137C; Homiliae in Cant. 5. PG 44, 
857D; ibid. 13. PG 44,1044B. ONYCIUI$ e seudo- 
Areo ai De Divinis Nominibus, 4,14. PG 3, 
P7120. 
For 
a splendid treatme disinterested love in the teaching 
of Maximus vide HAUSHERR, I. Philautie, De in tendresse 
pour soi aa charite, selon saint Maxime le Con esseur. 
0r en "lTa Chriana ä ec as 137) ome, on . Ins u- tum Orientalium Studiorum, 1952. 
17 PG 90,873A. 
18 Cf. JUSTIN MARTYR. Dia1o s cum Tryphone Judaeo. PG 6, 
492D. Vide LIDDELL ,A Greek - English Tjexioon 
under ")o4;, where it is dietTnguished from q)365-2.. 
19 PG 90,873B. 
20 It is the intention of the spirituality of Maximus tQ, root 
man in the immutable and the incorruptible, tid äcC e6vaý 
It is a dimension of O woi . The 'corruptible' is 
bound up with matter and man's liability to be drawn into 
the vortex of the material through passion. So the 
epithet &oiacpoöpwc is heavy with associations and 
qualifies äyäxrl , which is man's way of being emanci- 
pated from the tendency to nothingness, that is bound 
into creaturehood for the Fathers. Through &Yä1tB man 
enters the realm of the divine, above the transient and 
caducous condition of creation cut off from God. Through 
the action of God in Christ, he is anchored to permanence, 
destined to last 'from age to age'. 
21 This distinction, which is derived from the Trinitarian 
theology of the Cappadocians, is found throughout the 
works of Maximus and is one of his fundamental insights 
and theological tools. It has had many commentators. 
The most recent scholar to elaborate this distinction is 
HEINZER, F. Gottes Sohn als Mensch, as we pointed out in 
Chapter III - Footnotes, n. 31. 
22 Of. CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA. Stromateis, 1,26. PG 8,916A; 
ibid. 7,3 PG 9,421A. DIONYSIUS the pseudo-Areo a ite. 
le Caelesti Hierarchia 4,3. PG 3,181A; De Divinis 
Nom n us, 2.9. PG 3,648A. 
23 Vide DALMAIS, I. -H. 'La theorie des "Logoi" des 
creatures chez S. Maxime lr Confesseur'. Revue des 
Sciences Philoso hi ues et Theologiques (36) 1952, pp. 
244-249; 'La manifestation du Logosteaans l'homme et dans 
1'Eglise'. Maximus Confessor ed. by Heinzer, P. & 
Sch'dnborn, C., Fribourg, Editions Universitaires, 1982, 
pp. 13-25. 
24 Cf. Bxpositio Orationis Dominicae, PG 90,904B-905B. 
25 Vide HEINZER, F. op. cit. pp. 162-198. 
561 
26 Vide GARRIGUES, J. M. Maxime le Confesseur, la charite 
avenir divine de l'h©mme, pp. 1''j i. 
27 PG 90,873B. 
28 For a stimulating study of the numinous in general, vide 
OTTO, R. The Idea of the Holy, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1923. Por an ai Ty_s of mysterium tremendum, 
vide pp. 12-31. The author's Lutheran ulturand Sian philosophical presuppositions should not be 
allowed to drop out of sight. 
29 Vide LOSSKY, V. The Mystical, TheoloKy of the Eastern 
Church, pp. 7-43; ße Vision of God. London, The Faith 
Press, 1963, pp. 99-110; In the Iýma e and Likeness of 
God, London & Oxford, Mowbrays, 1975, pp. 13 
30 For a useful summary of Maximus' teaching on agape, vide 
SHERWOOD, P. The Ascetic Life, The Four Centuries on 
Charity, pp. 91--97. GARRIGUES, J . M. Max mý e le Confesseur, la charite avenir divine de ' omme is the 
most thorougW s udy of THY-s"gspec of Maximmu -teaching. 
31 PG 90,8730. 
32 Other passages in the maximian corpus corroborate this 
interpretation of the Prologue passage of the Pater 
Noster. In Q. Thal. 10 (PG 90,287A-292C) Maximus sets 
himself the task of reconciling the two fears, in a 
commentary on Matt. 10,28 and Pss. 19,9 & 88,8. He 
admits that it is necessary to enquire how ttydxrl casts 
out cp6ßo4; if : it', remains from age to age and how God 
remains cpopep6S to endless ages. He recalls the 
distinction between a fear that is 'chaste' and fear that 
is not. The non-chaste fear has its source in sin and 
expects punishment. That will disappear with penitence. 
This fear makes man look on God as Judge (cf. Or. Dom. 
PG 90,904D). The 'chaste' fear remains always without 
the memory of sin; it is rooted in an appreciation of 
the natural dignity of God's eminence. 'He therefore 
who does not fear God as a judge, but reveres him because 
of the eminence of his infinite power, justly nothing 
will be lacking to him, being perfect in charity, loving 
God with the reverence and veneration that befit Him. 
This man has acquired the fear that lasts from age to age 
and absolutely nothing remains to him to acquire'. In 
Carit. 1.81 we find: 'There is a twofold fear of God: 
the one takes its rise in us from threats of punishment; 
because of it are engendered in us in due order self- 
control, patience, hope in God and liberty of spirit and 
from these comes charity; the other is joined with 
charity itself and constantly produces respect (etXCLpe t, a) 
in the soul, lest because of the bold freedom of charity, 
it come to contempt for God' (Sherwood's translation, 
slightly modified). Cf. Carat. 1,82. The points of 
contact with the Pater Noster passage under consideration 
are obvious. EuXd43_EL a is interchangeable with etboC 
In fact, Evagrius, always a quarry for terminology with 
Maximus, uses if of fear that is distinct from servile 
fear and is expressed in prayer towards God (PG 79,1176B). 
It has overtones of caution restraint and discretion, all 
qualities associated with E£bot In the Centuries 
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charity casts out the lower kind of fear, but not before 
it has been instrumental in engendering virtues that 
release the play of charity in man's life. This has 
affinities with the role of compunction in Libor 
Asceticus (PG 90,932C). In reply to the Bro er's 
concern with his lack of compunction the Old Man 
accounts for its absence 'because there is no fear of 
God before our eyes, because we have become the resting 
place of all evils, and, for that reason, we scorn as a 
mere thought the dreadful punishment of God' (Sherwood). 
The Old Man is obviously linking fear with punishment 
and so speaking of the non-chaste fear. But this is 
the source of compunction which sets in train the 
radical conversion of man and which is so finely 
described in the latter part of Liber Asceticus. 
Dalmais has pointed out that Max us' interpretation of 
the scriptural texts on love and fear is the first 
instance of that exegesis in the East. Both St. Augustine 
and St. Gregory the Great wrote on this subject and this 
raises the question of the possibility of Augustinian 
influence on Maximus and the slight chance of Maximus 
having met Gregory when he went to Constantinople. 
(Vide DALMAIS, I. -H. ''Un Traite de Theologie Contem- 
plfve, Le Commentaire du Pater de S. Maxime le 
Confesseur'. p. 127). 
33 Vide DALMAIS, I. -H. 'Un traite de theologie contempla- 
tive, le commentaire du Pater Noster de S. Maxime le 
Confesseur'. p. 126. 
34 As we mentioned above, n. 12, auyXacäßaaLe is a 
basic idea with Sophronius. We find it playing an 
important part in Maximus' own thought about the 
Incarnation. Vide Ambig. PG 91,1041D. But the use 
goes back to Athanasius. Vide ATHANASIUS. Orationes 
Tres Adversus Arianos, 2,62. PG 26,280A; ibid. 4,31. 
PG2 6,5160. Videe etiam DIDYMUS THE BLIND. Contra 
Eunomium Libri, 5, in . opp. Bas. ) PG 29,716A; GREGORY OF NYSSA. Contra Eunomium, 6. PG 45,716C; 
L30NTIUS OF BYZANTIUM: Adversus rgumenta Severi. 
PG 86,1940A. 
35 Vide Ascet. PG 90,940B; gu. Thal. PG 90,657D; 
Ambi PPG 91,1081D; ibid. 1032B. 
36 PG 90,873A. 5. 
37 For an excellent treatment of this theme, vide 
GARRIGUES, J. M. Maxime le Confesseur. la charite 
avenir divin de l' comme , 
pp. 112-1527. C? RIO Vv. 
Le monde -1=$ li se salon Maxime le Confesseur. pp. 
123-135. 
38 Vide Ep. 2, PG 91,393C. For a magisterial presentation 
of he teaching of Maximus on the perfection of man 
through Christ, vide BALTHASAR, H. U. VON. Liturgie 
Cosmigue, pp. 209-278. PP. 215-221 and 253-2b5 are 
particularly relevant. 
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39 For a synthesis of Maximus' teaching on dYäxB vide 52. 
2, PG 91,392D-408B. 
40 PG 90,908C. 10; ibid. D. 3. 
41 PG 90,908A. 5; ibid. B. 1. 
42 PG 90,885B. 9; ibid. 888B. 11; ibid. 893B. 15; ibid. 
896A. 6. Some of the uses are associated with the idea of 
humility, derived from the Gospels, but the structure of 
the Pater Noster gives %pa6TIc striking prominence, so 
that we are j stified in thinking that Maximus sees it as 
a fundamental and comprehensive attitude to God as well as 
to man. Perhaps 'disponibility', an awkward but pertinent 
term, suggests what he means. fpaoc occurs seven times 
in the Pater Noster: PG 90,885B. 11; ibid. 888A. 8; 
ibid. 888B. 3; Lýid. 888B. 8; ibid. 893C. 2; ibid. 8930.3; 
Ibid. 893C. 5. 
43 rvwliil occurs twenty four times in the Pater Noster, 
including its inflected forms. This indicates the habitual 
character of Maximus thinking; he is constantly concerned 
with man's freedom, and so with what frees him to be truly 
free: &(&x As we have seen, Maximus would restrict the 
use of yvwp. later on, when it was associated with 
fallibility and so had to be excluded from the terminology 
attributable to Christ. Vide SHERWOOD, P. The Ascetic 
Life, The Four Centuries on-Charity, pp. 55-3 The 
71--nest treaatmen oe wHool -question of will in the 
teaching of Maximus is DOUCET, M. La Dispute do Maximo le 
Confesseur avec Pyrrhus, Introduction, e xte crit ue, ra uc on ýo es (an unpublished esi. s Montreal, 1972. 
A splen i essay on the emergence of the notion of the will 
can be found in MADDEN, J. D. 'The Authenticity of Early 
Definitions of Will (thelesis)'. Maximus Confessor. 
Fribourg, 1982. 
44 nPoaCPEoLC occurs four times, and 7. poaLpe'tix6c 
once, in the Pater Noster. 
45 Vide Expositio Orationis Dominicae PG 90,901D. 
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47 Vide Qu. Thale. PG 90,364A; Carit. 4,3, PG 90,1048C. 
48 Vide THUNBERG, L. Microcosm and Mediator, The Theologi- 
cal-Anthropology of Maximus the Condor, pp. 76-847- 
49 Vide 9. Thal. PG 90,317BC. 
50 Vide Cap. Theol. 2,23, PG 90,1136A. 
51 For parallel treatment of this theme vide SCHONBORN, 
C. VON. Sophrone de Jerusalem: vie monastigue et 
confession ogmatIque, pp. ß. I9-I56. 
52 Vide DALMAIS, I. -H. 'Divinisation'. Dictionnaire de 
Spiritualite, Ascetique et Mystique (3) 1370-1389.53 
Vide Cap. Theol. 2,23, PG 90,1136A. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Or. Dom. PG 90,873CD. 
56 Ambig. PG 91,1116B; ibid., 1392A. 
57 Qu. Thal. PG 90,317BC. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Cap. Theol. 2,23, PG 90,1136A. 
60 The a. oT6s of the Pater Noster (873D) is reproduced 
as oocpi. a in Qu. Thai. (317B). For an indication of 
how Maximus understands the function of wisdom in the 
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Myst. PG 91,672D-681D. 
61 Ambig. PG 91,1133A-1137C. 
62 Ibid., 1133A. 
63 Ibid., 1133B. 
64 Ibid., 1133D-1136A. 
65 Vide SHERWOOD, P. The Earlier Ambigua of St Maximus 
the Confessor, pp. 3-3 'f44ff. 
66 Ambig. PG 91,11330. 
67 Ibid., 1133CD. 
68 Ibid., 1136A. 
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found in HEINZER, F. Gottes 
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Sohn ala Mensch; vide 
71=i98. 
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75 Ambig. PG 91,1281D-1284A. 
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84 Ibid. 
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PG 3,376A. 
89 Ibid., 2.2,1; ibid., 6.3,5, PG 3,393A and 536C. 
90 Ibid., 1.2, PG 3,373A. 
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94 Vide Qu. Thal. PG 90,612AB; Ambig. PG 91,1316D; 
Ambig PG 91,1317B Ambig. PG 919 1344D. 
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103 Ibid. 
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108 Ambig. PG 91,1056A. 
109 I_. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Vide Qu Thal. PG 90,608C-609A; Ambig. Pg 91,1053B. 
or a iýscussion of this vide THUNS G, L. op. cit. 
pp. 21-37. 
112 0, 
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113 O1usc. 8, PG 91,97A. 
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127 Ambig. PG 91,1304D-1308D. 
128 Vide GARRIGUES, J. -M. Maxime le Confesseur, la charite 
avenir divin de l'homme, pp. 153- 
129 Vide HEINZER, P. op. Cit. pp. 171-181. 
130 Vide Qu. Thal. PG 90,636B-D. 
131 Vide HEINZER, P. . cit. pp. 181-198 for a perceptive 
account of this theme Maximus. 
132 t2hý 44, PG 91,644B; uec. 2 0, PG 91,241A-C; for 
cognate tpotiU700a9; vide Ep. 2, PG 91,404C. 
133 Vide RIOU, A. op. cit. pp. 123-200. 
134 Vide GARRIGUES, J. -M. 'L'energie divine et la grace 
c Maxime le Confesseur'. Istina, 1974, pp. 277-296. 
For 'tcpL wpijocc in This context vide e. g. 
Ambig. PG 91,1308B. 
135 Vide gu. Thal. PG 90,260B; Carit. 3.56,57. Cf. 
AUSARR, S. Philautie, De la ten resse pour soi a la 
charite, selon saint M_ IF Confesseur, pp. 93-T09. 
136 Vide GARRIGUES, J. -M. op. cit. pp. 180-199. 
137 Ibid. Cf. RIOU, A. op. cit. pp. 125-135. 
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90,953B. 
139 Vide SHERWOOD, P. St. Maximus the Confessor, The 
Ascetic Life, The Pour Cen ur es of C arty, pp. 73-77; 
RÜU, Ä. op. cit. pp. M-1-10. 
140 Vide Ambig. PG 91,1217A; Cap. Theol. 2, PG 90,1084A. 
141 BALTHASAR, H. U. VON. Liturgie Coamique, p. 159. 
142 Ibid. 
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of Maximus vide HEINZER, F. op. cit. pp. 70-76. 
147 Vide Ambi . PG 91,1057B; ibid., 1078A; Ep. 12, PG 919ý4 A. 
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Co Messeur, p. 3T. 
156 Carit. 3,25, PG 90,1024BC. 
157 For the co-ordination of this irreducible pair in the 
teaching of Maximus, vide RIOU, A. R. cit. pp. 73-121; 
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suggests that 'the natural passibility' here means 
the natural elan towards God. This seems to be far- 
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as to the head of the whole body are they attributed, as diseases of a patient to a doctor, while He who became 
man for us, God freed us from them' (loc. cit. ) LOSSKY in his The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Cch, pp. 148- 149, professes to n in Max saf ii daal =Onkor his 
distinction between a. natural and a relative assumption in Christ the former referring to incorruptibility, the 
latter'corruptibility and passibility. But as DOUCET, 2.2. 
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1. DENZINGER-SCHONMETZER. 
P2. cit. pp. 338-343. 
n. 302. Cf. KELLY, J. N. D. 
2. CYRIL OP ALEXANDRIA. Adversus Nestorium, 2, prooem. PG. 76,60D. Cf. EZ. Hd, Suc ssum, 2,3- 
3. Vide ACO 1,1,4, p. 18,25. 
4. DENZINGER-SCHONMETIER. n. 302. 
5. Vide ACO 2,1,1, p. 143,10f. 
6. Vide ACO 2,1,1, p. 120,14. 
7. Vide ACO 2,1,2, pp. 123f. Cf. KELLY, J. N. D. op. cit. 
p. 340. 
8. Vide SELLERS, R. V. The Council of Chalcedon, 
London, S. P. C. K. , 195379pp- . 332 ff7 
9. o usc. 9, PG 91,121AB. 
10. HEINZER, P. Op. cit. Pp. 85-94 admits that this 
thought-model may seem to be excessively academic, but 
he insists that it helps an understanding of the way in which hypostasis and nature combine in the thinking 
of the Leontii, especially in that of Leontius of 
Jerusalem. The latter's emphasis on the fact that the 
human ZötwµaTa are not a 'part' making up the 
'whole' of Christ's hypostasis serves to show that the 
union of the natures is not a matter of addition, but 
the actuation of both of them in the one hypostatic 
existence. Neither oücCaL nor features of ovotat, 
can be 'part' of an hypostasis (Adv. Nest. PG 86, 
1421AB). An insistence on his divinity and manhood 
being parts of Christ's hypostasis would lead to the 
anomalies of Severus. Differentiation of cnvot. c and b7c6ß, vaaL; is necessary (ibid., 1432BC); they are 
two different orders of being and combine in a way 
that transcends the restricted order of essences. With 
this in view we can admit that the Logos as hypostasis 16 the whole of Christ's person, which in a strictly formal way is identical with the Person of the Logos, (ibid., 1536). Logos as ovoCa is one of the two 
ovoCaL united in His personal subsistence and as 
such is part of Christ, God made man (ibid). These 
refinements in thinking about the relationship of the bA6oraaLc, and the oýaCm adumbrate the more 
Volished formulae of Maximus. The use of EoTty or 
By or bxcipXe Lv will bring out vividly what is implied by Leontius of Jerusalem. Vide Qpusculum 9, (PG 91,117CD) where Maximus says that his adversaries hold that the whole is something else than the parts, from which and in which it consists. He does not fail to remark that their discourse is declarative, not demonstrative and then he proceeds to demonstrate the 
untenability of their position: 'Firstly, let them 
demonstrate that the whole has an existence other than that of its own parts, and then only let them in the 
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same manner attribute to the whole as whole an opera- 
tion other than the essential operations which exist 
in its parts! If, in fact, they do not accord to the 
whole an existence other by nature, evidently they 
should not either attribute to it an operation other 
by nature than those of the parts. Christ, who by 
nature is each of the two (the Same is by nature God 
and man) possesses by nature that which is proper to 
each nature: divine will and operation as well as 
human will and operation, and not one only by the 
exclusion of two natural operations, nor another 
besides the two which exist by nature, which would 
make three operations and three wills'. 
11. DENZINGER-SCHON1 ETZER. n. 293. 
12. IETHEL, P. -M., o. cit. pp. 82-85 discusses how preci- 
sely Maximus unirs7anda the identity of the Logos with 
his natures, expressed in the eati of Ambig. PG 91, 
1052D. He claims that for Maximus there is not a real 
distinction between Christ and his divinity so that 
the esti expresses real identity. He cites ER. 15 
to bac up that claim where Maximus says that the 
unique divine nature is not alone 'in Three Persona' 
but that 'it is the Three Persona' (PG 91,549D- 
552A). MEYENDORFF, J. Christ in Eastern Christian 
Thought, pp. 212-213, prefers t1 Pa am e traaition 
and speaks of 'the real distinction in trinitarian 
theology between essence and hypostasis'. When in 
the text we say: 'In the Incarnation we have a 
unique subject distinct in some way from the natures', 
the intention is to affirm a rational or even an 
apophatic distinction between the Person of the Logos 
and his divine nature, thus preserving the irreduci- 
bility of the person to nature, but not necessarily 
affirming any real distinction in God apart from that 
which holds between the Persons as such. Lethel points 
out that there must be a real distinction between the 
hypostasis of the Logos and his human nature, but he 
invokes St. Thomas Aquinas to make a distinction which 
St. Maximus did not make and which clarifies the cont- 
ribution of the latter to the already existing 
terminology of ek and en. Aquinas says: 'Utraque 
ergo natura praeaicatur de Verbo Bei, sed una in 
concreto tantum, scilicet humana, ut cum dicimus 
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APPENDIX I 
Chronological Table of the Life of St. Maximus the 
Confessor, taking into account the possible variations 
suggested by the Syriac Life and Chronicles. 
Vita, Opera, etc. Syriac Life & Chroniclea 
579 Birth 
Early life at Constan- Early life in Palestine; 
tinople; entered entered Palaia _. 
monastery of 
Chrysopolis. 
617 Anastasius becomes his 
disciple. 
Went to Cyzicus? 
626 Went into exile from 
Chrysopolis/Cyzicus; 
Vists Crete. 
628 No longer near John 
the Chamberlain. 
630 Arrives in Africa. 
632 Already in Africa. 
Moved to Jerusalem, then 
to Cyzicus. 
633 Possibly in Alexandria Between 633 and 641, 
with Sophronius. Pact returns to Syria- 
of Union of Cyrus and Palestine. 
later the Psephos of 
S ergius . 
638 Ecthesis of Heraclius 
and Sergius. 
645 Dispute with Pyrrhus. 
In Syria after the 
Ecthesis of 638- 
641 Returns to Africa. 
646 Goes to Rome. 
647 Typos of Constans. 
649 Lateran Synod. 
653 Taken to Constantin- 
ople with Pope 
Martin I. 
654 First Trial; exiled 
to Bizya. 
652 went to Constantin- 
ople to propagate the 
decrees of the Lateran 
Synod. 
2. 
656 Attempts to suborn 
Maximus; 
transferred to Rhegium; 
further pressures. 
Back to Constantinople. 
662 Final Trial; exiled to 
Lazica. Death on the 
10th of August. 
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APPENDIX II 632 
Expoeitio Orationia Dominioae -A Literal Translation+ 
872D I received my Master himself, protected by God, who 
comes to me through his moat praiseworthy letters. 
Indeed, he is always present in spirit and cannot absent 
873A himself completely; and yet he does not avoid coming to 
the help of his servants in imitation of God by the 
abundance of hie virtue and through the occasion that 
God provided by nature. 
Therefore, marvelling at the greatness of his conde- 
scension, I have mingled fear with affection in his 
regard and have formed from the two, fear and affection, 
one charity consisting of reverence and goodwill, so that 
fear shipped of affection may not become hatred, not 
affection unaccompanied by prudent fear become contempt. 
So, charity should appear as the inner law of love and 
appropriate everything related to it by nature: by 
goodwill it masters hatred and by reverence it dispels 
873B contempt. The blessed David, recognizing in addition 
that it, I mean fear, is a constituent of divine 
charity, says: 'The fear of the Lord is chaste and 
lasts from age to age' (Pa. 19,9), that is he knew that 
this is different from the fear that consists in the 
dread of punishment because of crimes. Indeed, the one 
is expelled, disappearing entirely by the presence of 
charity, as the great evangelist John shows somewhere 
when he says: 'Charity casts out fear' (I John 4,16); 
the other characterizes naturally the law of true love. 
By reverence it preserves for ever for the saints 
entirely without corruption the norm and mode of 
charity towards God and towards one another. 
8730 And I, as I have said, mixing fear with affection, 
have laid down this law of charity in regard to my 
Master up to this day: restrained from writing through 
reverence lest contempt should occur, I am moved to 
write by goodwill so that an honourable refusal to write 
may not be considered to be hatred. Bidden to do this, 
I write not whatever thoughts occur to as because 'the 
thoughts of men are worthless' (Wied. 9,14) according 
to Scripture, but whatever God wills and grants by grace 
for effecting what in profitable. 'For the counsel of 
the Lord', says David, 'lasts for ever; the thoughts 
of his heart from generation to generation' (Ps. 33,11). 
* The Greek text from which the translation is made is that of 
Migne, Patrologia Graeca XC, 872D-908D. The English 
version of the scriptural citations is mine, apart from the 
formula of the Pater Noster which is that of the Roman 
liturgical usage. This-"accounts for translating 
as 'daily' in 897A. 
633 
Perhaps he means by the counsel of God the Father the 
ineffable self-emptying of the only-begotten Son (Cf. 
Phil. 2,7) for the deification of our nature by 
873D which he sets a limit to all the ages. By the 
'thoughts of his heart' he means the principles of his 
Providence and Judgement, by which He wisely regulates 
our present and future life as different generations, 
appropriately allotting to each the mode of activity 
that be c one a it . 
If then the work of the divine counsel is the dei- 
fication of our nature and it the purpose of the divine 
thoughts is the leading of our life to the goal of what 
is sought, then it is profitable to know and to experi- 
876A ence and so to write duly about the power of the Lord's 
prayer. But since my Master, in writing to me his own 
servant, moved by God, remembered particularly this 
prayer which I make of necesoity the subject matter of 
my words, I ask the Lord, the teacher of this prayer, 
to open my mind to the apprehension of the mysteries it 
contains and to give me commensurate discourse for the 
clear expression of the ideas. For it contains the 
whole scope in sum mystically concealed in its language 
or, to put it more properly, clearly proclaimed to 
those who are robust in mind. Indeed, the language of 
the prayer contains the petition of all the things of 
which the Word of God, having emptied himself, became 
the author through his flesh. It teaches us to lay 
876B claim to the benefits of which the God and Father 
alone, through the natural mediation of his Son in the 
Holy Spirit, is truly the giver. For, according to 
the divine Apostle, the Lord Jesus is 'the mediator 
between God and men' (I Tin. 2,5), making the Father, 
who is unknown, manifest to men through the flesh. He 
brings the men who were reconciled in him through the 
Spirit to the Father (Cf. Eph. 2,18). Being made man 
without changing for them and on their account, he 
becomes the author and teacher of so many new mysteries 
that reason cannot in any measure comprehend their 
multitude and their magnitude. 
There are seven in number more general than the 
rest, which he obviously gave to men in keeping with 
his singular generosity. The scope of the prayer, as 
I said, contains their power in a mystical way: 
876C theology, sonehip in grace, equality of honour with the 
angels, a share in eternal life, the restoration of 
nature to dispassionate inclination to itself, the 
destruction of the law of min and the abolition of the 
tyranny of the Evil One who mastered us by deceit. 
Let us examine the truth of what has been said. 
In fact, the Word of God made flesh teaches theology 
in that in himself he reveals the Father and the Holy 
Spirit. For the whole Father and the whole Holy Spirit 
were substantially and perfectly in the whole Son, even 
made flesh, even although they themselves were not 
made flesh. The former delighted in and the latter co- 
operated with the Son who himself effected the incarna- 
876D tion. For the Word remained in possession of his 
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intelligence and his life and was comprehended by no 
one at all in substance except by the Father alone 
and the Spirit and effected the hypostatic union 
with the flesh because of his love for man. 
877A He gives adoptive sonship, conferring through 
the Spirit in grace from above the birth which 
transcends nature. The protection and preservation 
of this in God is the free choice of those born. 
This loves with a sincere ddsposition the given grace 
and by the practice of the commandments carefully 
adorns the beauty given through the grace and by an 
emptying of the passions it lays claim to divinity to 
such an extent as the Word of God himself, having 
emptied himself voluntarily of his own pure glory by 
economy, became and was truly a man. 
He has made men of equal dignity with the 
angels, not only because, 'having pacified through 
the blood of His Cross... things in heaven and things 
877B on earth' (Col. 1,20), and having made ineffectual 
the hostile powers that fill the middle place 
between heaven and earth, He showed that as regards 
the distribution of divine gifts the festal gathering 
of earthly and heavenly powers was one because human 
nature joins in singing- with great joy the glory of 
God in one and the same will with the powers on high; 
but also because after the fulfilment of the economy 
on our behalf and having ascended with the body He 
had assumed, He united heaven and earth through 
Himself and joined the sensibles to the intelligibles 
and showed the created nature to be one in the 
extremes of its parts, bound to itself by virtue and 
the full knowledge of the First Cause. He shows, I 
think, by what he did mystically, how, on the one 
hand the Logos is the union of what is separated and 
877C on the other how the absence of the Logos is the 
separation of what is united. Let us learn, then to 
strive for the Logos through virtuous activity in 
order to be united not only to the angels in virtue, 
but to God in gnosis by detachment from things. 
He imparts a share of the divine life by making 
Himself eatable in a way that He himself understands; 
so do they who have received from him such intellectual 
sense, that, by the taste of this food, they know in 
accurate knowledge truly that 'the Lord is good'. 
(Ps. 34,8). It is He who imbues those who eat with a 
divine quality so that they may be deified, in as much 
as He clearly is and is called the bread of life and 
strength. (Cf. Jn. 6,48; Ps. 78,25). 
877D He restores nature to itself, not only because 
He was made man and preserved free-will passionless 
and without revolt in its relation to nature, nor 
was it shaken at all from its proper basis in 
nature against those who crucified Him, but rather, 
on the contrary, it chose death instead of life on 
their behalf, by which the voluntary character of 
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880A the passion, ratified by the philanthropic disposi- 
tion of the one who suffered, is shown; but rather 
in that he annulled the hatred by nailing to the 
cross the record of the sin by which nature was 
implacably at war with itself (Cf. Col. 2,14). 
Having called those who were far away and those who 
were near, that is obviously those who were under 
the law and those who were outside the law and 
having broken the wall of partition, that in having 
clarified the law of the commandments with his 
decrees, he created the two into one new man, 
making peace (Cf. Eph. 2,14-18) and reconciling us 
through Himself to the Father and to one another, 
no longer having the will at loggerheads with the 
principle of nature; rather, we would be immutable 
in free-will as well as in nature. 
He constitutes nature free from the law of  in 
880B by not allowing pleasure to precede His incarnation 
for our sakes. For his conception has taken place 
paradoxically without semen and his birth was 
supernaturally without corruption. This means that 
when God was born, he tightened the bonds of the 
virginity of his Mother by a birth that transcended 
nature. He frees all nature from the power of the 
law which dominated it in those who are willing and 
who imitate His self-chosen death by the mortifica- 
tion of their earthly members with regard to sense. 
(Cf. Col. 3,5). For the mystery of salvation is 
for the willing, not for the coerced. 
He works the destruction of the tyranny of the 
Evil One who dominated us by deceit: casting the 
8800 flesh that was vanquished in Adam at him as a 
weapon, He overcame him. In order to show that what 
was previously captured for death conquers the 
conqueror and destroys his life by a natural death, 
it became on the one hand ap bison to him in order 
that he may vomit up all those whom he had swallowed 
when he held away in having the power of death (Cf. 
Heb. 2,14); on the other hand, it became life to 
the human race by impelling the whole nature to rise 
like dough to resurrection of life. (Cf. Rom. 11, 
15-16; I Cor. 5,6-7). It was for this especially 
that the Logos who is God becomes man -a truly 
881A strange fact and piece of news - and voluntarily 
accepts the death of the flesh. 
As I have said, the text of the prayer will be 
found to contain the petition of all these things. 
For it speaks of the Father, of the Name of the 
Father and of the Kingdom. Besides, it presents the 
one who prays as being a son of this Father by grace. 
It asks that those in heaven and those on earth 
should become of one will. It commands me to ask 
for substantial bread. It prescribes reconciliation 
for men and binds nature to itself by forgiving and 
being forgiven, not being hacked asunder by the 
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differences of free-will. It teaches us to ask not 
to enter into temptation which is the law of sin, and 
it recommends the avoidance of evil. For it was 
881E fitting that the author and giver of the benefits 
should also be a teacher to those who believe in Him 
and imitate his conduct in the flesh, providing the 
words of this prayer as precepts of life. Through 
these he revealed the hidden treasures of wisdom 
and knowledge that really exist in Him (Cf. Col. 2, 
3), clearly impelling the desire of those who pray 
to enjoy them. 
Because of this, I think, Scripture has called 
this teaching 'prayer', containing as it does the 
petition of gifts given through grace by God to men. 
For thus our divinely inspired Fathers described 
prayer by defining it as a petition for those things 
which God naturally gives to men in a way that 
881C befits Him, just as a vow is, in turn, an undertaking, 
that is a promise of what men, who worship sincerely, 
offer to God. They adduce, besides, the Scripture 
which bears this out in many places in its own words, 
for instance: 'Make vows and render them to the 
Lord our God' (Ps. 76, ll. LXX), and 'As much as I 
have vowed, I will render to you my Saviour, my Lord' 
(Jonah 2,10. LXX). These things are said of vows; 
and again with regard to prayer, for instance: 'And 
Anna prayed to the Lord saying: "Lord God, God of 
hosts, if listening you will hear your servant and 
give me fruit of the womb"' (Cf. I Sam. 1,11), and 
'Hezekiah the king of Judah and Isaiah, son of Amos 
the prophet, prayed to the Lord' (Cf. 2 Chr. 32,20), 
and also what was said by the Lord to his disciples: 
'When you pray, say: "Our Father who art in heaven"' 
881D (Matt. 6,9; Luke 11,2). So a vow is the voluntary 
decision of the one who made the vow to observe the 
commandments; prayer, on the other hand, is a 
petition by the one who has observed them for 
renewal with reference to the good things observed, 
or, rather, a vow is the struggle of virtue, an 
offering which God accepts with greatest goodwill and 
884A prayer is the reward of virtue which God very gladly 
gives in return. 
Accordingly, since it has been shown that 
prayer is a request for the benefits given by the 
incarnate Logos, let us make Him our leader who is 
the teacher of the formula of the prayer and go 
forward boldly, exposing carefully by contemplation 
the meaning of each word, in so far as it is 
possible; indeed, the Logos himself is wont to 
equip us to our advantage and gives us the ability 
to take in the meaning of the One who says : 'pur 
Father, who art in heaven, hallowed by Thy name; 
Thy kingdom come' (Matt. 6,9-10). Straight away 
the Lord teaches those who pray in these words to 
begin duly from 'theology', and being by essence the 
884B Cause of beings, He initiates them into the mode of 
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existence of the creative Cause of beings. For the 
words of the prayer contain a manifestation of the 
Father, of the Name of the Father and of the 
Kingdom of the Father, so that we might be taught 
from the very beginning to venerate, invoke and 
adore the unique Trinity. For the Name of the God 
and Father subiiMte essentially and is the only- begotten Son; the Kingdom of the God and Father 
subsists essentially and is the Holy Spirit. For 
what Matthew here calls 'Kingdom', another one of the evangelists has elsewhere called 'Holy Spirit', 
saying: 'Let your Holy Spirit come and purify us' (Cf. Luke 11,2). For the Father does not have the 
Name as something acquired nor, indeed, do we 
understand the Kingdom as a dignity that was 
considered to have been added to Him, for He did not 
8840 commence to be in order to commence also to be a 
Father or a King, but being always, He is always 
both Father and King, having neither in any way at 
all commenced to be, nor to be Father nor King. 
And if He is always, then He is also both Father and 
King and therefore the Son and the Holy Spirit have 
always co-subsisted essentially with the Father, 
being from Him and naturally in Him, above cause and 
reason, but they are not subsequent to Him, as if 
coming to be afterwards through a cause. For 
relationship possesses the power of simultaneously 
demonstrating the terms of which it is and is said 
to be a relation, without allowing them to be 
thought of as one subsequent to the other. 
When we begin this prayer, then, we are led to 
honour the consubstantial and superessential Trinity 
as the creative cause of our coming into being. And 
884D besides, we are taught to proclaim the grace of ou 
filial adoption, deemed worthy to call the Creator 
by nature Father by grace. Thus, reverencing the 
invocation of the Begetter by grace, we should strive 
to exhibit in our lives the characteristics of the 
parent, hallowing his name on earth and taking after 
885A Him as a Father; we should show ourselves to be 
children by our actions and magnify by what we think 
or do the author of this adoption as sons, the Son 
of the Father by nature. 
But we hallow the Name of the Father by grace, 
who is in heaven, by clearly mortifying the desire 
for material things and by purifying ourselves of 
corrupting passions, since holiness is the immobility 
and mortification of sense desire. When we arrive at 
that, we hush the unbecoming barkings of the 
irascible appetite which no longer has the eoneupis- 
cible appetite stimulating it and persuading it to 
fight fror the pleasures that are dear to it, since it is already mortified by the holiness that is in 
keeping with reason. Indeed, the irascible appetite, 885B being by nature the vindicator of the concupiecible 
appetite, naturally ceases to rage whenever it sees the latter mortified. 
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Suitably then, by the rejection of aggression 
and desire in keeping with the prayer, the power of 
the Kingdom of the God and Father comes for those 
who, after the repudiation of these things, have 
become worthy to say: 'Thy Kingdom come', (Matt. 6, 
10), referring to the Holy Spirit; already they 
have been made temples for God by means of the Spirit 
through the principle and mode of meekness. (Cf. 
Eph. 2,21-22). For, He says, On whom shall I rest 
but on the meek and on the humble and on him who 
fears my words? ' (Cf. Isa. 66,2). Consequently, 
it is clear from this that the Kingdom of the God 
885C and Father belongs to the humble and to the meek. 
Indeed, he says: 'Blessed are the meek, for they 
shall inherit the earth' (Matt. 5,5). God did not 
promise as a heritage to those who love Him this 
earth which, by nature, holds the middle position 
of the universe, since he speaks the truth in 
saying: 'For when they shall arise from the dead 
they shall take neither husband nor wife, but the 
shall be like the angels in heaven' (Matt. 22,30), 
and 'Come you blessed of my Father, you shall 
inherit the Kingdom prepared for you from the 
foundation of the world' (Matt. 25,34), and else- 
where again to another who served with goodwill 
'Enter into the joy of your Lord' (Matt. 25,21). 
And after Him the divine Apostle says: 'For the 
trumpet will sound and the dead in Christ will rise 
first incorruptible. Then we the living who are 
left shall be borne away with them in the clouds to 
meet the Lord in the air and thus we shall be with 
the Lord for ever' (Cf. I Cor. 15,52; I These. 4, 
16-17). 
885D Since such promises were for those who love the 
Lord, who then, if he gives his mind only to the 
word of Scripture and if he is moved by reason and 
longs to be a servant of reason, would say that the 
heaven and the kingdom prepared from the foundation 
of the world and the joy of the Lord mystically 
hidden away and the continual and entirely unin- 
terrupted dwelling and abiding of the worthy with 
the Lord are in some way identical with the earth? 
But now I think that 'earth' means that habit and 
power of immutability that is stable and cannot be 
888A deflected, from the good, which belongs to the meek 
man. This means that he exists always with the 
Lord and has unfailing joy, having received the 
kingdom prepared from the beginning and having been 
deemed worthy of a place and position in heaven. 
He has taken possession, then, of the principle of 
virtue just like the 'earth', the middle position 
of the universe. In keeping with this, the meek 
man, finding himself between good and ill repute 
(Cf. 2 Cor. 6,8), remains impassible, being 
neither puffed up by the good reports (elated or 
vainglorious), nor made gloomy by the ill reports. 
For reason by nature remains free from them; 
having repulsed the inclination, it is insensible 
of them when they annoy it with their onslaughts, 
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having prevented itself from all agitation in their 
regard and moored the whole power of the soul to the 888B divine and imperturbable liberty. The Lord, desir- 
ing to share this with his disciples, says; 'Take 
my yoke upon you and learn from me, for I as meek and humble of heart and ou will find rest for your 
souls' (Matt. 11,29). He calls the power of the 
divine kingdom 'rest' in no far as it produces in 
those who are worthy a mastery that is freed fron all 
servitude. 
If the indestructible power of the inviolable 
kingdom is given to the humble and the meek, who 
would be no devoid of love and entirely without 
longing for the divine benefits as not to desire 
limitless humility and meekness in order that he 
might become, in so far as it is possible to man, 
the imprint of the divine kingdom? He would bear 
in himself by grace the exact form in spirit of 
888C Christ who is truly by nature the great king in 
essence. In this, the divine Apostle says, 'there 
is no male and female' (Gal. 3,28), that is, 
neither aggressiveness nor concupiscence. The 
former does away tyranically with the reasoning 
power and causes the operation of the intellect to 
be outside the law of nature; the latter causes 
what is inferior to be more desirable than the one 
and only desirable and impassible cause and nature; 
thus it puts more value on the flesh than on the 
spirit and makes the enjoyment of the sensible® 
more agreeable than the glory and splendour of the 
intelligibles. By the soothing character of sense 
pleasure it hinders the intellect from the divine 
888D and connatural grasp of the intelligibles. But, 
indeed, reason in its singularity, through the 
advantage of virtue, is stripped of tenderness and 
affection, which is entirely impassible but which 
is still natural, for the body. The spirit is still 
perfectly master of nature, persuading the intellect 
to forego ethical philosophy when it ought to unite 
itself to the superessential Logos through simple 
and indivisible contemplation, even if this contri- 
butes naturally to the easy cutting off and trans- 
cending of things fleeting in the realm of time. 
When this transcendence is achieved it in not 
reasonable that he, who has been shown to be 
detached from sensibles, should be weighed down 
with moral living as if it were a sheepskin. 
The great Elijah reveals this, having demon- 
889A strated this mystery figuratively by what he did. (Cf. 2 Kgs. 2,11-14). On the one hand, when he 
was caught up, he gave to Elisha his sheepskin, by 
which I mean the mortification of the flesh, 
through which moral decorum is firmly made an ally 
of the Spirit against every adverse power and a blow against the unstable and fluctuating nature, 
of which the Jordan was a figure; thus the 
disciple would not be impeded from crossing to the holy land and would not be overwhelmed by the 
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turbid and slippery condition of the passionate 
inclination to material things. On the other hand, 
he himself, being unrestricted, advanced towards 
God, absolutely untrammeled in any way in his 
relation to things, simple in desire and uncompli- 
cated in free-will, he made for his dwelling with 
Him who is simple by nature by means of inter- 
connected cardinal virtues, yoked together in 
gnosis like fiery horses. For he knew that a 
889B disciple of Christ ought to steer clear of 
unbalanced dispositions; their difference proves 
their estrangement: since the passion of concup- 
iscence produces a diffusion of blood about the 
heart, while the irascible appetite, when it is 
aroused, clearly causes the blood to boil. For 
instance, when a man has arrived at living being 
moved and being in Christ (Cf. Acts 17,28), he kas 
: Kid, J1bk5e_& of the discordant origin of inequali- 
ties, because, as I said, he does not have in 
himself the contrary dispositions of these 
passions, like male and female, that the reason 
may not be enslaved by them, subject to alteration 
with their unstable mutations; reverence for the 
divine image has been naturally infused in this, 
persuading the soul to be transformed through its 
free-will into the divine likeness and to become 
subject to the great Kingdom which co-subsists 
889C substantially with the God and Father of all things 
in that it becomes the all-resplendent dwelling 
place of the Holy Spirit. Thus, if it is permiss- 
ible to say so, it receives the whole authority of 
the knowledge of the divine nature g in so far as it is possible. In keeping with this the origin 
of what is worse is prevented, but the origin of 
what is better is made real, so that the soul 
preserves unimpaired in itself, in a manner like 
unto God by the grace of its vocation, the 
reality of the benefits conferred on it; in 
keeping with this Christ always desires to be born 
mystically becoming incarnate in those who are saved. 
He makes the soul which gives birth a virgin-mother 
which, to put it briefly, does not have, because of 
its condition, the characteristics of male and 
female peculiar to a nature that is subject to 
corruption and generation. 
889D No one should be astonished to hear corruption 
put before generation. For he who scrutinizes 
dispassionately, with right reason, the nature of 
what comes to be and passes away, will find 
generation clearly beginning from corruption and 
ending in corruption. Christ does not have, as I 
said, the passions that signify this; by that I 
mean the life and way-of-life of Christ and 
according to Christ, if, indeed, he speaks truly 
who says : 'In Christ, in fact, there is not male 
and female'. (Gal. 3,28), meaning, obviously, the 
signs and the passions of a nature subject to corr- 892A uption and generation; in fact, there in only that 
reason made deiform by divine gnosis and a unique 
movement of free-will that chooses virtue only. 
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'Neither Greek nor Jew' (Gal. 3,28; Col. 3, 
11); by this is meant the different, or at any 
rate, to speak more truly, opposite conceptions of 
the notion of God. One foolishly introduces a 
polyarchy and divides the one principle into 
opposite energies and powers and fashions a poly- 
theistic cult in a state of dissension with itself, 
because of the multitude of beings worshipped and 
ridiculous because of the diversity in the manner 
892B of worshipping. The other introduces one 
principle, but narrow and imperfect and nearly 
unreal, benefit as it were, of reason and of life 
and falling into evil comparable with the first 
conception, but in the opposite way, 'that of 
atheism, it limits the one principle to one person 
and this subsisting without Logos and Spirit, or 
as merely qualified by Logos and Spirit; it does 
not see what kind of God this would be if he were 
without a share in these, nor how he would be God 
by sharing in them as accidents by a participation 
akin to that of the rational beings subject to 
creation. Neither of these are to be found in 
Christ at all, as I said, but only the conception 
of true religion, a firm law of mystical theology. 
This rejects both the expansion of the divinity in 
the former conception and does not accept the 
contraction of the latter, so that there is not 
892C faction through the natural plurality, for that is 
the Greek position, nor the subject of one hypo- 
stasis, for that is what the Jews hold. That 
would mean deprived of Logos and Spirit or quali- 
fied by Logos and Spirit, but then God is not 
worshipped as Intellect, Logos and Spirit. It 
teaches us, who have been introduced to a recog- 
nition of the truth by the vocation of grace 
through faith, to know the one nature and power of 
the godhead, that is to say Oise God, contemplated 
in Father, Son and Holy Spirit. That means the 
unique uncaused substantially subsistent Intellect 
who is the Generator of the only Logos who subsists 
substantially without cause, who is the source of 
the only eternal Life that subsists in a substantial 
manner, as the Holy Spirit, a . Trinity in Unity and a Unity in Trinity. It is not a case of one thing in 
892D another, because the Trinity is not in the Unity as 
an accident in a substance nor, inversely, is the 
Unity in the Trinity, because it is without quality. 
Nor is it as one thing and another, because the 
Unity does not differ from the Trinity by diversity 
of nature, being, as it is, one simple nature. Nor 
is it as one thing after the other, because the 
Trinity is not distinguished from the Unity by a 
diminution of power, nor the Unity, in turn, from 
the Trinity. Nor is the Unity distinct from the 
Trinity as something common and universal from the 
particulars it subsumes, considered only in thought, 
since it is a substance that exists properly by 
itself and a power that really owns its strength. 
Nor as one through another, because there is no 
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mediation by relationship, like that of effect to 
cause, in that which is altogether identical and 
without relationship. Nor is one thing from the 
other, because the Trinity is not produced from 
the Unity, being untreated and self-manifested. But 
the same is said and understood to be truly Unity 
893A and Trinity, the former by reason of the principle 
of essence, the latter by reason of the mode of 
existence. The same is entirely Unity without 
being divided by the hypostases; the same is 
entirely Trinity without being confused by the 
Unity, so that polytheism is not introduced by 
fragmentation, nor atheism by confusion. 
By avoiding this, the teaching of Christ is 
resplendent; by 'the teaching of Christ' I mean 
the new proclamation of the truth that 'In him 
there is not male and female' (Cf. Gal. 3,28), 
that is to say, the signs and passions of nature 
subject to corruption and generation. 'There is 
no Greek and Jew' (Col. 3,11), that is to say, 
contrary conceptions of godhead. 'There is no 
circumcision and uncircumoision'(Cf. Col. 39 11), 
that is to say, the cults appropriate to each of 
these, the one through the symbols of the law 
blaming the visible creation and accusing the 
Creator as if he were the author of evils; the 
other, through the passions, deifying it and 
893B setting up the creature in opposition to the 
Creator. Both end up equal to each other in evil: 
insulting God. 'There is no barbarian and 
Scythian' (Cf. Col. 3,11), that is, seditious 
dissension of the one nature against itself 
through free-will. By this, the law of mutual 
slaughter, which brings destruction to men, was 
unnaturally introduced. 'There is no slave and 
free' (Cf. Col. 3,11), that is, of course, the 
division of the same nature because of free-will, 
depriving him of honour who has equal honour by 
nature, something which has as a supporting law 
the disposition of those who exercise dominance, 
which tyrannizes the dignity of the image. 'But 
Christ is all and in all' (Col. 3,11), who by 
Vaeans of what transcends nature and law, works at 
the formation of the eternal kingdom in the 
Spirit, which humility and meekness, as has been 
8930 shown, naturally characterize. Their concurrence 
reveals the man who is being created perfect 
according to Christ (Cf. Col. 1,28). For every 
humble man is also entirely meek and every meek 
man is also entirely humble. He is humble, indeed, 
because he knows that he has his being on loan; he 
is meek too, because he realizes that the use of 
his powers in keeping with nature has been donated 
to him. He gives the service of these to reason in 
order to produce virtue and he moderates perfectly 
their sense activity. And in this way he is 
always moved towards God with respect to intellect, 
on the one hand; on the other, with respect to 
sense, he is entirely unmoved when he experienced 
at the same time all the ills that afflict the 
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body, nor does the imprint of sorrow engrave his 
soul in place of the disposition that causes joy in 
it. In fact, he does not think sensible pain to be 
a privation of pleasure; indeed, he knows one 
893D delight, the intercourse of the soul with the Logos. 
The privation of this would be endless punishment, 
which naturally encompasses all the ages and 
because of this, having set aside the body and all 
that belongs to the body, he is born vehemently 
towards the divine intercourse, considering that, 
even if he should master everything on earth, one thing alone would be loss: the foregoing of the 
896A anticipated deification by grace. Therof ore, let 
us purify ourselves from every stain of flesh and 
spirit (Cf. 2 Cor. 7,1) that we may hallow the 
divine Name, quenching the concupiscence which 
improperly plays the wanton with the passions and 
let us restrain with reason the irascible appetite, 
which is thrown into a disorderly fury by 
pleasures, so that we may receive the Kingdom of 
the God and Father, which comes through meekness. 
And let us join the following phrase of the prayer 
to the preceding and say: 'Thy will be done on 
earth as it is in heaven' (Matt. 6,10). 
He who offers mystically to God the cult of 
worship with a reasonable power alone, which has 
been detached from concupiscence and aggressive- 
ness, this man fulfills the divine will on earth 
896B as the orders of angels do in heaven. He becomes 
in all things a worshipper like the angels and 
their companion, as the great Apostle says some- 
where: 'Our citizenship is in heaven' (Phil. 3, 
20). They have neither concupiscence which 
relaxes the tension of the intellect through 
pleasure, nor raging forgiveness, which barks 
irreverently at its fellow, but reason in its 
singularity that naturally leads reasonable beings 
to the first logos. It is in that alone that God 
rejoices and that He demands from us, his servants 
and he shows this by saying to the great David: 
'What is there for me in heaven and, apart from you, 
what did I desire on earth? ' (Ps. 73,25. LXX). bf }tee Iýoly Nothing is offered to God in heaven, (apart from the Y 
aK 6e! S 1 rational worship, which he expecterfrom us when He D teaches us to say in our prayer: 'Thy will be 
896C done on earth as it is in heaven' (Matt. 6,10). 
Let our reason, therefbre, , be moYed to . search for God and let the concupiscible power strive to 
desire Him and the irascible power to hold onto 
Hin. Rather, to speak more properly, let the 
whole intellect strain towards God, as if it were 
stretched through a forceful exeri-ion by way of 
the irascible power and on fire with longing 
through the supreme yearning of the concupiscible 
power. For by imitating the angels in heaven in 
this way, we shall be found to give worship to God 
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in everything and show ourselves to have on earth 
the same kind of citizenship as the angels, having, 
just like them, our intellect in its integrity 
896D moved to nothing that is inferior to God. For, by 
living thus, we shall receive, in keeping with our 
prayers, the Logos, who said: 'I am the bread 
which has come down from heaven and which gives 
life to the world' (Cf. John 6,33-35), as our 
substantial and living bread for the nourishment 
of our souls and the preservation of the good 
897A condition of the benefits bestowed on us. He 
becomes everything to us in proportion to how we 
are nourished by virtue and wisdom and He is 
embodied in a variety of ways in each of the saved, 
as he himself understands, while they are still in 
this age. This fits the meaning of the expression 
of the prayer which says: 'Give us this day our 
daily bread' (Matt. 6,11). 
For I think that this age is meant by 'today', 
as if one were to say, because of understanding this part of the prayer more clearly, 'Our bread', 
897B which you prepared in the beginning for the 
immortality of nature, 'give to us today', who 
have part in the mortality that pertains to this 
present life, in order that the nourishment of the 
bread of life and full knowledge may vanquish the 
death that results from sin. The transgression of 
the divine commndment did not allow the first man 
to become a sharer of this. So then, if he had 
been filled with this divine nourishment, he would 
not have been trapped by the death due to sin. 
Moreover, he who prays to receive this daily bread 
does not receive it, at any rate, entirely as the 
bread is in itself, but according as the recipient 
himself has a capacity for it. For the Bread of 
Life, being a lover of men, gives Himself to all 
who ask, but not in the same way at all. He gives 
897C Himself more to those who have done great works, but less to those who have done less of them, to 
each one, however, according an the worth of his intellect is capable of receiving. The Saviour led 
me to this understanding of the present statement, 
by explicitly ordering his disciples to take no 
account at all of sensible food, in saying: 'Be 
not solicitous about your life and what you eat or 
" what you drink, nor about your body, what you wear. For the peoples of world seek all these things. 
But seek first the kingdom of God and his justice 
and all these things will be added to you' (Matt. 
6,25,32-33). How then does he teach us to pray for what he formerly commanded us not to seek? 
For, it is clear that he did not command us to ask 
897D in prayer for what he had not enjoined to ask for 
by his commandment. Because only what is to be 
sought in keeping with the commandment is to be 
asked for in prayer. Perhaps, therefore, whatever 
we were not allowed to seek after by commandment, 
he did not lay down as lawful to ask for in prayer. 
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And if the Saviour has commanded us to seek only 
the kingdom and justice of God, it is likely that he 
urged those who are desirous of divine gifts to aok 
900A for this through prayer, so that having determined 
the gift of what is to be naturally asked for in 
prayer, he may join to the will of Hin who grants 
the gift the free-will of those who ask, made 
identical with it through a relational union. 
If we are ordered in the prayer to ask for the 
daily bread, by which our present life is naturally 
sustained, let us not leap over the limits of the 
prayer, envisaging with cupidity many periods of 
years and forget that we are mortals and that we 
possess a life that is passing like a shadow. But 
let us, without solicitude, ask in prayer for bread 
for a day and show that, in keeping/the philosophy /i tk 
of Christ, we make life a practice for death, by 
anticipating nature with free-will und, before 
900B death sets in, cut off the soul from solicitude 
about bodily things, so that it may not be nailed 
to corruptible things, turning the use of the 
natural inclination towards matter and learning 
avarice which deprives us of the abundance of 
divine benefits. 
Let us then fly as far as we can from love 
for matter and wipe away, like dust from our 
intellectual eyes, the relationship with it. Let 
us be content with those things alone which sustain 
our present life and not with those which give 
pleasure. Even above them let us value God, an we 
have been taught, that we may be able to preserve 
the soul unenslaved, mastered, through the body, 
by absolutely nothing visible. We must be seen to 
9000 eat for the sake of living, but we must not lay 
ourselves open to the accusation of living for the 
sake of eating; the former is obviously proper to 
rational, the latter to irrational nature. Let us 
be careful guardians of the prayer, shown by our 
very actions to cleave tenaciously to the one and 
only life in the spirit and to use the present 
(life) in order to lay hold of it. For that 
reason we love to make use of it to this extent 
that we do not avoid sustaining it by bread alone 
and preserving incorruptible, in so far as it is 
allowed, its natural health, not that we may live, 
but that we may live to God. We make the body, 
rendered reasonable by the virtues, the messenger 
of the soul and we make the latter, formed by 
firmness in goodness, the herald of God. And we 
naturally confine this bread to one day, not 
900D daring to extend the petition for it to a second day through the mediation of Him who gave the 
prayer. For should we thus really dispose our- 
selves in harmony with the meaning of the prayer, 
we should be able to move forward in a purified 
way to the following words t saying : 'And forgive us our debts as we forgive our debtors' (Matt. 6, 
12). 
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He who seeks through prayer the incorruptible 
901A bread of wisdom, from which according to the first 
attempt at an exposition of the previous statement, 
the transgression at the begfnkg cut us off, in 
this age, of which we said that 'today' is a symbol, 
he knows that the one pleasure consists in the 
attainment of divine things, the giver of which 
is naturally God, the guardian of which is the 
choice of free-will of the one who receives. He 
also knows that the only pain is the failure to 
attain to these; the devil instigates this, but 
everyman, who grows weary of divine things because 
of slackness in his free-will and does not 
preserve the honourable with love by a disposition 
of free-will, is its author. This man maintains 
his free-choice inclined to nothing of the sum 
total of visible things and, because of that, he is 
not subject to the painful things that happen to 
him in a bodily way. Truly, this man dispassion- 
ately forgives those who offend him because 
absolutely no one can lay a hand on the good which 
901B he strives for longingly and which is believed to 
be naturally unattainable. He even sets himself 
up as an example of virtue, if one may say so, by 
inviting the Inimitable One to come and imitate 
him, saying: 'Forgive us our debts as we for ive 
our debtors'. He beseeches God to bbbübd that 
which he was to his neighbour, for just as he for- 
gave the debts of those who offended him, so he 
desires that he also may be forgiven by God. 
This means that just as God forgives dispassion- 
ately those whom He forgives, so likewise he 
remains impassible in whatever befalls him; he 
forgives those who have offended him, not allowing 
the intellect to be impressed by any memory of 
901C foregoing injuries, so that he may not be accused 
of severing nature by free-will by separating 
himself, though a man, from some other man. For 
thus, when free-will is united to the principle of 
nature, the reconciliation of God with nature takes 
place naturally. Because, otherwise, it would be 
impossible that nature, in dissension with itself 
through will, should receive the inexpressible 
divine condescansionand, perhaps, because of this, 
God wills us first of all to make reconciliations 
with one another, not in order to learn from us to 
be reconciled to sinners and to waive the penalty 
of many monstrous crimes, but in order to purify 
us from passions and to show that the disposition 
901D of those forgiven corresponds with the relationship 
of grace. He has clearly made it evident that, 
while the free-will is united to the principle of 
nature, the free-choice of those who have put this 
right will not be in revolt against God, because 
nothing that is illogical can naturally be discerned 
in the principle of nature, which is both natural 
and divine law whenever it possesses the movement of 
free-will that operates in keeping with itself. 
And if nothing illogical exists in the principle of 
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nature will naturally have an activity that is in 
harmony with God in all things. This is an 
efficacious disposition, created by the grace of 
Him who is good by nature, f or the production of 
virtue. 
904A The one who asks for the bread of knowledge is 
disposed in this way, therefore, when he prays; 
after him is the one who seeks bread for the day 
only, through the constraint of nature; he has the 
same disposition. He forgives the debtors their 
debts because he knows that he is mortal by nature, 
and, for the rest, awaits each day in uncertainty 
that which is produced by nature, anticipating 
nature with his free-will, he becomes on his own 
initiative dead to the world according to the verse 
that says: 'For your sake we are put to death all 
the day long; we are re uted., as sheep for slaughter' 
(Ps. 44,22; Rom. B. 
M. 
his reason he is 
sacrificed for all (Cf. Phil. 2,17) in order to 
carry with him no mark of the depravity of the 
present age, when he emigrates to the life that 
grows not old, and that he may receive from the 
904B Judge and Saviour of the universe a recompense 
that is equal to the use of things he made while 
here. A pure disposition towards those who have 
caused them suffering is necessary to both of 
these for their own profit, all things considered 
and not least because of the meaning of the 
expressions that remain, which go like this: 'And 
lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from 
evil' (Matt. 6,13). 
In these words, indeed, Scripture makes clear 
that he who does not perfectly pardon transgressors 
and present to God a heart purified from rancour, 
resplendent with the light of reconciliation with 
his neighbour, will fail to obtain the grace of the 
benefits requested in prayer. And he will be 
handed over to temptation and to the Evil One by a 
904C just judgement, so that he may learn to be purified 
from his sins, being rid of his grievances against 
others. Now, temptation moans the 'law of ein', free 
from which the first man came into existence and 
'evil' means the devil, who kneaded this into the 
nature of men and persuaded man by deceit to make the 
desire of his soul pass from what is permitted to 
what is forbidden and to turn to the transgression 
of the divine commandment. The effect of this was 
the putting aside of the incorruptibility that had 
been given through grace. 
Or again, 'temptation' means the voluntary 
consent of the soul to the passion of the flesh; 
'evil' means the mode which consummates in act the 
904D passionate disposition. The just Judge will exempt 
from none of these things the man who does not 
forgive the debtors their debts, even if he should 
simply plead for this by the prayer. But rather, 
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he allows such a man to be stained by the law of sin 
and abandons the one whose will is hard and crude to 
be mastered by the Evil One, because he has preferred 
the passions of dishonour (Cf. Rom. 1,26), of which 
the devil is the sower, to nature, whose creator is 
God. Nay more, he does not prevent him from giving 
905A in voluntarily to the passions of the flesh, nor does 
he ransom him from the way the disposition is 
consummated in an activity in keeping with them. 
That is because thinking. less of nature than of 
groundless passions he disregarded its principle 
in his eagerness for them. If he had been moved in 
harmony with it, he should have known which was the 
law of nature and which that of the passions, whose 
tyranny arises through a voluntary choice, but not 
by nature; then he would have preserved the former 
by means of the natural operations and he would have 
rejected the latter far from his free-will and 
preserved by means of rationality the nature, which 
of itself is pure and stainless, without hatred or 
dissension. Besides, he would have made sure that 
the free-will co-operated with nature, entirely 
unconcerned about anything at all which the principle 
of nature does not bestow. Because of this, he puts 
aside all hatred and every dissension in regard to 
him who is by nature his relative, no that he may be 
heard when he says this prayer, and receive from God 
905B a double instead of a single grace : the foregive- 
ness of sins already committed and from the future 
ones protection and redempttion; also that he may 
not be allowed to enter into temptation nor suffered 
to being enslaved by the Evil One, because of one 
thing only: the prompt remittance of his neigh- 
bour's debts. 
Therefore - to go back a little that I may 
recount briefly the meaning of the words - if we 
really desire to be delivered from the Evil One and 
not to enter into temptation, let us have faith in 
God and forgive our debtors their debts, for He 
905C says: 'If you will not forgive men their sins, 
neither will your heavenly Father forgive you yours' 
(Matt. 6,15). Thus shall we not alone receive 
forgiveness for the sins we have committed, but we 
shall overcome the law of sin, not being left to 
enter into the experience of it. And we shall 
trample on the one who begat this, the evil serpent 
(Cf. Gen. 3,7ff. ) from whom we ask to be delivered 
with Christ, who conquered the world as our leader 
(cf. John 16933)9 arming us with the laws of Hie 
commandments and binding nature to itself through cha- 
x city, by lawfully laying aside the passions. He 
who is the bread of life, wisdom, knowledge and 
justice, moves our appetite insatiably to Himself. 
He constitutes us co-worshippers with the angels 
in fulfilment of the Father's will, manifesting in 
905D a well imitated way, by the conduct of our lives, 
celestial satisfaction. And from there again he is 
a leader upon the ascent of divine realities to the 
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Father of lights (Cf. James 1,17), and makes us 
sharers of the divine nature (Cf. 2 Pet. 1,4) by 
participation in the Spirit through grace; through 
this we are given the statue of sons of God, all 
of us having within us the entire author himself 
of this grace : the Son of the Father by nature, 
without any limitation and in a pure way. From Him, by Him and in Him, we have and shall have being, 
movement and life (Cf. Acts 17,28). 
Let the purpose of the prayer, then, be for us 
908A to look towards this mystery of deification, that we 
may know in place of what the self-emptying of the 
Only-begotten through the flesh has made us the 
kind we are and whence and where he raised up, by 
virtue of His beneficent hand, those who had 
reached the lowest place of the universe, into 
which the weight of sin had thrust us down. Let us 
love all the more Him who has so wisely prepared 
this salvation for us. By what we do, let us show 
the prayer being fulfilled and let us reveal and 
proclaim the God who is truly Father by grace. But, 
let us clearly prove ourselves not to have for the 
father of our lives the Evil One, who always tries 
to rule tyrannically over nature through the 
dishonour of the passions and lot us not unawares 
exchange death for life. For it happens naturally 
that each one should share with his associates his 
908B properties: the one provides eternal life for 
those who love Him; the other gives death to those 
who approach him, prompted by voluntary temptations. 
For there are, according to Scripture, two 
kinds of temptation: the one is pleasurable, the 
other is painful; the one is deliberately chosen, 
the other is unchosen. The former is the begetter 
of sin, into which we were commanded to pray that 
we might not enter, according to the teaching of 
the Lord, who says: 'And lead us not into tempta- 
tion' (Matt. 6,13), and 'Watch and pray that you 
may not enter into temptation' (Matt. 26,41). The 
latter takes vengeance for sin, chastising the sin- loving disposition by the involuntary onset of distress. If one endures this, especially one who 908C is not pinned down by the nails of vice, he will 
hear the great James proclaiming explicitly: 
'Consider it altogether a joy, my brothers, when 
you fall into various temptations, because the 
testing of your faith produces steadfast endurance, 
steadfast endurance produces approved character; 
let approved character bring forth a perfect work' (Cf. Jas. 1,2-4; Ron. 5,4). The Evil One 
maliciously exploits both temptations, the 
voluntary and the involuntary, the former by sowing 
and stimulating the soul with the pleasures of the body, scheming to turn the desire away from divine 
charity; the latter he provokes with sophistry, 
wishing to corrupt nature through pain, in order that he might constrain the soul, downcast through 
the languor that comes from sufferings, to move the 
thoughts to find fault with the Creator. 
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908D But let ua, who are well aware of the designs 
of the Evil One, on the one hand, avert by prayer 
the voluntary temptation, so that we may not set 
aside our longing for the divine charity; on the 
other hand, let us nobly endure the involuntary 
one, when it comes, with the permission of God, so 
that we may show that we have preferred the Creator 
cif nature to nature. May it befall all of us, who 
call on the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, to be 
delivered from the present pleasures of the Evil 
One and to be freed from the future pains by 
really participating in the substance of the good 
things to come (Cf. 2 Cor. 5,7; Heb. 11,1), 
given to us to be seen in Christ himself, our 
Lord, who alone with the Father and the Holy Spirit 
is glorified by all creation. Amen. 
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Some observations on comparing the Three Parte 
(Note that the Arabic numerals used here refer to the 
'seven mysteries' of the 'synoptic view' (viii). The 
Roman numerals refer to the three parts of the Commentary 
of Maximus, described above (i) as 'Part I', 'Part II' 
and 'Part III'0 and shown horizontally in the 'synoptic 
view'. The bracketed lower-case letters refer to the 
five sections of Part II which subsume the 'seven 
mysteries' of the other two parts). 
1. In II Theology and Filiation are dealt with as a unit and 
the treatment of the two is intermingled. There are 
passages that deal with Theology explicitly at the begin- 
ning and under the explanation of 'neither Greek nor Jew' 
In III Theology is not detached from filiation but never- 
theless it is clearly implied. In the schema I have made 
this more explicit, while allowing the 'economic' form of 
the text. 
2. In II and III sonahip by grace is treated in a Trinitarian 
context: Hallowing the Name, ensuring the coming of the 
Kingdom in II; participation in the Spirit, bearing 
about the Son in III. The II treatment is dynamic; III 
brings out the 'sharers of divine nature's underlining the 
ontological basis of the dynamism, but 'nature' itself is 
a dynamic concept, so that the distinction must not be 
overdrawn. II articulates the whole around the foci of 
X6yoc and meekness, X6ToC - rpdxoC by implication, 
where 'meekness' is openness to the personalising action 
of the Holy Spirit. There is also a firm balance in 
holding the Christological and anthropological elements 
in right co-ordination. The adyoc - rpoxoC dyad is 
also at work in 'image' to 'likeness' in II. In III there 
is a very neat formulation of the whole work of economy. 
We are said to be sharers of the divine nature by being 
sharers of the Spirit according to grace: The action of 
the Spirit is seen to be primary here, initiating the 
process of participating in diviie nature and doing this 
according to grace, by pouring aycixn into man and 
personalising him and so enabling him to appropriate the 
dynamism not only of his human nature, but of divine 
nature, knowing and loving God as He knows and loves 
himself. It is a 'sharer' that he is made to be, that is 
a free appropriator which makes him to be a son and go 
'bearing about' the Son and having God for Father. This 
requires 'purification' according to II, purification of 
what is opposed to X6ior. in xievµCa and Gvµ6C 
and what is opposed to tpa& ihr. , the willingness to interlock human freedom with God's or to receive &ydx 
by which we are divinized: rendered capable of being 
sharers of divine nature. r1cpLxoµC ov'teG (111,2) 
is akin to the embodiment of the Word in II(b). 
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3. The Will of God is that we should join the angels in 
worshipping Him. His Will is done when this is achieved 
(III): unity of the intelligibles and the aeneiblee, 
which makes for 'equality with angels' (II) in honour (I). 
X6yoc is seen as the key to this unification by leading 
man back to his Alpha, the A6yoc which ensures a 
proper harmony in man; his vo0c is then in search of 
God his Omega. 
(IIS: In II, we are told that living thus, we receive 
the Word as Bread in proportion to the wisdom and virtue 
we possess, that He is embodied in the saved. This 
describes the effect of A6yoc leading to A6YoG but 
it is linked to the presence of Bread in man. It also 
looks back to the characteristic of sons in 111,2: 
'bearing about the Son'. 
4. The Theme of Bread is very definitely linked to partici- 
pation in divine life in I and a 'share in eternal life' 
in II. This bread which is described as 'of life and 
knowledge' is given to us to vanquish death - the anti- 
thesis of life. The bread is then equated with 'He' who 
gives himself proportionately to the works and worth of 
uoüC. The secondary problem of bread 'for the day' 
is solved by the axiom to: 'eat to live to God'. The 
notion of embodiment from the previous section should not 
be overlooked. Part III speaks of 'bread of life' and 
adds 'wisdom and knowledge' which aligns it with II9 but 
it does not refer directly to participation in life. We 
are told that the Word moves our appetite to Himself. 
The conative side of spiritual life is emphasized. We 
might ask ourselves if knowledge-wisdom and appetite are 
a way of referring to wisdom-virtue or even more basically 
to person-nature where appetite, the organ of dY&'r. i , balances wisdom, one of the comprehensive notions of 
Maximus, which is on the noetie side but would seem to 
bridge the gap between theoria and %pULC if not actually 
between cpýaLc and k6o rao C in 1vtpYe La . We 
would then have aocpCm binding the active and contempla- 
tive aspects of man and d. y(t cH , through appetite, 
ensuring that the unified nature was lifted to the 
personal level. It is the whole man that the Word moves 
to Himself through appetite. We may refer again to the 
embodiment forestalled in II, (b), as it evokes the 
'XcpixoµC4ov'cc of 111,2. Identification with the Word 
is fundamental to this view. Men are sons in the Son and 
this is elaborated in terms of this Bread of life here 
which assimilates them to itself - paradoxically. We 
might notice that it is sharers in 'life' that they 
become. In 111,2 it was in nature; this is dynamic. 
The movement of appetite is 'life', appetite being 
" 'nature' or natures ,, 6pcEK 
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5. Forgiveness is made to be the principle of unification 
for those who share the one nature. (The one Broad 
makes us one body). The term used in I and II in 
'restoration' of nature to itself; in III 'binding' 
nature to itself. The implication is that nature has 
been tern asunder and that it is constitutionally one. 
The principle of fragmentation is yv41T) , by which 
persons fail to accept the exigencies of %6yoc 
CP, {60Cw4: and indulge wayward XtpoMCpeoLC . This 
centrifugal activity has to be replaced by centripetal 
choices which reconstitute riven nature. This binds 
'nature' to itself, restores its fundamental unity. 
Beneath this there appears to be the Nyssene idea of 
concrete universal; persons are participants in human 
nature and nature is restored when they become partici- 
pants in divine nature. Man becomes himself by going 
beyond himself - in ecstasy. II spells out the impli- 
cations of this 'restoration' and 'binding' in terms of 
YvciµT 76yoc cpi5oewc, xpoaCpeotr and vdµoC. 
cpi5ocws. 
6. Again the nullifying of the 'law of sin' is spelt out 
in II with its distinctions re 'temptation' and its use 
of v6µos cpvocwr. and v6 oc 7, a6(Iv as well as 
Yywll7y and cpüßc 
?. In III it is merely a matter of 'trampling' on the Evil 
One. I introduces the notion of 'tyranny' implied in 
the Evil One who is constantly trying to extend his 
negative empire. In II 'evil' is elaborated as 'devil' 
and 'actual consummation of the disposition'. 
The Just Judge is introduced and his handling of those 
who fail to forgive. 
APPENDIX IV 
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rtvcdtc, KCvnatc, ET&e«. 
In this attempt to elaborate the eewpCa gvo. xA 
of Maximus on becoming, movement and repose, we shall 
restrict our reflections to the visible creation. Since 
it is the Origenistic background that dictates, to a 
large extent, Maximus' selection of disputed questions, he 
is primarily concerned with embodied beings. It should bo 
noted, too, that although these considerations are overtly 
cosmological, Maximus is searching all the time for the 
ultimate ontological structure of the creature, its basic 
X, off, so that concepts like 'time' and 'space' are, for 
him, declarations of creaturely insufficiency and no of 
the need of God. The ? dyoi of creation are derived from 
and directed to the eternal Al oC. 
., With this triad YdvcO. LC, xCvrjotr., O-CdOLC 
Maximus proposes an account of the visible world as an 
alternative to the condemned views of the Origeniot©, the 
basis of whose synthesis was expressed in the triad: 
ti aLc. XN-naLC, ýIvcOCC . 
(l) For Origon, the 
phenomenal world was to be understood as in some way 
the expression of a falling away from an original statu of 
spiritual perfection, in which God was the world of spirit, 
so to speak, and in whom dwelt the sum total of other 
spiritual beings. Some of these had fallen away from their 
divine state, evidence of which was their separate existence 
apart from the primordial crda .A mysterious rest- lessness had taken hold of them due it must be, for want of 
anything extrinsic, to xdpoc, (2), to some kind of 
satiety or surfeit, a xCvrio t, c implying a boredom. The 
boredom implied freedom, so that the fall was a decision to 
live apart from, even independent of the Henad, the 
principle of which was God. The Y! YeoLG or coming to 
be of the visible world was then the manifestation of a 
divisive restlessness. The material dimension of man was an 
expression of his bid for independence from the Henad and 
from God. So that, for Origen, movement and the beginning 
of the visible world are symptoms of imperfection and limita- 
tion, an epiphany of an unsatisfactory state of affairs, that 
can only be remedied for man by a return to the immobile 
perfection of his original condition. This does not mean that 
Origen held that the material world was a mere accident of 
the Fall; it was the remedy provided by the goodness of God 
to enable man to find his way back to his secure tenure of 
(1) Vide SHERWOOD, P. The Earlier Amb` of St. t', axirsun the Confessor, pp. 92102. For a conpre E nsTve vow of this theme vide BALTHASAR, H. U. VON, Litur e Conmiauo, 
pp. 89-103. 
(2) Vide SHERWOOD, P. og. cit. pp. 181-204. 
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life and God. The freedom of spiritual beings is at the 
centre of his vision. Creationism seemed to imply an 
unnecessary concern with petty detail; traducianism 
endangered the spiritual transcendence of the soul, oo that 
a theory of pre-existence with emphasis on freedom scorned 
to avoid the limitations of the other two theories and, 
besides, it safe-guarded the justice of God by attributing 
the inequalities of a hierarchy of angels, men and demons 
to the quality of the primal disobedience shown by each 
one. (3) 
It is obvious that, if Maximus proposes a rearrange- 
ment of the terms of the triad, he does so in the porepoe-. 
tives of the ontology and anthropology envisaged by Origon. 
In fact, the origenist monks of Maximus's time had drawn 
bizarre conclusions from their master's principles, so that 
Maximus' construction of an orthodox theory was not merely 
an exercise in idle speculation. It shows also that he was 
not content to formulate a psychology and a spirituality 
out of the context of a complete philosophy of life. He 
never elaborated an ontology, but he gives us brilliant 
sketches of his insights and in this triad we have a funda- 
mental tenet of his doctrine. When he speaks of movement 
or change, xC fl WLt, he is thinking of it primarily in 
an ontological way. It describes the state of the creature 
in contrast to the state of the Creator. xtvxlotC is a 
characteristic of being; it marks being that is limited. 
If being is in movement, then, ý being it cannot be 
thought to be a fullness of being. It is of such a kind 
that it becomes what it was not. The whole fabric of the 
visible world is marked by this movement. Movement reveals 
its status as being. 
There is an existential character about being encoun- tered in this way. It is a realization of the existence of 
concrete things, of their inability to account for the fact 
that they exist. The existence is grasped and affirmed in 
judgement; judgement is suffused with wonder, the 7, dooC 
of the philosopher (4). The existing thing reveals itself 
as something that participates in being. It is not so much 
a case of kinds of things, to which existence is applied, so to speak, a predominantly essential approach to the mystery 
of things, as that the essence of things is a way of sharing 
in existence, so that existence, even if it can only be 
grasped conceptually in an oblique way, not being an 
essence, is seen to be that which projects essences into the 
realm of actuality or, more exactly, that in which things, 
that are, actually participate. It is why there is more 
mystery in the hazel nut in the hand of a mystic than in all idealist metaphysics put together. It is the intuitive 
grasp of the gratuitousness of the existence of the least 
thing, together with the realization that no definable 
created thing can exhaust the possibilities of existence as 
such, that projects the mind beyond the thing and demands a 
(3) Vide ORIGEN. De Principiis, 1.1,3; 2. or. CHADWICK, H. 'Philo andthe Beginnings of Christian Thought' 
. The Cambrid e History of hater Greek & Early Medieval 
Philosoph h ed. Armstrong, AH. ) CambriigeUniversit 
ress, , pp. 190-192. y 
(4) PLATO. Theaetetus, 155d. 
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limitless Existence to account for the partial oxiotoncoo, 
the sun total of which makes up the visible world. 
Movement is a symptom of the restricted charactor of 
everything that falls within our experience; it is an 
existential admission that the order, in which movement 
takes place, cannot be the ultimate order of things, 
simply because the fact of the movement reveals the 
inability of the moving thing to be absolutely. Since 
essence here is thought of as limited capacity for oxist- 
ence, the being to which participant being pointo must be 
without essence in this sense. In the realm of movement 
we catch the implication of the Unmoved; we apprehend 
transcendent being in the 'cosmological relation'. 
If the being of man's experience is of such a kind, 
it had to come to be. KCviIotC demands YevcotC 
It is a self-disclosure of the dependent nature of the 
created realm, because coming to be in this way cannot be 
anything else than creation, a production from nothing. 
There can be no question of emanation or any kind of 
distribution of the Being that is apprehended as demanded 
by being-in-motion. It is simply, and as such must be in 
itself substantially incommunicable fullness of being. 
Because it it is above movement, it cannot become from an 
essential point of view. If other being appears, than it 
must have been created: r veat, c accounts for xtvtiatr.. 
'The principle of all natural movement is the 
genesis of the beings set into motion; and the 
principle of the genesis of the beings set into 
motion is God as Creator ( yevcaLovpy6 ). (5) 
There can be no question of the created being exist- 
ing in the way the uncreated Being exists: the total, 
simultaneous, perfect possession of life. (6) And because 
there is no potentiality, there is no emerging into being, 
so that the mode of being must be totally self-possessed 
always, where the 'always' does not imply any kind of 
temporal succession. 'Who does not know that in every 
being .... the first thing to be known is the Where, to 
which is always attached the knowledge of the When? ' M ) 
In fact time is the mode of the duration of dbpendent 
being; it is the measure of being that is xCv1otr. 
being, that is incapable of total simultaneous and perfect 
self-possession, simply because it is not absolutely. It 
is a blend of being and not-being. In contrast to 
necessary being which is the unbounded exercise of exist- 
ence, contingent being must begin as timebound. Genesis 
is the beginning of contingent being in time. Even if it 
(5) Ambig. PG 91, 1217C. 
(6) Ambig. PG 91, 1217C. 
(7) Qu. Thai. PG 90,757D. 
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always existed, it would have always existed as contingent 
and so would have been measured by time with regard to its 
duration. Time is one dimension of contingent being, a 
reference to its duration which, on the one hand, rovoalo 
the presence of being, and, on the other hand, in a doclara- 
tion that this being is not absolute, is not the unqualified 
subsisting being which is entirely accountable for itsolf, 
unlimited in every way, including the mode of ito duration. 
Just as contingent being must have a duration in keeping 
with its ontic structure, so it must be somewhere. Ito 
falling short of being absolute is revealed as being 
located. 'Where' is again an ambivalent category: it is 
an explicit declaration of the presence of something in 
existence, but, at the same time, its being bounded is an 
admission of the limits of what is there, another symptom 
of its contingency, its finitude, its dependence. Place 
and time are the sine ýuýa. non of the being that we r©cog- 
nize as not being a solu e. 
'The immobile state is the aim of the natural move- 
ment of created beings; this state comes from the 
Infinitude ( aacc Lp ta) when one goos beyond all that 
is finite: in it, for absence of space, all movements of 
the beings set naturally into motion cease. (8). For Maxinuss, 
the movement that is at the heart of created being will be 
stilled. He finds the oti6o. C which was the first 
moment in the triad of Origen to be, in fact, the destiny 
of the creature, its final end. Where Origen leaves off 
his contemplation of the process of creaturehood with 
yevcats , and supplements it with 
the idea of the 
return, Maximus sees the outcome of xCu-QoLC in 
ßtiäaýý By saying that: 'the immobile state is tho 
aim of the natural movement of created beings', he is 
affirming that the destiny of the creature is beyond the 
creaturely state. There cannot be an ontological transfor- 
mation of the creature in the sense that it is no longer a 
creature. Maximus suggests that the creature is introduced 
into a state that is, in some way, beyond all that is 
finite. While remaining a creature it is granted a way of 
being a mode of existence, of moving, of living, that s 
beyond it. This stabilizes the constant possibility of 
slipping back into non-being or, in the case of creatures 
endowed with intellect and will, of aspiring to an autonomy 
that is ontologically impossible. - Man, through hypostatic 
innovation, can go beyond the limitations of a world bounded 
by time and space. 
'God is the principle (äpXA) and the end (' XoC) 
of all genesis and of all movement of beings; from Him 
they come, towards Him they move and in Him they shall find 
immobility'. (9) Maximus does not here provide a concept to 
link 'principle' to 'end'. It is implied in the very terms 
themselves because they indicate God from two points of viow. 
(8) Ami. PG 91,1217C. 
(9) Ambig. PG 91,1217D. For the triad vido Ambig. 
PG 91,1184D-1185A; ibid. 1217D. 
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God cannot avoid being the 'r6Xoc of the activity of 
which He is the äpxA . Otherwise He would be subject to some other end and so to some other being. He simply 
is the End and so must be the end to whatever He croatoo. 
To endow beings with being and to call them to share in 
existence and, in the case of man to call him beyond his 
state and habitat to enter ä1cc LpCa , 
(10) is a giving 
by God. The creature is the object of His benevolence, 
the beneficiary of His goodness. Thrown into existence, 
the creature . is called to God. God cannot avoid that act 
of calling, but it is a call to share in something for 
which beings compoinded of being and nothingness have, of 
themselves, no capacity and to which they have no right, 
because of the nothingness from which they came. T-tda<< 
is achieved by man when he attains to God an TtXoc. 
That he remains a creature and at the same time that he 
truly enters into äxc t. p Cc is suggested by Maximus in 
the notion &e txr. vrlßýta . 
(ll) The creaturohood 
requires xCvTlaLc ; the ¶6%O present to him 
in ac ap Cap changes time into a state of &c C. 
The attainment of äxst, pCa is the fulfilment of the 
creature. Eternity is the mode of the duration of God. 
No creature, because of its creaturely constitution, can 
enter into a mode of duration that is described as 
'eternity' in the strict sense. That is proper to God, 
so that Maximus, in his Contemplatio in Moysen t Elias, 
is describing the endless duration granted to-crem, 
when he says that 'eternity is time deprived of movement, 
time is eternity measured by movement'. (l2) Eternity 
cannot be measured by a temporal canon; even if 'time' 
is deprived of movement, the new condition of duration 
cannot be 'eternity' as it is in God. The immobility 
proper to God is in a different order from the immobility 
won by the creature in aTdaLc . Divine immobility is the prerogative of the One who possesses in total 
simultaneity the perfection of Being. The a. ZdoLC 
if the creature is the definitive stabilization of being 
that is mutable in essence through hypostatic relationship 
to the Eternal God. Maximus sees this realized in the 
mystery of the Incarnation. Referring to Moses, he says: 
'Zjooüv ydp Exc L ¶6 wav't6 Sv'ta xaC xpdvov xat atwuoC 
6LäboXov. 
'The Creator and the creature are not the same, 
thing'. (13) 'God is one, without beginning, incompre- 
hensible, having in His totality the entire power to be, 
excluding altogether the notion of time and mode, in that 
He is inaccessible to all and is unknowable through any 
being in a natural way'. (14) 'Mode' is here a comprehen- 
sive term that excludes from God any kind of limit with 
10) Ambig. PG 91,1220C. (11) Ambig. PG 9l, 1245B. 
(12) Ambig. PG 91,11646. (13) Ambig. PG 91,1221A. 
(14) Cap. Theol., 1,1. PG 90,1084A. 
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regard to His being and existence. It is exemplified in 
'time'. But it extends to every conceivable way of 
thinking about God that would imply that He was defined 
in any way. When Maximus ascribes to God the entire 
power to be', he is referring to His existence. The 
kind of existence of which man is aware within the 
horizon of his normal experience characterizes a compound 
of being and non-being. 'Every creature is a composite 
of substance and accident and always in need of Divine 
Providence, as it is not free from mutability'. (15 ) 
Tpö%oL is a form of xCvqot, t 
While Maximus is here dealing with the essential aspects 
of created being rather than their existence, the 
essential tip6loL is a symptom of the kind of 'power 
to be' possessed and exercised by creatures. The whole 
fabric of creation is of such a kind. It is testimony 
to the reality of existence and yet it demands the 
perfection of existence in order to account for itself. 
The recognition in the 'hazel-nut' (16) of the need of 
an existence beyond its own, to account for it, is not 
divorced from an intuition here and now into its onto- 
logical structure, that it is a complex of being and non- 
being. The cogency of the insight depends to a large 
extent on the ontological principle that contingent 
being demands necessary being which is revealed in the 
contemplation of xCVIiOIC . Neither the principle 
on its own, nor any logical orchestration based on the 
principle, could point conclusively to the fact of God. 
What seems to be an unauthorized leap from a realm of 
discourse, becomes acceptable when we keep in mind that 
the principle is used as an interpretation of this 
concrete thing here and now. The apprehension of the 
existent and the recognition of its exemplifying the 
principle coincide. The fact is self-evident at one 
level; the principle is self-evident at another. Their 
coincidence is the ground for secure extrapolation. It 
is obvious that what is obvious is not able to account 
for itself. The 'hazel-nut' demands a self-accounting 
Being to account for its being there. 
'On reflecting on the divine, universal infinity - 
that inaccessible, much desired abyss - the mind marvels; 
then it is astounded at how He has brought beings into 
existence from nothing'. (17) 'Some say that created 
things eternally existed with God, which is impossible. 
For how can things that are limited in every way 
eternally coexist with the absolutely infinite? Or how 
(15) Carit. 4,9. PG 90,1084A (Sherwood). 
(16) Cf. JULIAN OF NORWICH. Showings 5. (The 
Classics of Western Spiri uali y5 New York 
Paulist Press, 1978, translated by Colledge 
E. & Walsh, J. pp. 183-184. 
(17) Carit. 4,1. PG 90,1048B (Sherwood). 
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are they properly creatures if they are coeternal with 
the Creator? But such is the theory of the Greeks who 
make God out as Creator not at all of the substance of 
things, but only of their qualities. We, who know the 
all-powerful God, say that He is Creator not of the 
qualities but of the qualified substances. And if 
this is so, created things do not eternally coexist 
with God'. (18) In contrast to God 'the substance of 
things, however, has 'not-being' as contrary'. (19) Wo 
can agree with Meyendorff when he says that: 'the 
absolute transcendence of the divine being, and the 
full reality of creation in time are solidly established' (20) But it must be observed that it is not so obvious 
what 'in time' means. It certainly means that time in 
the measure of the duration of creatures; but it in not 
entirely obvious that creatures could not always have 
been, in dependence. Then Meyendorff finds that his 
conclusion is evidence that '0rigenism is outstripped'. 
Much of the Origens' effort was to establish the divine 
transcendence, especially as seen from the point of 
view of God's justice and goodness. Nor did he hold 
that souls were not created or were eternal. Where 
Maximus scores is in insisting implicitly on the sub- 
stantial unity of man, and so on his being created as 
a unit. (21) Nor can there be any necessary denigration 
of matter in this view of creation. He also avoids the 
hazard of tampering with the transcendent being of God 
by ideas of the Henad. The Henad-thesis did not 
eliminate the creation of spiritual beings but it 
obscured their relation to God. From the point of 
view of creation, there was no reason why God might 
not have created spirits who would eventually become 
incarnate. At least this was not incompatible with a 
Greek view of the hylomorphic constitution of man. It 
would not satisfy the Semitic sense of the wholeness of 
man. But Meyendorff is right to emphasise that the 
transcendence of God is enhanced in Maximus's view, 
where there can not be the slightest temptation to 
associate creatures with God in any way that would 
invade the divine otherness. 
This triad is in contrast to the Plotinian and 
Procline triad: µovrj - 'pdöoc - IxcoTpo94 (22) 
and it is corroborated by the other Naximian triad: 
dc Cm - övva LL, - 
Ivepys m. 
(18) Ibid. 4,6. PG 90,1049A (Sherwood). 
(19) Ibid. 3,28. PG 90,1025BC (Sherwood). 
(20) NEYENDORFF, J. Christ in Eastern Chrißtian 
Thought, p. 133. 
(21) SHERWOOD, P. St. Maximus the Confessor, The 
Ascetic Life, Wie Fou enTuries on a rijy 
p. 1. 
(22) Vide SHELDON WILLIAMS, I. P. 'St. Maximus the 
Conf`essor'. The Cambridge Histo of La tr 
Greek and EarI'"1ie eva osop Pý 
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In the Maximian view, movement is not so much a descent 
and return as the transition from being to its fulfil- 
ment. For Maximus, we can say that movement is the 
process of the being's becoming what it is. We have 
suggested that movement, in some sense, will always be 
basic to creaturely being, even when it is caught into 
Infinitude and thus stabilized. In man it is a way of 
saying that he will always live, but in such a way that 
there will be no possibility of his not living as 
befits his being; his movement will be true movement, 
his life true life. This will be so because he will 
have been lifted out of himself and stabilized in 
relation to God through his hypostasis. His µov1j 
will be the outcome of xCvIoLC . The dynamic 
and creative character of the xp6o6oC is 
better suggested in the yevsaLC . The C7C LOTpocprj is x iv oic. Sheldon William says simply 
that in Maximus "Motion is no longer descent and 
return". (23) This is particularly true if we wish to 
exclude the idea of movement as 'the nostalgia for an 
original perfection to be found again' (24) and see 
Maximus substituting for it a notion of movement that 
is 'a tension towards God as end and stable repose of 
the whole creation'. (25) If, with that proviso, we 
still think of creatures coming from God and returning 
to Him, as we can, then, the point of return is 
hypostatic freedom by which nature is innovated. It is 
in this way that the whole of creation, for Maximus, is 
eventually anchored in God. 
(23) Ibid., p. 23. 
(24) Vide RIOU, A. Le monde et 1'Egliee selon 
Maxime le Confesseur, p. 71. 
(25) Iý. 
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